This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
38 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Josep-Maria Terricabras (ed.) (1993). A Wittgenstein Symposium. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Frederick R. Adams, Gary Fuller & Robert A. Stecker (1993). Thoughts Without Objects. Mind and Language 8 (1):90-104.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Pedro Amaral (1987). Descartes' Quartum Quid. Philosophy Research Archives 13:379-409.
    My goal is to illustrate Descartes’ reliance on two quite different and competing interpretations of objective reality by explaining how each is used in defending his causal axioms. The initial criticism comes from Caterus (and is later taken up by Gassendi) who charges that Descartes makes it appear as if the thought in its objective aspect (the intentional entity) is really distinct from the thought qua modification of the mind (i.e., the thought in its formal aspect). This implies that the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Richard E. Aquila (1971). The Status of Intentional Objects. New Scholasticism 45 (3):427-456.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Stephen F. Barker (1982). Intensionality and Intentionality. Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) will not be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Ben Blumson (2009). Images, Intentionality and Inexistence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):522-538.
    The possibilities of depicting non-existents, depicting non-particulars and depictive misrepresentation are frequently cited as grounds for denying the platitude that depiction is mediated by resemblance. I first argue that these problems are really a manifestation of the more general problem of intentionality. I then show how there is a plausible solution to the general problem of intentionality which is consonant with the platitude.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Laurence BonJour (1991). Is Thought a Symbolic Process? Synthese 89 (3):331-52.
  8. Ilaria Canavotto (2013). The problem of intentionality and intentional objects critical analysis of the proposal by Searle and Crane. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 105 (1):17-40.
    Intentionality is traditionally defined as the property of a mental state to be directed at something presented in a particular way. The fact that we can think about objects which do not exist makes this definition problematic: what kind of things are those objects? The aim of this paper is to analyse the definition of intentionality as a relation in theories which do not admit non-existent special entities. In particular, I consider John R. Searle and Tim Crane’s theories of intentionality (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Michael Clark (1965). Intentional Objects. Analysis 25 (January):123-128.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Tim Crane (2006). Brentano's Concept of Intentional Inexistence. In Mark Textor (ed.), The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy. Routledge. 1--20.
    Franz Brentano’s attempt to distinguish mental from physical phenomena by employing the scholastic concept of intentional inexistence is often cited as reintroducing the concept of intentionality into mainstream philosophical discussion. But Brentano’s own claims about intentional inexistence are much misunderstood. In the second half of the 20th century, analytical philosophers in particular have misread Brentano’s views in misleading ways.1 It is important to correct these misunderstandings if we are to come to a proper assessment of Brentano’s worth as a philosopher (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Tim Crane (2001). Intentional Objects. Ratio 14 (4):298-317.
    Is there, or should there be, any place in contemporary philosophy of mind for the concept of an intentional object? Many philosophers would make short work of this question. In a discussion of what intentional objects are supposed to be, John Searle.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Eric Dowling (1970). Intentional Objects, Old and New. Ratio 12 (December):95-107.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Walter Edelberg (2006). Intersubjective Intentional Identity. Journal of Philosophy 103 (10):481-502.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Katalin Farkas (2010). Independent Intentional Objects. In Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way. College Publications.
    Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is based on the idea that the intentional (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jordi Fernandez (2006). The Intentionality of Memory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):39-57.
    The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories or, in other words, to determine what the intentional objects of memory are.1 The issue that will concern us is, then, analogous to the traditional philosophical question of whether perception directly puts us in cognitive contact with entities in the world or with entities in our own minds. As we shall see, there are some interesting aspects of the phenomenology and the epistemology of memory, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Gregory Fitch (1990). Thinking of Something. Noûs 24 (December):675-696.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Ma González Porta & Transzendentaler Objektivismus (2002). Equivocidad del ser y objeto intencional. Kriterion 105:97-118.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Michael Gorman (2006). Talking About Intentional Objects. Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.
    Discusses the old problem of how to characterize apparently intentional states that appear to lack objects. In tandem with critically discussing a recent proposal by Tim Crane, I develop the line of reasoning according to which talking about intentional objects is really a way of talking about intentional states—in particular, it’s a way of talking about their satisfaction-conditions.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. David Miguel Gray (forthcoming). HOT: Keeping Up Appearances? Southern Philosophical Review.
    David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg have recently provided a counter argument to Ned Block’s argument that a Higher Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness cannot accommodate the existence of hallucinatory conscious states (i.e. a conscious episode consisting of a HOT without the presence of a relevant lower order thought). Their counter argument invokes the idea of mental appearances: a non-existent intentional object which is to aid in an account of subjective conscious awareness. I argue that if mental appearances are to (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Alex Grzankowski (2012). Not All Attitudes Are Propositional. European Journal of Philosophy:n/a-n/a.
  22. Uriah Kriegel (2008). The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (1):79-95.
    The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Uriah Kriegel (2007). Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
    How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist?This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving (first) an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal inten- tionality, and (second) the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation (all intentionality derives from phenomenal intentionality). The solution is correspondingly two-part: (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Patrick Madigan (2009). The History of Intentionality: Theories of Consciousness From Brentano to Husserl. By Ryan Hickerson. [REVIEW] Heythrop Journal 50 (3):555-556.
  25. Norman Malcolm (1993). The Mystery of Thought. In Josep-Maria Terricabras (ed.), A Wittgenstein Symposium. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Olivier Massin (2011). Résistance Et Existence [Resistence and Existence]. Etudes de Philosophie 9:275- 310.
    I defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-independence of perceptual objects. In the first part, I address a humean objection against the very possibility of experiencing existential mind-independence. The possibility of an experience of mind-independence being secured, I argue in the second part that the experience of resistance is the only kind of experience by which we directly access existential mind-independence.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Mohan P. Matthen (1988). Biological Functions and Perceptual Content. Journal of Philosophy 85 (January):5-27.
    Perceptions "present" objects as red, as round, etc.-- in general as possessing some property. This is the "perceptual content" of the title, And the article attempts to answer the following question: what is a materialistically adequate basis for assigning content to what are, after all, neurophysiological states of biological organisms? The thesis is that a state is a perception that presents its object as "F" if the "biological function" of the state is to detect the presence of objects that are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Mohan Matthen & Edwin Levy (1984). Teleology, Error, and the Human Immune System. Journal of Philosophy 81 (7):351-372.
    The authors attempt to show that certain forms of behavior of the human immune system are illuminatingly regarded as errors in that system's operation. Since error-ascription can occur only within the context of an intentional/teleological characterization of the system, it follows that such a characterization is illuminating. It is argued that error-ascription is objective, non-anthropomorphic, irreducible to any purely causal form of explanation of the same behavior, and further that it is wrong to regard all errors of the immune system (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Wolfe Mays (1984). Husserl and Intentionality. Philosophical Books 25 (1):25-27.
  30. Colin McGinn (2004). The Objects of Intentionality. In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Abraham I. Melden (1940). Thought and its Objects. Philosophy of Science 7 (October):434-441.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Michelle Montague (2009). The Content of Perceptual Experience. In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
  33. Gary S. Rosenkrantz (1990). Reference, Intentionality, and Nonexistent Entities. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):165-171.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. William W. Rozeboom (1962). Intentionality and Existence. Mind 71 (January):15-32.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Amy M. Schmitter (2009). Making an Object of Yourself: Hume on the Intentionality of the Passions. In Jon Miller (ed.), Topics in Early Modern Philosophy of Mind. Springer Verlag. 223-40.
  36. Alberto Voltolini (2009). Consequences of Schematism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.
    In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Alberto Voltolini (2006). Are There Non-Existent Intentionalia? Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):436-441.
    In his recent book on the philosophy of mind, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are to be conceived as schematic entities, having no particular intrinsic nature. I take this metaphysical thesis as fundamentally correct. Yet in this paper I want to cast some doubts on whether this thesis prevents intentionalia, especially nonexistent ones, from belonging to the general inventory of what there is, as Crane seems to think. If my doubts are grounded, Crane’s treatment of intentionalia may further (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Alberto Voltolini (1991). Objects as Intentional and as Real. Grazer Philosophische Studien 41:1-32.
    A theory of intentionality is outlined, in which the desideratum that the intentional be the same as the real object is argued for in terms of an anti-realist ontology. According to such an ontology, an ordinary object is in itself an object of discourse taken as intentional when posited phenomenologically and as possible when posited naturalistically, i.e. as not existing in some possible worlds but as existing in others. If the actual world is included among the latter, the object deserves (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation