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  1. Fred Adams (2006). Intentions Confer Intentionality Upon Actions: A Reply to Knobe and Burra. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):255-268.
    Is intentionally doing A linked to the intention to do A? Knobe and Burra believe that the link between the English words ‘intention’ and ‘intentional’ may mislead philosophers and cognitive scientists to falsely believe that intentionally doing an action A requires one to have the intention to do A. Knobe and Burra believe that data from other languages..
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  2. Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action and Moral Considerations: Still Pragmatic. Analysis 64 (3):268 - 276.
  3. Fred Adams & Annie Steadman (2004). Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding? Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...)
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  4. Frederick Adams (1986). Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View. Mind and Language 1 (4):281-301.
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  5. Frederick Adams & Alfred Mele (1989). The Role of Intention in Intentional Action. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):511 - 531.
  6. Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele (1992). The Intention/Volition Debate. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.
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  7. J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.) (2010). Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford.
  8. Jesús H. Aguilar (2012). Basic Causal Deviance, Action Repertoires, and Reliability. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):1-19.
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  9. Mark Alfano, James Beebe & Brian Robinson (2012). The Centrality of Belief and Reflection in Knobe-Effect Cases. The Monist 95 (2):264-289.
    Recent work in experimental philosophy has shown that people are more likely to attribute intentionality, knowledge, and other psychological properties to someone who causes a bad side effect than to someone who causes a good one. We argue that all of these asymmetries can be explained in terms of a single underlying asymmetry involving belief attribution because the belief that one’s action would result in a certain side effect is a necessary component of each of the psychological attitudes in question. (...)
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  10. Maria Alvarez (2009). Acting Intentionally and Acting for a Reason. Inquiry 52 (3):293-305.
    This paper explores the question whether whatever is done intentionally is done for a reason. Apart from helping us to think about those concepts, the question is interesting because it affords an opportunity to identify a number of misconceptions about reasons. In the paper I argue that there are things that are done intentionally but not done for a reason. I examine two different kinds of example: things done “because one wants to” and “purely expressive actions”. Concerning the first, I (...)
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  11. Maria Alvarez (2009). Reasons, Desires and Intentional Actions. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
  12. Chrisoula Andreou (2013). Agency and Awareness. Ratio 26 (2):117-133.
    I focus on the idea that if, as a result of lacking any conscious goal related to X-ing and any conscious anticipation or awareness of X-ing, one could sincerely reply to the question ‘Why are you X-ing?’ with ‘I didn't realize I was doing that,’ then one's X-ing is not intentional. My interest is in the idea interpreted as philosophically substantial (rather than merely stipulative) and as linked to the familiar view that there is a major difference, relative to the (...)
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  13. G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  14. Louise M. Antony (1987). Attributions of Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 51 (3):311 - 323.
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  15. Robert Audi (1993). Action, Intention, and Reason. Cornell University Press.
    In this collection of essays, Audi develops a general theory of action ranging from the nature of action and action-explanation to free and rational action.
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  16. Carla Bagnoli (2010). “Responsibility for Action”. Paradigmi 27 (1):75-86.
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  17. Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino (2004). Ibn Sina and Husserl on Intention and Intentionality. Philosophy East and West 54 (1):71-82.
    : The concepts of intention and intentionality were particularly significant notions within the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic medieval philosophical traditions, and they regained philosophical importance in the twentieth century. The theories of intention and intentionality of the medieval Islamic philosopher and physician Ibn Sina and the phenomenological philosopher and mathematician Edmund Husserl are examined, compared, and contrasted here, showing that Ibn Sina's conception of intention is naturalistic and, in its naturalism, is influenced by the medical professional culture to which Ibn (...)
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  18. Tomás Barrero (2010). Razón, acción Y debilidad de la voluntad. Una lectura semántica. Ideas Y Valores 59 (143):161-187.
    This paper develops some of Austin’s ideas on excuses, stressing their “dimensional” character and relating it to Searle’s distinction between intention-in-action and previous intention, in order to show that the original speech-act shaped distinction between weakness of the will and moral weakness can be embedded in a quite different theoretical framework such as Davidson’s, while Austin’s dimensional classification of actions cannot. Finally, the article analyzes how Grice’s critique of Davidson’s views on akrasia is more faithful to Austin and more radical (...)
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  19. Peter Brian Barry, Intentional Action, Causation, and Deviance.
