About this topic
Summary

The subject of interlevel relations concerns the connection between items described by the different sciences, from fundamental-level physics to high-level human sciences. Philosophers analyze these relations in terms of concepts like reduction, or emergence, or supervenience, or realization. The subject is essential to any broad picture of the sciences and the world. 

Key works Most of the works in philosophy divide along the aforementioned views. For reduction, important ideas includes reduction as a derivation by bridge principles (Nagel 1961), approximate reduction (Schaffner 1967), an expanded continuum of strong to weak reduction that advertises no bridge laws (Churchland 1979; Hooker 1981; Bickle 1997), compositional or mechanistic reduction (Wimsatt 1976; Rosenberg 2006; Bechtel 2007), and functional reduction (Kim 1998). For emergence, there are views that involve epistemic, metaphysical, synchronic, and diachronic ideas (McLaughlin 1992; Wimsatt 1997; Humphreys 2008), as well as issues about actual cases in the sciences (Batterman 2002; Davies 2006). For supervenience, there are weak, strong, global, and mereological varieties (Kim 1993; Horgan 1993; McLaughlin 1995), as well as debates over their significance for issues of explanation and dependence (Grimes 1988; Bennett 2004) and their adequacy to express a doctrine of physicalism (Wilson 2005). For realization, the are accounts in terms of parts and wholes (Cummins 1983; Gillett 2002), functional roles and occupation (Papineau 1993; Melnyk 1994; Kim 1998), determinables and determinates (Macdonald & Macdonald 1986; Yablo 1992), and subsets of causal powers (Wilson 1999, 2011; Shoemaker 2001, 2007). There are also questions about the resulting broad picture of the sciences and how it is unified (Oppenheim & Putnam 1958; Rosenberg 1994).
Introductions Some works have a fairly broad scope, encompassing several of the views just mentioned. See Beckermann et al 1992; van Gulick 2001; and Kim 2003.
  Show all references
Related categories
Subcategories:
768 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 768
Material to categorize
  1. Takehisa Abe & Fusako Kobayashi (2002). Eastern Determinism Reconsidered From a Scientific Point of View. In Harald Atmanspacher & Robert C. Bishop (eds.), Between Chance and Choice: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Determinism. Thorverton Uk: Imprint Academic. 485.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Margaret S. Archer (2010). After Mandelbaum : From Societal Facts to Emergent Properties. In Ian Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Mark H. Bickhard (2012). 9 The Emergent Ontology of Persons. In Jack Martin & Mark H. Bickhard (eds.), The Psychology of Personhood: Philosophical, Historical, Social-Developmental and Narrative Perspectives. Cambridge University Press. 165.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Fabio Boschetti (2012). Causality, Emergence, Computation and Unreasonable Expectations. Synthese 185 (2):187-194.
    I argue that much of current concern with the role of causality and strong emergence in natural processes is based upon an unreasonable expectation placed on our ability to formalize scientific knowledge. In most disciplines our formalization ability is an expectation rather than a scientific result. This calls for an empirical approach to the study of causation and emergence. Finally, I suggest that for advances in complexity research to occur, attention needs to be paid to understanding what role computation plays (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Alban Bouvier (2011). Individualism, Collective Agency and The “Micro–Macro Relation”. In Ian Jarvie Jesus Zamora Bonilla (ed.), The Sage Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences. 199.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Ingo Brigandt (2010). Review of Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation – Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup (Eds). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):873-875.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. C. D. Broad (2002). E. Other Psychophysical Relations. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. 106.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Richard M. Burian (1993). Unification and Coherence as Methodological Objectives in the Biological Sciences. Biology and Philosophy 8 (3):301-318.
    In this paper I respond to Wim van der Steen''s arguments against the supposed current overemphasis on norms ofcoherence andinterdisciplinary integration in biology. On the normative level, I argue that these aremiddle-range norms which, although they may be misapplied in short-term attempts to solve (temporarily?) intractable problems, play a guiding role in the longer-term treatment of biological problems. This stance is supported by a case study of apartial success story, the development of the one gene — one enzyme hypothesis. As (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Ian Burney, David A. Kirby & Neil Pemberton (2013). Introducing 'Forensic Cultures'. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (1):1-3.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Robert L. Causey (1981). Reduction and Ontological Unification: Reply to McCauley. Philosophy of Science 48 (2):228-231.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Robert L. Causey (1976). Identities and Reduction: A Reply. Noûs 10 (3):333-337.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Anjan Chakravartty (2013). Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum Getting Causes From Powers. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axt007.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. F. Cizek (1979). Biology, Physics and Reductionism. Filosoficky Casopis 27 (4):488-503.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Michael C. Corballis (1988). Psychology's Place in the Science of the Mind/Brain? Biology and Philosophy 3 (3):363-373.
