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  1. Laird Addis (1984). Parallelism, Interactionism, and Causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):329-344.
    One may gather from the arguments of two of the last papers published before his death that J. L. Mackie held the following three theses concerning the mind/body problem : (1) There is a distinct realm of mental properties, so a dualism of properties at least is true and materialism false.
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  2. Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2010). What Descartes Did Not Know. Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (3):297-311.
    Descartes’ epistemologies of meditation and sense imply that we cannot know anything about the mind-body union, either in the Cartesian sense of having scientia or, more interestingly, in terms of any other concept of knowledge available to Descartes. After considering the implications of this conclusion for what we may know about mind-body interaction, it becomes clear that, on Descartes’ view, we at best can be said to know that mind-body interaction, if it does in fact take place, does not violate (...)
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  3. Zbigniew Ambrożewicz (2010). Felix Młynarski - Individualism and Interactionism. Diametros:124-144.
    In this article I discuss the rarely analyzed work of the Polish philosopher, sociologist, and economist Felix Młynarski. I present him against the background of contemporary intellectual currents and place him in the current of humanistic sociology, philosophy of life, and pragmatism. I also try to point out the original elements of his thought, emphasizing those which can be identified as individualism and interactionism.
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  4. Leonard Angel (2015). Since Physical Formulas Are Not Violated, No Soul Controls the Body. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 377-391.
    This paper provides evidence from the history of the natural sciences in philosophy (particularly mathematical physics, chemistry, and biology) that a “piloting” soul would have to make physical changes in human beings violating well-established physical laws. But, among other things, it has been discovered that there can be no such changes, and thus that there is no piloting soul.
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  5. Lonnie Athens (2009). The Roots of “Radical Interactionism”. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (4):387-414.
    A plea has been made for replacing the perspective of “symbolic interactionism” with a new interactionist's perspective—“radical interactionism.” Unlike in symbolic interactionism, where Mead's and Blumer's ideas play the most prominent roles, in radical interactionism's, Park's ideas play a more prominent role than either Mead's or Blumer's ideas. On the one hand, according to Mead, the general principle behind the organization of human group life was once dominance, but it is now “sociality.” On the other hand, according to Park, this (...)
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  6. Keith Augustine (2015). Introduction. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 1-47.
    The Introduction provides a general overview of the issues discussed in The Myth of an Afterlife in more detail in the individual selections, structured according to the four parts of the volume, plus preceding introductory and subsequent concluding comments. -/- [1. Preliminary Considerations] [2. Empirical Arguments for Annihilation] [3. Conceptual and Empirical Difficulties for Survival] [4. Problematic Models of the Afterlife] [5. Dubious Evidence for Survival] [6. The Importance of Empirical Consideration] [7. Alternative Paranormal Explanations of the Survival Evidence] [8. (...)
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  7. Keith Augustine & Yonatan I. Fishman (2015). The Dualist’s Dilemma: The High Cost of Reconciling Neuroscience with a Soul. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 203-292.
    Tight correlations between mental states and brain states have been observed time and again within the ethology of biologically ingrained animal behaviors, the comparative psychology of animal minds, the evolutionary psychology of mental adaptations, the behavioral genetics of inherited mental traits, the developmental psychology of the maturing mind, the psychopharmacology of mind-altering substances, and cognitive neuroscience more generally. They imply that our mental lives are only made possible because of brain activity—that having a functioning brain is a necessary condition for (...)
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  8. Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.) (2015). The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case Against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield.
    Because every single one of us will die, most of us would like to know what—if anything—awaits us afterward, not to mention the fate of lost loved ones. Given the nearly universal vested interest we personally have in deciding this question in favor of an afterlife, it is no surprise that the vast majority of books on the topic affirm the reality of life after death without a backward glance. But the evidence of our senses and the ever-gaining strength of (...)
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  9. Edward W. Averill & Bernard Keating (1981). Does Interactionism Violate a Law of Classical Physics? Mind 90 (January):102-7.
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  10. Andrew M. Bailey (2011). Review Of: The Waning of Materialism. [REVIEW] Mind 120 (478):534-538.
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  11. Andrew M. Bailey, Joshua Rasmussen & Luke van Horn (2011). No Pairing Problem. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):349-360.
    Many have thought that there is a problem with causal commerce between immaterial souls and material bodies. In Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim attempts to spell out that problem. Rather than merely posing a question or raising a mystery for defenders of substance dualism to answer or address, he offers a compelling argument for the conclusion that immaterial souls cannot causally interact with material bodies. We offer a reconstruction of that argument that hinges on two premises: Kim’s Dictum (...)
