Bookmark and Share

Intentionality

Edited by Robert Rupert (University of Colorado, Boulder, University of Edinburgh)
About this topic
Summary Intentionality is a property possessed by representational states or states with content or meaning, their property of being about something. Mental states appear most prominently among the inventory of intentional items, being directed toward such varied objects as historical events, people, and numbers. When a person believes that Hitler led the Nazis, her belief is about Hitler and about the Nazis. Philosophical work on intentionality ranges from phenomenological investigations of the experience of having thoughts about objects -- including nonexistent ones -- to investigations of the semantics of sentences used to attribute mental states, to the physical or causal determinants of the semantic values of mental representations. This category subsumes work in all of these areas, as well as work in cognitive science on concepts, symbolic representations, and mental images and work in consciousness studies on the intentionality of phenomenal states (such as the what-it's-like to see red).
Key works As part of a proposal for distinguishing the subject matter of psychology from that of the physical sciences, Franz Brentano (Brentano 1874/1973) claimed that intentionality is the mark of the mental and is present in mental states themselves (not a function of their relation to something beyond the psychological realm). Although this focus on internally accessible intentional objects may have comported well enough with the introspectionist psychology of Brentano's day and may have grounded rich phenomenological projects (e.g., Husserl 1980), the rise of behaviorist psychology tended, in the Anglophone world of analytic philosophy, to work against Brentano's approach and its close cousins. Instead, many of the most influential English-language works of the twentieth century marginalized or re-interpreted intentional claims (Ryle 1949, Quine 1956). Later parts of the twentieth century, however, saw the cognitivist revolution in the empirical study of the mind and the widespread rejection of philosophical behaviorism, and these developments led to renewed interest in mental representation and, accordingly, in intentionality, particularly in the promise that we might best understand intentionality as a physical, scientifically respectable phenomenon. Thus began efforts to "naturalize" intentionality, by grounding it in information-related, nomic, causal, or evolutionary facts (Dretske 1981Fodor 1990, and Millikan 1984 provide exemplary efforts of these sorts). Recent years have seen attempts to locate intentionality closer to where Brentano and the phenomenologists envisioned, as something directly experienced in, or as an intrinsic property of, conscious thought (see, e.g., Horgan & Tienson 2002, Kriegel 2007).
Introductions Rupert 2008Fodor 1985Adams & Aizawa 2010Crane 1998Margolis & Laurence 1999
  Show all references
Related categories
Subcategories:
History/traditions: Intentionality
7214 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 7214
Material to categorize
  1. N. G. A. & C. L. (2004). Présentation. Diogène 208 (4):2.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Andrew Lee Aavatsmark (1999). Individuation and Explanation in Cognitive Psychology. Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    Individualism is the view that psychological kinds must be defined only in terms of the internal properties of individual subjects. The argument for this view is that anything external to the individual cannot have any causal explanatory relevance to that individual's behavior. This assumes that to be scientific, psychology must individuate mental states by causally relevant properties. But I argue first, that this rules out individuating them by any sort of representational content. Second, if taken seriously, it entails that only (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. B. Abbott (1996). Gilles Fauconnier, Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning Construction in Natural Language. Minds and Machines 6:239-242.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Marshall David Abrams (2002). Probabilistic Foundations of Teleology and Content. Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    Ruth Millikan and others advocate theories which attempt to naturalize wide mental content in terms of functions, where the latter are in turn based in part on facts concerning past natural selection. While I support basing content on functions which are constituted by facts about the past, I argue that it is a mistake to base content on selection. This dissertation works out an alternative concept of function which is a more appropriate basis for a theory of mental content. In (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Bruce Abramson (1991). On Knowledge Representation in Belief Networks. In B. Bouchon-Meunier, R. R. Yager & L. A. Zadeh (eds.), Uncertainty in Knowledge Bases. Springer. 86--96.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Juan J. Acero (1996). Attitudes, Content and Identity: A Dynamic View. In J. Ezquerro A. Clark (ed.), Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning. Kluwer. 135--158.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Gilbert Achcar (2003). Présentation. Actuel Marx 1 (1):7-10.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Diana Ackerman (1980). Natural Kinds, Concepts, and Propositional Attitudes. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):469-486.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Laird Addis (2008). Ryle and Intentionality. Metaphysica 10 (1):49-63.
    After some opening comments on how I think one should approach the philosophy of mind, I look at what relatively little Gilbert Ryle had to say explicitly about intentionality, that occurring almost exclusively in his several papers on phenomenology. Then, I discuss the notion of intentionality with respect to the doctrines of The Concept of Mind, although neither the word nor the idea, strictly speaking, appears anywhere in the book. Following more exposition of my own views, including an argument I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Laird Addis (1983). Natural Signs. Review of Metaphysics 36 (3):543 - 568.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Frederick J. Adelmann (1964). Intentionality in Brentano. Modern Schoolman 41 (4):375-383.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Mortimer J. Adler (1967). Intentionality and Immateriality. New Scholasticism 41 (3):312-344.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Hicham-Stéphane Afeissa (2006). Présentation. Philosophie 90 (2):3.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Kathleen Akins (2002). A Question of Content. In Andrew Brook & Don Ross (eds.), Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press. 206.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Kathleen Alison Akins (1989). On Piranhas, Narcissism and Mental Representation: An Essay on Intentionality and Naturalism. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    This dissertation is motivated by the following question: Is the portrayal of mind/brain processes as representations--as entities that in some sense reflect, correspond with, or symbolize the world--particularily apt? Through detailed examples from the neuroscientific literature, with an emphasis on sensory processing, I argue that this way of viewing brain functioning is typically misleading. It depicts neural functioning as a bipartite process: first the production of a set of neural "calibrational" states with properties in the world, and then their interpretation (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Colin Frederick Allen (1989). Attributing Intentional States to Animals: Philosophical Issues Arising in Cognitive Ethology. Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    The naturalistic theory of mind that arises from ethology is faced with the question of continuity between human mind and animal mind. In particular, the applicability of intentional, mentalistic terms to animals arises. I argue that cognitive ethologists can and should operate with a realistic conception of intentional states in animals. ;I start by considering arguments claiming to show that the attribution of intentional states presents special difficulties in the case of animals, because the contents of such states cannot be (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Éric Alliez (2006). Présentation. Multitudes 2 (2):13-17.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Robert Almeder (1995). Dretske's Dreadful Question. Philosophia 24 (3-4):449-457.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Charles Altieri (2001). Representation, Representativeness, and Non-Representational Art. In Ananta Charana Sukla (ed.), Art and Representation: Contributions to Contemporary Aesthetics. Praeger. 243.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Majid Amini (2011). Fodor and the Impossibility of Learning. In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Erich Ammereller (1995). Wittgenstein on Intentionality.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Se-Gweon An (1990). Intentionality, Time, and Self-Identity: Husserl's Theory of Time and the Problem of Personal Identity. Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
    In this dissertation I raise three questions: What is Husserl's theory of time?; Can we develop a particular thesis of self-identity and, if so, what would it look like?; How does the thesis work in relation to the problems that are to be solved? ;In chapter II, I give an exposition of Husserl's view on time with the purpose of establishing a framework that will play a decisive role in the formation of a thesis of self-identity. Husserl defines time as (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Jaynie Anderson (2010). Présentation. Diogène 231 (3):3.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. G. E. M. Anscombe, Cora Diamond & Jenny Teichman (eds.) (1979). Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe. Cornell University Press.
  25. Mauro Antonelli (2012). Franz Brentano’s Intentionality Thesis. In A. Salice (ed.), Intentionality: Historical and Systematic Perspectives. Philosophia Verlag.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. L. Antony (1990). Cummins, R., "Meaning and Menta,L Representation". [REVIEW] Mind 99:637.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Michael Verne Antony (1990). Consciousness, Content, and Cognitive Architecture. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    This thesis consists of three essays in the philosophy of mind. Essay 1 contains an argument against functionalist theories of consciousness. The argument exploits an intuition to the effect that parts of an individual's brain that are not in use at a time t, can have no bearing whatever on whether that individual is conscious at t. After presenting the argument, I defend it against two possible objections, and then distinguish it from two arguments which appear, on the surface, to (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Richard E. Aquila (1987). Peacocke's Thoughts. Inquiry 30 (1 & 2):195 – 205.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Richard E. Aquila (1985). "Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind" by John R. Searle. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1):159.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Dan Arbib (2009). Présentation. Les Etudes Philosophiques 4 (4):451-453.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Tannis Y. Arbuckle & Louise Aznavour (1973). Effectiveness of Supplied Mediators in Relation to Presentation Modality and Retrieval Cue. Journal of Experimental Psychology 98 (2):286.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz (1999). Are Meanings in the Head? Ingarden’s Theory of Meaning. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 30 (3):306-326.
