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  1. Chrisoula Andreou (2008). The Newxin Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):415 - 422.
    A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer (...)
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  2. G. E. M. Anscombe, Cora Diamond & Jenny Teichman (eds.) (1979). Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe. Cornell University Press.
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  3. Robert Audi (1991). Intention, Cognitive Commitment, and Planning. Synthese 86 (3):361 - 378.
    This paper defends a cognitive-motivational account of intending against recent criticism by J. Garcia, connects intending with a number of other concepts important in the theory of action — including decison, volition, and planning — and explores some principles of intention transfer construed as counterparts of epistemic principles governing closure for belief and justification. Several routes to intention formation are described; the role of intentions in planning is examined; and a holistic conception of intention formation and change is stressed. The (...)
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  4. Robert Audi (1988). Deliberative Intentions and Willingness to Act: A Reply to Professor Mele. Philosophia 18 (2-3):243-245.
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  5. Bruce Aune (1990). Action, Inference, Belief, and Intention. Philosophical Perspectives 4:247-271.
  6. Annette C. Baier (1977). The Intentionality of Intentions. Review of Metaphysics 30 (3):389 - 414.
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  7. Annette C. Baier (1970). Act and Intent. Journal of Philosophy 67 (19):648-658.
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  8. John A. Bargh (1994). The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and Control in Social Cognition. In R. Wyer & T. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  9. Renée Bilodeau (2006). The Motivational Strength of Intentions. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:129-135.
    According to the early versions of the causal theory of action, intentional actions were both produced and explained by a beliefdesire pair. Since the end of the seventies, however, most philosophers consider intentions as an irreducible and indispensable component of any adequate account of intentional action. The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate some of the arguments that gave rise to the introduction of the concept of intention in action theory. My contention is that none of them (...)
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  10. Emma Borg (2006). Intention-Based Semantics. In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 250--266.
    There is a sense in which it is trivial to say that one accepts intention- (or convention-) based semantics.[2] For if what is meant by this claim is simply that there is an important respect in which words and sentences have meaning (either at all or the particular meanings that they have in any given natural language) due to the fact that they are used, in the way they are, by intentional agents (i.e. speakers), then it seems no one should (...)
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  11. Richard Bradley & Christian List (2009). Desire-as-Belief Revisited. Analysis 69 (1):31-37.
    On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very different kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they play very (...)
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  12. Michael Bratman (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for (...)
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  13. Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia (2014). Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
    Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, (...)
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  14. S. S. C. (1971). The Nature of Intention. Review of Metaphysics 25 (1):132-133.
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  15. Cristiano Castelfranchi & Fabio Paglieri (2007). The Role of Beliefs in Goal Dynamics: Prolegomena to a Constructive Theory of Intentions. Synthese 155 (2):237 - 263.
    In this article we strive to provide a detailed and principled analysis of the role of beliefs in goal processing—that is, the cognitive transition that leads from a mere desire to a proper intention. The resulting model of belief-based goal processing has also relevant consequences for the analysis of intentions, and constitutes the necessary core of a constructive theory of intentions, i.e. a framework that not only analyzes what an intention is, but also explains how it becomes what it is. (...)
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  16. Randy K. Chiu (2003). Ethical Judgment and Whistleblowing Intention: Examining the Moderating Role of Locus of Control. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 43 (1-2):65 - 74.
    The growing body of whistleblowing literature includes many studies that have attempted to identify the individual level antecedents of whistleblowing behavior. However, cross-cultural differences in perceptions of the ethicality of whistleblowing affect the judgment of whistleblowing intention. This study ascertains how Chinese managers/professionals decide to blow the whistle in terms of their locus of control and subjective judgment regarding the intention of whistleblowing. Hypotheses that are derived from these speculations are tested with data on Chinese managers and professionals (n = (...)
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  17. Randolph Clarke (2010). Intentional Omissions. Noûs 44 (1):158-177.
