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Intentions

Edited by Santiago Amaya (Universidad de Los Andes)
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  1. T. Aho (1989). Intention Varhaishistoria. Ajatus 46:87-99.
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  2. Michael L. Anderson & Don Perlis, Metacognition for Dropping and Reconsidering Intentions ∗.
    In this paper, we present a meta-cognitive approach for dropping and reconsidering intentions, wherein concurrent actions and results are allowed, in the framework of the time-sensitive and contradiction-tolerant active logic.
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  3. Chrisoula Andreou (2008). The Newxin Puzzle. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):415 - 422.
    A variety of thought experiments suggest that, if the standard picture of practical rationality is correct, then practical rationality is sometimes an obstacle to practical success. For some, this in turn suggests that there is something wrong with the standard picture. In particular, it has been argued that we should revise the standard picture so that practical rationality and practical success emerge as more closely connected than the current picture allows. In this paper, I construct a choice situation—which I refer (...)
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  4. G. E. M. Anscombe, Cora Diamond & Jenny Teichman (eds.) (1979). Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe. Cornell University Press.
  5. Robert Audi (1991). Intention, Cognitive Commitment, and Planning. Synthese 86 (3):361 - 378.
    This paper defends a cognitive-motivational account of intending against recent criticism by J. Garcia, connects intending with a number of other concepts important in the theory of action — including decison, volition, and planning — and explores some principles of intention transfer construed as counterparts of epistemic principles governing closure for belief and justification. Several routes to intention formation are described; the role of intentions in planning is examined; and a holistic conception of intention formation and change is stressed. The (...)
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  6. Robert Audi (1988). Deliberative Intentions and Willingness to Act: A Reply to Professor Mele. Philosophia 18 (2-3):243-245.
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  7. Mark P. Aulisio (1995). In Defense of the Intention/Foresight Distinction. American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):341 - 354.
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  8. Bruce Aune (1990). Action, Inference, Belief, and Intention. Philosophical Perspectives 4:247-271.
  9. Bruce Aune (1967). Intention. In Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York, Macmillan. 4.
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  10. Bruce Aune (1966). Intention and Foresight. Journal of Philosophy 63 (20):652-654.
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  11. G. B. (1958). Intention. Review of Metaphysics 12 (1):142-142.
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  12. Annette Baier (1979). Action Theory. Grazer Philosophische Studien 9:185-198.
  13. Annette C. Baier (1977). The Intentionality of Intentions. Review of Metaphysics 30 (3):389 - 414.
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  14. Annette C. Baier (1970). Act and Intent. Journal of Philosophy 67 (19):648-658.
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  15. Jodie A. Baird & Janet Wilde Astington (2005). The Complexities of Intention. In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford University Press.
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  16. John A. Bargh (1994). The Four Horsemen of Automaticity: Awareness, Intention, Efficiency, and Control in Social Cognition. In R. Wyer & T. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  17. Mark J. Barker (2012). Aquinas on Internal Sensory Intentions. International Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):199-226.
    This paper suggests several summa genera for the various meanings of intentio in Aquinas and briefly outlines the genera of cognitive intentiones. It presents the referential and existential nature of intentions of harm or usefulness as distinguished from external sensory or imaginary forms in light of Avicenna’s threefold sensory abstraction. The paper offers a terminological clarification regarding the quasi-immaterial existential status of intentions. Internal sensory intentions account for a way in which one perceives something, as is best seen in light (...)
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  18. Monroe C. Beardsley (1980). Motives and Intentions. Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:71-79.
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  19. Monroe C. Beardsley (1978). Intending. In A. I. Goldman & I. Kim (eds.), Philosophical Review. Boston: D. Reidel. 163--184.
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  20. Errol Bedford (1966). Intention and Law. Journal of Philosophy 63 (20):654-656.
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  21. Monika Betzler (2009). Expressive Actions. Inquiry 52 (3):272-292.
    Actions expressing emotions (such as caressing the clothes of one's dead friend in grief, or tearing apart a photograph out of jealousy) pose a notorious challenge to action theorists. They are thought to be intentional in that they are in some sense under the agent's control. They are not thought to be done for a reason, however, because they cannot be explained by considerations that favor them from the agent's point of view. This seems to be the case, at least, (...)
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  22. Renée Bilodeau (2006). The Motivational Strength of Intentions. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:129-135.
    According to the early versions of the causal theory of action, intentional actions were both produced and explained by a beliefdesire pair. Since the end of the seventies, however, most philosophers consider intentions as an irreducible and indispensable component of any adequate account of intentional action. The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate some of the arguments that gave rise to the introduction of the concept of intention in action theory. My contention is that none of them (...)
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  23. T. Blakeley (1961). Values and Intentions. Philosophical Studies 11:271-272.
  24. V. Blankenship (1985). The Dynamics of Intention. In Michael Frese & John Sabini (eds.), Goal Directed Behavior: The Concept of Action in Psychology. L. Erlbaum Associates. 161--170.
