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  1. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1967). Intensional Expressions. Studia Logica 20 (1):63 - 86.
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  2. Stephen F. Barker (1982). Intensionality and Intentionality. Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) will not be (...)
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  3. George Bealer (1996). Intensional Logic. In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement. Macmillan 262-264.
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  4. George Bealer (1994). Toward a New Theory of Content. In R. Casati, B. Smith & G. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky 179-92.
    The purpose of this paper is to lay out the algebraic approach to propositions and then to show how it can be implemented in new solutions to Frege's puzzle and a variety of related puzzles about content.
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  5. J. M. Bell (1973). What is Referential Opacity? Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1):155 - 180.
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  6. Jonathan Berg (1988). The Pragmatics of Substitutivity. Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (3):355 - 370.
  7. Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever (2001). Believing in Words. Synthese 127 (3):279 - 301.
    The semantic puzzles posed by propositional attitude contexts have, since Frege, been understood primarily in terms of certain substitution puzzles. We will take as paradigmatic of such substitution puzzles cases in which two coreferential proper names cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate in the context of an attitude verb. Thus, for example, the following sentences differ in truth value: (1) Lois Lane believes Superman can fly. (2) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent can fly. despite the fact that "Superman" and "Clark Kent" (...)
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  8. Spencer Carr (1974). Opacity and Indefinite Terms. Philosophical Studies 26 (1):39 - 49.
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  9. Roderick Chisholm (1976). Intentional Inexistence. In L. L. McAlister (ed.), The Philosophy of Franz Brentano. Duckworth
  10. M. J. Cresswell (1985). Structured Meanings. MIT Press.
    Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.
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  11. Charles B. Daniels (1987). “The Story Says That” Operator in Story Semantics. Studia Logica 46 (1):73-86.
    In [2] a semantics for implication is offered that makes use of stories — sets of sentences assembled under various constraints. Sentences are evaluated at an actual world and in each member of a set of stories. A sentence B is true in a story s just when B s. A implies B iff for all stories and the actual world, whenever A is true, B is true. In this article the first-order language of [2] is extended by the addition (...)
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  12. Graeme Forbes (1993). Solving the Iteration Problem. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (3):311 - 330.
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  13. Bryan Frances (2006). The New Leibniz's Law Arguments for Pluralism. Mind 115 (460):1007-1022.
    For years philosophers argued for the existence of distinct yet materially coincident things by appealing to modal and temporal properties. For instance, the statue was made on Monday and could not survive being flattened; the lump of clay was made months before and can survive flattening. Such arguments have been thoroughly examined. Kit Fine has proposed a new set of arguments using the same template. I offer a critical evaluation of what I take to be his central lines of reasoning.
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  14. Anthony C. Genova (1975). Opacity, Inexistence and Intentionality. Ratio 17 (December):237-246.
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  15. Lou Goble (1973). Opacity and the Ought-to-Be. Noûs 7 (4):407-412.
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  16. Jaakko Hintikka (1969). Partially Transparent Senses of Knowing. Philosophical Studies 20 (1-2):4 - 8.
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  17. Dale Jacquette (2000). Identity, Intensionality, and Moore's Paradox. Synthese 123 (2):279 - 292.
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  18. Michael Alan Johnson (2009). Indirect Discourse: Parataxis, the Propositional Function Modification, and “That”. Aporia 19 (1):9-24.
    The purpose of this paper is to assess the general viability of Donald Davidson's paratactic theory of indirect discourse, as well as the specific plausibility of a reincarnated form of the Davidsonian paratactic theory, Gary Kemp's propositional paratactic theory. To this end I will provide an introduction to the Davidsonian paratactic theory and the theory's putative strengths, thereafter noting that an argument from ambiguity seems to effectively undermine Davidson's proposal. Subsequently, I will argue that Kemp's modification of Davidson's theory – (...)
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  19. David Kaplan (1986). Opacity. In Lewis Edwin Hahn & Paul Arthur Schilpp (eds.), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. Open Court 229-289.