    It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
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  18. Margaret A. Cuonzo (2008). Gossip: An Intention-Based Account. Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (1):131–140.
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  19. Jonathan Dancy (2000). Intention and Permissibility, II. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):319–338.
    [T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person (or refrain from giving him treatment that he needs in order to survive) because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is (...)
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  20. Maximilian De Gaynesford (ed.) (2011). Agents and Their Actions. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Machine generated contents note: Preface.1. Reasons for Action and Practical Reasoning (Maria Alvarez).2. Ambivalence and Authentic Agency (Laura W. Ekstrom).3. The Road to Larissa (John Hyman).4. What is the Content of an Intention in Action? (John McDowell).5. Joseph Raz Being in the World (Joseph Raz).6. Moral Scepticism and Agency (Kant and Korsgaard Robert Stern).7. Speech, Action and Uptake (Maximilian de Gaynesford).Index.
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  21. Laura DeHelian & Edward F. McClennen (1993). Planning and the Stability of Intention: A Comment. Minds and Machines 3 (3):319-333.
    Michael Bratman''s restricted two-tier approach to rationalizing the stability of intentions contrasts with an alternative view of planning, for which all of the following claims are made: (a) it shares with Bratman''s restricted two-tier approach the virtue of reducing the magnitude of Smart''s problem; (2) it, rather than the unrestricted two-tier approach, is what is argued for in McClennen (1990); (3) there does not appear to be anything in the central analysis that Bratman has provided of plans and intentions (both (...)
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  22. Ulrich Diehl (2012). Jaspers on Drives, Wants and Volitions. Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Karl-Jaspers-Gesellschaft 25:101-125.
    In § 6 of his General Psychopathology (1st edition 1913) Jaspers distinguished between drives, wants and volitions as three different and irreducible kinds of motivational phenomena which are involved in human decision making and which may lead to successful actions. He has characterized the qualitative differences between volitions in comparison with basic vital drives and emotional wants such as being (a.) intentional, (b.) content-specific and (b.) directed towards concrete objects and actions as goals. Furthermore, Jaspers has presented and discussed three (...)
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  23. Dylan Dodd (2005). Intentions, Plans, and Weakness of Will. Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):45-52.
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  24. Walter Freeman (2008). Nonlinear Brain Dynamics and Intention According to Aquinas. Mind and Matter 6 (2):207-234.
    We humans and other animals continuously construct and main- tain our grasp of the world by using astonishingly small snippets of sensory information. Recent studies in nonlinear brain dynamics have shown how this occurs: brains imagine possible futures and seek and use sensory stimulation to select among them as guides for chosen actions. On the one hand the scientific explanation of the dynamics is inaccessible to most of us. On the other hand the philosophical foundation from which the sciences grew (...)
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  25. Margaret Gilbert (2009). Shared Intention and Personal Intentions. Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
    This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people (...)
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  26. Grant Gillett (2009). Intention, Autonomy, and Brain Events. Bioethics 23 (6):330-339.
    Informed consent is the practical expression of the doctrine of autonomy. But the very idea of autonomy and conscious free choice is undercut by the view that human beings react as their unconscious brain centres dictate, depending on factors that may or may not be under rational control and reflection. This worry is, however, based on a faulty model of human autonomy and consciousness and needs close neurophilosophical scrutiny. A critique of the ethics implied by the model takes us towards (...)
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  27. Michael Gorr (1996). Should the Law Distinguish Between Intention and (Mere) Foresight? Legal Theory 2 (4):359-380.
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  28. Michael Gorr & Terence Horgan (1982). Intentional and Unintentional Actions. Philosophical Studies 41 (2):251 - 262.
  29. Maurita J. Harney (1984). Intentionality, Sense and the Mind. Distributors for the U.S. And Canada, Kluwer Academic.
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  30. Allan Hazlett (2012). Reasons for Action. Edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall. (Cambridge UP, 2009. Pp. 288. Price £53 (Hardcover), £21.99 (Paperback).). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):413-415.
