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  1. Samuel Alexander (2013). An Axiomatic Version of Fitch's Paradox. Synthese 190 (12):2015-2020.
    A variation of Fitch’s paradox is given, where no special rules of inference are assumed, only axioms. These axioms follow from the familiar assumptions which involve rules of inference. We show (by constructing a model) that by allowing that possibly the knower doesn’t know his own soundness (while still requiring he be sound), Fitch’s paradox is avoided. Provided one is willing to admit that sound knowers may be ignorant of their own soundness, this might offer a way out of the (...)
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  2. Rodrigo Borges (2015). On Synchronic Dogmatism. Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693.
    Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.
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  3. Jochen Briesen (2010). Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):221-234.
    Anthony Brueckner argues for a strong connection between the closure and the underdetermination argument for scepticism. Moreover, he claims that both arguments rest on infallibilism: In order to motivate the premises of the arguments, the sceptic has to refer to an infallibility principle. If this were true, fallibilists would be right in not taking the problems posed by these sceptical arguments seriously. As many epistemologists are sympathetic to fallibilism, this would be a very interesting result. However, in this paper I (...)
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  4. Jessica Brown (2013). Impurism, Practical Reasoning, and the Threshold Problem. Noûs 47 (1):179-192.
    I consider but reject one broad strategy for answering the threshold problem for fallibilist accounts of knowledge, namely what fixes the degree of probability required for one to know? According to the impurist strategy to be considered, the required degree of probability is fixed by one's practical reasoning situation. I distinguish two different ways to implement the suggested impurist strategy. According to the Relevance Approach, the threshold for a subject to know a proposition at a time is determined by the (...)
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  5. Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2012). A Tale of Two Fallibilists: On an Argument for Infallibilism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):195-199.
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  6. Gregor Damschen (2010). Are There Ultimately Founded Propositions? Universitas Philosophica 54 (54):163-177.
    Can we find propositions that cannot rationally be denied in any possible world without assuming the existence of that same proposition, and so involving ourselves in a contradiction? In other words, can we find transworld propositions needing no further foundation or justification? Basically, three differing positions can be imagined: firstly, a relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are impossible; secondly, a meta-relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are possible but unnecessary; and thirdly, an absolute position, according (...)
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  7. Dylan Dodd (2011). Against Fallibilism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.
    In this paper I argue for a doctrine I call ?infallibilism?, which I stipulate to mean that If S knows that p, then the epistemic probability of p for S is 1. Some fallibilists will claim that this doctrine should be rejected because it leads to scepticism. Though it's not obvious that infallibilism does lead to scepticism, I argue that we should be willing to accept it even if it does. Infallibilism should be preferred because it has greater explanatory power (...)
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  8. Julien Dutant (2007). The Case for Infallibilism. In C. Penco, M. Vignolo, V. Ottonelli & C. Amoretti (eds.), Proceedings of the 4th Latin Meeting in Analytic Philosophy. Genoa: University of Genoa 59-84.
    Infallibilism is the claim that knowledge requires that one satisfies some infallibility condition. I spell out three distinct such conditions: epistemic, evidential and modal infallibility. Epistemic infallibility turns out to be simply a consequence of epistemic closure, and is not infallibilist in any relevant sense. Evidential infallibilism i s unwarranted but it is not an satisfactory characterization of the infallibilist intuition. Modal infallibility, by contrast, captures the core infallibilist intuition, and I argue that it is required to solve the Gettier (...)
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  9. J. L. Evans (1978). Knowledge And Infallibility. St Martin's Press.
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  10. Azam Golam (2006). Some Reflections on Gettier's Problem. The Dhaka University Studies,June 2006 (1):83-97.
  11. John Hawthorne (2012). Knowledge and Epistemic Necessity. Philosophical Studies 158 (3):493-501.
    Claims of the form 'I know P and it might be that not-P' tend to sound odd. One natural explanation of this oddity is that the conjuncts are semantically incompatible: in its core epistemic use, 'Might P' is true in a speaker's mouth only if the speaker does not know that not-P. In this paper I defend this view against an alternative proposal that has been advocated by Trent Dougherty and Patrick Rysiew and elaborated upon in Jeremy Fantl and Matthew (...)
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  12. Wesley H. Holliday (2015). Fallibilism and Multiple Paths to Knowledge. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:97-144.
    This chapter argues that epistemologists should replace a “standard alternatives” picture of knowledge, assumed by many fallibilist theories of knowledge, with a new “multipath” picture of knowledge. The chapter first identifies a problem for the standard picture: fallibilists working with this picture cannot maintain even the most uncontroversial epistemic closure principles without making extreme assumptions about the ability of humans to know empirical truths without empirical investigation. The chapter then shows how the multipath picture, motivated by independent arguments, saves fallibilism (...)
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  13. Daniel Howard-Snyder (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
    Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can (...)
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  14. Christos Kyriacou (forthcoming). Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism: Between Gettier Cases and Saving Epistemic Appearances. Journal of Philosophical Research.
