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Siblings:History/traditions: Intentionality, Misc
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  1. A. Abraham, M. Werning, H. Rakoczy, D. Von Cramon & R. Schubotz (2008). Minds, Persons, and Space: An fMRI Investigation Into the Relational Complexity of Higher-Order Intentionality. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):438-450.
    Mental state reasoning or theory-of-mind has been the subject of a rich body of imaging research. Although such investigations routinely tap a common set of regions, the precise function of each area remains a contentious matter. With the help of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we sought to determine which areas are involved when processing mental state or intentional metarepresentations by focusing on the relational aspect of such representations. Using non-intentional relational representations such as spatial relations between persons and between (...)
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  2. Laird Addis (1989). Natural Signs: A Theory of Intentionality. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
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  3. Lilli K. Alanen (1992). Thought-Talk: Descartes and Sellars on Intentionality. American Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1):19-34.
  4. Richard E. Aquila (1989). Intentionality, Content, and Primitive Mental Directedness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):583-604.
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  5. Edward G. Armstrong (1977). Intersubjective Intentionality. Midwestern Journal of Philosophy 5:1-11.
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  6. Stephen F. Barker (1982). Intensionality and Intentionality. Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
    This paper proposes interpretations of the vexed notions of intensionality and intentionality and then investigates their resulting interrelations.The notion of intentionality comes from Brentano, in connection with his view that it can help us understand the mental. Setting aside Husserl’s basic definition of intentionality as not quite in line with Brentano’s explanatory purpose, this paper proposes that intentionality be defined in terms of inexistence and indeterminacy.It results that Brentano’s thesis (that all and only mental phenomena are intentional) will not be (...)
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  7. W. B. Barton Jr (1963). Intentionality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):14-19.
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  8. P. William Bechtel (1978). Indeterminacy and Intentionality: Quine's Purported Elimination of Propositions. Journal of Philosophy 75 (November):649-661.
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  9. David Beisecker (1999). The Importance of Being Erroneous: Prospects for Animal Intentionality. Philosophical Topics 27 (1):281-308.
    The question of animal belief (or animal intentionality) often degenerates into a frustrating and unproductive exchange. Foes of animal intentionality point out that non-linguistic animals couldn’t possibly possess the kinds of mental states we linguistic beings enjoy. They claim that linguistic ability enables us to become sensitive to intensional contexts or to the states of mind of others in a way that is unavailable to the non-linguistic, and that would be necessary for proper attributions of intentionality. To attribute mental states (...)
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  10. Gustav Bergmann (1955). Intentionality. Archivio Di Filosofia 3:177-216.
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  11. Claudia Bianchi (2013). How to Do Things with (Recorded) Words. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):485-495.
    The aim of this paper is to evaluate which context determines the illocutionary force of written or recorded utterances—those involved in written texts, films and images, conceived as recordings that can be seen or heard in different occasions. More precisely, my paper deals with the “metaphysical” or constitutive role of context—as opposed to its epistemic or evidential role: my goal is to determine which context is semantically relevant in order to fix the illocutionary force of a speech act, as distinct (...)
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  12. Akeel Bilgrami (1989). Realism Without Internalism: A Critique of Searle on Intentionality. Journal of Philosophy 86 (February):57-72.
  13. Alexandre Billon (2011). My Own Truth ---Pathologies of Self-Reference and Relative Truth. In Rahman Shahid, Primiero Giuseppe & Marion Mathieu (eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, Vol. 23. springer.
    emantic pathologies of self-reference include the Liar (‘this sentence is false’), the Truth-Teller (‘this sentence is true’) and the Open Pair (‘the neighbouring sentence is false’ ‘the neighbouring sentence is false’). Although they seem like perfectly meaningful declarative sentences, truth value assignment to their uses seems either inconsistent (the Liar) or arbitrary (the Truth-Teller and the Open-Pair). These pathologies thus call for a resolution. I propose such a resolution in terms of relative-truth: the truth value of a pathological sentence use (...)
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  14. Larry L. Blackman (2002). Mind as Intentionality Alone. Metaphysica 3 (2):41-64.
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  15. Andrea Bonomi (1986). A Problem About Intentionality. Topoi 5 (September):91-100.