  15. Antonella Corradini (2008). 1. Monism in British Emergentism. In Alessandro Antonietti, Antonella Corradini & E. Jonathan Lowe (eds.), Psycho-Physical Dualism Today: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Lexington Books. 185.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Marcel Crabbé (1983). On the Reduction of Type Theory. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 29 (4):235-237.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Suzanne Cunningham (1983). The Nature of Mind and Other Essays. By David M. Armstrong. Modern Schoolman 60 (2):124-125.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Paul Davies, Emergent Biological Principles and the Computational Properties of the Universe.
    T he term emergence is used to describe the appearance of new properties that arise when a system exceeds a certain level of size or complexity, properties that are absent from the constituents of the system. It is a concept often summed up by the phrase that “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts,” and it is a key notion in the burgeoning field of complexity science. Life is often cited as a classic example of an emergent (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Dennis Dieks & Henk W. de Regt (1998). Reduction and Understanding. Foundations of Science 3 (1):45-59.
    Reductionism, in the sense of the doctrine that theories on different levels of reality should exhibit strict and general relations of deducibility, faces well-known difficulties. Nevertheless, the idea that deeper layers of reality are responsible for what happens at higher levels is well-entrenched in scientific practice. We argue that the intuition behind this idea is adequately captured by the notion of supervenience: the physical state of the fundamental physical layers fixes the states of the higher levels. Supervenience is weaker than (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Zoltan Domotor (1982). Reduction of Macrotheories to Micro-Theories. Erkenntnis 17 (1):3 - 21.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. M. V. Dougherty (2012). The Problem of Negligent Omissions. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):161-163.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2008). Serious Metaphysics and the Vindication of Reductions. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):91 - 110.
    What would be sufficient to show of some apparently higher-level property that it is ‘nothing over and above’ some complex configuration of more basic properties? This paper defends a new method for justifying reductions by demonstrating its comparative advantages over two methods recently defended in the literature. Unlike its rivals, what I’ll call “the semantic method” makes a reduction’s truth epistemically transparent without relying on conceptual analyses.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Janice Dowell (2008). Serious Metaphysics and the Vindication of Reductions. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):91 - 110.
    What would be sufficient to show of some apparently higher-level property that it is 'nothing over and above' some complex configuration of more basic properties? This paper defends a new method for justifying reductions by demonstrating its comparative advantages over two methods recently defended in the literature. Unlike its rivals, what I'll call "the semantic method" makes a reduction's truth epistemically transparent without relying on conceptual analyses.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Charles E. M. Dunlop (1983). Kim's “Supervenient Mind”. Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):145-149.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Reinaldo Elugardo (2004). Skidmore on Properties. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):189-193.
  26. Markus I. Eronen (2013). No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):1042-1052.
    I show that the recent account of levels in neuroscience proposed by Craver and Bechtel is unsatisfactory since it fails to provide a plausible criterion for being at the same level and is incompatible with Craver and Bechtel’s account of downward causation. Furthermore, I argue that no distinct notion of levels is needed for analyzing explanations and causal issues in neuroscience: it is better to rely on more well-defined notions such as composition and scale. One outcome of this is that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Rita Finkbeiner (2012). Emergent Contexts. In Rita Finkbeiner, Jörg Meibauer & Petra Schumacher (eds.), What is a Context?: Linguistic Approaches and Challenges. John Benjamins Pub. Co.. 196--153.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Bas C. Van Fraassen & Karel Lambert (1967). On Free Description Theory. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 13 (15):225-240.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Manuel Garc?A.-Carpintero (1994). The Supervenience of Mental Content. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94:117 - 135.
  30. Raoul Gervais (2014). A Framework for Inter-Level Explanations: Outlines for a New Explanatory Pluralism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 48:1-9.
  31. Alfred Gierer (1996). Organisms-Mechanisms: Stahl, Wolff, and the Case Against Reductionist Exclusion. Science in Context 9 (4).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Norman Chase Gillespie (1983). Response: Subvenient Identities and Supervenient Differences. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (Supplement):111-116.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. H. Gomperz (1937). Some Simple Thoughts on Freedom and Responsibility. Philosophy 12 (45):61 - 76.
    The following considerations have been styled “simple thoughts” for two reasons.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Charles Goodman (2005). Vaibhāsika Metaphoricalism. Philosophy East and West 55 (3):377-393.
