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  1. Frederick R. Adams & Laura A. Dietrich (2004). Swampman's Revenge: Squabbles Among the Representationalists. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):323-40.
    There are both externalist and internalist theories of the phenomenal content of conscious experiences. Externalists like Dretske and Tye treat the phenomenal content of conscious states as representations of external properties. Internalists think that phenomenal conscious states are reducible to electrochemical states of the brain in the style of the type-type identity theory. In this paper, we side with the representationalists and visit a dispute between them over the test case of Swampman. Does Swampman have conscious phenomenal states or not? (...)
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  2. Lilian Alweiss (2009). Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl's Account of Intentionality. Inquiry 52 (1):53-78.
    There is a strong consensus among analytic philosophers that Husserl is an internalist and that his internalism must be understood in conjunction with his methodological solipsism. This paper focuses on Husserl's early work the, Logical Investigations , and explores whether such a reading is justified. It shows that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: He neither believes that meaning can be reduced to the individual, nor does he assign an explanatory role for meaning to the subject. Explanatory priority is assigned (...)
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  3. David Bain (2007). Color, Externalism, and Switch Cases. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):335-362.
    I defend externalism about color experiences and color thoughts, which I argue color objectivism requires. Externalists face the following question: would a subject’s wearing inverting lenses eventually change the color content of, for instance, those visual experiences the subject reports with “red”? From the work of Ned Block, David Velleman, Paul Boghossian, Michael Tye, and Fiona Macpherson, I extract problems facing those who answer “Yes” and problems facing those who answer “No.” I show how these problems can be overcome, leaving (...)
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  4. Gary Bartlett (2014). On Phenomenal Character and Petri Dishes. Journal of Philosophical Research 39:67-74.
    Michael Tye (2007) argues that phenomenal character cannot be an intrinsic microphysical property of experiences (or be necessitated by intrinsic microphysical properties) because this would entail that experience could occur in a chunk of tissue in a Petri dish. Laudably, Tye attempts to defend the latter claim rather than resting content with the counter-intuitiveness of the associated image. However, I show that his defense is problematic in several ways, and ultimately that it still amounts to no more than an appeal (...)
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  5. Gary Bartlett (2008). On the Correct Treatment of Inverted Earth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):294-311.
    The Inverted Earth case has seen fierce debate between Ned Block, who says it defeats the causal-covariational brand of wide representationalism about qualia, and Michael Tye and Bill Lycan, who say it does not. The debate has generated more heat than light because of a failure to get clear on who is supposed to be proving what, and what premises can be deployed in doing so. I argue that a correct understanding of the case makes it clear that the causal (...)
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  6. John I. Biro (1996). Dretske on Phenomenal Externalism. Philosophical Issues 7:171-178.
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  7. Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head. 1 Intentionalism comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects have the same qualia. 2.
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  8. Mihnea D. I. Capraru (2015). Stained Glass as a Model for Consciousness. Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):90-103.
    Contemporary phenomenal externalists are motivated to a large extent by the transparency of experience and by the related doctrine of representationalism. On their own, however, transparency and representationalism do not suffice to establish externalism. Hence we should hesitate to dismiss phenomenal internalism, a view shared by many generations of competent philosophers. Rather, we should keep both our options open, internalism and externalism. It is hard, however, to see how to keep open the internalist option, for although transparency and representationalism have (...)
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  9. David J. Chalmers (2013). The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and Siegel. Analysis 73 (2):345-368.
    This is a reply to commentaries on my book, The Character of Consciousness, by Benj Hellie, Christopher Peacocke, and Susanna Siegel. The reply to Hellie focuses on issues about acquaintance and transparency. The reply to Peacocke focuses on externalism about spatial experience. The reply to Siegel focuses on whether there can be Frege cases in perceptual experience.
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  10. Tim Crane (2006). Comment on Ted Honderich's Radical Externalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):28-43.
    Ted Honderich's theory of consciousness as existence, which he here calls Radical Externalism, starts with a good phenomenological observation: that perceptual experience appears to involve external things being immediately present to us. As P.F. Strawson once observed, when asked to describe my current perceptual state, it is normally enough simply to describe the things around me (Strawson, 1979, p. 97). But in my view that does not make the whole theory plausible.
