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  1. Juan José Acero (1998). Non-Conceptual Content, Subject-Centered Information and the Naturalistic Demand. Philosophical Issues 9:359-367.
  2. Frederick R. Adams (2003). The Informational Turn in Philosophy. Minds and Machines 13 (4):471-501.
    This paper traces the application of information theory to philosophical problems of mind and meaning from the earliest days of the creation of the mathematical theory of communication. The use of information theory to understand purposive behavior, learning, pattern recognition, and more marked the beginning of the naturalization of mind and meaning. From the inception of information theory, Wiener, Turing, and others began trying to show how to make a mind from informational and computational materials. Over the last 50 years, (...)
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  3. Kathleen Akins (1996). Of Sensory Systems and the "Aboutness" of Mental States. Journal of Philosophy 93 (7):337--372.
  4. Murat Aydede (1997). Pure Informational Semantics and the Narrow/Broad Dichotomy. In Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics. Maribor.
    The influence of historical-causal theories of reference developed in the late sixties and early seventies by Donnellan, Kripke, Putnam and Devitt has been so strong that any semantic theory that has the consequence of assigning disjunctive representational content to the mental states of twins (e.g. [H2O or XYZ]) has been thereby taken to refute itself. Similarly, despite the strength of pre-theoretical intuitions that exact physical replicas like Davidson's Swampman have representational mental states, people have routinely denied that they have any (...)
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  5. Jon Barwise (1987). Unburdening the Language of Thought. Mind and Language 2 (1):82-96.
  6. Jon Barwise (1986). Information and Circumstance. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (July):324-338.
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  7. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Mit Press.
  8. Radu J. Bogdan (1994). Grounds for Cognition. Erlbaum.
    This is how guidance of behavior to goal grounds and explains cognition and the main forms in which it manages information.
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  9. Radu J. Bogdan (1988). Information and Semantic Cognition: An Ontological Account. Mind and Language 3 (2):81-122.
    Information is the fuel of cognition. At its most basic level, information is a matter of structures interacting under laws. The notion of information thus reflects the (relational) fact that a structure is created by the impact of another structure. The impacted structure is an encoding, in some concrete form, of the interaction with the impacting structure. Information is, essentially, the structural trace in some system of an interaction with another system; it is also, as a consequence, the structural fuel (...)
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  10. Radu J. Bogdan (1988). Replies to Israel and Dretske's Bogdan on Information. Mind and Language 3:145-151.
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  11. Radu J. Bogdan (1987). Mind, Content and Information. Synthese 70 (February):205-227.
    What is it that one thinks or believes when one thinks or believes something? A mental formula? A sentence in some natural language? Its truth conditions? Or perhaps an abstract proposition? The current story of content is fairly ecumenical. It says that a number of aspects, some mental, other semantic, go into our understanding of content. Yet the current story is incomplete. It leaves out a very important aspect of content, one which I call incremental information. It is information in (...)
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  12. Jason Bridges (2006). Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy. Noûs 40 (3):522�547.
    In this paper, I argue that informational semantics, the most well-known and worked-out naturalistic account of intentional content, conflicts with a fundamental psychological principle about the conditions of belief-formation. Since this principle is an important premise in the argument for informational semantics, the upshot is that the view is self-contradictory??indeed, it turns out to be guilty of a sophisticated version of the fallacy famously committed by Euthyphro in the eponymous Platonic dialogue. Criticisms of naturalistic accounts of content typically proceed piecemeal (...)
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  13. Jason Bridges (2006). Does Informational Semantics Commit Euthyphro's Fallacy. Noûs 40 (3):522-547.
    To commit Euthyphro’s fallacy is to endorse a pair of incompatible explanations, one constitutive and the other causal. Asked to explain the nature of piety, Euthyphro hazards that being pious consists in being an object of the gods’ love. But asked what causes the gods to love what they do, he holds with the commonsensical thought that the gods love pious people because they are pious. As Socrates points out (and for reasons we shall shortly rehearse), Euthyphro cannot have it (...)
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  14. Cameron Buckner (forthcoming). The Semantic Problem(s) with Research on Animal Mindreading. Mind and Language.
    Philosophers have worried that research on animal mind-reading faces a “logical problem”: the difficulty of experimentally determining whether animals represent mental states (e.g. seeing) or merely the observable evidence for those states (e.g. line-of-gaze). The most impressive attempt to confront this problem has been mounted recently by Robert Lurz (2009, 2011). However, Lurz’ approach faces its own logical problem, revealing this challenge to be a special case of the more general problem of distal content. Moreover, participants in this debate do (...)
