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  1. Sean Allen-Hermanson (forthcoming). Introspection, Anton's Syndrome, and Human Echolocation. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Philosophers have recently argued that since there are people who are blind, but don’t know it, and people who echolocate, but don’t know it, conscious introspection is highly unreliable. I contend that a second look at Anton’s syndrome, human echolocation, and “facial vision” suggests otherwise. These examples do not support skepticism about the reliability of introspection.
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  2. David M. Armstrong (1976). Incorrigibility, Materialism, and Causation. Philosophical Studies 30 (August):125-28.
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  3. David M. Armstrong (1963). Is Introspective Knowledge Incorrigible? Philosophical Review 62 (4):417-32.
  4. John E. Atwell (1966). Austin on Incorrigibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 27 (December):261-266.
  5. Robert N. Audi (1974). The Limits of Self-Knowledge. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (December):253-267.
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  6. George Bailey (1979). Pappas, Incorrigibility, and Science. Philosophical Studies 35 (April):319-321.
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  7. Lewis White Beck (1948). Self-Justification in Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy 45 (10):253-260.
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  8. Bernard Berofsky (1958). Minkus-Benes on Incorrigibility. Mind 67 (April):264-266.
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  9. Anthony Brueckner (2005). Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self-Knowledge. Veritas: Revista de Filosofia da PUCRS 50 (4):53-64.
    Há um argumento cético clássico derivado das Meditações sobre a filosofia primeira. Este artigo oferece uma formulação contemporânea padrão do argumento, pretendendo mostrar que ninguém sabe qualquer coisa sobre o mundo extramental. A obra de Hilary Putnam na filosofia da linguagem e da mente parece fornecer uma resposta a uma versão atualizada do argumento cético cartesiano. Em sua maior parte, este artigo é dedicado a uma análise e crítica das meditações anti-céticas de Putnam. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Descartes. Putnam. Ceticismo. Cérebros em (...)
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  10. David Charles Bryant (1974). Pain, Incorrigibility, and Self-Intimation. Dissertation, University of Michigan
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  11. Peter Carruthers, Cartesian Epistemology.
    This paper argues that a Cartesian belief in the self-transparency of minds might actually be an innate aspect of our mind-reading faculty. But it acknowledges that some crucial evidence needed to establish this claim hasn’t been looked for or collected. What we require is evidence that a belief in the self-transparency of mind is universal to the human species. The paper closes with a call to anthropologists (and perhaps also developmental psychologists), who are in a position to collect such evidence, (...)
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  12. John H. Chandler (1970). Incorrigibity and Classification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (May):101-6.
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  13. G. K. Chesterton (1991). The Infallible State. The Chesterton Review 17 (2):157-159.
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  14. Annalisa Coliva (2006). Error Through Misidentification: Some Varieties. Journal of Philosophy 103 (8):407-425.
  15. Claudio F. Costa (2001). I'm Thinking. Ratio 14 (3):222-233.
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  16. Francis W. Dauer (1981). Incorrigibility. Ratio 23 (December):98-113.
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  17. Gerald Doppelt (1978). Incorrigibility and the Mental. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (May):3-20.
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  18. Gerald Doppelt (1978). Incorrigibility and the Mental. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):3-20.
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  19. Charles E. M. Dunlop (1977). Lehrer and Ellis on Incorrigibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (December):201-5.
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  20. Paul Egré (2008). Reliability, Margin for Error, and Self-Knowledge. In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave Macmillan 215--250.
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  21. Brian Ellis (1976). Avowals Are More Corrigible Than You Think. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (August):201-5.
  22. J. L. Evans (1978/1979). Knowledge And Infallibility. St Martin's Press.
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  23. John Exdell & James Hamilton (1975). The Incorrigibility of First Person Disavowals. Personalist 56 (4):389-394.
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  24. Fred Feldman & Herbert Heidelberger (1973). Tormey on Access and Incorrigibility. Journal of Philosophy 70 (May):297-298.
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  25. Brice N. Fleming (1965). Price on Infallibility. Mind 75 (April):193-210.
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  26. James Ford (1974). Richard Robinson on Incorrigibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):199 - 200.
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  27. Danny Frederick (2012). Critique of an Argument for the Reality of Purpose. Prolegomena 11 (1):25-34.
    Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept of purpose is not theoretical. He argues that the concept is known directly to be instantiated, through self-awareness; and that to maintain that the concept is theoretical involves an infinite regress. I show that Schueler’s argument fails because all our concepts are theoretical in the sense that we may be mistaken in applying them to our experience. As a consequence, it is conceivable that (...)
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  28. Erik Gotlind (1952). Some Comments on Mistakes in Statements Concerning Sense-Data. Mind 61 (July):297-306.
  29. Nikola Z. Grahek (1992). Knowledge, Certainty and Incorrigibility. Theoria 35 (3):45-52.
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  30. Garth Green (2010). The Aporia of Inner Sense: The Self-Knowledge of Reason and the Critique of Metaphysics in Kant. Brill.
    This work identifies Kant’s doctrine of inner sense as a central element within the ‘architectonic of pure reason’ of the first Critique, exposes its variant construals, and considers the implications of its problematicity for Kant’s theoretical philosophy most generally.