    : Scholars have proposed several different interpretations of the doctrine of no-self found in the Buddhist Abhidharma literature. It is argued here that two of these, Constitutive Reductionism and Eliminativism, are ruled out by textual evidence. A third, the Eliminative Reductionism of Siderits, is much closer to the intent of the texts.We can refine it further by attending to the role of metaphor in Vaibhāsika accounts of the no-self doctrine. If we update this view by drawing on analytic philosophy, the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. S. Guccione (1995). Levels. In Giuseppe Trautteur (ed.), Consciousness: Distinction and Reflection. Bibliopolis. 52--54.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Stuart Hampshire (1969). A Kind of Materialism. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 43:5 - 23.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Rom Harré (2005). Transcending the Emergence/Reduction Distinction: The Case of Biology. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80 (56):1-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Stephan Hartmann (2010). Who's Afraid of Nagelian Reduction? Erkenntnis 73 (3):393 - 412.
    We reconsider the Nagelian theory of reduction and argue that, contrary to a widely held view, it is the right analysis of intertheoretic reduction. The alleged difficulties of the theory either vanish upon closer inspection or turn out to be substantive philosophical questions rather than knock-down arguments.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Robert J. Henle (1949). Our Emergent Civilisation. Modern Schoolman 26 (2):193-194.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. David Hommen (2014). Moore and Schaffer on the Ontology of Omissions. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 45 (1):71-89.
    In this paper, I discuss Michael Moore’s and Jonathan Schaffer’s views on the ontology of omissions in context of their stances on the problem of omissive causation. First, I consider, from a general point of view, the question of the ontology of omissions, and how it relates to the problem of omissive causation. Then I describe Moore’s and Schaffer’s particular views on omissions and how they combine with their stances on the problem of omissive causation. I charge Moore and Schaffer (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Ted Honderich, Psychoneural Pairs.
    The problem first of clarifying and then of answering the questions how far human thoughts and actions are subject to causality and whether this is consistent with their being free is one to which many different approaches have been made throughout the history of philosophy. I doubt if any of them has been the product of such intense research as Professor Honderich has devoted to the construction, the defence and the evaluation of his theory of determinism. Agreement among philosophers, especially (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Walter Horn (1984). A New Proof for the Physical World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (4):531-537.
    A proof is offered according to which if a psychological premise held by many diverse philosophers through the centuries to the effect that any represented physical property will be held to be exemplified unless some conflicting physical property is simultaneously represented is considered to be necessary, then there are physical objects in every possible world.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Jack K. Horner, The Case Of The Brobdingnagian Lilliputian: A Swiftly Penned Reply to Shrader.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Steven Horst (2009). Review of Jakob Hohwy, Jesper Kallestrup (Eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6).
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Peter Howlett & Mary S. Morgan (eds.) (2010). How Well Do Facts Travel?: The Dissemination of Reliable Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
    Machine generated contents note: 1. Travelling facts Mary S. Morgan; Part I. Matters of Fact: 2. Facts and building artefacts: what travels in material objects? Simona Valeriani; 3. A journey through times and cultures? Ancient Greek forms in American 19th century architecture: an archaeological view Lambert Schneider; 4. Manning's N: putting roughness to work Sarah J. Whatmore and Catharina Landström; 5. My facts are better than your facts: spreading good news about global warming Naomi Oreskes; 6. Real problems with fictional (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. David L. Hull (1979). Reduction in Genetics. Philosophy of Science 46 (2):316-320.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Paul Humphreys (2009). Causation and Reduction. In Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oup Oxford.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Cyrille Imbert (2007). Why Diachronically Emergent Properties Must Also Be Salient. In Carlos Gershenson, Diederik Aerts & Bruce Edmonds (eds.), Worldviews, Science, and Us: Philosophy and Complexity. World Scientific. 99--116.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. C. E. M. Joad (1916). Monism in the Light of Recent Developments in Philosophy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 17:95 - 116.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Gergely Kertész (2013). On Margitay's Notion of Reduction by Definition. Tradition and Discovery: The Polanyi Society Periodical 39 (2):16-21.
    In a recent article “From Epistemology to Ontology,” Tihamer Margitay argues, in addition to other things, that the ontological arguments Polanyi provided for his ontological realism with respect to the levels of reality are insufficient. Although Margitay shows this correctly in the case of arguments from boundary conditions, his arguments are not that convincing against the unidentifyability thesis, the thesis that entity kinds on higher levels cannot be identified with descriptions given on lower levels. I argue that here Polányi relies (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 768