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  16. Lisa Bortolotti (2006). Moral Rights and Human Culture. Ethical Perspectives 13 (4):603-620.
    In this paper I argue that there is no moral justification for the conviction that rights should be reserved to humans. In particular, I reject James Griffin’s view on the moral relevance of the cultural dimension of humanity. Drawing from the original notion of individual right introduced in the Middle Ages and the development of this notion in the eighteenth century, I emphasise that the practice of according rights is justified by the interest in safeguarding the powers of reason and (...)
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  17. Johannes L. Brandl (2005). The Immanence Theory of Intentionality. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 167.
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  18. Franz Brentano (1944). Psychologie du Point de Vue Empirique. Montaigne.
  19. Franz Brentano (1874/1973/1973). Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge.
  20. Franz Brentano (1874). Psychologie Vom Empirischen Standpunkte. Duncker & Humblot.
  21. Stuart C. Brown (1963). Intentionality Intensified. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (October):357-360.
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  22. Alex Byrne (forthcoming). Intentionality. In J. Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.
    Some things are _about_, or are _directed on_ , or _represent_, other things. For example, the sentence 'Cats are animals' is about cats (and about animals), this article is about intentionality, Emanuel Leutze's most famous painting is about Washington's crossing of the Delaware, lanterns hung in Boston's North Church were about the British, and a map of Boston is about Boston. In contrast, '#a$b', a blank slate, and the city of Boston are not about anything. Many mental states and events (...)
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  23. Castaneda Calderon & Hector Neri (eds.) (1966). Intentionality, Minds, And Perception. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
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  24. Roderick M. Chisholm (1989). The Formal Structure of the Intentional: A Metaphysical Study. Brentano Studien 1:11-18.
    What is the metaphysical significance of what Brentano has shown us about intentionality? It is the fact that intentional phenomena have logical or structural features that are not shared by what is not psychological. It was typical of British empiricism, particularly that of Hume, to suppose that consciousness is essentially sensible. The objects of consciousness were thought to be primarily such objects as sensations and their imagined or dreamed counterparts. In the Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Brentano makes clear that intentional (...)
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  25. Roderick M. Chisholm (1984). The Primacy of the Intentional. Synthese 61 (October):89-110.
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  26. Roderick M. Chisholm (1973). Homeless Objects. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 22.
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  27. Roderick M. Chisholm (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to develop a terminological structure in which private perceptions can be discussed publicly without bringing into existence the usual unnecessary philosophical problems of confused usage of language. chisholm displays an appraisive, quasi-ethical use of language, whereby he claims that a thing has some particular sensible property is to have adequate evidence that it actually does have that property. (staff).
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  28. Roderick M. Chisholm (1954). On the Uses of Intentional Words. Journal of Philosophy 51 (July):436-440.
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  29. Caleb Cohoe (2013). Why the Intellect Cannot Have a Bodily Organ: De Anima 3.4. Phronesis 58 (4):347-377.
    I reconstruct Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ. I present Aristotle’s account of the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive states, both perceptual and intellectual. On my interpretation, Aristotle’s account is based around the notion of cognitive powers taking on forms in a special preservative way. Based on this account, Aristotle argues that no physical structure could enable a bodily part or combination of bodily parts to produce or determine the full range of forms that (...)
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  30. James W. Cornman (1964). The Extent of Intentionality. Philosophical Quarterly 14 (October):355-357.
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  31. James W. Cornman (1962). Intentionality and Intensionality. Philosophical Quarterly 12 (January):44-52.
    Certain philosophers have held the thesis of the unity of science. As often conceived, the thesis has two parts: the thesis of physicalism and the thesis of extensionality. For each of these two parts there is an outstanding problem, i.e. the problem of intentionality and the problem of intensionality respectively. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to make explicit the nature of these two problems, and second, to show to what extent they can be said to be the (...)
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  32. Christian Coseru (2012). Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    What turns the continuous flow of experience into perceptually distinct objects? Can our verbal descriptions unambiguously capture what it is like to see, hear, or feel? How might we reason about the testimony that perception alone discloses? Christian Coseru proposes a rigorous and highly original way to answer these questions by developing a framework for understanding perception as a mode of apprehension that is intentionally constituted, pragmatically oriented, and causally effective. By engaging with recent discussions in phenomenology and analytic philosophy (...)
