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  1. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1967). Intensional Expressions. Studia Logica 20 (1):63 - 86.
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  2. Stephen F. Barker (1982). Intensionality and Intentionality. Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) will not be (...)
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  3. J. M. Bell (1973). What is Referential Opacity? Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1):155 - 180.
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  4. Jonathan Berg (1988). The Pragmatics of Substitutivity. Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (3):355 - 370.
  5. Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever (2001). Believing in Words. Synthese 127 (3):279 - 301.
    The semantic puzzles posed by propositional attitude contexts have, since Frege, been understood primarily in terms of certain substitution puzzles. We will take as paradigmatic of such substitution puzzles cases in which two coreferential proper names cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate in the context of an attitude verb. Thus, for example, the following sentences differ in truth value: (1) Lois Lane believes Superman can fly. (2) Lois Lane believes Clark Kent can fly. despite the fact that "Superman" and "Clark Kent" (...)
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  6. Spencer Carr (1974). Opacity and Indefinite Terms. Philosophical Studies 26 (1):39 - 49.
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  7. Charles B. Daniels (1987). “The Story Says That” Operator in Story Semantics. Studia Logica 46 (1):73 - 86.
    <span class='Hi'></span> In <span class='Hi'></span>[2]<span class='Hi'></span> a semantics for implication is offered that makes use of stories <span class='Hi'></span>— sets of sentences assembled under various constraints.<span class='Hi'></span> Sentences are evaluated at an actual world and in each member of a set of stories.<span class='Hi'></span> A sentence B is true in a story s just when B s.<span class='Hi'></span> A implies B iff for all stories and the actual world,<span class='Hi'></span> whenever A is true,<span class='Hi'></span> B is true.<span class='Hi'></span> In this (...)
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  8. Anthony C. Genova (1975). Opacity, Inexistence and Intentionality. Ratio 17 (December):237-246.
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  9. Lou Goble (1973). Opacity and the Ought-to-Be. Noûs 7 (4):407-412.
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  10. David Kaplan (1968). Quantifying In. Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
  11. Ali Akhtar Kazmi (1987). Quantification and Opacity. Linguistics and Philosophy 10 (1):77 - 100.
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  12. William C. Kneale (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality, Part I. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:73-90.
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  13. Leonard Linsky (1983). Oblique Contexts. University of Chicago Press.
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  14. Kirk Ludwig & Greg Ray (1998). Semantics for Opaque Contexts. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):141--66.
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  15. Genoveva Marti (1993). The Source of Intensionality. Philosophical Perspectives 7:197-206.
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  16. Ari Maunu (2003). No Belief Is Contingently True. Auslegung 26 (2):67-75.
    It is commonly held, plausibly, that many true beliefs are true only contingently, that is, are actually true (or true with respect to the actual world) but would be false were the world in some relevant ways otherwise (i.e. are false with respect to some other possible worlds). However, a radically different approach, according to which no belief is contingently true, is entirely defensible. The key point in this alternative approach is that each belief concerns the world in which the (...)
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  17. Ari Maunu (2002). Indiscernibility of Identicals and Substitutivity in Leibniz. History of Philosophy Quarterly 19 (4):367-380.
    It is shown that typical arguments from intensionality against the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals (InI) misconstrue this principle, confusing it with the Principle of Substitution (PS). It has been proposed that Leibniz, in his statements like, "If A is the same as B, then A can be substituted for B, salva veritate, in any proposition", is not applying InI to objects nor PS to signs, but is talking about substitution of concepts in propositions, or applying InI to concepts. It (...)
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  18. Friederike Moltmann, Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs.
    The question whether natural language permits quantification over intentional objects as the ‘nonexistent’ objects of thought is the topic of major philosophical controversy, as is the status of intentional objects as such. This paper will argue that natural language does reflect a particular notion of intentional object and in particular that certain types of natural language constructions (generally disregarded in philosophical literature) cannot be analysed without positing intentional objects. At the same time, those intentional objects do not come for free; (...)
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  19. Richard Montague & Donald Kalish (1959). That. Philosophical Studies 10 (4):54 - 61.
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  20. Michael Nelson (2012). Intensional Contexts. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International Pub.. 125.
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  21. A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.) (2000). Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand.