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  15. Anthony Chemero (2003). Information for Perception and Information Processing. Minds and Machines 13 (4):577-588.
    Do psychologists and computer/cognitive scientists mean the same thing by the term `information'? In this essay, I answer this question by comparing information as understood by Gibsonian, ecological psychologists with information as understood in Barwise and Perry's situation semantics. I argue that, with suitable massaging, these views of information can be brought into line. I end by discussing some issues in (the philosophy of) cognitive science and artificial intelligence.
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  16. Andy Clark (1987). Intentionality and Information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (September):335-341.
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  17. Austen Clark (1993). Mice, Shrews, and Misrepresentation. Journal of Philosophy 60 (6):290-310.
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  18. Jonathan Cohen (2006). An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):333 – 352.
    We offer a novel theory of information that differs from traditional accounts in two respects: (i) it explains information in terms of counterfactuals rather than conditional probabilities, and (ii) it does not make essential reference to doxastic states of subjects, and consequently allows for the sort of objective, reductive explanations of various notions in epistemology and philosophy of mind that many have wanted from an account of information.
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  19. Jonathan Cohen (2002). Information and Content. In Luciano Floridi (ed.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing. Blackwell.
    Mental states differ from most other entities in the world in having semantic or intentional properties: they have meanings, they are about other things, they have satisfaction- or truth-conditions, they have representational content. Mental states are not the only entities that have intentional properties - so do linguistic expressions, some paintings, and so on; but many follow Grice, 1957 ] in supposing that we could understand the intentional properties of these other entities as derived from the intentional properties of mental (...)
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  20. David J. Cole, Natural Language and Natural Meaning.
    In Book II of the _Essay_, at the beginning of his discussion of language in Chapter II ("Of the Signification of Words"), John Locke writes that we humans have a variety of thoughts which might profit others, but that unfortunately these thoughts lie invisible and hidden from others. And so we use language to communicate these thoughts. As a result, "words, in their primary or immediate signification,stand for nothing but _the ideas in the mind of him that uses them_.
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  21. Jeff Coulter (1995). The Informed Neuron: Issues in the Use of Information Theory in the Behavioral Sciences. Minds and Machines 5 (4):583-96.
  22. Anthony Doyle (1985). Is Knowledge Information-Produced Belief? Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):33-46.
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  23. Fred Dretske (2000). Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by eminent philosopher Fred Dretske brings together work on the theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind spanning thirty years. The two areas combine to lay the groundwork for a naturalistic philosophy of mind. The fifteen essays focus on perception, knowledge, and consciousness. Together, they show the interconnectedness of Dretske's work in epistemology and his more contemporary ideas on philosophy of mind, shedding light on the links which can be made between the two. The first section (...)
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  24. Fred Dretske (1991). Dretske's Replies. In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  25. Fred Dretske (1991). Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  26. Fred Dretske (1990). Putting Information to Work. In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
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  27. Fred Dretske (1988). Bogdan on Information: Commentary. Mind and Language 3 (2):141-144.
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  28. Fred Dretske (1983). Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6:55-90.
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  29. Fred Dretske (1981/1999). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. MIT Press.
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form (experience) for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning (or belief content) (...)
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  30. Kevan Edwards (2010). Concept Referentialism and the Role of Empty Concepts. Mind and Language 25 (1):89-118.
    This paper defends a reference-based approach to concept individuation against the objection that such an approach is unable to make sense of concepts that fail to refer. The main line of thought pursued involves clarifying how the referentialist should construe the relationship between a concept's (referential) content and its role in mental processes. While the central goal of the paper is to defend a view aptly titled Concept Referentialism , broader morals are drawn regarding reference-based approaches in general. The paper (...)
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  31. Chris Eliasmith (2000). How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content. Dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis
    Questions concerning the nature of representation and what representations are about have been a staple of Western philosophy since Aristotle. Recently, these same questions have begun to concern neuroscientists, who have developed new techniques and theories for understanding how the locus of neurobiological representation, the brain, operates. My dissertation draws on philosophy and neuroscience to develop a novel theory of representational content.
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  32. Gareth Evans (1985). Collected Papers. Oxford University Press.
