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  1. Juan José Acero (1998). Non-Conceptual Content, Subject-Centered Information and the Naturalistic Demand. Philosophical Issues 9:359-367.
  2. Frederick R. Adams (2003). The Informational Turn in Philosophy. Minds and Machines 13 (4):471-501.
    This paper traces the application of information theory to philosophical problems of mind and meaning from the earliest days of the creation of the mathematical theory of communication. The use of information theory to understand purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition, and more marked the beginning of the naturalization of mind and meaning. From the inception of information theory, Wiener, Turing, and others began trying to show how to make a mind from informational and computational materials. Over the last 50 years, (...)
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  3. Kathleen Akins (1996). Of Sensory Systems and the "Aboutness" of Mental States. Journal of Philosophy 93 (7):337--372.
    La autora presenta una critica a la concepcion clasica de los sentidos asumida por la mayoria de autores naturalistas que pretenden explicar el contenido mental. Esta crítica se basa en datos neurobiologicos sobre los sentidos que apuntan a que estos no parecen describir caracteristicas objetivas del mundo, sino que actuan de forma ʼnarcisita', es decir, representan informacion en funcion de los intereses concretos del organismo.El articulo se encuentra también en: Bechtel, et al., Philosophy and the Neuroscience.
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  4. Murat Aydede (1997). Pure Informational Semantics and the Narrow/Broad Dichotomy. In Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics. Maribor. 157.
    The influence of historical-causal theories of reference developed in the late sixties and early seventies by Donnellan, Kripke, Putnam and Devitt has been so strong that any semantic theory that has the consequence of assigning disjunctive representational content to the mental states of twins (e.g. [H2O or XYZ]) has been thereby taken to refute itself. Similarly, despite the strength of pre-theoretical intuitions that exact physical replicas like Davidson's Swampman have representational mental states, people have routinely denied that they have any (...)
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  5. Jon Barwise (1987). Unburdening the Language of Thought. Mind and Language 2 (1):82-96.
  6. Jon Barwise (1986). Information and Circumstance. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (July):324-338.
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  7. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Mit Press.
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  8. Jonathan Birch (forthcoming). Propositional Content in Signalling Systems. Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    Skyrms, building on the work of Dretske, has recently developed a novel information-theoretic account of propositional content in simple signalling systems. Information-theoretic accounts of content traditionally struggle to accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation, and I show that Skyrms’s account is no exception. I proceed to argue, however, that a modified version of Skyrms’s account can overcome this problem. On my proposed account, the propositional content of a signal is determined not by the information that it actually carries, but by the (...)
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  9. Radu J. Bogdan (1994). Grounds for Cognition. Erlbaum.
    This is how guidance of behavior to goal grounds and explains cognition and the main forms in which it manages information.
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  10. Radu J. Bogdan (1988). Information and Semantic Cognition: An Ontological Account. Mind and Language 3 (2):81-122.
    Information is the fuel of cognition. At its most basic level, information is a matter of structures interacting under laws. The notion of information thus reflects the (relational) fact that a structure is created by the impact of another structure. The impacted structure is an encoding, in some concrete form, of the interaction with the impacting structure. Information is, essentially, the structural trace in some system of an interaction with another system; it is also, as a consequence, the structural fuel (...)
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  11. Radu J. Bogdan (1988). Replies to Israel and Dretske's Bogdan on Information. Mind and Language 3:145-151.
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  12. Radu J. Bogdan (1987). Mind, Content and Information. Synthese 70 (February):205-227.
    What is it that one thinks or believes when one thinks or believes something? A mental formula? A sentence in some natural language? Its truth conditions? Or perhaps an abstract proposition? The current story of content is fairly ecumenical. It says that a number of aspects, some mental, other semantic, go into our understanding of content. Yet the current story is incomplete. It leaves out a very important aspect of content, one which I call incremental information. It is information in (...)
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  13. Jason Bridges (2006). Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy. Noûs 40 (3):522�547.
    In this paper, I argue that informational semantics, the most well-known and worked-out naturalistic account of intentional content, conflicts with a fundamental psychological principle about the conditions of belief-formation. Since this principle is an important premise in the argument for informational semantics, the upshot is that the view is self-contradictory??indeed, it turns out to be guilty of a sophisticated version of the fallacy famously committed by Euthyphro in the eponymous Platonic dialogue. Criticisms of naturalistic accounts of content typically proceed piecemeal (...)
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  14. Jason Bridges (2006). Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy. Noûs 40 (3):522-547.