    It is reasonably well accepted that the explanation of intentional action is teleological explanation. Very roughly, an explanation of some event, E, is teleological only if it explains E by citing some goal or purpose or reason that produced E. Alternatively, teleological explanations of intentional action explain “by citing the state of affairs toward which the behavior was directed” thereby answering questions like “To what end was the agent’s behavior directed?” Causalism—advocated by causalists—is the thesis that explanations of intentional action (...)
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  20. Peter Brian Barry, Two Dogmas of Moral Psychology.
    I contend that there are two dogmas that are still popular among philosophers of action: that agents can only desire what they think is good and that they can only intentionally pursue what they think is good. I also argue that both dogmas are false. Broadly, I argue that our best theories of action can explain the possibility of intentionally pursuing what one thinks is not at all good, that we need to allow for the possibility of intentionally pursuing what (...)
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  21. James R. Beebe & Wesley Buckwalter (2010). The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect. Mind and Language 25 (4):474-498.
    Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004b) and others have demonstrated the surprising fact that the valence of a side-effect action can affect intuitions about whether that action was performed intentionally. Here we report the results of an experiment that extends these findings by testing for an analogous effect regarding knowledge attributions. Our results suggest that subjects are less likely to find that an agent knows an action will bring about a side-effect when the effect is good than when it is bad. It (...)
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  22. José Luis Bermúdez (1995). Transcendental Arguments and Psychology:The Example of O'Shaughnessy on Intentional Action. Metaphilosophy 26 (4):379-401.
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  23. Renée Bilodeau (2002). Intention Et Faiblesse de la Volonté. Dialogue 41 (01):27-44.
    Akrasia is both an intentional and an irrational phenomenon. These two characteristics can be reconciled by a careful reconstruction of practical reasoning. I undertake this task along Davidsonian lines, arguing against his critics that the notion of unconditional judgment is the key to an adequate account of akrasia. Unless akrasia is conceived as a failure of the agent to form an unconditional judgment that conforms to her best judgment "all things considered," the intentionality of akrasia is lost. Likewise, I show (...)
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  24. John Bishop (1990). Searle on Natural Agency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (3):282 – 300.
  25. John Bishop (1985). Causal Deviancy and Multiple Intentions: A Reply to James Montmarquet. Analysis 45 (3):163 - 168.
  26. John Bishop (1981). Peacocke on Intentional Action. Analysis 41 (2):92 - 98.
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  27. Rüdiger Bittner (2001). Doing Things for Reasons. Oxford University Press.
    What exactly are the reasons we do things, and how are they related to the resulting actions? Bittner explores this question and proposes an answer: a reason is a response to that state of affairs. Elegantly written, this work is a substantial contribution to the fields of rationality, ethics, and action theory.
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  28. Jean Beer Blumenfeld (1976). Goldman's Account of Intentional Action. Philosophical Studies 29 (6):391 - 396.
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  29. Susanne Bobzien (2014). Choice and Moral Responsibility in Nicomachean Ethics Iii 1-5. In R. Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press. 81-109.
    ABSTRACT: This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions (...)
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  30. G. Botterill (2010). Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will * By ALFRED R. MELE. [REVIEW] Analysis 70 (2):395-398.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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  31. Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions (...)
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  32. Michael Bratman (1984). Two Faces of Intention. Philosophical Review 93 (3):375-405.
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  33. Michael Bratman (1983). Taking Plans Seriously. Social Theory and Practice 9 (2/3):271-287.
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  34. Michael E. Bratman (2011). Intention Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
    The practical thought of planning agents is subject to distinctive rationality norms. In particular, there are norms of intention consistency and of means-end coherence. I discuss the normative significance of these norms and their relation to practical reasons. I seek a path between views that see these norms as, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality, and views that see the idea that these norms have distinctive normative significance as a 'myth'. And I seek to distinguish these norms from principles about (...)
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  35. Michael E. Bratman (1995). Review of Action, Intention, and Reason by Robert Audi. [REVIEW] Ethics 105 (4):927-.
  36. Michael E. Bratman (1992). Planning and the Stability of Intention. Minds and Machines 2 (1):1-16.
    I sketch my general model of the roles of intentions in the planning of agents like us-agents with substantial resource limitations and with important needs for coordination. I then focus on the stability of prior intentions: their rational resistance to reconsideration. I emphasize the importance of cases in which one's nonreconsideration of a prior intention is nondeliberative and is grounded in relevant habits of reconsideration. Concerning such cases I argue for a limited form of two-tier consequentialism, one that is restricted (...)
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  37. Michael E. Bratman (1989). Intention and Personal Policies. Philosophical Perspectives 3:443-469.
  38. F. A. Y. Brian (1978). Practical Reasoning, Rationality and the Explanation of Intentional Action. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 8 (1):77–101.
