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Material to categorize
- Kelly Alberts (1987). Intentionality and First Person Reference. Philosophy Research Archives 13:613-636.
- W. B. Barton (1963). Intentionality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):14-19.
- Noam Chomsky (1994). Naturalism and Dualism in the Study of Language and Mind. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2):181 – 209.
- Jordi Fernandez (forthcoming). Objects of Memory. In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Publications.
- Jordi Fernandez (2008). Memory and Time. Philosophical Studies 141 (3):333 - 356.
- Jordi Fernandez (2008). Memory, Past and Self. Synthese 160 (1):103-121.
- Jordi Fernandez (2006). The Intentionality of Memory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):39-57.
- Peter Geach (1957). Mental Acts. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Philip A. Glotzbach (1983). Referential Inscrutablility, Perception, and the Empirical Foundation of Meaning. Philosophy Research Archives 9:535-569.
- Paul Katsafanas (2011). Activity and Passivity in Reflective Agency. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 6. Oxford.
- Wolfe Mays (1984). Husserl and Intentionality. Philosophical Books 25 (1):25-27.
- M. Montague (2010). Recent Work on Intentionality. Analysis 70 (4):765-782.
- G. E. Moore (1899). The Nature of Judgment. Mind 8 (30):176-193.
- Walter Ott (forthcoming). What is Locke's Theory of Representation? British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
- Maria E. Reicher (2002). Negative Facts, Ideal Meanings, and Intentionality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1):181-191.
- David M. Rosenthal (1987). Intentionality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):151-184.
- Bertrand Russell (1910). Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:108--28.
- Aaron Allen Schiller (2007). Psychological Nominalism and the Plausibility of Sellars's Myth of Jones. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):435-454.
- John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
- Russ Shafer-Landau (2006). Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3. Oxford University Press.
- Sydney Shoemaker (1990). Book Review. The Intentional Stance. D Dennett. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):212-16.
- Nigel J. T. Thomas, Attitude and Image, or, What Will Simulation Theory Let Us Eliminate?
- Charles Travis (1991). Annals of Analysis. Mind 100 (398):237-264.
- William Turnbull & Jeremy I. M. Carpendale (1999). Locating Meaning in Interaction, Not in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (2):304-305.
- Crispin Wright (1989). Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy, and Intention. Journal of Philosophy 86 (11):622-634.
- Kathleen Akins (1996). Perception. Oxford University Press.
- Lynne Rudder Baker (1996). Science and the Attitudes: A Reply to Sanford. Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):187-189.
- Lynne Rudder Baker (1995). Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind. Cambridge University Press.
- Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
- Richard Bradley (2008). Comparing Evaluations. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1part1):85-100.
- John Broome (1991). Desire, Belief and Expectation. Mind 100 (2):265-267.
- Delilah Caldwell (2009). The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):812 – 816.
- Roberto Casati & Elena Pasquinelli (2007). How Can You Be Surprised? The Case for Volatile Expectations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2).
- Quassim Cassam (2010). Judging, Believing and Thinking. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):80-95.
- Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987). Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing. Philosophical Perspectives 1:405-454.
- Lenny Clapp (2002). Davidson's Program and Interpreted Logical Forms. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (3):261-297.
- Sean Crawford (2008). Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes: Quine Revisited. Synthese 160 (1):75 - 96.
- Mark Crimmins (1992). Context in the Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (2):185 - 198.
- Donald Davidson (1968). On Saying That. Synthese 19 (1-2):130--46.
- Willem deVries, Sellars, Animals, and Thought. Problems From Sellars.
- Walter Edelberg (1992). Intentional Identity and the Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (6):561 - 596.
- Donald Fisher (1909). Common Sense and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 6 (12):316-323.
- Graeme Forbes (2000). Objectual Attitudes. Linguistics and Philosophy 23 (2):141-183.
- John Gibbons (2001). Knowledge in Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):579-600.
- David Landy (2005). Inside Doubt: On the Non-Identity of the Theory of Mind and Propositional Attitude Psychology. Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.
- Kirk Ludwig & Greg Ray (1998). Semantics for Opaque Contexts. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):141--66.
The Language of Thought
- Barbara Abbott (1995). Thinking Without English. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):49 - 55.
- Louise M. Antony, What Are You Thinking? Character and Content in the Language of Thought.
- Noga Arikha (2005). Deafness, Ideas and the Language of Thought in the Late 1600s. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):233 – 262.
- Jay David Atlas, Some Remarks on Jerry Fodor's Arguments for a Language of Thought.
- Murat Aydede, Language of Thought Hypothesis: State of the Art.
- Murat Aydede (2005). Computation and Functionalism: Syntactic Theory of Mind Revisited. In G. Irzik & G. Guezeldere (eds.), Turkish Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science. Springer.