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  12. Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.) (2009). Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
  13. Friedrich Beck, Carl Johnson, Franz von Kutschera, E. Jonathan Lowe, Uwe Meixner, David S. Oderberg, Ian J. Thompson & Henry Wellman (2008). Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Lexington Books.
    Until quite recently, mind-body dualism has been regarded with deep suspicion by both philosophers and scientists. This has largely been due to the widespread identification of dualism in general with one particular version of it: the interactionist substance dualism of Réné Descartes. This traditional form of dualism has, ever since its first formulation in the seventeenth century, attracted numerous philosophical objections and is now almost universally rejected in scientific circles as empirically inadequate. During the last few years, however, renewed attention (...)
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  14. John Beloff (1994). Minds and Machines: A Radical Dualist Perspective. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):32-37.
    The article begins with a discussion about what might constitute consciousness in entities other than oneself and the implications of the mind-brain debate for the possibility of a conscious machine. While referring to several other facets of the philosophy of mind, the author focuses on epiphenomenalism and interactionism and presents a critique of the former in terms of biological evolution. The interactionist argument supports the relevance of parapsychology to the problem of consciousness and the statistical technique of meta-analysis is cited (...)
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  15. John Beloff (1976). Mind-Body Interactionism in Light of the Parapsychological Evidence. Theoria to Theory 10 (May):125-37.
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  16. Kieran Bonner (1994). Hermeneutics and Symbolic Interactionism: The Problem of Solipsism. [REVIEW] Human Studies 17 (2):225 - 249.
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  17. Raymond D. Bradley (2015). Why Survival is Metaphysically Impossible. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 297-328.
    Human bodies have a totally different mode of existence from those collections of mental properties (intelligence, will power, consciousness, etc.) that we call minds. They belong to the ontological category of physical substances or entities, whereas mental properties belong to the ontological category of properties or attributes, and as such can exist only so long as their physical bearers exist. Mental properties “emerge” (in a sense that makes emergence ubiquitous throughout the natural world) when the constituent parts of a biological (...)
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  18. John Bricke (1975). Interaction and Physiology. Mind 84 (April):255-9.
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  19. May Brodbeck (1966). Objectivism and Interaction: A Reaction to Margolis. Philosophy of Science 33 (September):287-292.
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  20. M. Buncombe (1995). The Substance of Consciousness: An Argument for Interactionism. Avebury.
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  21. Patricia M. Burbank & Diane C. Martins (2010). Symbolic Interactionism and Critical Perspective: Divergent or Synergistic? Nursing Philosophy 11 (1):25-41.
    Throughout their history, symbolic interactionism and critical perspective have been viewed as divergent theoretical perspectives with different philosophical underpinnings. A review of their historical and philosophical origins reveals both points of divergence and areas of convergence. Their underlying philosophies of science and views of human freedom are different as is their level of focus with symbolic interactionism having a micro perspective and critical perspective using a macro perspective. This micro/macro difference is reflected in the divergence of their major concepts, goals (...)
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  22. David J. Chalmers, How Cartesian Dualism Might Have Been True.
    We could have been characters in a huge computer simulation. It is a familiar idea that the whole world might be simulated on a computer, and things would seem exactly the same to us (and indeed, who is to say that we are not).
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  23. Enrique Chávez‐Arvizo (1997). Descartes's Interactionism and His Principle of Causality. The European Legacy 2 (6):959-976.
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  24. Steven M. Duncan, Objections to Dualism.
    In this essay, I discuss the standard objections to substance dualism and conclude that they are far less formidable than is usually supposed.
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  25. John C. Eccles (1980). The Human Psyche. Berlin: Springer.
    The Human Psyche is an in-depth exploration of dualist-interactionism, a concept Sir John Eccles developed with Sir Karl Popper in the context of a wide...
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  26. Avshalom C. Elitzur (2009). Consciousness Makes a Difference: A Reluctant Dualist’s Confession. In A. Batthyany & A. C. Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious: Selected Papers on Consciousness.
    This paper’s outline is as follows. In sections 1-3 I give an exposi¬tion of the Mind-Body Problem, with emphasis on what I believe to be the heart of the problem, namely, the Percepts-Qualia Nonidentity and its incompatibility with the Physical Closure Paradigm. In 4 I present the “Qualia Inaction Postulate” underlying all non-interactionist theo¬ries that seek to resolve the above problem. Against this convenient postulate I propose in section 5 the “Bafflement Ar¬gument,” which is this paper's main thesis. Sections 6-11 (...)
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  27. Avshalom C. Elitzur (1995). Consciousness Can No Longer Be Ignored. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):353-58.