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  39. Robert Briscoe (2011). The Elusive Experience of Agency. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against (...)
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  40. Berit Brogaard (2010). Stupid People Deserve What They Get: The Effects of Personality Assessment on Judgments of Intentional Action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):332-334.
    Knobe argues that people’s judgments of the moral status of a side-effect of action influence their assessment of whether the side-effect is intentional. We tested this hypothesis using vignettes akin to Knobe’s but involving economically or eudaimonistically (wellness-related) negative side-effects. Our results show that it is people’s sense of what agents deserve and not the moral status of side-effects that drives intuition.
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  41. Fernando Broncano (2006). Consideraciones epistemológicas acerca del “sentido de agencia”. Epistemological Requirements of the Sense of Agency. Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica 39:7-27.
    We discuss the conditions that the knowledge of an action must meet to reach the status of agency or complete intentional action. A first problem is to account how the subject appears in the action. We consider the model of a "sense of agency" and we oppose a theory of action control that does not take in charge the epistemological problems associated to the sense of agency model. Our claim is that epistemological requirements are intrinsic components of the agency, and (...)
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  42. D. G. Brown (1968). Action. TorontoUniversity Press.
    An essay in descriptive metaphysics, this book offers a sketch of the concept of action embodied in pretheoretical, folk ways of speaking. It focuses on the points of view of the agent and spectator in the kind of action in which the question of what to do can arise for the agent. It explores the relations among such action, inanimate action, and the inanimate action of parts of the body on external objects, finding in them analogous roles for the notion (...)
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  43. Andrei A. Buckareff (2007). Mental Overpopulation and Mental Action: Protecting Intentions From Mental Birth Control. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):49-65.
    Many philosophers of action afford intentions a central role in theorizing about action and its explanation. Furthermore, current orthodoxy in the philosophy of action has it that intentions play a causal role with respect to the etiology and explanation of action. But action theory is not without its heretics. Some philosophers have challenged the orthodox view. In this paper I examine and critique one such challenge. I consider David-Hillel Ruben's case against the need for intentions to play a causal role (...)
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  44. Merry Bullock (ed.) (1991). The Development of Intentional Action: Cognitive, Motivational, and Interactive Processes. Karger.
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  45. S. Buss (2008). Review: What Does the Structure of Intentional Action Tell Us About Our Reasons for Action? [REVIEW] Mind 117 (468):1035-1050.
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  46. Margaret Cameron (2007). Abelard (and Heloise?) On Intention. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):323-338.
    For Abelard, the notion of “intention” (intentio, attentio) plays a central and important role in his cognitive and ethical theories. Is there any philosophicalconnection between its uses in these contexts? In recent publications, Constant Mews has argued that the cognitive and ethical senses of “intention” are related(namely, the cognitive sense evolves into the ethical sense), and that Abelard is repeatedly led to focus on intentions throughout his career due to the influenceof Heloise. Here I evaluate Mews’s arguments by examining and (...)
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  47. L. S. Carrier (1986). Free Will and Intentional Action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.
    I argue for the following analysis of a freely willed action: an act is done of one's own free will, if and only if, it is an intentional act performed by one acting as a rational agent from unobstructed reasons, and so situated that he or she has the capacity to forbear from performing it.
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  48. L. S. Carrier (1976). Perversity. Philosophical Quarterly 26 (104):229-242.
    I argue that there are perverse actions, in the sense that they are acts performed in the belief that they are wrong. They are also, however, acts done in the belief that they are right. What makes them perverse is, not only that they have conflicting motivations, but that the motivation that wins out is not in accord with reason. That is, a perverse act is one resulting from one's strongest motivation but not based on all one's available reasons.
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  49. Hector -Neri Castañeda (1992). Indexical Reference and Bodily Causal Diagrams in Intentional Action. Studia Logica 51 (3-4):439 - 462.
    In this paper, completed only months before his death, the author studies a number of concepts of importance for the analysis of intentional action. Four themes in particular are discussed: the intentionality of action, the practical syllogism, what the author terms the practical causality of practical thinking, and the proximate cause of action. (K. S.).
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  50. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1992). Indexical Reference and Bodily Causal Diagrams in Intentional Action. Studia Logica 51 (3/4):439-462.
    In this paper, completed only months before his death, the author studies a number of concepts of importance for the analysis of intentional action. Four themes in particular are discussed: the intentionality of action, the practical syllogism, what the author terms "the practical causality of practical thinking", and the proximate cause of action. (K. S.).
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