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  1. Anna Alexandrova & Robert Northcott (2013). It's Just a Feeling: Why Economic Models Do Not Explain. Journal of Economic Methodology 20 (3):262 - 267.
    Julian Reiss correctly identified a trilemma about economic models: we cannot maintain that they are false, but nevertheless explain and that only true accounts explain. In this reply we give reasons to reject the second premise ? that economic models explain. Intuitions to the contrary should be distrusted.
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  2. George C. Bitros (2010). Two Puzzles Regarding the Replacement Ratio in the Context of Renewal Theory. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (4):375-395.
    The models Feldstein and Rothschild, on the hand, and Jorgenson on the other adopted in 1974 to highlight the replacement ratio are identical. Yet, the authors reached opposite conclusions and the latter's view prevailed, which is weaker in terms of theoretical and empirical foundations. This paper argues that both puzzles may be resolved by reference to the differences in the methodological preconceptions of the authors involved, the operational advantages of the theorem of proportionality, the accumulated data that facilitate research, the (...)
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  3. Lawrence A. Boland (2003). Methodological Criticismvs. Ideology and Hypocrisy. Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (4):521-526.
    Milton Friedman's famous methodology essay is one of the most cited in economics literature. There was a time when it was usually cited as a prime example of positivist methodology. But since the publication of my 1979 critique of the critics of his essay, almost everyone now recognizes his essay as a prime example of what I called instrumentalism. Most economists, who when questioned about their views of methodology, will agree with Friedman's instrumentalism but only if Friedman's name is not (...)
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  4. David Colander (1995). Is Milton Friedman an Artist or a Scientist? Journal of Economic Methodology 2 (1):105-122.
    Most economists will agree that Milton Friedman is a brilliant economist. Yet, the majority assessment is that his work is ideologically flawed, and that the Marshallian economics he advocates has been superseded by Walrasian economics. In this paper I argue that the reason for this negative assessment is that Friedman, like Alfred Marshall before him, tried to straddle a fence between policy and logical-deductive theory, combining the artistic science of the historical and institutional school with the logical-deductive science of economics (...)
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  5. Pat Devine (2006). Price, Principle, and the Environment, Mark Sagoff. Cambridge University Press, 2004, X + 284 Pp. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 22 (02):281-.
  6. Wenceslao J. González (1996). On the Theoretical Basis of Prediction in Economics. Journal of Social Philosophy 27 (3):201-228.
  7. D. Hammes (2011). Reviews: Milton's Positivism Found Wanting. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (3):398-419.
    Milton Friedman’s 1953 essay created controversy and consternation amongst economists. It provided a prescription, based on empirically generated predictive success, of how to do economics, yet many saw it as a concession of the search for truth and theoretical beauty within the discipline. This article reviews a 50th anniversary festschrift devoted to views of the essay. The purpose of the volume is to provide today’s reader with the essay, responses, and a guide to interpreting it. The volume is selective and (...)
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  8. D. Wade Hands (2003). Did Milton Friedman's Methodology License the Formalist Revolution? Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (4):507-520.
    This paper examines two conflicting views that have emerged within the recent methodological literature regarding the relationship between Friedman's famous essay and the formalist revolution. I focus on three influential contributors to this ongoing debate: Mark Blaug, Terence Hutchison, and Thomas Mayer. Blaug and Hutchison have argued repeatedly that Friedman's essay licensed the formalist revolution while Mayer has argued precisely the opposite; the formalist revolution was a result of not following Friedman's methodological advice. The juxtaposition of these (...)
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  9. John Hart (2009). Machlup's Misrepresentation of Hutchison's Methodology. Journal of Economic Methodology 16 (3):325-340.
    Hutchison's 1938 essay has been mainly interpreted as introducing positivism and ultra-empiricism into economics. Such interpretations misrepresent his position. While he clearly drew on logical positivism, his methodology stems from a more moderate form of empiricism. However the issue at stake is not the exact degree of Hutchison's empiricism, but rather the extent to which such negative labelling has trivialised his position and distracted attention from the main concern of his 1938 essay. This was to mount a sustained and systematic (...)
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  10. S. P. H. Heap (1999). What a Rational Action!: A Review of Bruno S. Frey's Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation. [REVIEW] Journal of Economic Methodology 6:140-144.
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  11. Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit (1992). In Defense of Explanatory Ecumenicalism. Economics and Philosophy 8 (1):1--21.