    Moody's thought-experiment invoking zombies to demonstrate the uniqueness of consciousness is commended. His conclusions accord well with previous ones arrived at by Penrose, Chalmers and myself. All these works lead to a disturbing conclusion: onsciousness, as something distinct from the brain processes, interferes with physical reality. Ergo, it is no longer possible to adhere to any of the modern theories of mind that preserve the completeness of physics. This conclusion is, in principle, testable.
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  28. Avshalom C. Elitzur (1990). Neither Idealism nor Materialism: A Reply to Snyder. Journal of Mind and Behavior 303 (2):303-307.
    Lack of distinction between the formalism of quantum mechanics and its various interpretations leads to some popular misrepresentations. As long as none of the interpretations can present an unambiguous empirical validation, their status remains purely philosophical. These arguments are shown to apply to Snyder's claims. Next it is shown that Snyder's critcism does not address the main points in the argument concerning the physical impact of consciousness. The reply concludes with some reflections on methodology in the search for a physical (...)
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  29. Avshalom C. Elitzur (1989). Consciousness and the Incompleteness of the Physical Explanation of Behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10 (1):1-20.
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  30. Melvin Firestone (1978). Christmas Mumming and Symbolic Interactionism. Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 6 (2):92-113.
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  31. John A. Foster (1991). The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind. Routledge.
    The Immaterial Self examines and defends this thesis, and in particular argues for its Cartesian version, which assigns the non-physical ingredients of the ...
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  32. Brian J. Garrett (2000). Defending Non-Epiphenomenal Event Dualism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):393-412.
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  33. E. Gaviola (1936). The Impossibility of Interaction Between Mind and Matter. Philosophy of Science 3 (2):133-142.
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  34. Rocco J. Gennaro & Yonatan I. Fishman (2015). The Argument From Brain Damage Vindicated. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 105-133.
    It has long been known that brain damage has important negative effects on one’s mental life and even eliminates one’s ability to have certain conscious experiences. It thus stands to reason that when all of one’s brain activity ceases upon death, consciousness is no longer possible and so neither is an afterlife. It seems clear that human consciousness is dependent upon functioning brains. This essay reviews some of the overall neurological evidence from brain damage studies and concludes that our argument (...)
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  35. José Gusmão Rodrigues (2014). There Are No Good Objections to Substance Dualism. Philosophy 89 (02):199-222.
    This article aims to review the standard objections to dualism and to argue that will either fail to convince someone committed to dualism or are flawed on independent grounds. I begin by presenting the taxonomy of metaphysical positions on concrete particulars as they relate to the dispute between materialists and dualists, and in particular substance dualism is defined. In the first section, several kinds of substance dualism are distinguished and the relevant varieties of this kind of dualism are selected. The (...)
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  36. I. Hanzel (2011). Beyond Blumer and Symbolic Interactionism: The Qualitative-Quantitative Issue in Social Theory and Methodology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (3):303-326.
    The article analysis the views approaching quantitative and qualitative methods in social sciences as separable or irreconcilable. First, we characterize these views and show how they deal with this divide and how they view the aspects of the latter. Next, we identify the works of Herbert Blumer as the basis of that divide and subject them to an analysis. Finally, by means of categories like quantity, quality, and measure, we show that the qualitative-quantitative divide is based on a wrong approach (...)
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  37. David Hodgson (1991). The Mind Matters: Consciousness and Choice in a Quantum World. Oxford Unversity Press.
    In this book, Hodgson presents a clear and compelling case against today's orthodox mechanistic view of the brain-mind, and in favor of the view that "the mind matters." In the course of the argument he ranges over such topics as consciousness, informal reasoning, computers, evolution, and quantum indeterminancy and non-locality. Although written from a philosophical viewpoint, the book has important implications for the sciences concerned with the brain-mind problem. At the same time, it is largely non-technical, and thus accessible to (...)
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  38. Daniel Holbrook (1992). Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction. Southwest Philosophical Studies 14:74-83.
    In his "Meditations on First Philosophy", Descartes argues for there being a radical difference between mind and body. Yet, we know that mind and body interest. How is this possible? Descartes's answer tothis question is that human nature is a "substantial union" of mind and body. In this essay, Descartes's solution is explained and critically examined.
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  39. Emmett L. Holman (1984). Continuity and the Metaphysics of Dualism. Philosophical Studies 45 (March):197-204.
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  40. Jamie Horder (2015). The Brain That Doesn’T Know Itself: Persons Oblivious to Their Neurological Deficits. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 195-202.
    This paper surveys the neuroscientific evidence that brain lesions and drug intoxication can not only disrupt mental functions like perception and motor control, but can also remove one’s very awareness that these functions are impaired or altered. Such deficits imply that consciousness of one’s mental faculties, no less than the faculties themselves, is a product of particular neural structures. But this is inconsistent with any view—such as the dualistic interactionism of John Eccles—that holds that the conscious self interacts with and (...)