  33. Luciano Floridi (2005). Is Semantic Information Meaningful Data? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):351-370.
    There is no consensus yet on the definition of semantic information. This paper contributes to the current debate by criticising and revising the Standard Definition of semantic Information (SDI) as meaningful data, in favour of the Dretske-Grice approach: meaningful and well-formed data constitute semantic information only if they also qualify as contingently truthful. After a brief introduction, SDI is criticised for providing necessary but insufficient conditions for the definition of semantic information. SDI is incorrect because truth-values do not supervene on (...)
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  34. Luciano Floridi (2003). Two Approaches to the Philosophy of Information. Minds and Machines 13 (4):459-469.
  35. Luciano Floridi (ed.) (2002). Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Information and Computing. Blackwell.
  36. Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
    The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory on the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of rival theories, and (...)
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  37. Jerry A. Fodor (1990). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. MIT Press.
  38. Jerry A. Fodor (1987). A Situated Grandmother. Mind and Language 2:64-81.
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  39. Jerry A. Fodor (1986). Information and Association. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 27 (July):307-323.
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  40. Richard Foley (1987). Dretske's 'Information-Theoretic' Account of Knowledge. Synthese 70 (February):159-184.
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  41. M. C. Frank (2004). Against Informational Atomism. The Dualist 10.
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  42. Gary Gates (1996). The Price of Information. Synthese 107 (3):325-347.
    In this paper I apply an old problem of Quine's (the inscrutability of reference in translation) to a new style of theory about mental content (causal/nomological/informational accounts of meaning) and conclude that no "naturalization" of content of the sort currently popular can solve Quine's "gavagai" enigma. I show how failure to solve the problem leads to absurd conclusions not about one's own mental life, but about the non-mental world. I discuss various ways of attempting to remedy the accounts so as (...)
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  43. Olav Gjelsvik (1991). Dretske on Knowledge and Content. Synthese 86 (March):425-41.
    In this paper I discuss Fred Dretske's account of knowledge critically, and try to bring out how his account of informational content leads to cases of extreme epistemic good luck in his treatment of knowledge. My main interest, however, is to establish that the cases of epistemic luck arise because Dretske's account of knowledge in a fundamental way fails to take into account the role our actual recognitional capacities and powers of discrimination play in perceptually based knowledge. This result is, (...)
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  44. Richard E. Grandy (1987). Information-Based Epistemology, Ecological Epistemology and Epistemology Naturalized. Synthese 70 (February):191-203.
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  45. Patrick Grim, P. St Denis & T. Kokalis (2004). Information and Meaning: Use-Based Models in Arrays of Neural Nets. Minds and Machines 14 (1):43-66.
    The goal of philosophy of information is to understand what information is, how it operates, and how to put it to work. But unlike ‘information’ in the technical sense of information theory, what we are interested in is meaningful information. To understand the nature and dynamics of information in this sense we have to understand meaning. What we offer here are simple computational models that show emergence of meaning and information transfer in randomized arrays of neural nets. These we take (...)
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  46. Philip P. Hanson (ed.) (1990). Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
  47. Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1994). Indicator Semantics and Dretske's Function. Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):367-82.
    In his Explaining Behavior, Fred Dretske uses a reliabilist theory of representation to try to vindicate the use of intentional explanation for behaviour against latter-day elitninativism. Although Dretske's indicator semantics turns on the notion of function, he himself never explicitly defines what function means. Dretske's reticence in discussing function may ultimately be an error, for, as I argue, his implicit understanding of what a function amounts to does not fit with data from op rant conditioning. Still, this need not be (...)
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  48. M. Heller (1991). Indication and What Might Have Been. Analysis 51 (October):187-91.
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  49. David R. Hilbert, Content, Intention, and Explanation.
    Naturalistic theories of content and whether or not reason-giving explanations of human behavior are causal explanations have been central topics in recent philosophy of mind. Fred Dretske, in his book Explaining Behavior, attempts to construct a naturalistic theory of the contents of beliefs and desires that gives these mental states an important role in the causation of behavior. Even if Dretske is granted that the theory adequately accounts for individual behaviors the theory still faces problems in offering an adequate account (...)
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  50. Frank Hofmann (2001). The Reference of de Re Representations. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):83-101.