  31. Larry A. Hickman (1980). Modern Theories of Higher Level Predicates: Second Intentions in the Neuzeit. Philosophia.
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  32. Wiebe van Der Hoek, Wojciech Jamroga & Michael Wooldridge (2007). Towards a Theory of Intention Revision. Synthese 155 (2):265 - 290.
    Although the change of beliefs in the face of new information has been widely studied with some success, the revision of other mental states has received little attention from the theoretical perspective. In particular, intentions are widely recognised as being a key attitude for rational agents, and while several formal theories of intention have been proposed in the literature, the logic of intention revision has been hardly considered. There are several reasons for this: perhaps most importantly, intentions are very closely (...)
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  33. Richard Holton (2009). Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford University Press.
    Richard Holton provides a unified account of intention, choice, weakness of will, strength of will, temptation, addiction, and freedom of the will.
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  34. Richard Holton (2004). Rational Resolve. Philosophical Review 113 (4):507-535.
    Empirical findings suggest that temptation causes agents not only to change their desires, but also to revise their beliefs, in ways that are not necessarily irrational. But if this is so, how can it be rational to maintain a resolution to resist? For in maintaining a resolution it appears that one will be acting against what one now believes to be best. This paper proposes a two-tier account according to which it can be rational neither to reconsider the question of (...)
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  35. Richard Holton (1999). Intention and Weakness of Will. Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241-262.
    Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgement. It is argued that this is a mistake. Weakness of will consists in a quite different failing, namely an over-ready revision of one's intentions. Building on the work of Bratman, an account of such over-ready revision is given. A number of examples are then adduced showing how weakness of will, so understood, differs from akrasia.
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  36. Richard Holton (1993). Intention Detecting. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (172):298-318.
    Crispin Wright has argued that our concept of intention is extension-determining, and that this explains why we are so good at knowing our intentions: it does so by subverting the idea that we detect them. This paper has two aims. The first is to make sense of Wright's claim that intention is extension-determining; this is achieved by comparing his position to that of analytic functionalism. The second is to show that it doesn't follow from this that we do not detect (...)
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  37. J. F. Horty & M. E. Pollack, Evaluating New Options in the Context of Existing Plans.
    This paper contributes to the foundations of a theory of rational choice for artificial agents in dynamic environments. Our work is developed within a theoretical framework, originally due to Bratman, that models resource-bounded agents as operating against the background of some current set of intentions, which helps to frame their subsequent reasoning. In contrast to the standard theory of rational choice, where options are evaluated in isolation, we therefore provide an analysis of situations in which the options presented to an (...)
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  38. J. F. M. Hunter (1978). Intending. Published for the Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy by Dalhousie University Press.
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  39. Gary Iseminger (ed.) (1992). Intention and Interpretation. Temple University Press.
    " The essays, mostly commissioned by the editor, explore the presuppositions and consequences of arguing for the importance of the author's intentions in the ...
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  40. Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis (eds.) (2010). Hegel on Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This volume focuses on Hegel's philosophy of action in connection to current concerns. Including key papers by Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, and John McDowell, as well as eleven especially commissioned contributions by leading scholars in the field, it aims to readdress the dialogue between Hegel and contemporary philosophy of action. Topics include: the nature of action, reasons and causes; explanation and justification of action; social and narrative aspects of agency; the inner and the outer; the relation between intention, planning, and (...)
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  41. Paisley Livingston (2005). Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press.
    In Art and intention Paisley Livingston develops a broad and balanced perspective on perennial disputes between intentionalists and anti-intentionalists in philosophical aesthetics and critical theory. He surveys and assesses a wide range of rival assumptions about the nature of intentions and the status of intentionalist psychology. With detailed reference to examples from diverse media, art forms, and traditions, he demonstrates that insights into the multiple functions of intentions have important implications for our understanding of artistic creation and authorship, the ontology (...)