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  41. Christopher D. Horvath (2000). Interactionism and Innateness in the Evolutionary Study of Human Nature. Biology and Philosophy 15 (3):321-337.
    While most researchers who use evolutionary theory to investigatehuman nature especially human sexuality describe themselves as ``interactionists'', there is no clear consensus on the meaning of thisterm in this context. By interactionism most people in the fieldmean something like, both nature and nurture ``count'' in thedevelopment of human psychology and behavior. Nevertheless, themultidisciplinary nature of evolutionary psychology results in a widevariety of interpretations of this general claim. Today, mostdebates within evolutionary psychology about the innateness of agiven behavioral characteristic or over (...)
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  42. Frank Jackson (1980). Interactionism Revived? Philosophy of Social Science 10 (September):316-23.
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  43. Jaegwon Kim (2015). What Could Pair a Nonphysical Soul to a Physical Body? In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 335-347.
    This paper argues that since nonphysical souls lack a position in space, they cannot have the pairing relations that would allow them to interact with physical bodies. For example, if two rifles (A and B) are fired at the same time, and consequently Andy and Buddy are killed, we can only say that rifle A killed Andy while rifle B killed Buddy, rather than the other way around, if there are appropriate spatial relations (such as distance and orientation) that pair (...)
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  44. Jaegwon Kim (2004). The Mind-Body Problem at Century's Turn. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Clarendon Press 129-152.
    A plausible terminus for the mind-body debate begins by embracing ontological physicalism—the view that there is only one kind of substance in the concrete world, and that it is material substance. Taking mental causation seriously, this terminus also embraces conditional reductionism, the thesis that only physically reducible (i.e., functionalizable) mental properties can be causally efficacious. Intentional/cognitive properties (what David Chalmers calls “psychological” aspects of mind) are physically reducible, but qualia (“phenomenal” aspects of mind) are not. In saving the causal efficacy (...)
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  45. Ole Koksvik (2007). Conservation of Energy is Relevant to Physicalism. Dialectica 61 (4):573–582.
    I argue against Montero’s claim that Conservation of Energy (CoE) has nothing to do with Physicalism. I reject her reconstruction of the argument from CoE against interactionist dualism, and offer instead an alternative reconstruction that better captures the intuitions of those who believe that there is a conflict between interactionist dualism and CoE.
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  46. Thomas Kroedel (2015). Dualist Mental Causation and the Exclusion Problem. Noûs 49 (2):357-375.
    The paper argues that dualism can explain mental causation and solve the exclusion problem. If dualism is combined with the assumption that the psychophysical laws have a special status, it follows that some physical events counterfactually depend on, and are therefore caused by, mental events. Proponents of this account of mental causation can solve the exclusion problem in either of two ways: they can deny that it follows that the physical effect of a mental event is overdetermined by its mental (...)
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  47. Robert A. Larmer (1986). Mind-Body Interactionism and the Conservation of Energy. International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (September):277-85.
    One of the major reasons underlying the widespread rejection of the theory that the mind is an immaterial substance distinct from the body, But which nevertheless acts on the body, Is that it is felt that such a theory commits one to denying the principle of the conservation of energy. My aim in this article is to assess the strength of this objection. My thesis is that the usual replies are inadequate, But--Strong as this objection appears--Some important logical distinctions have (...)
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  48. Eric LaRock (2001). Dualistic Interaction, Neural Dependence, and Aquinas's Composite View. Philosophia Christi 3 (2):459-472.
    I explicate the Churchland's dualistic interaction and neural dependence objections to Cartesian dualism and argue that Aquinas’s conception of Aristotelian hylomorphism provides a way out of those objections. -/- .
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  49. Benjamin W. Libet (1994). A Testable Theory of Mind-Brain Interaction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (1):119-26.
    The paper begins by contrasting the unitary nature of conscious experience with the demonstrable localization of neural events. Philosophers and neuroscientists have developed models to account for this paradox, but they have yet to be tested empirically. The author proposes a `Conscious Mental Field', which is produced by, but is phenomenologically distinct from, brain activity. The hypothesis is, in principle, open to experimental verification. The paper suggests appropriate surgical procedures and some of the difficulties that would need to be overcome (...)
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  50. B. I. B. Lindahl (2001). Consciousness, Behavioural Patterns and the Direction of Biological Evolution: Implications for the Mind-Brain Problem. In Paavo Pylkkanen & Tere Vaden (eds.), Dimensions of Conscious Experience. John Benjamins 73-99.
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