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  1. Frederick & Alfred Mele (1989). The Role of Intention in Intentional Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511-531.
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  2. Fred Adams (2006). Intentions Confer Intentionality Upon Actions: A Reply to Knobe and Burra. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):255-268.
    Is intentionally doing A linked to the intention to do A? Knobe and Burra believe that the link between the English words ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ may mislead philosophers and cognitive scientists to falsely believe that intentionally doing an action A requires one to have the intention to do A. Knobe and Burra believe that data from other languages..
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  3. Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...)
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  4. Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action and Moral Considerations: Still Pragmatic. Analysis 64 (3):268 - 276.
  5. Frederick Adams (1986). Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View. Mind and Language 1 (4):281-301.
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  6. Frederick Adams & Alfred Mele (1989). The Role of Intention in Intentional Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511 - 531.
  7. Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele (1992). The Intention/Volition Debate. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.
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  8. J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.) (2010). Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford.
  9. Jesús H. Aguilar (2012). Basic Causal Deviance, Action Repertoires, and Reliability. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):1-19.
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  10. Mark Alfano, James Beebe & Brian Robinson (2012). The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe-Effect Cases. The Monist 95 (2):264-289.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy has shown that people are more likely to attribute intentionality, knowledge, and other psychological properties to someone who causes a bad side effect than to someone who causes a good one. We argue that all of these asymmetries can be explained in terms of a single underlying asymmetry involving belief attribution because the belief that one’s action would result in a certain side effect is a necessary component of each of the psychological attitudes in question. (...)
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  11. William P. Alston (1986). An Action-Plan Interpretation of Purposive Explanations of Actions. Theory and Decision 20 (3):275-299.
  12. Maria Alvarez (2009). Acting Intentionally and Acting for a Reason. Inquiry 52 (3):293-305.
    This paper explores the question whether whatever is done intentionally is done for a reason. Apart from helping us to think about those concepts, the question is interesting because it affords an opportunity to identify a number of misconceptions about reasons. In the paper I argue that there are things that are done intentionally but not done for a reason. I examine two different kinds of example: things done “because one wants to” and “purely expressive actions”. Concerning the first, I (...)
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  13. Maria Alvarez (2009). Reasons, Desires and Intentional Actions. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan
  14. Chrisoula Andreou (2013). Agency and Awareness. Ratio 26 (2):117-133.
    I focus on the idea that if, as a result of lacking any conscious goal related to X-ing and any conscious anticipation or awareness of X-ing, one could sincerely reply to the question ‘Why are you X-ing?’ with ‘I didn't realize I was doing that,’ then one's X-ing is not intentional. My interest is in the idea interpreted as philosophically substantial (rather than merely stipulative) and as linked to the familiar view that there is a major difference, relative to the (...)
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  15. G. E. M. Anscombe (2011). The Causation of Action. In Mary Geach & Luke Gormally (eds.), Human life, action and ethics: essays by GEM Anscombe. Andrews UK Limited 89-108.
  16. G. E. M. Anscombe (1981). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: The Collected Philosophical Papers of G. E. M. Anscombe Volume Two. Basil Blackwell.
  17. G. E. M. Anscombe (1957). Intention. Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  18. Louise M. Antony (1987). Attributions of Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):311 - 323.
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  19. D. M. Armstrong (1966). Taylor, Richard: "Action and Purpose". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 44:231.
  20. Valérie Aucouturier, Human Action and Intentional Action: A Non Mentalist View.
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  21. Robert Audi (1993). Action, Intention, and Reason. Cornell University Press.
    In this collection of essays, Audi develops a general theory of action ranging from the nature of action and action-explanation to free and rational action.
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  22. Matthew Babb (2016). The Essential Indexicality of Intentional Action. Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264):439-457.
    Cappelen and Dever challenge the widely accepted idea that some key aspect of intentional action is essentially indexical. They argue that the classical arguments for this coming from Perry are in fact arguments for a different phenomenon: the opacity of explanatory contexts. I agree with Cappelen and Dever that what Perry says about the ineliminability of indexical terms from explanations of intentional action fails to amount to an argument for this indexicality being essential. But this should not lead us to (...)
