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  1. Leslie Allan, The Principle of Double Effect.
    Absolutist systems of ethics have come in for harsh criticism on a number of fronts. The Principle of Double Effect was formulated by Catholic ethicists to overcome such objections. In this essay, Leslie Allan addresses four of the most prominent problems faced by an absolutist ethic and evaluates the extent to which the Principle of Double Effect is successful in avoiding or mitigating these criticisms.
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  2. Bp Allen (1989). Fear, Arousal, and Intentions to Take Action Against Nuclear-War. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 27 (6):503-503.
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  3. Facundo M. Alonso (2016). A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention. Journal of Social Ontology 2 (2):271–302.
    In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose (...)
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  4. William P. Alston (1986). An Action-Plan Interpretation of Purposive Explanations of Actions. Theory and Decision 20 (3):275-299.
  5. Michael L. Anderson, Time-Situated Agency: Active Logic and Intention Formation.
    In recent years, embodied cognitive agents have become a central research focus in Cognitive Science. We suggest that there are at least three aspects of embodiment| physical, social and temporal|which must be treated simultaneously to make possible a realistic implementation of agency. In this paper we detail the ways in which attention to the temporal embodiment of a cognitive agent (perhaps the most neglected aspect of embodiment) can enhance the ability of an agent to act in the world, both in (...)
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  6. Chrisoula Andreou (2014). Temptation, Resolutions, and Regret. Inquiry 57 (3):275-292.
    Discussion of temptation has figured prominently in recent debates concerning instrumental rationality. In light of some particularly interesting cases in which giving in to temptation involves acting in accordance with one’s current evaluative rankings, two lines of thought have been developed: one appeals to the possibility of deviating from a well-grounded resolution, and the other appeals to the possibility of being insufficiently responsive to the prospect of future regret. But the current appeals to resolutions and regret and some of the (...)
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  7. Chrisoula Andreou (2010). Coping with Procrastination. In Chrisoula Andreou and Mark D. White (ed.), The Thief of Time.
    This paper focuses on a puzzling but familiar strategy for coping with procrastination that has not yet been analyzed in the literature on that topic. The strategy involves leveraging control. In employing the strategy, we take advantage of the possibility that poor self-control can be a local trait rather than a robust character trait.
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  8. Chrisoula Andreou (2009). Taking on Intentions. Ratio 22 (2):157-169.
    I propose a model of intention formation and argue that it illuminates and does justice to the complex and interesting relationships between intentions on the one hand and practical deliberation, evaluative judgements, desires, beliefs, and conduct on the other. As I explain, my model allows that intentions normally stem from pro-attitudes and normally control conduct, but it is also revealing with respect to cases in which intentions do not stem from pro-attitudes or do not control conduct. Moreover, it makes the (...)
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  9. Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Might Intentions Be the Only Source of Practical Imperatives? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (3):311 - 325.
    I focus on the broadly instrumentalist view that all genuine practical imperatives are hypothetical imperatives and all genuine practical deliberation is deliberation from existing motivations. After indicating why I see instrumentalism as highly plausible, I argue that the most popular version of instrumentalism, according to which genuine practical imperatives can take desires as their starting point, is problematic. I then provide a limited defense of what I see as a more radical but also more compelling version of instrumentalism. According to (...)
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  10. Chrisoula Andreou (2006). Standards, Advice, and Practical Reason. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):57-67.
    Is there a mode of sincere advice in which the standards of the adviser are put aside in favor of the standards of the advisee? I consider two sorts of cases that appear to be such that the adviser is evaluating things from within the advisee’s system of standards even though this system conflicts with her own; and I argue that these cases are best interpreted in ways that dissolve this appearance. I then argue that the nature of sincere advice (...)
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  11. Chrisoula Andreou (2004). Instrumentally Rational Myopic Planning. Philosophical Papers 33 (2):133-145.
    Abstract I challenge the view that, in cases where time for deliberation is not an issue, instrumental rationality precludes myopic planning. I show where there is room for instrumentally rational myopic planning, and then argue that such planning is possible not only in theory, it is something human beings can and do engage in. The possibility of such planning has, however, been disregarded, and this disregard has skewed related debates concerning instrumental rationality.
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  12. Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D. White (eds.) (2010). The Thief of Time: Philosophical Essays on Procrastination. OUP Usa.
    The essays collected in this volume explore procrastination in relation to agency, rationality, and ethics -- topics that philosophy is well-suited to address.
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  13. G. E. M. Anscombe (2011). The Causation of Action. In Mary Geach & Luke Gormally (eds.), Human life, action and ethics: essays by GEM Anscombe. Andrews UK Limited 89-108.
  14. G. E. M. Anscombe (1981). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. University of Minnesota Press.
    The intentionality of sensation -- The first person -- Substance -- The subjectivity of sensation -- Events in the mind -- Comments on Professor R.L. Gregory's paper on perception -- On sensations of position -- Intention -- Pretending -- On the grammar of "Enjoy" -- The reality of the past -- Memory, "experience," and causation -- Causality and determination -- Times, beginnings, and causes -- Soft determinism -- Causality and extensionality -- Before and after -- Subjunctive conditionals -- "Under a (...)
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  15. Alfred Archer (2013). Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent. Philosophia 41 (2):447-462.
    It has been claimed, by David Heyd, that in order for an act to count as supererogatory the agent performing the act must possess altruistic intentions (1982 p.115). This requirement, Heyd claims, allows us to make sense of the meritorious nature of acts of supererogation. In this paper I will investigate whether there is good reason to accept that this requirement is a necessary condition of supererogation. I will argue that such a reason can be found in cases where two (...)
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  16. Avery Archer (forthcoming). Do Desires Provide Reasons? An Argument Against the Cognitivist Strategy. Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    According to the cognitivist strategy, the desire to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P in a way analogous to how perceiving that P provides reasons for believing that P. However, while perceiving P provides reasons for believing P by representing P as true, desiring to bring about P provides reasons for intending to bring about P by representing P as good. This paper offers an argument against this view. My argument proceeds via an appeal to (...)
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  17. Robert Audi (1973). Intending. Journal of Philosophy 70 (13):387-403.
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  18. Nicanor Austriaco (2005). On Reshaping Skulls and Unintelligible Intentions. Nova Et Vetera 3:81-100.
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  19. Dennis J. Baker (2007). The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms. New Criminal Law Review 10 (3):370-391.
    I draw on accessorial liability jurisprudence in an attempt to outline the moral limits of criminalizing people for merely influencing the criminal choices of others. A person's conduct is a remote harm when it is harmless but for the fact that it encourages another independent party to commit a harmful criminal act (a primary harm). For example, the broken windows thesis holds that minor incivilities (such as passive begging) are a precursor to more serious crime. Passive begging allegedly sends a (...)
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  20. Derek Baker (2015). Deliberators Must Be Imperfect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):321-347.
    This paper argues that, with certain provisos, predicting one's future actions is incompatible with rationally deliberating about whether to perform those actions. It follows that fully rational omniscient agents are impossible, since an omniscient being could never rationally deliberate about what to do . Consequently, theories that explain practical reasons in terms of the choices of a perfectly rational omniscient agent must fail. The paper considers several ways of defending the possibility of an omniscient agent, and concludes that while some (...)
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  21. M. Balaguer (2011). Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will. Philosophical Review 120 (3):447-452.
  22. Thomas Baldwin (1979). Foresight and Responsibility. Philosophy 54 (209):347 - 360.
    Where a man foresaw that through its consequences his action would violate a law, is he for that reason to be judged responsible for the violation of the law? The principle that such a man is responsible, and thus that foresight is sufficient for responsibility, has long been accepted in both legal and moral theory. But in recent years anxieties about this principle have been expressed by both philosophers and lawyers. What one commonly finds in older books, both legal and (...)
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  23. Marina Paola Banchetti-Robino (2004). Ibn Sina and Husserl on Intention and Intentionality. Philosophy East and West 54 (1):71-82.
    : The concepts of intention and intentionality were particularly significant notions within the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic medieval philosophical traditions, and they regained philosophical importance in the twentieth century. The theories of intention and intentionality of the medieval Islamic philosopher and physician Ibn Sina and the phenomenological philosopher and mathematician Edmund Husserl are examined, compared, and contrasted here, showing that Ibn Sina's conception of intention is naturalistic and, in its naturalism, is influenced by the medical professional culture to which Ibn (...)
