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  1. Kristin Andrews (2002). Interpreting Autism: A Critique of Davidson on Thought and Language. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):317-332.
    Donald Davidson's account of interpretation purports to be a priori , though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson's view. Developmental psychologists have made plausible claims about the existence of some people with autism who use language but who are unable to interpret the minds of others. This empirical claim undermines Davidson's theoretical claims that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers and that one (...)
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  2. Tomás Barrero (2013). Acción y construcción lógica. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 45 (133):3-26.
    By considering Davidson’s analysis of prepositions as defining individual events predicates, I argue against his semantics for action sentences and stress some logico-linguistic puzzles concerning both the interpretive pretension and the referential indifference of this proposal. Inspired by Evans as well as by Grice, I advance another interpretive semantics for those cases which does not take as assumption the individual character of events and argue for a constructivist approach to events in action discourse.
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  3. T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.) (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press, USA.
    This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology.
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  4. Ansgar Beckermann (1988). Why Tropistic Systems Are Not Genuine Intentional Systems. Erkenntnis 29 (July):125-142.
  5. David Beisecker (2002). Dennett and the Quest for Real Meaning: In Defense of a Myth. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 9 (1):11-18.
    In several recent pieces, Daniel Dennett has advanced a line of reasoning purporting to show that we should reject the idea that there is a tenable distinction to be drawn between the manner in which we represent the way things are and the manner in which "blessedly simple" intentional systems like thermostats and frogs represent the way things are. Through a series of thought experiments, Dennett aims to show that philosophers of mind should abandon their preoccupation with "real meaning as (...)
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  6. Matteo Bianchin (2002). Intentionalität und Interpretation Auffassung, Auslegung und Interpretation in der Phänomenologie Husserls. Studia Phaenomenologica 2 (3-4):45-63.
  7. H. K. Bouma (2006). Radical Interpretation and High-Functioning Autistic Speakers: A Defense of Davidson on Thought and Language. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):639-662.
    Donald Davidson argues in "Thought and Talk" that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers: linguistic competence requires the possession of intentional concepts and the ability to attribute intentional states to other people. Kristin Andrews (in Philosophical Psychology, 15) has argued that empirical evidence about autism undermines this theoretical claim, for some individuals with autism lack the requisite "theory of mind" skills to be able to interpret, yet are competent speakers. In this paper, Davidson is defended on the grounds (...)
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  8. João Branquinho (ed.) (2001). The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Given the controversial nature of most issues in the foundations of cognitive science, it could hardly be expected from a description of the territory that ...
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  9. Robert Briscoe (2007). Communication and Rational Responsiveness to the World. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):135-159.
    Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be credited with the concept of objectivity – and, so, with language and thought – it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here examine Davidson’s central argument for this thesis and argue that it is unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom’s defense of the thesis in Making It Explicit. I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept of objectivity it is not (...)
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  10. Anthony L. Brueckner (1991). The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again. Analysis (October) 199 (October):199-205.
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  11. Alex Byrne (1998). Interpretivism. European Review of Philosophy 3:199-223.
    In the writings of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson we find something like the following bold conjecture: it is an a priori truth that there is no gap between our best judgements of a subject's beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject's beliefs and desires. Under ideal conditions a subject's belief-box and desire-box become transparent.
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  12. H. G. Callaway (1993). Context for Meaning and Analysis, A Critical Study in the Philosophy of Language. Rodopi.
    This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam are (...)
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  13. H. G. Callaway (1988). Semantic Competence and Truth-Conditional Semantics. Erkenntnis 28 (1):3 - 27.
    Davidson approaches the notions of meaning and interpretation with the aim of characterizing semantic competence in the syntactically characterized natural language. The objective is to provide a truth-theory for a language, generating T-sentences expressed in the semantic metalanguage, so that each sentence of the object language receives an appropriate interpretation. Proceeding within the constraints of referential semantics, I will argue for the viability of reconstructing the notion of linguistic meaning within the Tarskian theory of reference. However, the view proposed here (...)
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  14. H. G. Callaway (1985). Meaning Without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning Without Analyticity). Logique Et Analyse 109 (March):41-60.
    In a series of interesting and influential papers on semantics, Hilary Putnam has developed what he calls a “post-verificationist” theory of meaning. As part of this work, and not I think the most important part, Putnam defends a limited version of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this paper I will survey and evaluate Putnam’s defense of analyticity and explore its relationship to broader concerns in semantics. Putnam’s defense of analyticity ultimately fails, and I want to show here exactly why it fails. (...)
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  15. H. G. Callaway & J. van Brakel (1996). No Need to Speak the Same Language? Review of Ramberg, Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language. Dialectica, Vol. 50, No.1, 1996, Pp. 63-71 50 (1):63-72.
    The book is an “introductory” reconstruction of Davidson on interpretation —a claim to be taken with a grain of salt. Writing introductory books has become an idol of the tribe. This is a concise book and reflects much study. It has many virtues along with some flaws. Ramberg assembles themes and puzzles from Davidson into a more or less coherent viewpoint. A special virtue is the innovative treatment of incommensurability and of the relation of Davidson’s work to hermeneutic themes. The (...)
