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  1. Mark H. Bernstein (1998). On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters. Oxford University Press.
    In this fresh and powerfully argued book, Mark Bernstein identifies the qualities that make an entity deserving of moral consideration. It is frequently assumed that only (normal) human beings count. Bernstein argues instead for "experientialism"--the view that having conscious experiences is necessary and sufficient for moral standing. He demonstrates that this position requires us to include many non-human animals in our moral realm, but not to the extent that many deep ecologists champion.
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  2. Jason Brennan (2007). Dominating Nature. Environmental Values 16 (4):513-528.
    Something is wrong with the desire to dominate nature. In this paper, I explain both the causes and solution to anti-environmental attitudes within the framework of Hegel's master–slave dialectic. I argue that the master–slave dialectic (interpreted as a metaphor, rather than literally) can provide reasons against taking an attitude of domination, and instead gives reasons to seek to be worthy of respect from nature, though nature cannot, of course, respect us. I then discuss what the social and economic conditions of (...)
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  3. Benjamin Hale (2008). Technology, the Environment, and the Moral Considerability of Artifacts. In Evan Selinger, Jan Kyrre Berg Olson & Soren Riis (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Technology. Palgrave Macmillan.
  4. Benjamin Hale (2006). The Moral Considerability of Invasive Transgenic Animals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (4):337-366.
    The term moral considerability refers to the question of whether a being or set of beings is worthy of moral consideration. Moral considerability is most readily afforded to those beings that demonstrate the clearest relationship to rational humans, though many have also argued for and against the moral considerability of species, ecosystems, and “lesser” animals. Among these arguments there are at least two positions: “environmentalist” positions that tend to emphasize the systemic relations between species, and “liberationist” positions that tend to (...)
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  5. Aaron Lercher (2006). Liberty of Ecological Conscience. Environmental Ethics 28 (3):315-322.
    Our concern for nonhuman nature can be justified in terms of a human right to liberty of ecological conscience. This right is analogous to the right to religious liberty, and is equally worthy of recognition as that fundamental liberty. The liberty of ecological conscience, like religious liberty, is a negative right against interference. Each ecological conscience supports a claim to protection of the parts of nonhuman nature that are current or potential sites of its active pursuit of natural value. If (...)
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  6. Alejandra Mancilla (2011). Allen Carlson and Sheila Lintott (Eds.): Nature, Aesthetics and Environmentalism: From Beauty to Duty. [REVIEW] Environmental Values 20 (3):449-452.
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  7. Alejandra Mancilla (2011). Avatar Vs Mononoke. Philosophy Now 85:44-46.
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  8. Toby Svoboda (2012). The Ethics of Geoengineering: Moral Considerability and the Convergence Hypothesis. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):243-256.
    Although it could avoid some harmful effects of climate change, sulphate aerosol geoengineering (SAG), or injecting sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere in order to reflect incoming solar radiation, threatens substantial harm to humans and non-humans. I argue that SAG is prima facie ethically problematic from anthropocentric, animal liberationist, and biocentric perspectives. This might be taken to suggest that ethical evaluations of SAG can rely on Bryan Norton's convergence hypothesis, which predicts that anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists will agree to implement the same (...)
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  9. Toby Svoboda (2011). Why There is No Evidence for the Intrinsic Value of Non-Humans. Ethics and the Environment 16 (2):25-36.
    The position of some environmental ethicists that some non-humans have intrinsic value as a mind-independent property is seriously flawed. This is because human beings lack any evidence for this position and hence are unjustified in holding it. For any possible world that is alleged to have this kind of intrinsic value, it is possible to conceive an observationally identical world that lacks intrinsic value. Hence, one is not justified in inferring the intrinsic value of some non-human from any set of (...)
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  10. Jonathan Webber (2011). Climate Change and Public Moral Reasoning. In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave.