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  1. G. E. M. Anscombe (1965). The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature. In Ronald J. Butler (ed.), Analytic Philosophy. Blackwell.
  2. David M. Armstrong (2004). In Defence of the Cognitivist Theory of Perception. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):19-26.
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  3. David M. Armstrong (1991). Intentionality, Perception, and Causality. In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  4. David M. Armstrong (1991). John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  5. Clare Batty (2010). Scents and Sensibilia. American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):103-118.
    This paper considers what olfactory experience can tell us about the controversy over qualia and, in particular, the debate that focuses on the alleged transparency of experience. The appeal to transparency is supposed to show that there are no qualia—intrinsic, non-intentional and directly accessible properties of experience that determine phenomenal character. It is most commonly used to motivate intentionalism—namely, the view that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its representational content. Although some philosophers claim that transparency holds (...)
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  6. Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (1983). Toward a Different Approach to Perception. International Philosophical Quarterly 23 (March):45-64.
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  7. John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman (2011). A New Framework for Conceptualism. Noûs 45 (1):167-189.
    Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative (...)
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  8. Jacob Berger (2012). Do We Conceptualize Every Color We Consciously Discriminate? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):632-635.
    Mandik (2012)understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of (...)
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  9. David Bourget, Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions of Conscious States.
    In this paper I argue that perceptual ascriptions lend themselves to intensional readings, and that perceptual predicates can denote phenomenal states on such readings. I show that Montague's treatment of quantification in intensional contexts applies to intensional perceptual ascriptions. I conclude with some remarks on the implications of these findings for disjunctive and non-disjunctive theories of perceptual experience.
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  10. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). It’s Not What It Seems. A Semantic Account of ‘Seems’ and Seemings. Inquiry.
    I start out by reviewing the semantics of ‘seem’. As ‘seem’ is a subject-raising verb, ‘it seems’ can be treated as a sentential operator. I look at the semantic and logical properties of ‘it seems’. I argue that ‘It seems’ is a hyperintensional and contextually flexible operator. The operator distributes over conjunction but not over disjunction, conditionals or semantic entailments. I further argue that ‘It seems’ does not commute with negation and does not agglomerate with conjunction. I then show that (...)
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  11. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Perceptual Reports. In Mohan Matthen (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Perceptual reports are utterances of sentences that contain a perceptual verb, such as ‘look’, ‘sound’, ‘feel’, ‘see’, and ‘perceive’. It is natural to suppose that at least in many cases, these types of reports reflect aspects of the phenomenal character and representational content of a subject’s perceptual experiences. For example, an utterance of ‘my chair looks red but it’s really white’ appears to reflect phenomenal properties of the speaker’s experience of a chair. Whether perceptual reports actually reflect these things is (...)
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  12. Derek H. Brown (2010). Locating Projectivism in Intentionalism Debates. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):69-78.
    Intentionalism debates seek to uncover the relationship between the qualitative aspects of experience—phenomenal character—and the intentionality of the mind. They have been at or near center stage in the philosophy of mind for more than two decades, and in my view need to be reexamined. There are two core distinct intentionalism debates that are rarely distinguished (Sect. 1). Additionally, the characterization of spectrum inversion as involving inverted qualities and constant intentional content is mistaken (Sect. 3). These confusions can be witnessed (...)
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  13. Tyler Burge (1991). Vision and Intentional Content. In Ernest LePore & Robert Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Blackwell.
  14. Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
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  15. Robert C. Coburn (1977). Intentionality and Perception. Mind 86 (January):1-18.
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  16. Tim Crane (2009). Is Perception a Propositional Attitude? Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.
    It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I (...)
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  17. Dan D. Crawford (1974). Bergmann on Perceiving, Sensing, and Appearing. American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (April):103-112.
    In this study I am going to present and discuss some of the central themes of Gustav Bergmann's theory of perception. I shall be concerned, however, only with "later Bergmann," that is, with the perceptual theory worked out in a series of essays in which Bergmann shifts from phenomenalism to a form of intentional realism. This label ("intentional realism") indicates the two dominant themes in Bergmann's later thought about perception: perceivings are analyzed as mental acts (thoughts) which are intentionally related (...)