  20. David Kaplan (1968). Quantifying In. Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
  21. Ali Akhtar Kazmi (1987). Quantification and Opacity. Linguistics and Philosophy 10 (1):77 - 100.
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  22. William C. Kneale (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:73-90.
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  23. Leonard Linsky (1983). Oblique Contexts. University of Chicago Press.
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  24. Leonard Linsky (1972). Referential Opacity. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 26 (99/100):130.
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  25. Kirk Ludwig & Greg Ray (1998). Semantics for Opaque Contexts. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):141-66.
    In this paper, we outline an approach to giving extensional truth-theoretic semantics for what have traditionally been seen as opaque sentential contexts. We outline an approach to providing a compositional truth-theoretic semantics for opaque contexts which does not require quantifying over intensional entities of any kind, and meets standard objections to such accounts. The account we present aims to meet the following desiderata on a semantic theory T for opaque contexts: (D1) T can be formulated in a first-order extensional language; (...)
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  26. Emar Maier, The Pragmatics of Attraction: Explaining Unquotation in Direct and Free Indirect Discourse.
    The quotational theory of free indirect discourse postulates that pronouns and tenses are systematically unquoted. But where does this unquotation come from? Based on cases of apparent unquotation in direct discourse constructions (including data from Kwaza speakers, Catalan signers, and Dutch children), I suggest a general pragmatic answer: unquotation is essentially a way to resolve a conflict that arises between two opposing constraints. On the one hand, the reporter wants to use indexicals that refer directly to the most salient speech (...)
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  27. Norman Malcolm (1965). Rejoinder to Mr. Sosa. Dialogue 3 (4):424-425.
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  28. Genoveva Marti (1993). The Source of Intensionality. Philosophical Perspectives 7:197-206.
    There are obvious differences between (1) Mary is talking to the Dean and (2) Mary is looking for the Dean. In (1) we can replace "the Dean" by any other coextensional term and preserve truth value; also, from (1) we can infer that there is someone Mary is talking to. Such behavior breaks down in (2): neither intersubstitution of coextensional terms nor existential generalization guarantee preservation of truth value in a sentence like (2). (1) is purely extensional; (2) is intensional.
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  29. Mohan P. Matthen (1989). Intensionality and Perception: A Reply to Rosenberg. Journal of Philosophy 86 (December):727-733.
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  30. Ari Maunu (2003). No Belief Is Contingently True. Auslegung 26 (2):67-75.
    It is commonly held, plausibly, that many true beliefs are true only contingently, that is, are actually true (or true with respect to the actual world) but would be false were the world in some relevant ways otherwise (i.e. are false with respect to some other possible worlds). However, a radically different approach, according to which no belief is contingently true, is entirely defensible. The key point in this alternative approach is that each belief concerns the world in which the (...)
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  31. Ari Maunu (2002). Indiscernibility of Identicals and Substitutivity in Leibniz. History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (4):367-380.
    It is shown that typical arguments from intensionality against the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals (InI) misconstrue this principle, confusing it with the Principle of Substitution (PS). It has been proposed that Leibniz, in his statements like, "If A is the same as B, then A can be substituted for B, salva veritate, in any proposition", is not applying InI to objects nor PS to signs, but is talking about substitution of concepts in propositions, or applying InI to concepts. It (...)
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  32. Friederike Moltmann (2015). Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs. In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer
    The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of a major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in the philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, those intentional objects do not come (...)
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  33. Richard Montague & Donald Kalish (1959). That. Philosophical Studies 10 (4):54 - 61.
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  34. Harold Morick (1971). Intentionality, Intensionality, and the Psychological. Analysis 32 (December):39-44.
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  35. Michael Nelson (2012). Intensional Contexts. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International Pub. 125.
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  36. A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.) (2000). Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand.
    The essays in this collection are by some of the leading figures in their fields and they touch on the most recent turnings in Quine's work.
