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Intentions

Edited by Santiago Amaya (Universidad de Los Andes)
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  1. T. Aho (1989). Intention Varhaishistoria. Ajatus 46:87-99.
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  2. G. E. M. Anscombe, Cora Diamond & Jenny Teichman (eds.) (1979). Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe. Cornell University Press.
  3. Mark P. Aulisio (1995). In Defense of the Intention/Foresight Distinction. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):341 - 354.
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  4. Bruce Aune (1966). Intention and Foresight. Journal of Philosophy 63 (20):652-654.
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  5. G. B. (1958). Intention. Review of Metaphysics 12 (1):142-142.
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  6. Annette Baier (1979). Action Theory. Grazer Philosophische Studien 9:185-198.
  7. Jodie A. Baird & Janet Wilde Astington (2005). The Complexities of Intention. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford University Press
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  8. John A. Bargh (1994). The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and Control in Social Cognition. In R. Wyer & T. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum
  9. Mark J. Barker (2012). Aquinas on Internal Sensory Intentions. International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):199-226.
    This paper suggests several summa genera for the various meanings of intentio in Aquinas and briefly outlines the genera of cognitive intentiones. It presents the referential and existential nature of intentions of harm or usefulness as distinguished from external sensory or imaginary forms in light of Avicenna’s threefold sensory abstraction. The paper offers a terminological clarification regarding the quasi-immaterial existential status of intentions. Internal sensory intentions account for a way in which one perceives something, as is best seen in light (...)
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  10. Monroe C. Beardsley (1980). Motives and Intentions. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:71-79.
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  11. Monroe C. Beardsley (1978). Intending. In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Philosophical Review. Boston: D. Reidel 163--184.
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  12. T. Blakeley (1961). Values and Intentions. Philosophical Studies 11:271-272.
  13. V. Blankenship (1985). The Dynamics of Intention. In Michael Frese & John Sabini (eds.), Goal Directed Behavior: The Concept of Action in Psychology. L. Erlbaum Associates 161--170.
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  14. Emma Borg (2006). Intention-Based Semantics. In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press 250--266.
    There is a sense in which it is trivial to say that one accepts intention- (or convention-) based semantics.[2] For if what is meant by this claim is simply that there is an important respect in which words and sentences have meaning (either at all or the particular meanings that they have in any given natural language) due to the fact that they are used, in the way they are, by intentional agents (i.e. speakers), then it seems no one should (...)
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  15. James M. Brown (1982). Action & Interpretation. Philosophical Studies 29:349-351.
  16. E. Brugger (2005). Action, Intention and Self-Determination. Vera Lex 6 (1/2):79-106.
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  17. Ann Bumpus (2000). Aiming and Intending. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):581-595.
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  18. D. Canter (1985). Intention, Meaning and Structure: Social Action in its Physical Context. In G. P. Ginsburg, Marylin Brenner & Mario von Cranach (eds.), Discovery Strategies in the Psychology of Action. Academic Press 35--171.
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  19. William H. Capitan (1964). The Artist's Intention. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 18 (68/69):323-34.
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  20. Robert Champigny (1959). Main Intentions in the Use of Language. Journal of Philosophy 56 (12):528-533.
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  21. David Charles (1989). Intention. In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Norwell: Kluwer 33--52.
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  22. Ewing Y. Chinn (1977). Intentional Actions and Their Side Effects. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):161-171.
  23. Randy K. Chiu (2003). Ethical Judgment and Whistleblowing Intention: Examining the Moderating Role of Locus of Control. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 43 (1-2):65-74.
    The growing body of whistleblowing literature includes many studies that have attempted to identify the individual level antecedents of whistleblowing behavior. However, cross-cultural differences in perceptions of the ethicality of whistleblowing affect the judgment of whistleblowing intention. This study ascertains how Chinese managers/professionals decide to blow the whistle in terms of their locus of control and subjective judgment regarding the intention of whistleblowing. Hypotheses that are derived from these speculations are tested with data on Chinese managers and professionals. (...)
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  24. Randolph Clarke (2010). Intentional Omissions. Noûs 44 (1):158-177.
    It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
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  25. Michael Cohen (1982). Intention and Intentionality. Philosophical Books 23 (1):30-32.
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  26. Niel Henk Conradie, Towards a Convincing Account of Intention.
    Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014.
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  27. Michael J. Costa (1986). Acting Intentionally and Minimal Abilities. Analysis 46 (3):144 - 147.
  28. Margaret A. Cuonzo (2008). Gossip: An Intention-Based Account. Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (1):131–140.
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  29. G. D. (1973). Motive and Intention. Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):139-139.
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  30. Jonathan Dancy (2000). Intention and Permissibility, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):319–338.
    [T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does (...)
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  31. David Davies (2005). Intentions et signification de l'énonciation. Philosophiques 32 (1):83-99.
    J’évalue de manière critique un certain nombre de thèses concernant la façon dont l’intention peut compléter ou supplanter la convention dans une théorie de l’interprétation. Je soutiens que la signification de l’énonciation ne peut être identifiée aux intentions du locuteur, qu’elles soient réelles ou attribuées. Ou bien l’identification de la signification de l’énonciation aux intentions réelles ne réussit pas à attribuer un rôle déterminant véritable à ces intentions, ou bien elle échoue à rendre compte de la manière dont ces intentions (...)
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  32. Maximilian De Gaynesford (ed.) (2011). Agents and Their Actions. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface.1. Reasons for Action and Practical Reasoning (Maria Alvarez).2. Ambivalence and Authentic Agency (Laura W. Ekstrom).3. The Road to Larissa (John Hyman).4. What is the Content of an Intention in Action? (John McDowell).5. Joseph Raz Being in the World (Joseph Raz).6. Moral Scepticism and Agency (Kant and Korsgaard Robert Stern).7. Speech, Action and Uptake (Maximilian de Gaynesford).Index.
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  33. Laura DeHelian & Edward F. McClennen (1993). Planning and the Stability of Intention: A Comment. Minds and Machines 3 (3):319-333.
    Michael Bratman''s restricted two-tier approach to rationalizing the stability of intentions contrasts with an alternative view of planning, for which all of the following claims are made: (a) it shares with Bratman''s restricted two-tier approach the virtue of reducing the magnitude of Smart''s problem; (2) it, rather than the unrestricted two-tier approach, is what is argued for in McClennen (1990); (3) there does not appear to be anything in the central analysis that Bratman has provided of plans and intentions (both (...)
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  34. Ulrich Diehl (2012). Jaspers on Drives, Wants and Volitions. Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Karl-Jaspers-Gesellschaft 25:101-125.
    In § 6 of his General Psychopathology (1st edition 1913) Jaspers distinguished between drives, wants and volitions as three different and irreducible kinds of motivational phenomena which are involved in human decision making and which may lead to successful actions. He has characterized the qualitative differences between volitions in comparison with basic vital drives and emotional wants such as being (a.) intentional, (b.) content-specific and (b.) directed towards concrete objects and actions as goals. Furthermore, Jaspers has presented and discussed three (...)
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  35. Dylan Dodd (2005). Intentions, Plans, and Weakness of Will. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):45-52.
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  36. C. F. Douglass (2003). Rationality in Action by John Searle. Auslegung 26 (2):106-112.
  37. R. Dunn (2000). BRATMAN, ME-Faces of Intention. Philosophical Books 41 (2):127-128.
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  38. A. J. Ellis (1974). Intention and Interpretation in Literature. British Journal of Aesthetics 14 (4):315-325.
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  39. Peter A. Facione (1973). Meaning and Intending. American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (4):277 - 287.
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  40. Daniel M. Farrell (1992). Immoral Intentions. Ethics 102 (2):268-286.
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  41. Luca Ferrero (2015). Ludwig on Conditional Intentions. Methode 4 (6):61-74.
    In this paper, I discuss Ludwig's systematic and illuminating account of conditional intentions, with particular reference to my own view (presented in "Conditional Intentions", Noûs, 2009). In contrast to Ludwig, I argue that we should prefer a formal characterization of conditional intentions rather than a more substantial one in terms of reasons for action (although the conditions that qualify an intention bear on the reasonableness and justifiability of the intention). I then defend a partially different taxonomy of the conditions that (...)