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  25. Jean Beer Blumenfeld (1980). Acting Intentionally and Acting Voluntarily. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1/2):228-231.
  26. Margaret A. Boden (1973). The Structure of Intentions. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 3 (1):23–46.
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  27. Emma Borg (2006). Intention-Based Semantics. In Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press. 250--266.
    There is a sense in which it is trivial to say that one accepts intention- (or convention-) based semantics.[2] For if what is meant by this claim is simply that there is an important respect in which words and sentences have meaning (either at all or the particular meanings that they have in any given natural language) due to the fact that they are used, in the way they are, by intentional agents (i.e. speakers), then it seems no one should (...)
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  28. Richard Bradley & Christian List (2009). Desire-as-Belief Revisited. Analysis 69 (1):31-37.
    On Hume’s account of motivation, beliefs and desires are very different kinds of propositional attitudes. Beliefs are cognitive attitudes, desires emotive ones. An agent’s belief in a proposition captures the weight he or she assigns to this proposition in his or her cognitive representation of the world. An agent’s desire for a proposition captures the degree to which he or she prefers its truth, motivating him or her to act accordingly. Although beliefs and desires are sometimes entangled, they play very (...)
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  29. Myles Brand (1987). Intentional Actions and Plans. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):213-230.
  30. Myles Brand (1986). Intending and Acting. Philosophical Review 95 (2):261-264.
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  31. Michael Bratman (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
    This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. In Bratman's view, when we settle on a plan for action we are committing ourselves to future conduct in ways that help support important forms of coordination and organization both within the life of the agent and interpersonally. These essays enrich that account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for (...)
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  32. Michael Bratman (1998). Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of Intention. In Jules L. Coleman, Christopher W. Morris & Gregory S. Kavka (eds.), Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka. Cambridge University Press. 59--83.
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  33. Michael Bratman (1979). Simple Intention. Philosophical Studies 36 (3):245 - 259.
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  34. James M. Brown (1982). Action & Interpretation. Philosophical Studies 29:349-351.
  35. Ann Bumpus (2000). Aiming and Intending. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):581-595.
  36. Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia (2014). Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
    Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, (...)
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  37. S. S. C. (1971). The Nature of Intention. Review of Metaphysics 25 (1):132-133.
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  38. D. Canter (1985). Intention, Meaning and Structure: Social Action in its Physical Context. In G. P. Ginsburg, Marylin Brenner & Mario von Cranach (eds.), Discovery Strategies in the Psychology of Action. Academic Press. 35--171.
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  39. William H. Capitan (1964). The Artist's Intention. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 18 (68/69):323-34.
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  40. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1972). Intentions and Intending. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (2):139 - 149.
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  41. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1971). Intentions and the Structure of Intending. Journal of Philosophy 68 (15):453-466.
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  42. Cristiano Castelfranchi & Fabio Paglieri (2007). The Role of Beliefs in Goal Dynamics: Prolegomena to a Constructive Theory of Intentions. Synthese 155 (2):237 - 263.
    In this article we strive to provide a detailed and principled analysis of the role of beliefs in goal processing—that is, the cognitive transition that leads from a mere desire to a proper intention. The resulting model of belief-based goal processing has also relevant consequences for the analysis of intentions, and constitutes the necessary core of a constructive theory of intentions, i.e. a framework that not only analyzes what an intention is, but also explains how it becomes what it is. (...)
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  43. Robert Champigny (1959). Main Intentions in the Use of Language. Journal of Philosophy 56 (12):528-533.
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  44. David K. Chan (1999). A Not-so-Simple View of International Action. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):1–16.
  45. David Charles (1989). Intention. In John Heil (ed.), Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays Honoring C. B. Martin. Norwell: Kluwer. 33--52.
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  46. Ewing Y. Chinn (1977). Intentional Actions and Their Side Effects. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):161-171.
  47. Roderick M. Chisholm (1970). The Structure of Intention. Journal of Philosophy 67 (19):633-647.
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  48. Randy K. Chiu (2003). Ethical Judgment and Whistleblowing Intention: Examining the Moderating Role of Locus of Control. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 43 (1-2):65 - 74.
    The growing body of whistleblowing literature includes many studies that have attempted to identify the individual level antecedents of whistleblowing behavior. However, cross-cultural differences in perceptions of the ethicality of whistleblowing affect the judgment of whistleblowing intention. This study ascertains how Chinese managers/professionals decide to blow the whistle in terms of their locus of control and subjective judgment regarding the intention of whistleblowing. Hypotheses that are derived from these speculations are tested with data on Chinese managers and professionals (n = (...)
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  49. Randolph Clarke (2010). Intentional Omissions. Noûs 44 (1):158-177.
    It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
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  50. Michael Cohen (1982). Intention and Intentionality. Philosophical Books 23 (1):30-32.
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