    Many of the things that we try to explain, in both our common sense and our scientific engagement with the world, are capable of being explained more or less finely: that is, with greater or lesser attention to the detail of the producing mechanism. A natural assumption, pervasive if not always explicit, is that other things being equal, the more finegrained an explanation, the better. Thus, Jon Elster, who also thinks there are instrumental reasons for wanting a more fine-grained explanation, (...)
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  12. John Maloney (1994). Economic Method and Economic Rhetoric. Journal of Economic Methodology 1 (2):253-268.
    McCloskey's work on the rhetoric of economics has little to say about Imre Lakatos, and indeed the scientific method prescribed by Lakatos, as it stands, would support McCloskey's claim that philosophers? imperatives bear little relation to what economists actually do. But a Bayesianized version of Lakatos is a different matter, and provides a yardstick against which the various rhetorical devices noted by McCloskey can be measured. We argue that McCloskey's list can be divided into those forms of persuasion which would (...)
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  13. Philippe Mongin (1992). Milton Friedman: Economics in Theory and Practice, Abraham Hirsch and Neil De Marchi. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1990, Viii + 325 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 8 (01):183-.
  14. Michiru Nagatsu (2013). Experimental Philosophy of Economics. Economics and Philosophy 29 (2):263-76.
    This article is a prelude to an experimental study of the preference concept in economics. I argue that a new empirical approach called experimental philosophy of science is a promising approach to advance the philosophy of economics. In particular, I discuss two debates in the field, the neuroeconomics controversy and the commonsensible realism debate, and suggest how experimental and survey techniques can generate data that will inform these debates. Some of the likely objections from philosophers and economists are addressed, and (...)
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  15. Bart Nooteboom (1986). Plausibility in Economics. Economics and Philosophy 2 (02):197-.
    According to the instrumentalism of Friedman (1970) and Machlup (1967) it is irrelevant whether the explanatory principles or “assumptions” of a theory satisfy any criterion of “plausibility,” “realism,” “credibility,” or “soundness.” In this view the main or only criterion for selecting theories is whether a theory yields empirically testable implications that turn out to be consistent with observations. All we should require or expect from a theory is that it is a useful instrument for the purpose of prediction. Considerations of (...)
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  16. Julian Reiss (2012). Idealization and the Aims of Economics: Three Cheers for Instrumentalism. Economics and Philosophy 28 (3):363-383.
    This paper aims to provide characterizations of realism and instrumentalism that are philosophically interesting and applicable to economics; and to defend instrumentalism against realism as a methodological stance in economics. Starting point is the observation that , which, or so I argue, is difficult to square with the realist's aim of truth, even if the latter is understood as or . The three cheers in favour of instrumentalism are: Once we have usefulness, truth is redundant. There is something disturbing about (...)
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  17. Alexander Rosenberg (1992). Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns? University of Chicago Press.
    Economics today cannot predict the likely outcome of specific events any better than it could in the time of Adam Smith. This is Alexander Rosenberg's controversial challenge to the scientific status of economics. Rosenberg explains that the defining characteristic of any science is predictive improvability--the capacity to create more precise forecasts by evaluating the success of earlier predictions--and he forcefully argues that because economics has not been able to increase its predictive power for over two centuries, it is not a (...)
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  18. Alexander Rosenberg (1986). Lakatosian Consolations for Economics. Economics and Philosophy 2 (01):127-.
    The F-twist is giving way to the methodology of scientific research programs. Milton Friedman's “Methodology for Economics” is being supplanted as the orthodox rationale for neoclassical economics by Imre Lakatos' account of scientific respectability. Friedman's instrumentalist thesis that theories are to be judged by the confirmation of their consequences and not the realism of their assumptions has long been widely endorsed by economists, under Paul Samuelson's catchy rubric “the F-twist.” It retains its popularity among economists who want no truck with (...)
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  19. David Teira (2009). Why Friedman's Methodology Did Not Generate Consensus Among Economists? Journal of the History of Economic Thought 31 (2):201-214.
    In this paper I study how the theoretical categories of consumption theory were used by Milton Friedman in order to classify empirical data and obtain predictions. Friedman advocated a case by case definition of these categories that traded theoretical coherence for empirical content. I contend that this methodological strategy puts a clear incentive to contest any prediction contrary to our interest: it can always be argued that these predictions rest on a wrong classification of data. My conjecture is that this (...)
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  20. David Teira (2007). Milton Friedman, the Statistical Methodologist. History of Political Economy 39 (3):511-28.