    The title question should be construed as an epistemological and not ontological one. Omitting the difficult problems of the ontology of intentionality we will ask, if all, what is needed to explain the phenomenon of meaningful use of words, could be found “in our private head” interpreted as a sphere of specific privileged access, the sphere that is in the relevant epistemological sense subjective, private or non public. There are many “mentalistic” theories of meaning that force us to the answer: (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Stewart Arneil (1989). Intentionality and the Foundational Triad of Computationalism.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Mark Aronszajn (1991). What Are Thoughts? Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    In this dissertation, I investigate a conception of thoughts figuring in ordinary discourse, and argue that this conception is an improvement over a certain standard conception employed in current philosophical and linguistic endeavors. ;In Chapter 2, I discuss the leading principles of the standard conception, a conception according to which thoughts in general are to be identified with propositions. I also briefly preview some of the main features that distinguish the conception developed in the course of this study from the (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. P. Sven Arvidson (2013). Restructuring Attentionality and Intentionality. Human Studies 36 (2):199-216.
    Phenomenology and experimental psychology have been largely interested in the same thing when it comes to attention. By building on the work of Aron Gurwitsch, especially his ideas of attention and restructuration, this paper attempts to articulate common ground in psychology and phenomenology of attention through discussion of a new way to think about multistability in some phenomena. What psychology views as an attentionality-intentionality phenomenon, phenomenology views as an intentionality-attentionality phenomenon. The proposal is that an awareness of this restructuring of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Olav Asheim (1992). Reference and Intentionality. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Henri Atlan (1994). Intentionality in Nature. Against an All-Encompassing Evolutionary Paradigm: Evolutionary and Cognitive Processes Are Not Instances of the Same Process. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (1):67–87.
    Three examples of theoretical analysis of evolutionary processes are presented. It is shown that the mechanisms involved have little to do with cognitive processes except for superficial and formal analogies. That is the case not only for classical models of adaptive evolution , but also for more recent ones making use of neural network computation and self-organization theories.Recent works on functional self-organization exhibiting some features of intentionality are discussed in this context. It is argued that Dennett's intentional stance cannot be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Catherine Audard (2006). Presentation. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3:281-283.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Joseph L. Austerweil & Thomas L. Griffiths (2010). Learning Hypothesis Spaces and Dimensions Through Concept Learning. In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. 73--78.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. William H. Austin (1987). Arthur Peacocke: "Intimations of Reality". [REVIEW] The Thomist 51 (1):194.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Iep Author, Intentionality.
    Intentionality If I think about a piano, something in my thought picks out a piano. If I talk about cigars, something in my speech refers to cigars. This feature of thoughts and words, whereby they pick out, refer to, or are about things, is intentionality. In a word, intentionality is aboutness. Many mental states exhibit […].
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Tal Miller Aviran (2003). On Content and Truth-Conditions. Dissertation, University of Alberta (Canada)
    The purpose of this dissertation is to come-up with a theory of mental content as a causally efficacious property. It is claimed that such a notion of mental content needs to satisfy seven desiderata: mental content has to be a causal-nomic property, that is, one which is subsumed by causal-laws. mental content has to determine causal processes which are isomorphic to its semantic liaisons. mental content has to be an atomistic or molecularistic property: it cannot be a holistic property. mental (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Anita Avramides (1989). Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism Lynne Rudder Baker Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Pp. 190. $19.95 (U.S.), $9.95 (U.S.) Paper. [REVIEW] Dialogue 28 (04):693-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. M. R. Ayers (1972). Some Thoughts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73:69 - 86.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Georges Azzaria & Castets-Renard (2012). Présentation. Éthique Publique (vol. 14, n° 2).
    Les textes composant le dossier thématique de ce numéro abordent quelques facettes de la relation qu’entretiennent les technologies numéri­ques avec l’éthique. L’emprise des technologies sur une grande partie des activités humaines est aujourd’hui difficilement contestable et le monde numérique comporte son lot de pratiques et de règles, parfois en rupture avec les modèles existants. Dans ce contexte, comment faire en sorte que les diverses manifestations du numérique respectent l’éthique et,..
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. F. E. B. (1960). The New Testament Documents--Are They Reliable? Review of Metaphysics 14 (1):170-170.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. J. P. Bahsoun, P. Fares & C. Servières (forthcoming). Multilevel Proof System for Concurrent Object-Oriented Systems 2de France-Japan Workshop on Object Based Parallel and Distributed Computing October 1997. Hermes.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Lynne Rudder Baker (1991). [Book Review] Saving Belief, a Critique of Physicalism. [REVIEW] Criminal Justice Ethics 10 (4):27-40.
  49. Lynne Rudder Baker (1984). "Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality" Edited by Andrew Woodfield. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (1):137.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. T. Baldwin (1985). Stalnaker, R. C., "Inquiry". [REVIEW] Mind 94:627.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 7214