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  18. John Dilworth (2010). Depictive Seeing and Double Content. In Catharine Abell & Katerina Bantinaki (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives on Picturing. Oxford University Press.
    A picture provides both configurational content concerning its design features, and recognitional content about its external subject. But how is this possible, since all that a viewer can actually see is the picture's own design? I argue that the most plausible explanation is that a picture's design has a dual function. It both encodes artistically relevant design content, and in turn that design content encodes the subject content of the picture--producing overall a double content structure. Also, it is highly desirable (...)
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  19. John Dilworth (2007). Representationalism and Indeterminate Perceptual Content. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.
    Representationalists currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve _indeterminate _perceptual content, but a _double content_ (DC) view is more promising. Four related cases of perceptual imprecision are used to outline the DC view, which also applies to imprecise photographic content. Next, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate (...)
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  20. John Dilworth (2006). Perception, Introspection, and Functional Consonance. Theoria 72 (4):299-318.
    What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a _conforming _belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be _red _to oneself--rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be (...)
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  21. John Dilworth (2005). The Double Content of Perception. Synthese 146 (3):225-243.
    Clearly we can perceive both objects, and various aspects or appearances of those objects. But how should that complexity of perceptual content be explained or analyzed? I argue that perceptual representations normally have a double or two level nested structure of content, so as to adequately incorporate information both about contextual aspects Y(X) of an object X, and about the object X itself. On this double content (DC) view, perceptual processing starts with aspectual data Y?(X?) as a higher level of (...)
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  22. John Dilworth (2005). The Perception of Representational Content. British Journal Of Aesthetics 45 (4):388-411.
    How can it be true that one sees a lake when looking at a picture of a lake, since one's gaze is directed upon a flat dry surface covered in paint? An adequate contemporary explanation cannot avoid taking a theoretical stand on some fundamental cognitive science issues concerning the nature of perception, of pictorial content, and of perceptual reference to items that, strictly speaking, have no physical existence. A solution is proposed that invokes a broadly functionalist, naturalistic theory of perception, (...)
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  23. John Dilworth (2005). A Double Content Theory of Artistic Representation. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (3):249–260.
    The representational content or subject matter of a picture is normally distinguished from various non-representational components of meaning involved in artworks, such as expressive, stylistic or intentional factors. However, I show how such non subject matter components may themselves be analyzed in content terms, if two different categories of representation are recognized--aspect indication for stylistic etc. factors, and normal representation for subject matter content. On the account given, the relevant kinds of content are hierarchically structured, with relatively unconceptualized lower level (...)
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  24. John Dilworth (2002). Varieties of Visual Representation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):183-206.
    Pictorial representation is one species of visual representation--but not the only one, I argue. There are three additional varieties or species of visual representation--namely 'structural', 'aspect' and 'integrative' representation--which together comprise a category of 'delineative' rather than depictive visual representation. I arrive at this result via consideration of previously neglected orientational factors that serve to distinguish the two categories. I conclude by arguing that pictures (unlike 'delineations') are not physical objects, and that their multiplicity and modal narrowness motivates a view (...)
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  25. Fabian Dorsch (2011). Transparency and Imagining Seeing. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
    One of the most powerful arguments against intentionalism and in favour of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences has been formulated by M. G. F. Martin in his paper The Transparency of Experience. The overall structure of this argument may be stated in the form of a triad of claims which are jointly inconsistent.
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  26. Fred Dretske (2003). The Intentionality of Perception. In Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  27. John A. Foster (2004). Reply to Armstrong. Harvard Review of Philosophy 12 (1):27-28.
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  28. Craig French (forthcoming). Perceptual Experience and Seeing That P. Synthese.
    I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that p —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that p . And thus we can’t sustain (...)
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  29. Todd Ganson & Ben Bronner (2013). Visual Prominence and Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):405-418.