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  42. Luca Ferrero (2015). Pro-Tempore Disjunctive Intentions. In Roman Altshuler & MIchael J. Sigrist (eds.), Time and The Philosophy of Action. Routledge
    I investigate the structure of pro-tempore disjunctive intentions: intentions directed at two or more eventually incompatible goals that are nonetheless kept open for the time being, while the agent is waiting to acquire more information to determine which option is better. These intentions are the basic tool for balancing, in our planning agency, rigidity and flexibility, stability and responsiveness to changing circumstances. They are a pervasive feature of intentional diachronic agency and contribute to secure dynamic consistency in our plans. I (...)
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  43. Luca Ferrero (2014). Diachronic Structural Rationality. Inquiry 57 (3):311-336.
    In this paper I investigate whether there are genuine and irreducible pressures of diachronic rationality grounded on the structure of the subject rather than on substantive considerations, such as pragmatic ones. I argue that structural pressures of diachronic rationality have a limited scope. The most important pressure only tells against arbitrary interference with the mechanisms for the retention of attitudes over time. I then argue that in the practical case, a substantial account in terms of the agent's temporal identity appears (...)
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  44. Luca Ferrero (2013). Can I Only Intend My Own Actions? In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Action and Responsibility. Oxford University Press (1) 70-94.
    In this paper, I argue against the popular philosophical thesis---aka the ‘own action condition’---that an agent can only intend one’s own actions. I argue that the own action condition does not hold for any executive attitude, intentions included. The proper object of intentions is propositional rather than agential (‘I intend that so-and-so be the case’ rather than ‘I intend to do such-and-such’). I show that, although there are some essential de se components in intending, they do not restrict the content (...)
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  45. Luca Ferrero (2012). Diachronic Constraints of Practical Rationality. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):144-164.
    In this paper, I discuss whether there are genuinely *diachronic* constraints of practical rationality, that is, pressures on combinations of practical attitudes over time, which are not reducible to mere synchronic rational pressures. Michael Bratman has recently argued that there is at least one such diachronic rational constraint that governs the stability of intentions over time. *Pace* Bratman, I argue that there are no genuinely diachronic constraints on intentions that meet the stringent desiderata set by him. But I show that (...)
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  46. Luca Ferrero (2010). Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (2):1-23.
    It is often argued that future-directed decisions are effective at shaping our future conduct because they give rise, at the time of action, to a decisive reason to act as originally decided. In this paper, I argue that standard accounts of decision-based reasons are unsatisfactory. For they focus either on tie-breaking scenarios or cases of self-directed distal manipulation. I argue that future-directed decisions are better understood as tools for the non-manipulative, intrapersonal division of deliberative labor over time. A future-directed decision (...)
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  47. Luca Ferrero (2010). Decisions, Diachronic Autonomy, and the Division of Deliberative Labor. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (2):1-23.
    It is often argued that future-directed decisions are effective at shaping our future conduct because they give rise, at the time of action, to a decisive reason to act as originally decided. In this paper, I argue that standard accounts of decision-based reasons are unsatisfactory. For they focus either on tie-breaking scenarios or cases of self-directed distal manipulation. I argue that future-directed decisions are better understood as tools for the non-manipulative, intrapersonal division of deliberative labor over time. A future-directed decision (...)
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  48. Luca Ferrero (2009). Action. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell 137-151.
  49. Luca Ferrero (2009). What Good Is a Diachronic Will? Philosophical Studies 144 (3):403 - 430.
    There are two standard conceptions of the functioning of and rationale for the diachronic will, i.e., for an agent's capacity to settle on her future conduct in advance. According to the pragmatic-instrumentalist view, the diachronic will benefits us by increasing the long-term satisfaction of our rational preferences. According to the cognitive view, it benefits us by satisfying our standing desire for self-knowledge and self-understanding. Contrary to these views, I argue for a constitutive view of the diachronic will: the rationale for (...)
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  50. Luca Ferrero (2006). Three Ways of Spilling Ink Tomorrow. In E. Baccarini & S. Prijic-Samarzija (eds.), Rationality in Belief and Action. Rijeka 95-127.
    There are three ways to control our future conduct: by causing it, by manipulating our future selves, or by taking future-directed decisions. I show that the standard accounts of future-directed decisions fail to do justice to their distinctive contribution in intentional diachronic agency. The standard accounts can be divided in two categories: First, those that conflate the operation of decisions with that of devices for either physical constraint or manipulative self-management. Second, accounts that, although they acknowledge the non-manipulative nature (...)
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