    To commit Euthyphro’s fallacy is to endorse a pair of incompatible explanations, one constitutive and the other causal. Asked to explain the nature of piety, Euthyphro hazards that being pious consists in being an object of the gods’ love. But asked what causes the gods to love what they do, he holds with the commonsensical thought that the gods love pious people because they are pious. As Socrates points out (and for reasons we shall shortly rehearse), Euthyphro cannot have it (...)
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  15. Cameron Buckner (forthcoming). The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mindreading. Mind and Language.
    Philosophers have worried that research on animal mind-reading faces a “logical problem”: the difficulty of experimentally determining whether animals represent mental states (e.g. seeing) or merely the observable evidence for those states (e.g. line-of-gaze). The most impressive attempt to confront this problem has been mounted recently by Robert Lurz (2009, 2011). However, Lurz’ approach faces its own logical problem, revealing this challenge to be a special case of the more general problem of distal content. Moreover, participants in this debate do (...)
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  16. Anthony Chemero (2003). Information for Perception and Information Processing. Minds and Machines 13 (4):577-588.
    Do psychologists and computer/cognitive scientists mean the same thing by the term `information'? In this essay, I answer this question by comparing information as understood by Gibsonian, ecological psychologists with information as understood in Barwise and Perry's situation semantics. I argue that, with suitable massaging, these views of information can be brought into line. I end by discussing some issues in (the philosophy of) cognitive science and artificial intelligence.
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  17. Andy Clark (1987). Intentionality and Information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (September):335-341.
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  18. Austen Clark (1993). Mice, Shrews, and Misrepresentation. Journal of Philosophy 60 (6):290-310.
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  19. Jonathan Cohen (2002). Information and Content. In Luciano Floridi (ed.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing. Blackwell.
    Mental states differ from most other entities in the world in having semantic or intentional properties: they have meanings, they are about other things, they have satisfaction- or truth-conditions, they have representational content. Mental states are not the only entities that have intentional properties - so do linguistic expressions, some paintings, and so on; but many follow Grice, 1957 ] in supposing that we could understand the intentional properties of these other entities as derived from the intentional properties of mental (...)
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  20. Jonathan Cohen & Aaron Meskin (2006). An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):333 – 352.
    We offer a novel theory of information that differs from traditional accounts in two respects: (i) it explains information in terms of counterfactuals rather than conditional probabilities, and (ii) it does not make essential reference to doxastic states of subjects, and consequently allows for the sort of objective, reductive explanations of various notions in epistemology and philosophy of mind that many have wanted from an account of information.
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  21. David J. Cole, Natural Language and Natural Meaning.
    In Book II of the _Essay_, at the beginning of his discussion of language in Chapter II ("Of the Signification of Words"), John Locke writes that we humans have a variety of thoughts which might profit others, but that unfortunately these thoughts lie invisible and hidden from others. And so we use language to communicate these thoughts. As a result, "words, in their primary or immediate signification,stand for nothing but _the ideas in the mind of him that uses them_.
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  22. Jeff Coulter (1995). The Informed Neuron: Issues in the Use of Information Theory in the Behavioral Sciences. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 5 (4):583-96.
    The concept of “information” is virtually ubiquitous in contemporary cognitive science. It is claimed to be “processed” (in cognitivist theories of perception and comprehension), “stored” (in cognitivist theories of memory and recognition), and otherwise manipulated and transformed by the human central nervous system. Fred Dretske's extensive philosophical defense of a theory of informational content (“semantic” information) based upon the Shannon-Weaver formal theory of information is subjected to critical scrutiny. A major difficulty is identified in Dretske's equivocations in the use of (...)
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  23. Robert C. Cummins & Pierre Poirier (2004). Representation and Indication. In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. 21--40.
    This paper is about two kinds of mental content and how they are related. We are going to call them representation and indication. We will begin with a rough characterization of each. The differences, and why they matter, will, hopefully, become clearer as the paper proceeds.
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  24. Simon D'Alfonso (forthcoming). The Logic of Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Minds and Machines:1-19.
    In this paper I look at Fred Dretske’s account of information and knowledge as developed in Knowledge and The Flow of Information. In particular, I translate Dretske’s probabilistic definition of information to a modal logical framework and subsequently use this to explicate the conception of information and its flow which is central to his account, including the notions of channel conditions and relevant alternatives. Some key products of this task are an analysis of the issue of information closure and an (...)
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  25. Anthony Doyle (1985). Is Knowledge Information-Produced Belief? Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):33-46.
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  26. Fred Dretske (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years. The two areas combine to lay the groundwork for a naturalistic philosophy of mind. The fifteen essays focus on perception, knowledge, and consciousness. Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske's work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links which can be made between the two. The first section (...)
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  27. Fred Dretske (1991). Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  28. Fred Dretske (1991). Dretske's Replies. In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  29. Fred Dretske (1990). Putting Information to Work. In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
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  30. Fred Dretske (1988). Bogdan on Information: Commentary. Mind and Language 3 (2):141-144.
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  31. Fred Dretske (1983). Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):55-90.
    A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the (...)
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  32. Fred Dretske (1981/1999). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form (experience) for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning (or belief content) (...)
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  33. Kevan Edwards (2010). Concept Referentialism and the Role of Empty Concepts. Mind and Language 25 (1):89-118.
    This paper defends a reference-based approach to concept individuation against the objection that such an approach is unable to make sense of concepts that fail to refer. The main line of thought pursued involves clarifying how the referentialist should construe the relationship between a concept's (referential) content and its role in mental processes. While the central goal of the paper is to defend a view aptly titled Concept Referentialism , broader morals are drawn regarding reference-based approaches in general. The paper (...)
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  34. Chris Eliasmith (2000). How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content. Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis
    Questions concerning the nature of representation and what representations are about have been a staple of Western philosophy since Aristotle. Recently, these same questions have begun to concern neuroscientists, who have developed new techniques and theories for understanding how the locus of neurobiological representation, the brain, operates. My dissertation draws on philosophy and neuroscience to develop a novel theory of representational content.
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  35. Gareth Evans (1985). Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.
  36. Luciano Floridi (2005). Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):351-370.
    There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on (...)
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  37. Luciano Floridi (2003). Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Information. Minds and Machines 13 (4):459-469.
  38. Luciano Floridi (ed.) (2002). Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing. Blackwell.
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  39. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  40. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.
  41. Jerry A. Fodor (1987). A Situated Grandmother. Mind and Language 2 (1):64-81.
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  42. Jerry A. Fodor (1986). Information and Association. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (July):307-323.
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  43. Richard Foley (1987). Dretske's 'Information-Theoretic' Account of Knowledge. Synthese 70 (February):159-184.
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  44. M. C. Frank (2004). Against Informational Atomism. The Dualist 10.
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  45. Gary Gates (1996). The Price of Information. Synthese 107 (3):325-347.
    In this paper I apply an old problem of Quine's (the inscrutability of reference in translation) to a new style of theory about mental content (causal/nomological/informational accounts of meaning) and conclude that no "naturalization" of content of the sort currently popular can solve Quine's "gavagai" enigma. I show how failure to solve the problem leads to absurd conclusions not about one's own mental life, but about the non-mental world. I discuss various ways of attempting to remedy the accounts so as (...)
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  46. Olav Gjelsvik (1991). Dretske on Knowledge and Content. Synthese 86 (March):425-41.
    In this paper I discuss Fred Dretske's account of knowledge critically, and try to bring out how his account of informational content leads to cases of extreme epistemic good luck in his treatment of knowledge. My main interest, however, is to establish that the cases of epistemic luck arise because Dretske's account of knowledge in a fundamental way fails to take into account the role our actual recognitional capacities and powers of discrimination play in perceptually based knowledge. This result is, (...)
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  47. Richard E. Grandy (1987). Information-Based Epistemology, Ecological Epistemology and Epistemology Naturalized. Synthese 70 (February):191-203.
    Shannon's notion of information is more useful for naturalized epistemology than Dretske's.
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  48. Patrick Grim, P. St Denis & T. Kokalis (2004). Information and Meaning: Use-Based Models in Arrays of Neural Nets. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 14 (1):43-66.
    The goal of philosophy of information is to understand what information is, how it operates, and how to put it to work. But unlike ‘information’ in the technical sense of information theory, what we are interested in is meaningful information. To understand the nature and dynamics of information in this sense we have to understand meaning. What we offer here are simple computational models that show emergence of meaning and information transfer in randomized arrays of neural nets. These we take (...)
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  49. Philip P. Hanson (ed.) (1990). Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
  50. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1994). Indicator Semantics and Dretske's Function. Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):367-82.
    In his Explaining Behavior, Fred Dretske uses a reliabilist theory of representation to try to vindicate the use of intentional explanation for behaviour against latter-day elitninativism. Although Dretske's indicator semantics turns on the notion of function, he himself never explicitly defines what function means. Dretske's reticence in discussing function may ultimately be an error, for, as I argue, his implicit understanding of what a function amounts to does not fit with data from op rant conditioning. Still, this need not be (...)
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