    A common objection to representationalism is that a representationalist view of phenomenal character cannot accommodate the effects that shifts in covert attention have on visual phenomenology: covert attention can make items more visually prominent than they would otherwise be without altering the content of visual experience. Recent empirical work on attention casts doubt on previous attempts to advance this type of objection to representationalism and it also points the way to an alternative development of the objection.
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  30. Todd Ganson, Ben Bronner & Alex Kerr (forthcoming). Burge's Defense of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A central question, if not the central question, of philosophy of perception is whether sensory states have a nature similar to thoughts about the world, whether they are essentially representational. According to the content view, at least some of our sensory states are, at their core, representations with contents that are either accurate or inaccurate. Tyler Burge’s Origins of Objectivity is the most sustained and sophisticated defense of the content view to date. His defense of the view is problematic in (...)
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  31. Kathrin Glüer (2009). In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience. Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.
    Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. (...)
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  32. Richard Gray (2003). Tye's Representationalism: Feeling the Heat? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):245-256.
    According to Tyes PANIC theory of consciousness, perceptualstates of creatures which are related to a disjunction ofexternal contents will fail to represent sensorily, andthereby fail to be conscious states. In this paper I arguethat heat perception, a form of perception neglected in therecent literature, serves as a counterexample to Tyesradical externalist claim. Having laid out Tyes `absentqualia scenario, the PANIC theory from which it derivesand the case of heat perception as a counterexample, Idefend the putative counterexample against three possibleresponses: (1) (...)
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  33. Jong-Ho Ha (1988). On the Propositional Theory of Perception. Grazer Philosophische Studien 32:205-208.
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  34. Benj Hellie, Visual Form, Attention, and Binocularity.
    This somewhat odd paper argues against a representational view of visual experience using an intricate "inversion" type thought experiment involving double vision: two subjects could represent external space in the same way while differing phenomenally due to different "spread" in their double images. The spatial structure of the visual field is explained not by representation of external space but functionally, in terms of the possible locations of an attentional spotlight. -/- I'm fond of the ideas in this paper but doubt (...)
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  35. Jaakko Hintikka (1969). Models for Modalities. Dordrecht, D. Reidel.
  36. Jaakko Hintikka (1969). The Logic of Perception. In Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), Models for Modalities. Reidel.
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  37. Emmett L. Holman (2003). Sense Experience, Intentionality, and Modularity. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:143-57.
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  38. Dale Jacquette (1984). Sensation and Intentionality. Philosophical Studies 47 (3):229-40.
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  39. John-Michael M. Kuczynski (2004). Some Arguments Against Intentionalism. Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.
    According to a popular doctrine known as "intentionalism," two experiences must have different representational contents if they have different phenomenological contents, in other words, what they represent must differ if what they feel like differs. Were this position correct, the representational significance of a given affect (or 'quale'---plural 'qualia'--to use the preferred term), e.g. a tickle, would be fixed: what it represented would not be a function of the subject's beliefs, past experiences, or other facts about his past or present (...)
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  40. Fiona Macpherson (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, University of Stirling
    This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential (...)
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  41. Fiona Macpherson (1999). Perfect Pitch and the Content of Experience. Philosophy and Anthropology 3 (2).
  42. Norman Malcolm (1983). The Intentionality of Sense-Perception. Philosophical Investigations 6 (July):175-183.
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  43. Edwin Martin Jr (1973). The Intentionality of Observation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (September):121-129.
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  44. Mohan Matthen (2008). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Précis. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):392–399.
    An outline of Seeing, Doing, and Knowing (Oxford, 2005).
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  45. Mohan P. Matthen (2005). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Seeing, Doing, and Knowing is an original and comprehensive philosophical treatment of sense perception as it is currently investigated by cognitive neuroscientists. Its central theme is the task-oriented specialization of sensory systems across the biological domain; these systems coevolve with an organism's learning and action systems, providing the latter with classifications of external objects in terms of sensory categories purpose--built for their need. On the basis of this central idea, Matthen presents novel theories of perceptual similarity, content, and realism. His (...)
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  46. Barry Maund (2003). Perception. Acumen.