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  24. Patrick K. Bastable (1971). The Nature of Intention. Philosophical Studies 20:338-338.
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  25. Melissa R. Beck, Daniel T. Levin & Bonnie L. Angelone (2007). Change Blindness Blindness: Beliefs About the Roles of Intention and Scene Complexity in Change Detection. Consciousness and Cognition 16 (1):31-51.
    Observers have difficulty detecting visual changes. However, they are unaware of this inability, suggesting that people do not have an accurate understanding of visual processes. We explored whether this error is related to participants’ beliefs about the roles of intention and scene complexity in detecting changes. In Experiment 1 participants had a higher failure rate for detecting changes in an incidental change detection task than an intentional change detection task. This effect of intention was greatest for complex scenes. However, participants (...)
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  26. Rafik I. Beekun, Jim Westerman & Jamal Barghouti (2005). Utility of Ethical Frameworks in Determining Behavioral Intention: A Comparison of the U.S. And Russia. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 61 (3):235 - 247.
    Using Reidenbach and Robin‘s ( Journal of Business Ethics 7, 871–879, 1988) multi-criteria ethics instrument, we carried out the first empirical test of Robertson and Crittenden‘s (Strategic Management Journal 24, 385–392, 2003) cross-cultural map of moral philosophies to examine what ethical criteria guide business people in Russia and the U.S. in their intention to behave. Competing divergence and convergence hypotheses were advanced. Our results support a convergence hypothesis, and reveal a common emphasis on relativism. Americans are also influenced by the (...)
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  27. J. Bishop (2001). McCANN, HJ-The Works of Agency. Philosophical Books 42 (3):232-232.
  28. Olle Blomberg (2016). Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition. Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally \ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their \-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
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  29. Olle Blomberg (2015). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together By Michael Bratman. [REVIEW] Analysis 75 (2):346-348.
  30. Paul Bloom (1996). Intention, History, and Artifact Concepts. Cognition 60 (1):1-29.
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  31. Jean Beer Blumenfeld (1981). Action and Intention. Philosophia 9 (3-4):299-315.
  32. Hilary Bok (1996). Acting Without Choosing. Noûs 30 (2):174-196.
    I will argue that this intuitive description is in fact accurate: that we can and do perform actions we know to be wrong simply because we fail to decide what to do. I will then try to show that once we recognize this fact, we can identify a character trait which any plausible moral theory which is not strictly self-defeating must require that we develop. Finally, I will sketch some implications of this argument for the role of virtue in moral (...)
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  33. Shoshana Brassfield (2013). Descartes and the Danger of Irresolution. Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):162-178.
    Descartes's approach to practical judgments about what is beneficial or harmful, or what to pursue or avoid, is almost exactly the opposite of his approach to theoretical judgments about the true nature of things. Instead of the cautious skepticism for which Descartes is known, throughout his ethical writings he recommends developing the habit of making firm judgments and resolutely carrying them out, no matter how doubtful and uncertain they may be. Descartes, strikingly, takes irresolution to be the source of remorse (...)
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  34. Michael Bratman (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. Intentions (...)
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  35. Michael Bratman (1981). Intention and Means-End Reasoning. Philosophical Review 90 (2):252-265.
  36. Michael E. Bratman (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. OUP Usa.
    Human beings act together in characteristic ways that matter to us a great deal. This book explores the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of such sociality. It argues that appeal to the planning structures involved in our individual, temporally extended agency provides substantial resources for understanding these foundations of our sociality.
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  37. Michael E. Bratman (2011). Intention Rationality. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):227-241.
    The practical thought of planning agents is subject to distinctive rationality norms. In particular, there are norms of intention consistency and of means-end coherence. I discuss the normative significance of these norms and their relation to practical reasons. I seek a path between views that see these norms as, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality, and views that see the idea that these norms have distinctive normative significance as a 'myth'. And I seek to distinguish these norms from principles about (...)
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  38. Michael E. Bratman (2009). Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical. In Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason: New Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity. OUP Oxford
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  39. Michael E. Bratman (1992). Planning and the Stability of Intention. Minds and Machines 2 (1):1-16.