    The essays in this collection are by some of the leading figures in their fields and they touch on the most recent turnings in Quine's work.
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  22. T. Parent, Paradox with Just Self-Reference.
    If a semantically open language allows self-reference, one can show there is a predicate which is both satisfied and unsatisfied by a self-referring term. The argument requires something akin to diagonalization on substitution-instances of a definition-scheme (*): ‘x is Lagadonian iff in the nth substitution-instance of (*), the initial variable is replaced with x’. Given an appropriate enumeration of the instances, a self-referring term is counted as “Lagadonian” if the initial variable in (*) is replaced with the term itself. But (...)
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  23. Jaroslav Peregrin, Constructions and Concepts.
    Some twenty years ago, semanticists of natural language came to be overwhelmed by the problem of semantic analysis of belief sentences (and sentences reporting other kinds of propositional attitudes): the trouble was that sentences of the shapes X believes that A and X believes that B appeared to be able to have different truth values even in cases when A and B shared the same intension, i.e. were, from the viewpoint of intensional semantics, synonymous 1 . Thus, taking intensional semantics (...)
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  24. Pierre Pica (1986). Subject, Tense and Truth. In Jacqueline Guéron, Hans-Georg Obenauer & Jean-Yves Pollock (eds.), Grammatical Representations. Foris.
    It is suggested that the notion of truth value plays a role in syntactic theory and should be incorporated in the appropriate formulation of conditions on transformations.
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  25. Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Fregean Innocence. Mind and Language 11 (4):338-370.
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  26. Consuelo Preti (1992). Opacity, Belief and Analyticity. Philosophical Studies 66 (3):297 - 306.
    Contrary to appearances, semantic innocence can be claimed for a Fregean account of the semantics of expressions in indirect discourse. Given externalism about meaning, an expression that refers to its ordinary sense in an opaque context refers, ultimately, to its "references"; for, on this view, the reference of an expression directly determines its meaning. Externalism seems to have similar consequences for the truth-conditions of analytic sentences. If reference determines meaning, how can we distinguish a class of sentences as true in (...)
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  27. A. N. Prior (1968). Intentionality and Intensionality, Part II. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91:91-106.
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  28. Erich Rast (2012). De Se Puzzles, the Knowledge Argument, and the Formation of Internal Knowledge. Analysis and Metaphysics 11 (December):106-132.
    ABSTRACT. Thought experiments about de se attitudes and Jackson’s original Knowledge Argument are compared with each other and discussed from the perspective of a computational theory of mind. It is argued that internal knowledge, i.e. knowledge formed on the basis of signals that encode aspects of their own processing rather than being intentionally directed towards external objects, suffices for explaining the seminal puzzles without resorting to acquaintance or phenomenal character as primitive notions. Since computationalism is ontologically neutral, the account also (...)
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  29. Francois Recanati (2000). Opacity and the Attitudes. In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand. 367--406.
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  30. Hans Reichenbach (1956). Can Operators Reach Through Quotes? Philosophical Studies 7 (3):33 - 36.
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  31. Maribel Romero, Tense and Intensionality in Specificational Copular Sentences.
    Specificational sentences show Connectivity Effects (Akmajian 1970, Higgins 1979, Halvorsen 1978, Jacobson 1994, among others). For example, an NP like no man embedded in a relative clause in general cannot bind a pronoun outside the relative clause, as illustrated in (3a); but in specificational copular sentences this binding is possible, as in (3b). This effect is called Variable Binding Connectivity. Similarly, the NP a unicorn cannot be interpreted de dicto with respect to the embedded verb look for in (4a); but (...)
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  32. Mark Sainsbury (2012). Representing Unicorns: How to Think About Intensionality. In G. Currie, P. Kotatko & M. Pokorny (eds.), Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publications.
    The paper focuses on two apparent paradoxes arising from our use of intensional verbs: first, their object can be something which does not exist, i.e. something which is nothing; second, the fact that entailment from a qualified to a non-qualified object is not guaranteed. In this paper, I suggest that the problems share a solution, insofar as they arise in connection with intensional verbs that ascribe mental states. The solution turns on (I) a properly intensional or nonrelational notion of representation (...)
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  33. Paul Saka (2010). Rarely Pure and Never Simple: Tensions in the Theory of Truth. Topoi 29 (2):125-135.