  47. Alan Millar (1986). What's in a Look? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86:83-98.
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  48. Boyd Millar (forthcoming). The Phenomenological Problem of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A perceptual experience of a given object seems to make the object itself present to the perceiver’s mind. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) provides a better account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience than does the content view (the view that to perceive is to represent the world to be a certain way). But the naïve realist account of this phenomenology (...)
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  49. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). The Representationalism Versus Relationalism Debate: Explanatory Contextualism About Perception. European Journal of Philosophy.
    There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to representationalism, perceptual states are representations: they represent the world as being a certain way. They have content, which may or may not be different from the content of beliefs. They represent objects as having properties, sometimes veridically, sometimes not. According to relationalism, perception is a relation between the agent and the perceived object. Perceived objects are literally constituents of our perceptual states and not of the contents thereof. Perceptual (...)
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  50. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Explanatory Contextualism About Perception. European Journal of Philosophy.
    There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to representationalism, perceptual states are representations: they represent the world as being a certain way. They have content, which may or may not be different from the content of beliefs. They represent objects as having properties, sometimes veridically, sometimes not. According to relationalism, perception is a relation between the agent and the perceived object. Perceived objects are literally constituents of our perceptual states and not of the contents thereof. Perceptual (...)
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  51. Thomas Natsoulas (1977). On Perceptual Aboutness. Behaviorism 5:75-97.
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  52. Douglas Odegard (1972). Anscombe, Sensation and Intentional Objects. Dialogue 11 (March):69-77.
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  53. Pacherie (1999). Leibhaftigkeit and Representational Theories of Perception. In Naturalizing Phenomenology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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  54. Adam Pautz (2010). An Argument for the Intentional View of Visual Experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press.
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  55. Adam Pautz (2007). Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):495-541.
    H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness.
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  56. Adam Pautz (2006). Sensory Awareness is Not a Wide Physical Relation: An Empirical Argument Against Externalist Intentionalism. Noûs 40 (2):205-240.
  57. Ryan Perkins & Tim Bayne (2013). Representationalism and the Problem of Vagueness. Philosophical Studies 162 (1):71-86.
    This paper develops a novel problem for representationalism (also known as "intentionalism"), a popular contemporary account of perception. We argue that representationalism is incompatible with supervaluationism, the leading contemporary account of vagueness. The problem generalizes to naive realism and related views, which are also incompatible with supervaluationism.
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  58. Ian Phillips (2005). Experience and Intentional Content. Dissertation, Oxford University
    Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its Intentional content. Strong or Pure Anti-Intentionalism is the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual experience can be exhaustively characterized solely by reference to its non-Intentional properties. In Chapters One and Two, I consider how best to delineate the opposition between these positions. I reject various characterizations of the distinction, in particular, that it can be (...)
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  59. Oliver Rashbrook (forthcoming). An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that ‘a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession’. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption I call the ‘Seems→Seemed’ claim. I then show that commitment to this assumption comes at a price: if we accept it, we either (...)
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  60. Edward S. Reed (1983). Two Theories of the Intentionality of Perceiving. Synthese 54 (January):85-94.
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  61. Georges Rey (2004). A Deflated Intentionalist Alternative to Clark's Unexplanatory Metaphysics. Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):519-540.
    Throughout his discussion, Clark speaks constantly of phenomenal and qualitative properties. But properties, like any other posited entities, ought to earn their explanatory keep, and this I don't think Clark's phenomenal or qualitative properties actually do. I argue that all the work he enlists for them could be done better by purely intentional contents of our sentient states; that is, they could better be regarded as mere intentional properties, not real ones. Clark eschews such intentionalism, but I see no reason (...)
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  62. Steven L. Reynolds (2000). The Argument From Illusion. Noûs 34 (4):604-621.
  63. Howard M. Robinson (1974). The Irrelevance of Intentionality to Perception. Philosophical Quarterly 24 (October):300-315.
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  64. Ronald W. Ruegsegger (1980). The Propositional Attitude in Perception. Philosophy Research Archives 1408.
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  65. Joseph Runzo (1977). The Propositional Structure of Perception. American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (July):211-220.