    I present an argument for a sophisticated version of sceptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem, address the dogmatism paradox and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of ‘saving epistemic appearances’. A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce (e.g. account for concessive knowledge attributions). BSI can (...)
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  15. Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Concessive Knowledge Attributions and Fallibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):603-619.
    Lewis thought concessive knowledge attributions (e.g., ‘I know that Harry is a zebra, but it might be that he’s just a cleverly disguised mule’) caused serious trouble for fallibilists. As he saw it, CKAs are overt statements of the fallibilist view and they are contradictory. Dougherty and Rysiew have argued that CKAs are pragmatically defective rather than semantically defective. Stanley thinks that their pragmatic response to Lewis fails, but the fallibilist cause is not lost because Lewis was wrong about the (...)
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  16. John Mcdowell (2004). Reply to Åsa Wikforss. Theoria 70 (2-3):294-297.
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  17. Jeremy Fantl Æ Matthew McGrath, Advice for Fallibilists: Put Knowledge to Work.
    Abstract We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is ‘‘mad,’’ that it licenses absurd claims such as (...)
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  18. Masaharu Mizumoto (2011). It’s Not so Easy to Be a Fallibilist. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 19:1-25.
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  19. Masaharu Mizumoto (2011). It’s Not so Easy to Be a Fallibilist. Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 19:1-25.
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  20. Carolyn R. Morillo (1984). Epistemic Luck, Naturalistic Epistemology and the Ecology of Knowledge or What the Frog Should Have Told Dretske. Philosophical Studies 46 (1):109-129.
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  21. T. Parent, Infallibilism About Self-Knowledge II: Lagadonian Judging.
    This draft now appears (in revised form) as Chapter 7 of _Self-Reflection for the Opaque Mind_. See http://philpapers.org/rec/PARSFT-3.
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  22. T. Parent (2016). The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.
    Philosophers and psychologists generally hold that, in light of the empirical data, a subject lacks infallible access to her own mental states. However, while subjects certainly are fallible in some ways, I show that the data fails to discredit that a subject has infallible access to her own occurrent thoughts and judgments. This is argued, first, by revisiting the empirical studies, and carefully scrutinizing what is shown exactly. Second, I argue that if the data were interpreted to rule out all (...)
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  23. T. Parent (2013). Infallibility Naturalized: Reply to Hoffmann. Dialectica 67 (3):353-358.
    The present piece is a reply to G. Hoffmann on my infallibilist view of self-knowledge. Contra Hoffmann, it is argued that the view does not preclude a Quinean epistemology, wherein every belief is subject to empirical revision.
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  24. Boris Rähme (2007). Fallibilism, Factivity and Epistemically Truth-Guaranteeing Justification. In Nils Gilje & Harald Grimen (eds.), Discursive Modernity. Universitetsforlaget
    This paper explores the question of how the epistemological thesis of fallibilism should best be formulated. Sections 1 to 3 critically discuss some influential formulations of fallibilism. In section 4 I suggest a formulation of fallibilism in terms of the unavailability of epistemically truth-guaranteeing justification. In section 5 I discuss the claim that unrestricted fallibilism engenders paradox and argue that this claim is unwarranted.
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  25. Sven Rosenkranz (2015). Fallibility and Trust. Noûs 49 (3):616-641.
    I argue that while admission of one's own fallibility rationally requires one's readiness to stand corrected in the light of future evidence, it need have no consequences for one's present degrees of belief. In particular, I argue that one's fallibility in a given area gives one no reason to forego assigning credence 1 to propositions belonging to that area. I can thus be seen to take issue with David Christensen's recent claim that our fallibility has far-reaching consequences for our account (...)
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  26. Jason Stanley (2008). Knowledge and Certainty. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.
    This paper is a companion piece to my earlier paper “Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions”. There are two intuitive charges against fallibilism. One is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, though it might be that he is not a Republican”. The second is that it countenances the truth (and presumably acceptability) of utterances of sentences such as “I know that Bush is a Republican, even though (...)
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  27. Dennis Whitcomb (2013). One Wage of Unknowability. Synthese 190 (3):339-352.
    Suppose for reductio that I know a proposition of the form p and I don’t know p . Then by the factivity of knowledge and the distribution of knowledge over conjunction, I both know and do not know p ; which is impossible. Propositions of the form p and I don’t know p are therefore unknowable. Their particular kind of unknowability has been widely discussed and applied to such issues as the realism debate. It hasn’t been much applied to theories (...)
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  28. Ru Ye (2015). Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.
    ABSTRACTAccording to the Dogmatism Puzzle presented by Gilbert Harman, knowledge induces dogmatism because, if one knows that p, one knows that any evidence against p is misleading and therefore one can ignore it when gaining the evidence in the future. I try to offer a new solution to the puzzle by explaining why the principle is false that evidence known to be misleading can be ignored. I argue that knowing that some evidence is misleading doesn't always damage the credential of (...)
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