- Murat Aydede, The Language of Thought Hypothesis. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Murat Aydede (1997). Language of Thought: The Connectionist Contribution. Minds and Machines 7 (1):57-101.
- Murat Aydede (1995). Connectionism and the Language of Thought. CSLI Technical Report.
- Lynne Rudder Baker (1990). Seeming to See Red. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):121-128.
- Jon Barwise (1987). Unburdening the Language of Thought. Mind and Language 2 (1):82-96.
- Ansgar Beckermann (1994). Can There Be a Language of Thought? In G. White, B. Smith & R. Casati (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky.
- José Luis Bermúdez (2003). Thinking Without Words. Oxford University Press.
- Derek Bickerton (2005). Language First, Then Shared Intentionality, Then a Beneficent Spiral. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):691-692.
- Ben Blumson (forthcoming). Mental Maps1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:no-no.
- Laurence A. BonJour (1991). Is Thought a Symbolic Process? Synthese 89 (3):331-52.
- David Braddon-Mitchell & J. Fitzpatrick (1990). Explanation and the Language of Thought. Synthese 83 (1):3-29.
- James Cargile (2010). The Language of Thought Revisited. Analysis 70 (2):359-367.
- P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (1998). Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press.
- David J. Chalmers (1999). Is There Synonymy in Ockham's Mental Language. In P. V. Spade (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge.
- Hugh Clapin (1997). Problems with Principle P. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):261-77.
- David Cole (2009). Jerry Fodor, Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited , New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, X+228, $37.95, Isbn 978-0-119-954877-. Minds and Machines 19 (3):439-443.
- David J. Cole, Pinker on the Thinker: Against Mentalese Monopoly.
- Josep E. Corbí (1993). Classical and Connectionist Models: Levels of Description. Synthese 95 (2):141 - 168.
- Tim Crane (1990). The Language of Thought: No Syntax Without Semantics. Mind and Language 5 (3):187-213.
- Martin Davies (1998). Language, Thought, and the Language of Thought (Aunty's Own Argument Revisited). In P. Carruthers & J. Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought. Cambridge University Press.
- Daniel C. Dennett (1990). Granny's Campaign for Safe Science. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
- Richard DeWitt (1995). Vagueness, Semantics, and the Language of Thought. Psyche 1 (1):--.
- Charles E. M. Dunlop (1990). Conceptual Dependency as the Language of Thought. Synthese 82 (2):275-96.
- M. F. Egan (1991). Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (September):379-88.
- James H. Fetzer (2002). Consciousness Evolving. John Benjamins.
- Hartry Field (1978). Mental Representation. Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-18.
- J. A. Fodor (1985). Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: The Intelligent Auntie's Vade-Mecum. Mind 94 (373):76-100.
- Jerry A. Fodor (2008). Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford University Press.
- Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Why There Still has to Be a Language of Thought. In Psychosemantics. MIT Press.
- Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
- Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (1996). Two Spurious Varieties of Compositionality. Minds and Machines 6 (2):159-72.
- Jay L. Garfield (1997). Mentalese Not Spoken Here: Computation, Cognition, and Causation. Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):413-35.
- James W. Garson (1998). Chaotic Emergence and the Language of Thought. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):303-315.
- Christopher Gauker (1998). Are There Wordlike Concepts Too? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):70-71.
- Hans-Johann Glock (2010). Reviews Lot 2: The Language of Thought Revisited by Jerry A. Fodor Oxford University Press, 2008. Philosophy 85 (1):164-167.
- Larry Hauser (1995). Natural Language and Thought: Doing Without Mentalese. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):41-47.
- Richard Horsey (2001). Definitions: Implications for Syntax, Semantics, and the Language of Thought, by Annabel Cormack. Mind and Language 16 (3):345–349.
- Kent Johnson (2004). On the Systematicity of the Language of Thought. Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):111-139.
- Lawrence J. Kaye (1995). The Languages of Thought. Philosophy of Science 62 (1):92-110.
- Jonathan Knowles (1998). The Language of Thought and Natural Language Understanding. Analysis 58 (4):264-272.
- Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis (1997). Regress Arguments Against the Language of Thought. Analysis 57 (1):60-66.
- Stephen Leeds (2002). Perception, Transparency, and the Language of Thought. Noûs 36 (1):104-129.
- Joseph Levine (1988). Demonstrating in Mentalese. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.
- Eric Lormand, Connectionist Languages of Thought.
- Michael Losonsky (1992). Leibniz's Adamic Language of Thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (4).
- Edouard Machery (2005). You Don't Know How You Think: Introspection and Language of Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):469-485.
- Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (2002). Lewis's Strawman. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):55-65.
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