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  66. Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Perceptual Content Defended. Noûs 45 (4):714-750.
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience has content apply only to (...)
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  67. Robert Schroer (2012). Representationalism and the Scene-Immediacy of Visual Experience: A Journey to the Fringe and Back. Philosophical Psychology 25 (4):595 - 615.
    Both visual experience and conscious thought represent external objects, but in visual experience these objects seem present before the mind and available for direct access in a way that they don?t in conscious thought. In this paper, I introduce a couple of challenges that this ?Scene-Immediacy? of visual experience raises for traditional versions of Representationalism. I then identify a resource to which Representationalists can appeal in addressing these challenges: the low-detail fringe of visual experience. I argue that low-detail contents within (...)
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  68. John R. Searle (1991). Response: Perception and the Satisfactions of Intentionality. In John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  69. John R. Searle (1991). John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  70. Nicholas Silins (2011). Seeing Through the 'Veil of Perception'. Mind 120 (478):329-367.
    Suppose our visual experiences immediately justify some of our beliefs about the external world — that is, justify them in a way that does not rely on our having independent reason to hold any background belief. A key question now arises: Which of our beliefs about the external world can be immediately justified by experiences? I address this question in epistemology by doing some philosophy of mind. In particular, I evaluate the following proposal: if your experience e immediately justifies you (...)
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  71. Alison Simmons (1999). Are Cartesian Sensations Representational? Noûs 33 (3):347-369.
  72. A. D. Smith (2008). Translucent Experiences. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):197--212.
    This paper considers the claim that perceptual experience is “transparent”, in the sense that nothing other than the apparent public objects of perception are available to introspection by the subject of such experience. I revive and strengthen the objection that blurred vision constitutes an insuperable objection to the claim, and counter recent responses to the general objection. Finally the bearing of this issue on representationalist accounts of the mind is considered.
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  73. Barry Smith (ed.) (2003). John Searle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This is the only comprehensive introduction to Searle's work, and as such it will be of particular value to advanced undergraduates, graduates and professionals ...
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  74. Ernest Sosa (1986). Experience and Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 14 (1):67-83.
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  75. Jeff Speaks (2009). Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
    I argue that the transparency of experience provides the basis of arguments both for intentionalism -- understood as the view that there is a necessary connection between perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology -- and for the view that the contents of perceptual experiences are Russellian propositions. While each of these views is popular, there are apparent tensions between them, and some have thought that their combination is unstable. In the second half of the paper, I respond to these worries by (...)
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  76. William C. Swabey (1924). The Phenomenology of Experience and Psychologism. Philosophical Review 33 (1):51-66.
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  77. R. Thomason (1973). Perception and Individuation. In M. Munitz (ed.), Logic and Ontology. New York University Press.
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  78. Charles S. Travis (2004). The Silence of the Senses. Mind 113 (449):57-94.
    There is a view abroad on which (a) perceptual experience has (a) representational content in this sense: in it something is represented to the perceiver as so. On the view, a perceptual experience has a face value at which it may be taken, or which may be rejected. This paper argues that that view is mistaken: there is nothing in perceptual experience which makes it so that in it anything is represented as so (except insofar as the perceiver represents things (...)
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  79. Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Noûs 41 (1):589 - 613.
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. (...)
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  80. Michael Tye (1992). Visual Qualia and Visual Content. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
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  81. Godfrey N. A. Vesey (1966). Miss Anscombe on the Intentionality of Sensation. Analysis 26 (March):135-137.
  82. Sebastian Watzl (2011). Attention as Structuring of the Stream of Consciousness. In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays.
    This paper defends and develops the structuring account of conscious attention: attention is the conscious mental process of structuring one’s stream of consciousness so that some parts of it are more central than others. In the first part of the paper, I motivate the structuring account. Drawing on a variety of resources I argue that the phenomenology of attention cannot be fully captured in terms of how the world appears to the subject, as well as against an atomistic conception of (...)
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  83. Dan Zahavi (1994). Intentionality and the Representative Theory of Perception. Man and World 27 (1):37-47.