    Section 1 discerns ambiguity in the word “truth”, observing that the term is used most naturally in reference to truth-bearers rather than truth-makers. Focusing on truths-as-truth-bearers, then, it would appear that alethic realism conflicts with metaphysical realism as naturalistically construed. Section 2 discerns ambiguity in the purporting of truth (as in assertion), conjecturing that all expressions, not just those found in traditionally recognized opaque contexts, can be read intensionally (as well, perhaps, as extensionally). For instance, we would not generally want (...)
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  34. Philippe Schlenker (2003). A Plea for Monsters. Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.
    Kaplan claims in Demonstratives that no operator may manipulate the context of evaluation of natural language indexicals. We show that this is not so. In fact, attitude reports always manipulate a context parameter (or, rather, a context variable). This is shown by (i) the existence of De Se readings of attitude reports in English (which Kaplan has no account for), and (ii) the existence of a variety of indexicals across languages whose point of evaluation can be shifted, but only in (...)
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  35. Yael Sharvit (2008). The Puzzle of Free Indirect Discourse. Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (3):353-395.
    The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the familiar puzzle of free indirect discourse (FID). FID shares some properties with standard indirect discourse and with direct discourse, but there is currently no known theory that can accommodate such a hybrid. Based on the observation that FID has ‘de se’ pronouns, I argue that it is a kind of an attitude report.
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  36. Richard Sharvy (1972). Three Types of Referential Opacity. Philosophy of Science 39 (2):153-161.
    Three distinct things have been called "referential opacity," causing some confusion. A noun position in a sentence may be opaque in three different ways: (1) substitutivity of identity may fail there, (2) quantifiers prefixed to the sentence may not be able to bind variables in that position, or (3) substitutivity of identity may fail when the singular nouns in question are read as having small scope. Some connections among these three types of opacity are examined.
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  37. Jonathan Stoltz (2008). Concepts, Intention, and Identity in Tibetan Philosophy of Language. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 29 (2):383-400.
    This article examines one highly localized set of developments to the Buddhist doctrine of word meaning that was made by twelfth and thirteenth century Tibetan Buddhist epistemologists primarily schooled at gSaṅ phu Monastery in central Tibet. I will show how these thinkers developed the notion of a concept (don spyi) in order to explain how it is that words are capable of applying to real objects, and how concepts can be used to capture elements of word meaning extending beyond reference (...)
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  38. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (2007). Searle's Derivation of Promissory Obligation. In , Intentional Acts and Insitutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology. Springer.
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  39. Dustin Tucker & Richmond H. Thomason (2011). Paradoxes of Intensionality. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):394-411.
    We identify a class of paradoxes that is neither set-theoretical nor semantical, but that seems to depend on intensionality. In particular, these paradoxes arise out of plausible properties of propositional attitudes and their objects. We try to explain why logicians have neglected these paradoxes, and to show that, like the Russell Paradox and the direct discourse Liar Paradox, these intensional paradoxes are recalcitrant and challenge logical analysis. Indeed, when we take these paradoxes seriously, we may need to rethink the commonly (...)
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  40. Alberto Voltolini, How to Get Intentionality by Language.
    One is often told that sentences expressing or reporting mental states endowed with intentionality—the feature of being “directed upon” an object that some mental states possess—contain contexts that both prevent those sentences to be existentially generalized and are filled by referentially opaque occurrences of singular terms. Failure of existential generalization and referential opacity have been traditionally said to be the basic characterizations of intentionality from a linguistic point of view. I will call those contexts directional contexts. In what follows, I (...)
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  41. Takashi Yagisawa (1997). A Somewhat Russellian Theory of Intensional Contexts. Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):43-82.
    Consider the following sentence schemata: (1) The proposition that P is F; (2) The property of being Q is F; (3) The relation of being R is F, where `P' is a schematic letter for a sentence, `Q' and `F' are schematic letters for a nonrelational predicate, and `R' is a schematic letter for a relational predicate. For example, if we substitute `Snow is white' for `P', `famous' for `F' in (1), `round' for `Q', `instantiated' for `F' in (2), `a (...)
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  42. Richard Zuber (2006). Possible Intensionality of the Verb Phrase Position. Analysis 66 (291):255–256.
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