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  1. Jean Baratgin & Guy Politzer (2011). Updating: A Psychologically Basic Situation of Probability Revision. Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):253-287.
    The Bayesian model has been used in psychology as the standard reference for the study of probability revision. In the first part of this paper we show that this traditional choice restricts the scope of the experimental investigation of revision to a stable universe. This is the case of a situation that, technically, is known as focusing. We argue that it is essential for a better understanding of human probability revision to consider another situation called updating (Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1992), (...)
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  2. John C. Bigelow (1977). Semantics of Probability. Synthese 36 (4):459--72.
  3. Benj Hellie, Jenann Ismael's 'Probability and Physics'.
    Jenann’s central metaphysical thesis is that there is an objective conditional probability function PrG(A/B), the domain of which includes a great many, perhaps all, pairs of contingent propositions. This pair can be synchronic or diachronic: both can concern how things are at the same time, or not. Jenann’s central epistemological thesis is antiskepticism about PrG, in the following sense: prima facie, the subjective credence functions of epistemically reasonable agents converge on PrG: roughly, if you’ve done a lot of science, for (...)
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  4. Pawel Kawalec (2012). Bayesianizm w polskiej tradycji probabilizmu – studium stanowiska Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza. Ruch Filozoficzny 1 (1).
    Abstract The opening section outlines probabilism in the 20th century philosophy and shortly discusses the major accomplishments of Polish probabilist thinkers. A concise characterization of Bayesianism as the major recent form of probabilism follows. It builds upon the core personalist version of Bayesianism towards more objectively oriented versions thereof. The problem of a priori probability is shortly discussed. A tentative characterization of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s standpoint regarding the inductive inference is cast in Bayesian terms. His objections against it presented in Pragmatic (...)
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  5. J. L. Mackie (1973). Truth, Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical Logic. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
    Classic work by one of the most brilliant figures in post-war analytic philosophy.
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  6. Timothy McGrew & Lydia McGrew (2012). The Reliability of Witnesses and Testimony to the Miraculous. In Jake Chandler Victoria S. Harrison (ed.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford.
    The formal representation of the strength of witness testimony has been historically tied to a formula — proposed by Condorcet — that uses a factor representing the reliability of an individual witness. This approach encourages a false dilemma between hyper-scepticism about testimony, especially to extraordinary events such as miracles, and an overly sanguine estimate of reliability based on insufficiently detailed evidence. Because Condorcet’s formula does not have the resources for representing numerous epistemically relevant details in the unique situation in which (...)
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  7. Christopher J. G. Meacham (forthcoming). The Meta-Reversibility Objection. In Barry Loewer, Brad Weslake & Eric Winsberg (eds.), Time's Arrow and the Probability Structure of the World.
    One popular approach to statistical mechanics understands statistical mechanical probabilities as measures of rational indifference. Naive formulations of this ``indifference approach'' face reversibility worries - while they yield the right prescriptions regarding future events, they yield the wrong prescriptions regarding past events. This paper begins by showing how the indifference approach can overcome the standard reversibility worries by appealing to the Past Hypothesis. But, the paper argues, positing a Past Hypothesis doesn't free the indifference approach from all reversibility worries. For (...)
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  8. Charles H. Pence, Hope Hollocher, Ryan Nichols, Grant Ramsey, Edwin Siu & Daniel John Sportiello (2011). Elliott Sober: Did Darwin Write the Origin Backwards? Philosophical Essays on Darwin's Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 78 (4):705-709.
  9. Jacob Rosenthal (2010). The Natural-Range Conception of Probability. In Gerhard Ernst & Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), Time, Chance and Reduction: Philosophical Aspects of Statistical Mechanics. Cambridge University Press. 71--90.
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  10. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2012). Objective Bayesianism Defended? Metascience 21 (1):193-196.
    This is a review of Jon Williamson's 'In Defence of Objective Bayesianism'.
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  11. Darrell P. Rowbottom (2008). Intersubjective Corroboration. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):124-132.
    How are we to understand the use of probability in corroboration functions? Popper says logically, but does not show we could have access to, or even calculate, probability values in a logical sense. This makes the logical interpretation untenable, as Ramsey and van Fraassen have argued. -/- If corroboration functions only make sense when the probabilities employed therein are subjective, however, then what counts as impressive evidence for a theory might be a matter of convention, or even whim. So isn’t (...)
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  12. Michael J. Shaffer (2004). Probability and Tempered Modal Eliminativism. History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):305-318.
    In this paper the strategy for the eliminative reduction of the alethic modalities suggested by John Venn is outlined and it is shown to anticipate certain related contemporary empiricistic and nominalistic projects. Venn attempted to reduce the alethic modalities to probabilities, and thus suggested a promising solution to the nagging issue of the inclusion of modal statements in empiricistic philosophical systems. However, despite the promise that this suggestion held for laying the ‘ghost of modality’ to rest, this general approach, tempered (...)
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  13. Michael Strevens (forthcoming). Stochastic Independence and Causal Connection. Erkenntnis:1-23.
    Assumptions of stochastic independence are crucial to statistical models in science. Under what circumstances is it reasonable to suppose that two events are independent? When they are not causally or logically connected, so the standard story goes. But scientific models frequently treat causally dependent events as stochastically independent, raising the question whether there are kinds of causal connection that do not undermine stochastic independence. This paper provides one piece of an answer to this question, treating the simple case of two (...)
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  14. Richard G. Swinburne (1971). Probability, Credibility and Acceptability. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (3):275 - 283.
    THE PAPER EXAMINES WHAT IS MEANT BY ’EVIDENCE’ WHEN IT IS SAID THAT A THEORY IS PROBABLE ON CERTAIN EVIDENCE. IT CONSIDERS WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN A THEORY BEING PROBABLE ON CERTAIN EVIDENCE, A THEORY BEING BELIEVED, AND A THEORY BEING CREDIBLE. IT DISTINGUISHES VARIOUS SENSES OF ’ACCEPT’ IN WHICH SCIENTISTS ARE SAID TO ACCEPT THEORIES, ONLY ONE OF WHICH IS THE SENSE OF ’ACCEPT’ IN WHICH IT IS EQUATED WITH ’BELIEVE’. IT ANALYSES THE LOGICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN A THEORY (...)
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  15. László E. Szabó (2007). Objective Probability-Like Things with and Without Objective Indeterminism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):626-634.
    I shall argue that there is no such property of an event as its “probability.” This is why standard interpretations cannot give a sound definition in empirical terms of what “probability” is, and this is why empirical sciences like physics can manage without such a definition. “Probability” is a collective term, the meaning of which varies from context to context: it means different — dimensionless [0, 1]-valued — physical quantities characterising the different particular situations. In other words, probability is a (...)
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  16. László E. Szabó (2007). Objective Probability-Like Things with and Without Objective Indeterminism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):626-634.
    I shall argue that there is no such property of an event as its “probability.” This is why standard interpretations cannot give a sound definition in empirical terms of what “probability” is, and this is why empirical sciences like physics can manage without such a definition. “Probability” is a collective term, the meaning of which varies from context to context: it means different — dimensionless [0, 1]-valued — physical quantities characterising the different particular situations. In other words, probability is a (...)
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