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  11. Martin Davies (1997). Externalism and Experience. In Ned Block & Owen J. Flanagan (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. MIT Press 244-250.
    In this paper, I shall defend externalism for the contents of perceptual experience. A perceptual experience has representational properties; it presents the world as being a certain way. A visual experience, for example, might present the world to a subject as containing a surface with a certain shape, lying at a certain distance, in a certain direction; perhaps a square with sides about 30 cm, lying about one metre in front of the subject, in a direction about 20 degrees to (...)
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  12. Martin Davies (1993). Aims and Claims of Externalist Arguments. Philosophical Issues 4:227-249.
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  13. Martin Davies (1992). Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.
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  14. Martin Davies (1991). Individualism and Perceptual Content. Mind 100 (399):461-84.
  15. Willem A. de Vries (1996). Experience and the Swamp Creature. Philosophical Studies 82 (1):55-80.
  16. Fred Dretske (1996). Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia? Philosophical Issues 7:143-158.
  17. Fred Dretske (1996). Phenomenal Externalism. Philosophical Issues 7.
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  18. Andy Egan & James John, A Puzzle About Perception.
    experience supervene on the intrinsic properties of the experience.
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  19. Jonathan Ellis, Can an Externalist About Concepts Be an Internalist About Phenomenal Character.
    Many philosophers today believe that what an individual is thinking does not depend entirely on the individual.
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  20. Jonathan Ellis (2010). Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.
    A celebrated problem for representationalist theories of phenomenal character is that, given externalism about content, these theories lead to externalism about phenomenal character. While externalism about content is widely accepted, externalism about phenomenal character strikes many philosophers as wildly implausible. Even if internally identical individuals could have different thoughts, it is said, if one of them has a headache, or a tingly sensation, so must the other. In this paper, I argue that recent work on phenomenal concepts reveals that, contrary (...)
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  21. Jonathan Ellis (2007). Content Externalism and Phenomenal Character: A New Worry About Privileged Access. Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.
    A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject.
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  22. Andreas Elpidorou (2015). Actual Consciousness By Ted Honderich. [REVIEW] Analysis 75 (4):682-684.
  23. Katalin Farkas (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise. The Monist 91 (2):273-93.
    In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality : the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. (...)
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  24. Jordi Fernandez (forthcoming). Objects of Memory. In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Publications
  25. Jordi Fernandez (2008). Memory, Past and Self. Synthese 160 (1):103-121.
    The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’ feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took (...)
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  26. Jordi Fernandez (2008). Memory and Time. Philosophical Studies 141 (3):333 - 356.
    The purpose of this essay is to clarify the notion of mnemonic content. Memories have content. However, it is not clear whether memories are about past events in the world, past states of our own minds, or some combination of those two elements. I suggest that any proposal about mnemonic content should help us understand why events are presented to us in memory as being in the past. I discuss three proposals about mnemonic content and, eventually, I put forward a (...)
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  27. Graeme R. Forbes (1997). Externalism and Scientific Cartesianism. Mind and Language 12 (2):196-205.
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  28. Robert Francescotti (1991). Externalism and Marr's Theory of Vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.
    According to one brand of 'externalism', cognitive theories should individuate mental content 'widely'--that is, partly in terms of environmental features. David Marr's theory of vision is often cited in support of this view. Many philosophers (most notably, Tyler Burge) regard it as a prime example of a fruitful cognitive theory that widely individuates the representations it posits. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, Marr's theory does not presuppose an externalist view of mental content.
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  29. Anthony Freeman (2006). Radical Externalism: Honderich's Theory of Consciousness Discussed. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
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  30. Anthony Freeman (2006). Special Issue on Radical Externalism - Editorial Preface. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):1-1.
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  31. Brie Gertler (2007). Content Externalism and the Epistemic Conception of the Self. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):37–56.
    Our fundamental conception of the self seems to be, broadly speaking, epistemic : selves are things that have thoughts, undergo experiences, and possess reasons for action and belief. In this paper, I evaluate the consequences of this epistemic conception for the widespread view that properties like thinking that arthritis is painful are relational features of the self.
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  32. John Hawthorne (2004). Why Humeans Are Out of Their Minds. Noûs 38 (2):351-58.