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  33. Christian Coseru (2009). Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Perhaps no other classical philosophical tradition, East or West, offers a more complex and counter-intuitive account of mind and mental phenomena than Buddhism. While Buddhists share with other Indian philosophers the view that the domain of the mental encompasses a set of interrelated faculties and processes, they do not associate mental phenomena with the activity of a substantial, independent, and enduring self or agent. Rather, Buddhist theories of mind center on the doctrine of no-self (Pāli anatta, Skt.[1] anātma), which postulates (...)
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  34. Tim Crane (ed.) (1998). Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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  35. Tim Crane (2007). Review of Gbor Forrai, George Kampis (Eds.), Intentionality: Past and Future. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (1).
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  36. Tim Crane (1998). Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental. In , Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which (...)
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  37. Tim Crane (ed.) (1996). Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge.
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  38. Sean Crawford (2006). Object-Dependent Thoughts. In Keith Brown (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd ed.
  39. Suzanne Cunningham (1997). Two Faces of Intentionality. Philosophy of Science 64 (3):445-460.
    Theories of intentionality need to account for non-cognitive states like emotions as well as cognitive states like beliefs. When certain non-cognitive states are included, one can formulate a feasible physicalist account of intentionality that highlights its evolutionary roots. I argue that recent experimental data support just such a move.
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  40. Adrian Cussins (1992). Content, Embodiment, and Objectivity: The Theory of Cognitive Trails. Mind 101 (404):651-88.
  41. David Davies (1992). Perspectives on Intentional Realism. Mind and Language 7 (3):264-285.
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  42. Kim Davies (1982). Intentionality: Spontaneous Ascription and Deep Intuition. Analysis 42 (June):169-171.
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  43. Daniel C. Dennett & John Haugeland (1987). Intentionality. In Richard L. Gregory (ed.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press. 139-143.
    Intentionality is aboutness. Some things are about other things: a belief can be about icebergs, but an iceberg is not about anything; an idea can be about the number 7, but the number 7 is not about anything; a book or a film can be about Paris, but Paris is not about anything. Philosophers have long been concerned with the analysis of the phenomenon of intentionality, which has seemed to many to be a fundamental feature of mental states and events.
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  44. Ezio Di Nucci (2013). Mindlessness. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    Thinking is overrated: golfers perform best when distracted and under pressure; firefighters make the right calls without a clue as to why; and you are yourself ill advised to look at your steps as you go down the stairs, or to try and remember your pin number before typing it in. Just do it, mindlessly. Both empirical psychologists and the common man have long worked out that thinking is often a bad idea, but philosophers still hang on to an intellectualist (...)
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  45. Richard Double (1984). Searle's Answer to 'Hume's Problem'. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):435-438.
    John searle has recently claimed to have dissolved what daniel dennett calls 'hume's problem'--The question whether the explanation of behavior by appeal to mental representations can be done without circularity or infinite regress. Searle argues that a careful analysis of the concept of an intentional state shows that mental representations do not require intentional "homunculi" to explain how intentional states have their contents, And, Hence dennett's worry is groundless. I argue that searle's conceptual analysis of intentional states, Even if correct, (...)
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  46. Fred Dretske (1980). The Intentionality of Cognitive States. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):281-294.
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  47. John J. Drummond (2012). 5 Imagination and Appresentation, Sympathy and Empathy in Smith And. In Christel Fricke & Dagfinn Føllesdal (eds.), Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl. Ontos Verlag. 8--117.
  48. Katalin Farkas (2009). Not Every Feeling is Intentional. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):39 - 52.
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  49. Hartry Field (1986/2001). Stalnaker on Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's Inquiry. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (April):98-112.
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  50. W. Tecumseh Fitch (2008). Nano-Intentionality: A Defense of Intrinsic Intentionality. Biology and Philosophy 23 (2):157-177.
    I suggest that most discussions of intentional systems have overlooked an important aspect of living organisms: the intrinsic goal-directedness inherent in the behaviour of living eukaryotic cells. This goal directedness is nicely displayed by a normal cell’s ability to rearrange its own local material structure in response to damage, nutrient distribution or other aspects of its individual experience. While at a vastly simpler level than intentionality at the human cognitive level, I propose that this basic capacity of living things provides (...)
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