    Full understanding ofrepresentation requires both an accountofrepresentational content and of reference. Fred Dretske has proposed a powerful theory of representational content, the teleological theory of indicator functions. And he has indicated that he thinks an informational account of reference is basically correct. According to this account, reference is determined by a certain informational relation, the relation of carrying primary information about an object. However, a closer examination will show that the informational account cannot adequately deal with our intuitions about certain (...)
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  51. Amir Horowitz (1990). Dretske on Perception. Ratio 3 (2):136-141.
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  52. David J. Israel (1988). Bogdan on Information: Commentary. Mind and Language 3 (2):123-140.
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  53. David J. Israel & John Perry (1990). What is Information? In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
  54. Ray S. Jackendoff (1985). Information is in the Mind of the Beholder. Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (February):23-33.
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  55. Dunja Jutronic (ed.) (1997). The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics. Maribor.
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  56. Matti Kamppinen (1988). Intentionality and Information From an Ontological Point of View. Philosophia 18 (April):107-118.
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  57. Max Kistler (2000). Source and Channel in the Informational Theory of Mental Content. Facta Philosophica 2:213-36.
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  58. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Two Notions of Mental Representation. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge.
    The main thesis of this paper is twofold. In the first half of the paper, (§§1-2), I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective. In the second part (§§3-7), I argue that this casts familiar tracking theories of mental representation as incomplete: while it is clear how they might account for objective representation, they at least require supplementation to account for subjective representation.
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  59. John Kulvicki (2004). Isomorphism in Information-Carrying Systems. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4):380-395.
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  60. Ernest LePore (ed.) (1986). Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  61. Barry M. Loewer (1987). From Information to Intentionality. Synthese 70 (February):287-317.
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  62. Olimpia I. Lombardi (2005). Dretske, Shannon's Theory, and the Interpretation of Information. Synthese 144 (1):23-39.
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  63. Olimpia I. Lombardi (2004). What is Information? Foundations of Science 9 (2):105-134.
    The main aim of this work is to contribute tothe elucidation of the concept of informationby comparing three different views about thismatter: the view of Fred Dretske's semantictheory of information, the perspective adoptedby Peter Kosso in his interaction-informationaccount of scientific observation, and thesyntactic approach of Thomas Cover and JoyThomas. We will see that these views involvevery different concepts of information, eachone useful in its own field of application. This comparison will allow us to argue in favorof a terminological `cleansing': it (...)
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  64. J. Christopher Maloney (1983). Dretske on Knowledge and Information. Analysis 43 (January):25-28.
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  65. Brian P. McLaughlin (1991). Belief Individuation and Dretske on Naturalizing Content. In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  66. Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.) (1991). Dretske and His Critics. Basil Blackwell.
  67. Brian P. McLaughlin (1987). What is Wrong with Correlational Psychosemantics. Synthese 70 (February):271-286.
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  68. Angela Mendelovici (forthcoming). Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation. Philosophical Studies.
    It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation (e.g. those of Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan) have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against them.
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  69. Ruth G. Millikan (2001). What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation? In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    "According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32).
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  70. William E. Morris (1990). Knowledge and the Regularity Theory of Information. Synthese 82 (3):375-398.
    Fred Dretske's "Knowledge and the Flow of Information" is an extended attempt to develop a philosophically useful theory of information. Dretske adapts central ideas from Shannon and Weaver's mathematical theory of communication, and applies them to some traditional problems in epistemology. In doing so, he succeeds in building for philosophers a much-needed bridge to important work in cognitive science. The pay-off for epistemologists is that Dretske promises a way out of a long-standing impasse -- the Gettier problem. He offers an (...)
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  71. William E. Morris (1990). The Regularity Theory of Information. Synthese 82:375-398.
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  72. Lawrence Moss, Gizburg S., Rijke Jonathaden & Maarten (eds.) (1999). Logic, Language and Computation Vol. Csli.
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  73. Karen Neander (forthcoming). Toward an Informational Teleosemantics. In Justine Kinsgsbury, Dan Ryder & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and Her Critics. Wiley.
  74. S. G. O'Hair (1969). A Definition of Informational Content. Journal of Philosophy 66 (March):132-133.
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  75. David Pineda (1998). Information and Content. Philosophical Issues 9:381-387.
    In this paper I discuss critically Stalnaker's views on content.
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  76. G. Primiero (2008). Information and Knowledge. Springer.
    The constructive reformulation of the semantic theory suggests two basic principles to be assumed: first, the distinction between proper knowledge, expressed in judgemental form, and the assertion conditions for such knowledge; second, ...