  33. Benj Hellie (2013). It's Still There! In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out. Springer
    The view concerning perception developed in ‘There it is’ (Hellie 2011) involves, most centrally, the following theses: I. A. One brings a within the scope of attention only if a is an aspect of one’s perceptual (or sense-perceptual) condition; B. If one sees veridically, one ordinarily brings within the scope of attention such an a partly constituted by the condition of the bodies surrounding one; C. The perceptual condition of a dreaming subject is never partly constituted by the bodies surrounding (...)
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  34. Benj Hellie (2010). An Externalist's Guide to Inner Experience. In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press 97–145.
    Let's be externalists about perceptual consciousness and think the form of veridical perceptual consciousness includes /seeing this or that mind-independent particular and its colors/. Let's also take internalism seriously, granting that spectral inversion and hallucination can be "phenomenally" the same as normal seeing. Then perceptual consciousness and phenomenality are different, and so we need to say how they are related. It's complicated!<br><br>Phenomenal sameness is (against all odds) /reflective indiscriminability/. I build a "displaced perception" account of reflection on which indiscriminability stems (...)
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  35. Ted Honderich (2006). Radical Externalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):3-13.
    If you want a philosophically diligent exposition of a theory, something that has got through review by conventional peers, go elsewhere (Honderich, 2004). If you want an understanding made more immediate by brevity and informality, read on. The theory is a Radical Externalism about the nature of consciousness. If it is not a complete departure from the cranialism of most of the philosophy and science of consciousness, it is a fundamental departure.
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  36. Paul Horwich (1996). Comment on Dretske. Philosophical Issues 7:167-170.
  37. Solomon Igel (1995). A Few Remarks Concerning a Science of Sensory Phenomena. Axiomathes 6 (1):105-118.
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  38. Michael Jacovides (2010). Experiences as Complex Events. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):141-159.
    It is argued that experiences are complex events that befall their subjects. Each experience has a single subject and depends on the state or the event that it is of. The constituents of an experience are its subject, its grounding event or state, and everything that the subject is aware of during that time that's relevant to the telling of the story of how it was to participate in that event or be put in that state. The experience occurs where (...)
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  39. Jaegwon Kim (1996). Dretske's Qualia Externalism. Philosophical Issues 7:159-165.
  40. Robert Kirk (1998). Consciousness, Information, and External Relations. Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 30 (3-4):249-71.
  41. Robert Kirk (1996). Why Ultra-Externalism Goes Too Far. Analysis 56 (2):73-79.
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  42. Robert Kirk (1994). The Trouble with Ultra-Externalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 68:293-307.
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  43. Uriah Kriegel (2006). Review of M. Rowlands, Externalism: Putting Mind and World Back Together Again. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):487-490.
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  44. Brendan J. Lalor (1999). Intentionality and Qualia. Synthese 121 (3):249-290.
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  45. Stephen Law (2006). Honderich and the Curse of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8):61-70.
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  46. Charles Lenay & Pierre Steiner (2010). Beyond the Internalism/Externalism Debate: The Constitution of the Space of Perception. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):938-952.
    This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the “inner” and the “outer” can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind; it argues in favor of the latter position, but with arguments that are foundationally (...)
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  47. E. J. Lowe (2006). Radical Externalism or Berkeley Revisited? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):78-94.
    Ted Honderich's 'Radical Externalism' concerning the nature of consciousness is a refreshing, and in many ways very appealing, approach to a long- standing and seemingly intractable philosophical conundrum. Although I sympathize with many of his motivations in advancing the theory and share his hostility for certain alternative approaches that are currently popular, I will serve him better by playing devil's advocate than by simply recording my points of agreement with him. If his theory is a good one, it should be (...)
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  48. William G. Lycan (2001). The Case for Phenomenal Externalism. Philosophical Perspectives 15 (s15):17-35.
    Since Twin Earth was discovered by American philosophical-space explorers in the 1970s, the domain of.
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  49. Fiona Macpherson (2005). Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.
    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional attitudes. Thus, colour inver- sion scenarios are more damaging to externalist (...)
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  50. Fiona Macpherson (2000). Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character. Dissertation, University of Stirling
    This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are conscious experiences. These claims are taken to explain both how conscious experiential (...)
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