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  23. Carla Bagnoli (2010). “Responsibility for Action”. Paradigmi 27 (1):75-86.
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  24. Jodie A. Baird & Dare A. Baldwin (2001). Making Sense of Human Behavior: Action Parsing and Intentional Inference. In Bertram Malle, L. J. Moses & Dare Baldwin (eds.), Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition. MIT Press 193--206.
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  25. M. Balaguer (2011). Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Philosophical Review 120 (3):447-452.
  26. Thomas Baldwin (1979). Foresight and Responsibility. Philosophy 54 (209):347 - 360.
    Where a man foresaw that through its consequences his action would violate a law, is he for that reason to be judged responsible for the violation of the law? The principle that such a man is responsible, and thus that foresight is sufficient for responsibility, has long been accepted in both legal and moral theory. But in recent years anxieties about this principle have been expressed by both philosophers and lawyers. What one commonly finds in older books, both legal and (...)
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  27. Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino (2004). Ibn Sina and Husserl on Intention and Intentionality. Philosophy East and West 54 (1):71-82.
    : The concepts of intention and intentionality were particularly significant notions within the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic medieval philosophical traditions, and they regained philosophical importance in the twentieth century. The theories of intention and intentionality of the medieval Islamic philosopher and physician Ibn Sina and the phenomenological philosopher and mathematician Edmund Husserl are examined, compared, and contrasted here, showing that Ibn Sina's conception of intention is naturalistic and, in its naturalism, is influenced by the medical professional culture to which Ibn (...)
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  28. Gerald W. Barnes (1990). George Wilson, The Intentionality of Human Action Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 10 (5):212-216.
  29. Winston H. F. Barnes (1941). Action. Mind 50 (199):243-257.
  30. Tomas Barrero (2010). Reason, Action, and Weakness of the Will: A Semantic Approach. Ideas Y Valores 59 (143):161-187.
    This paper develops some of Austin’s ideas on excuses, stressing their “dimensional” character and relating it to Searle’s distinction between intention-in-action and previous intention, in order to show that the original speech-act shaped distinction between weakness of the will and moral weakness can be embedded in a quite different theoretical framework such as Davidson’s, while Austin’s dimensional classification of actions cannot. Finally, the article analyzes how Grice’s critique of Davidson’s views on akrasia is more faithful to Austin and more radical (...)
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  31. Peter Brian Barry, Intentional Action, Causation, and Deviance.
    It is reasonably well accepted that the explanation of intentional action is teleological explanation. Very roughly, an explanation of some event, E, is teleological only if it explains E by citing some goal or purpose or reason that produced E. Alternatively, teleological explanations of intentional action explain “by citing the state of affairs toward which the behavior was directed” thereby answering questions like “To what end was the agent’s behavior directed?” Causalism—advocated by causalists—is the thesis that explanations of intentional action (...)
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  32. Peter Brian Barry, Two Dogmas of Moral Psychology.
    I contend that there are two dogmas that are still popular among philosophers of action: that agents can only desire what they think is good and that they can only intentionally pursue what they think is good. I also argue that both dogmas are false. Broadly, I argue that our best theories of action can explain the possibility of intentionally pursuing what one thinks is not at all good, that we need to allow for the possibility of intentionally pursuing what (...)
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  33. James R. Beebe & Wesley Buckwalter (2010). The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Mind and Language 25 (4):474-498.
    Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004b) and others have demonstrated the surprising fact that the valence of a side-effect action can affect intuitions about whether that action was performed intentionally. Here we report the results of an experiment that extends these findings by testing for an analogous effect regarding knowledge attributions. Our results suggest that subjects are less likely to find that an agent knows an action will bring about a side-effect when the effect is good than when it is bad. It (...)
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  34. David Paul Behan (1967). Intentional Action. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
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  35. Daniel Clark Bennett (1960). Action and the Will. Dissertation, Stanford University
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  36. José Luis Bermúdez (1995). Transcendental Arguments and Psychology:The Example of O'Shaughnessy on Intentional Action. Metaphilosophy 26 (4):379-401.