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  42. Emiliano Lorini & Andreas Herzig (2008). A Logic of Intention and Attempt. Synthese 163 (1):45 - 77.
    We present a modal logic called (logic of intention and attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of , we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.
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  43. Christoph Lumer (2013). The Volitive and the Executive Function of Intentions. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):511-527.
    Many philosophers of action, including Bratman and Mele, conceive intentions functionally, as executive states: intentions are mental states that represent an action and tend to cause this action. In the philosophical tradition (e.g. for Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Leibniz, Kant) another function of intentions, which may be called “volitive”, played a much more prominent role: intentions are mental states that represent what kind of actions we want and prefer to be realised and thus, in a possibly rational way, synthesise our motivational, (...)
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  44. Christoph Lumer (2005). Intentions Are Optimality Beliefs – but Optimizing What? Erkenntnis 62 (2):235 - 262.
    In this paper an empirical theory about the nature of intention is sketched. After stressing the necessity of reckoning with intentions in philosophy of action a strategy for deciding empirically between competing theories of intention is exposed and applied for criticizing various philosophical theories of intention, among others that of Bratman. The hypothesis that intentions are optimality beliefs is defended on the basis of empirical decision theory. Present empirical decision theory however does not provide an empirically satisfying elaboration of the (...)
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  45. Ausonio Marras (ed.) (1972). Intentionality, Mind, And Language. London: University Of Illinois Press.
    Chisholm, R. M. Sentences about believing.--Cornman, J. W. Intentionality and intensionality.--Marras, A. Intentionality and cognitive sentences.--Chisholm, R. M. Notes on the logic of believing.--Luce, D. R., Sleigh, R. C., and Chisholm, R. M. Discussion on "Notes on the logic of believing."--Lycan, W. G. On intentionality and the psychological.--Hempel, C. G. Logical analysis of psychology.--Carnap, R. Logical foundations of the unity of science.--Nagel, T. Physicalism.--Ryle, G. Dispositions.--Sellars, W. Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.--Chisholm, R. M. and Sellars, W. The Chisholm-Sellars correspondence (...)
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  46. Hugh McCann (1995). Intention and Motivational Strength. Journal of Philosophical Research 20:571-583.
    One of the principal preoccupations of action theory is with the role of intention in the production of action. It should be expected that this role would be important, since an item of behavior appears to count as action just when there is some respect in which it is intended by the agent. This being the case, an account of the function of intention should provide insight into how human action might differ from other sorts of events, what the foundations (...)
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  47. Hugh J. McCann (1998). The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom. Cornell University Press.
    In these essays, Hugh J. McCann develops a unified perspective on human action. Written over a period of twenty-five years, the essays provide a comprehensive survey of the major topics in contemporary action theory. In four sections, the book addresses the ontology of action; the foundations of action; intention, will, and freedom; and practical rationality. McCann works out a compromise between competing perspectives on the individuation of action; explores the foundations of action and defends a volitional theory; argues for a (...)
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  48. Hugh J. McCann (1989). Intending and Planning: A Reply to Mele. Philosophical Studies 55 (1):107 - 110.
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  49. John McDowell (2010). What is the Content of an Intention in Action? Ratio 23 (4):415-432.
    On the view proposed, the content of an intention in action is given by what one would say in expressing it, and the proper form for expressing such an intention is a statement about what one is doing: e.g. ‘I am doing such-and-such’. By contrast, some think that there are normative or evaluative elements to the content of an intention in action which would be left out of a form that merely stated facts. They think that the appropriate way to (...)
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  50. Conor McHugh (2012). Control of Belief and Intention. Thought 1 (4):337-346.
    This paper considers a view according to which there are certain symmetries between the nature of belief and that of intention. I do not defend this Symmetry View in detail, but rather try to adjudicate between different versions of it: what I call Evaluative, Normative and Teleological versions. I argue that the central motivation for the Symmetry View in fact supports only a specific Teleological version of the view.
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