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  77. Hilary Putnam (1986). Information and the Mental. In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  78. Matthew Rellihan (forthcoming). Informational Semantics and Frege Cases. Acta Analytica:1-28.
    One of the most important objections to information-based semantic theories is that they are incapable of explaining Frege cases. The worry is that if a concept’s intentional content is a function of its informational content, as such theories propose, then it would appear that coreferring expressions have to be synonymous, and if this is true, it’s difficult to see how an agent could believe that a is F without believing that b is F whenever a and b are identical. I (...)
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  79. William S. Robinson (1983). Dretske's Etiological View. Southwest Philosophical Studies 9:23-29.
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  80. Dan Ryder (2009). Problems of Representation II: Naturalizing Content. In Francisco Garzon & John Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge.
    John is currently thinking that the sun is bright. Consider his occurrent belief or judgement that the sun is bright. Its content is that the sun is bright. This is a truth- evaluable content (which shall be our main concern) because it is capable of being true or false. In virtue of what natural, scientifically accessible facts does John’s judgement have this content? To give the correct answer to that question, and to explain why John’s judgement and other contentful mental (...)
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  81. Steven F. Savitt (1987). Absolute Informational Content. Synthese 70 (February):185-90.
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  82. Kenneth M. Sayre (1987). Cognitive Science and the Problem of Semantic Content. Synthese 70 (February):247-69.
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  83. Kenneth M. Sayre (1986). Intentionality and Information Processing: An Alternative Model for Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9:121-38.
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  84. Paul G. Skokowski (1999). Information, Belief, and Causal Role. In L. S. Moss, J. Ginzburg & M. de Rijke (eds.), Logic, Language, and Computation Vol 2. CSLI Press.
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  85. Stephen P. Stich (1990). Building Belief: Some Queries About Representation, Indication, and Function. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):801-806.
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  86. D. Sturdee (1997). The Semantic Shuffle: Shifting Emphasis in Dretske's Account of Representational Content. Erkenntnis 47 (1):89-104.
    In Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Fred Dretske explains representational content by appealing to natural indication: a mental representation has its content in virtue of being a reliable natural indicator of a particular type of state of the world. His account fails for several reasons, not the least of which is that it cannot account for misrepresentation. Recognizing this, Dretske adds a twist in his more recent work on representational content (sketched in 'Misrepresentation' and elaborated in Explaining Behavior): a (...)
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  87. Donna M. Summerfield & Pat A. Manfredi (1998). Indeterminacy in Recent Theories of Content. Minds and Machines 8 (2):181-202.
    Jerry Fodor has charged that Fred Dretske's account of content suffers from indeterminacy to the extent that we should reject it in favor of Fodor‘s own account. In this paper, we ask what the problem of indeterminacy really is; we distinguish a relatively minor problem we call ‘looseness of fit’ from a major problem of failing to show how to point to what is not there. We sketch Dretske's account of content and how it is supposed to solve the major (...)
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  88. Kenneth A. Taylor (1987). Belief, Information and Semantic Content: A Naturalist's Lament. Synthese 71 (April):97-124.
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  89. Marius Usher (2001). A Statistical Referential Theory of Content: Using Information Theory to Account for Misrepresentation. Mind and Language 16 (3):331-334.
  90. Enrique Villanueva (ed.) (1990). Information, Semantics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  91. Corey G. Washington (2002). A Conflict Between Language and Atomistic Information. Minds and Machines 12 (3):397-421.
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  92. Michael Welbourne (1983). A Cognitive Thoroughfare. Mind 92 (July):410-413.
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  93. Terry Winograd (1987). Cognition, Attunement and Modularity. Mind and Language 2 (1):97-103.
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  94. Palle Yourgrau (1987). Information Retrieval and Cognitive Accessibility. Synthese 70 (February):229-246.
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  95. Jos Zalabardo (1995). A Problem for Information-Theoretic Semantics. Synthese 105 (1):1-29.
    Information theoretic semantics proposes to construe predicate reference in terms of nomological relations between distal properties and properties of representational mental events. Research on the model has largely concentrated on the problem of choosing the nomological relation in terms of which distal properties are to be singled out. I argue that, in addition to this, an information theoretic account has to provide a specification of which properties of representational mental events will play a role in determining reference, qua bearers of (...)
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