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  37. Monika Betzler (2009). Expressive Actions. Inquiry 52 (3):272-292.
    Actions expressing emotions (such as caressing the clothes of one's dead friend in grief, or tearing apart a photograph out of jealousy) pose a notorious challenge to action theorists. They are thought to be intentional in that they are in some sense under the agent's control. They are not thought to be done for a reason, however, because they cannot be explained by considerations that favor them from the agent's point of view. This seems to be the case, at least, (...)
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  38. Matteo Bianchin (2015). Intentions and Intentionality. Philosophy and Public Issues – Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche:43-54.
    Michael Thompson recently advanced a “naïve action theory” as an alternative to the “sophisticated” accounts of action displayed by ordinary folk psychology. In what follows I defend the plausibility of intentional psychology and folk psychological explanations. I do this in two ways. First I question that naïve explanations are more naïve than the ones provided by folk psychology and suggest that the latter are phenomenologically prior to the former. Second, I focus on the role of intentionality in deliberation and action (...)
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  39. Renée Bilodeau (2002). Intention et faiblesse de la volonté. Dialogue 41 (01):27-44.
    Akrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgment is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgment that conforms to her best judgment "all things considered," the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show (...)
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  40. Renée Bilodeau (2001). La satisfaction d'être dupe. Philosophiques 28 (2):381-393.
    Je me propose d'examiner la solution davidsonnienne au problème de la duperie de soi afin de clarifier en quel sens il s'agit d'un acte intentionnel. Après une étude de quelques difficultés liées au concept même de duperie de soi, mon analyse met en lumière que la notion de partition de l'esprit que Davidson emprunte à son traitement de la faiblesse de la volonté ne peut être appliquée de manière satisfaisante à ce nouveau problème. J'indique ensuite que non seulement Davidson mais (...)
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  41. Renée Bilodeau (2000). Du pouvoir causal des intentions. Actes du XXVIIe Congrès de L’Association des Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française:718-725.
    Je défends l'idée que le seul rôle causal des intentions est d'initier l'action. Elles ont, éventuellement, d’autres fonctions qui se manifestent pendant le déroulement de l’action. Toutefois, ces fonctions sont d’ordre délibératif, non causal.
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  42. Renée Bilodeau (2000). La philosohie de l'action. In Pascal Engel (ed.), Précis de philosophie analytique. P.U.F. 189-212.
    Introduction à quelques problèmes de philosophie de l'action: la nature de l'action, l'individuation de l'action, la théorie causale, les raisons et les causes, les chaînes causales déviantes, la notion d'intention, la "simple view", les raisonnements pratiques.
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  43. Renée Bilodeau (1993). Donald Davidson, Paradoxes de l'irrationalité, tr. de Pascal Engel, Combas, Éditions de l'Éclat, coll. « Tiré à part », 1991. [REVIEW] Philosophiques 20 (2):503-506.
    Compte-rendu de trois articles de Donald Davidson "Paradoxes of Irrationality", "Deception and Division" et "Rational Animals".
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  44. J. Bishop (2001). McCANN, HJ-The Works of Agency. Philosophical Books 42 (3):232-232.
  45. John Bishop (1990). Searle on Natural Agency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):282 – 300.
  46. John Bishop (1985). Causal Deviancy and Multiple Intentions: A Reply to James Montmarquet. Analysis 45 (3):163 - 168.
  47. John Bishop (1981). Peacocke on Intentional Action. Analysis 41 (2):92 - 98.
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  48. Rüdiger Bittner (2001). Doing Things for Reasons. Oxford University Press.
    What exactly are the reasons we do things, and how are they related to the resulting actions? Bittner explores this question and proposes an answer: a reason is a response to that state of affairs. Elegantly written, this work is a substantial contribution to the fields of rationality, ethics, and action theory.
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  49. Jean Beer Blumenfeld (1981). Action and Intention. Philosophia 9 (3-4):299-315.
  50. Jean Beer Blumenfeld (1976). Goldman's Account of Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 29 (6):391 - 396.
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