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  37. T. Parent, Paradox with Just Self-Reference.
    If a semantically open language allows self-reference, one can show there is a predicate which is both satisfied and unsatisfied by a self-referring term. The argument requires something akin to diagonalization on substitution instances of a definition-scheme for the predicate "x is Lagadonian." (The term 'Lagadonian' is adapted from David Lewis). Briefly, a self-referring term is counted as “Lagadonian” if the initial variable in the schema is replaced with the term itself. But the same term is not counted as Lagadonian (...)
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  38. Michael J. Pendlebury (2002). Opacity and Self-Consciousness. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):243-251.
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  39. Jaroslav Peregrin, Constructions and Concepts.
    Some twenty years ago, semanticists of natural language came to be overwhelmed by the problem of semantic analysis of belief sentences (and sentences reporting other kinds of propositional attitudes): the trouble was that sentences of the shapes X believes that A and X believes that B appeared to be able to have different truth values even in cases when A and B shared the same intension, i.e. were, from the viewpoint of intensional semantics, synonymous 1 . Thus, taking intensional semantics (...)
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  40. Pierre Pica (1986). Subject, Tense and Truth. In Jacqueline Guéron, Hans-Georg Obenauer & Jean-Yves Pollock (eds.), Grammatical Representations. Foris
    It is suggested that the notion of truth value plays a role in syntactic theory and should be incorporated in the appropriate formulation of conditions on transformations.
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  41. Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Fregean Innocence. Mind and Language 11 (4):338-370.
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  42. N. Ángel Pinillos (2011). Coreference and Meaning. Philosophical Studies 154 (2):301 - 324.
    Sometimes two expressions in a discourse can be about the same thing in a way that makes that very fact evident to the participants. Consider, for example, 'he' and 'John' in 'John went to the store and he bought some milk'. Let us call this 'de jure' coreference. Other times, coreference is 'de facto' as with 'Mark Twain' and 'Samuel Clemens' in a sincere use of 'Mark Twain is not Samuel Clemens'. Here, agents can understand the speech without knowing that (...)
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  43. Consuelo Preti (1992). Opacity, Belief and Analyticity. Philosophical Studies 66 (3):297 - 306.
    Contrary to appearances, semantic innocence can be claimed for a Fregean account of the semantics of expressions in indirect discourse. Given externalism about meaning, an expression that refers to its ordinary sense in an opaque context refers, ultimately, to its "references"; for, on this view, the reference of an expression directly determines its meaning. Externalism seems to have similar consequences for the truth-conditions of analytic sentences. If reference determines meaning, how can we distinguish a class of sentences as true in (...)
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  44. A. N. Prior (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality, Part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:91-106.
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  45. Erich Rast (2012). De Se Puzzles, the Knowledge Argument, and the Formation of Internal Knowledge. Analysis and Metaphysics 11 (December):106-132.
    ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also (...)
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  46. François Recanati (2004). Précis of *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation. Dialectica 58 (2):237-247.
    A summary of my book *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta*, published by MIT Press in 2000 ('Representation and Mind' series).
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  47. François Recanati (2003). Belief Ascription, Simulation, and Opacity. Facta Philosophica 5 (2):223-237.
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  48. François Recanati (2000). The Iconicity of Metarepresentations. In Dan Sperber (ed.), Meta-Representations: a Multidisciplinary Perspective. Oxford 311-360.
  49. François Recanati (2000). Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta: An Essay on Metarepresentation. MIT Press.
    Among the entities that can be mentally or linguistically represented are mental and linguistic representations themselves. That is, we can think and talk about speech and thought. This phenomenon is known as metarepresentation. An example is "Authors believe that people read books." -/- In this book François Recanati discusses the structure of metarepresentation from a variety of perspectives. According to him, metarepresentations have a dual structure: their content includes the content of the object-representation (people reading books) as well as the (...)
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  50. Francois Recanati (2000). Opacity and the Attitudes. In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand 367--406.
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