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  31. Osborne Harvey Green (1966). Criteria, Incorrigibility, and Feelings. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
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  32. Patrick Greenough (2012). Discrimination and Self-Knowledge. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
    In this paper I show that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, I offer a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but (...)
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  33. Steven D. Hales (1994). Certainty and Phenomenal States. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (1):57-72.
    If we agree, along with Arnauld, Berkeley, Descartes, Hume, Leibniz, and others that our occurrent phenomenal states serve as sources of epistemic certainty for us, we need some explanation of this fact. Many contemporary writers, most notably Roderick Chisholm, maintain that there is something special about the phenomenal states themselves that allows our certain knowledge of them. I argue that Chisholm's view is both wrong and irreparable, and that the capacity of humans to know these states with certainty has to (...)
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  34. Bengt Hansson (2006). Infallibility and Incorrigibility. In Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 65.
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  35. Jonathan Harrison (1984). The Incorrigibility of the Cogito. Mind 93 (July):321-335.
  36. Thomas De Riemer Hawley (1896). Infallible Logic.
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  37. Glen Hoffmann (2012). Infallible A Priori Self-Justifying Propositions. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):55-68.
    On rationalist infallibilism, a wide range of both (i) analytic and (ii) synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified, i.e., justified in a way that is truth-entailing. In this paper, I examine the second thesis of rationalist infallibilism, what might be called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. Exploring the seemingly only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of so-called self-justifying propositions.
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  38. Keith Hossack (2002). Self-Knowledge and Consciousness. Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 102 (2):168-181.
    The Identity Thesis, proposed by Reid for the case of sensations, and extended by Brentano to conscious states generally, says that a state is conscious iff it is identical with introspective knowledge of its own instantiation. The Thesis offers simple explanations of a number of puzzling features of introspective self-knowledge, and unites the problems of introspection, consciousness and knowledge in the single problem of the metaphysical nature of conscious states. It does nothing to solve the latter problem, but it does (...)
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  39. Robert A. Imlay (1969). Immediate Awareness. Dialogue 8 (September):228-42.
  40. Frank Jackson (1973). Is There a Good Argument Against the Incorrigibility Thesis? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (May):51-62.
    "the incorrigibility thesis", The thesis that it is logically impossible to be mistaken about such things as whether I am now in pain or am seeing or seeming to see something red, Is very widely supposed to be false. I consider the arguments designed to show this, And argue that they all fail.
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  41. Frank Jackson (1967). A Note on Incorrigibility and Authority. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 45 (December):358-363.
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  42. Rockney Jacobsen (1997). Self-Quotation and Self-Knowledge. Synthese 110 (3):419-445.
    I argue that indirect quotation in the first person simple present tense (self-quotation) provides a class of infallible assertions. The defense of this conclusion examines the joint descriptive and constitutive functions of performative utterances and argues that a parallel treatment of belief ascription is in order. The parallel account yields a class of infallible belief ascriptions that makes no appeal to privileged modes of access. Confronting a dilemma formulated by Crispin Wright for theories of self-knowledge gives an epistemological setting for (...)
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  43. Christoph Jäger (1999). Selbstreferenz und Selbstbewusstsein (Self-Reference and Self-Knowledge). Mentis.
  44. Rasmus Thybo Jensen (2013). Merleau-Ponty and McDowell on the Transparency of the Mind. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):470-492.
    McDowell and Merleau-Ponty share a critical attitude towards a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. According to the picture in question nothing which properly belongs to subjectivity can be hidden to the subject herself. Nevertheless there is a striking asymmetry in how the two philosophers portray the problematic consequences of such a picture. They can seem to offer exact opposite views of these consequences, which, given the almost identical characterization of the transparency claim, is puzzling. I argue that a closer (...)
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  45. Sidney D. Johnson (1970). Statements and Incorrigibility. Mind 79 (October):600-601.
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  46. William Kane (1961). Self-Knowledge: True and False. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 35:187-197.
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  47. Frederik Kaufman (1990). Conceptual Necessity, Causality and Self-Ascriptions of Sensation. International Studies in Philosophy 22 (3):3-11.
  48. Geert Keil (2011). Ich bin jetzt hier - aber wo ist das? In Siri Granum Carson, Jonathan Knowles & Bjørn K. Myskja (eds.), Kant: Here, Now, and How. Mentis 15-34.
  49. Geert Keil (2000). Indexikalität und Infallibilität. In Audun Ofsti, Peter Ulrich & Truls Wyller (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism: The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Mentis
    Some, if not all statements containing the word 'I' seem to be 'immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun' (Shoemaker). This immunity, however, is due to the fact that the pronoun 'I' plays no identifying role in the first place. Since no identification takes place here, the alleged immunity to misidentification should come as no surprise. But there is a second immunity thesis, which captures the peculiarity of 'I' better: The first-person pronoun is immune to reference-failure. Some (...)
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  50. John Kekes (1983). An Argument Against Foundationalism. Philosophia 12 (March):273-281.
    This paper argues against foundationalism not on the familiar ground that a person may be mistaken about the object of any of his cognitive states, But on the new ground that a person may be mistaken in identifying any mental states as cognitive. The argument is claimed to hold against all version of foundationalism.
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