    I sketch my general model of the roles of intentions in the planning of agents like us-agents with substantial resource limitations and with important needs for coordination. I then focus on the stability of prior intentions: their rational resistance to reconsideration. I emphasize the importance of cases in which one's nonreconsideration of a prior intention is nondeliberative and is grounded in relevant habits of reconsideration. Concerning such cases I argue for a limited form of two-tier consequentialism, one that is restricted (...)
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  40. Michael E. Bratman (1989). Intention and Personal Policies. Philosophical Perspectives 3:443-469.
  41. John Brunero (2009). Against Cognitivism About Practical Rationality. Philosophical Studies 146 (3):311-325.
    Cognitivists about Practical Rationality argue that we can explain some of the requirements of practical rationality by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. First, they argue that intentions involve beliefs, and, second, they show how the theoretical requirements governing those involved beliefs can explain some of the practical requirements governing those intentions. This paper avoids the ongoing controversy about whether and how intentions involve beliefs and focuses instead on this second part of the Cognitivist approach, where I think Cognitivism (...)
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  42. John Brunero (2007). Are Intentions Reasons? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (4):424–444.
    This paper presents an objection to the view that intentions provide reasons and shows how this objection is also inherited by the more commonly accepted Tie-Breaker view, according to which intentions provide reasons only in tie-break situations. The paper also considers and rejects T. M. Scanlon's argument for the Tie-Breaker view and argues that philosophers might be drawn to accept the problematic Tie-Breaker view by confusing it with a very similar, unproblematic view about the relation between intentions and reasons in (...)
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  43. Howard F. Buchan (2005). Ethical Decision Making in the Public Accounting Profession: An Extension of Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behavior. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 61 (2):165 - 181.
    The purpose of this study is to expand our understanding of the factors that influence ethical behavioral intentions of public accountants. Recent scandals have dominated the news and have caused legislators, regulators and the public to question the role of the accounting profession. Legislative changes have brought about major structural changes in the profession and continued scrutiny will surely lead to further changes. Thus, developing an understanding of the personal and contextual factors that influence ethical decisions is critical. An extension (...)
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  44. Andrei A. Buckareff (2012). Bruno Verbeek (Ed.), Reasons and Intentions (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008), 243 Pages. ISBN: 9780754660040 (Hbk.). Hardback: £65.00. [REVIEW] Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (2):308-310.
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  45. Alessandro Capone (2002). Review of Jaszczolt's 'Discourse, Beliefs and Intentions'. [REVIEW] Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):354-361.
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  46. Davide P. Cargnello (2014). Beyond Morality: Intentional Action in Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Mind 123 (491):671-706.
    The paper discusses Hegel’s conception of intentional action. Drawing principally on Hegel’s analysis of the determinations and rights of action in the Morality chapter of the Philosophy of Right, I suggest that Hegel is committed to a corrigibilist view of action, according to which intentions are definitive of action, objective, and publicly accessible, in principle, via ex post facto corrective interpretation. I conclude by commenting briefly on the place of Hegel’s conception of action in the broader action-theoretic landscape.
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  47. John W. Carroll (1987). Intending and Blameworthiness. Philosophia 17 (4):393-409.
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  48. Thomas A. Cavanaugh (2005). How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. [REVIEW] International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2):266-268.
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  49. Randolph Clarke (2014). Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophical theories of agency have focused primarily on actions and activities. But, besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. How is this aspect of our agency to be conceived? This book offers a comprehensive account of omitting and refraining, addressing issues ranging from the nature of agency and moral responsibility to the metaphysics of absences and causation. Topics addressed include the role of intention in intentional omission, the connection between negligence and omission, the distinction (...)
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  50. Randolph Clarke (2007). Commanding Intentions and Prize-Winning Decisions. Philosophical Studies 133 (3):391-409.
    It is widely held that any justifying reason for making a decision must also be a justifying reason for doing what one thereby decides to do. Desires to win decision prizes, such as the one that figures in Kavka’s toxin puzzle, might be thought to be exceptions to this principle, but the principle has been defended in the face of such examples. Similarly, it has been argued that a command to intend cannot give one a justifying reason to intend as (...)
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