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  16. John R. Cook (2009). Is Davidson a Gricean? Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie 48 (3):557-575.
    In his recent collection of essays, Language, Truth and History (2005), Donald Davidson appears to endorse a philosophy of language which gives primary importance to the notion of the speaker’s communicative intentions, a perspective on language not too dissimilar from that of Paul Grice. If that is right, then this would mark a major shift from the formal semanticist approach articulated and defended by Davidson in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984). In this paper, I argue that although there (...)
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  17. Sean Crawford (2013). Review of The Sources of Intentionality by Uriah Kriegel. [REVIEW] Analysis 73 (1):190-193.
  18. Anthony Dardis (1994). How the Radically Interpreted Make Mistakes. Dialogue 33 (03):415-.
    Meaning involves normativity: a word has a meaning only if some of its uses are correct and some are incorrect. A full understanding of meaning demands an account of the normativity of meaning. One such account has it that the normativity of meaning stems from conventions for the use of words. Donald Davidson argues that communication does not require linguistic conventions. Ian Hacking has objected to Davidson's theory of meaning on the ground that Davidson is unable to allow for the (...)
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  19. Donald Davidson (2001). What Thought Requires. In Joao Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 121.
  20. Donald Davidson (1994). Radical Interpretation Interpreted. Philosophical Perspectives 8:121-128.
  21. Donald Davidson (1993). Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  22. Donald Davidson (1993). Reply to Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore's Is Radical Interpretation Possible?. In Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  23. Donald Davidson (1989). The Conditions of Thought. In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi. 193-200.
    This summary paper explains why we are not constrained to start from a solipsistic, or first person point of view in considering the nature of thought. My aim here is to suggest the nature of an acceptable extemalism. According to this view, knowledge of other minds need not be a problem m addition to the problem of empirical knowledge. The essential step toward determining the content of someone else's thought is made by discovering what normally causes those thoughts. Hence I (...)
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  24. Donald Davidson (1989). The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.
  25. Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
    Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, linguists, (...)
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  26. Donald Davidson (1980). Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:1-12.
    The central propositional attitudes of belief, desire, and meaning are interdependent; it is therefore fruitless to analyse one or two of them in terms of the others. A method is outlined in this paper that yields a theory for interpreting speech, a measure of degree of belief, and a measure of desirability. The method combines in a novel way features of Bayesean decision theory, and a Quinean approach to radical interpretation.
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  27. Donald Davidson (1974). Belief and the Basis of Meaning. Synthese 27 (July-August):309-323.
    A theory of radical interpretation gives the meanings of all sentences of a language, and can be verified by evidence available to someone who does not understand the language. Such evidence cannot include detailed information concerning the beliefs and intentions of speakers, and therefore the theory must simultaneously interpret the utterances of speakers and specify (some of) his beliefs. Analogies and connections with decision theory suggest the kind of theory that will serve for radical interpretation, and how permissible evidence can (...)
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  28. Donald Davidson (1973). Radical Interpretation. Dialectica 27 (1):314-328.
  29. Daniel Dennett (2011). Intentional Systems Theory. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
  30. Daniel C. Dennett (1983). Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The 'Panglossian Paradigm' Defended. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
    Ethologists and others studying animal behavior in a spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable data - is sketched. The (...)
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  31. Daniel C. Dennett (1971). Intentional Systems. Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
  32. Daniel C. Dennett, An Overview of My Work in Philosophy.
    In my opinion, the two main topics in the <span class='Hi'>philosophy</span> of mind are content and consciousness, and they have received about equal attention from me. As the title of my first book, Content and Consciousness (1969) suggested, that is the order in which they must be addressed: first, a theory of content or intentionality--a phenomenon more fundamental than consciousness--and then, building on that foundation, a theory of consciousness. Over the years I have found myself recapitulating this basic structure twice, (...)
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  33. Pascal Engel (1988). Radical Interpretation and the Structure of Thought. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:161-177.
    It is often argued that a radical interpretation procedure for the analysis of thought (especially davidson's) is committed to the thesis that thoughts are essentially structured entities, And is therefore false because many structures of thought do not match linguistic or semantic structures. The author attempts to defend davidson's theory of radical interpretation against such criticisms and to show that the interdependence of thought and language presupposed by this theory does not mean a primacy of either one over the other.
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  34. Jerry A. Fodor (1993). Is Radical Interpretation Possible? In Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf. Hawthorne: De Gruyter. 101-119.
  35. Jerry A. Fodor (1993). Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  36. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1994). Is Radical Interpretation Possible? Philosophical Perspectives 8:101-119.
  37. Gordon R. Foxall (1999). The Contextual Stance. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.
    The contention that cognitive psychology and radical behaviorism yield equivalent accounts of decision making and problem solving is examined by contrasting a framework of cognitive interpretation, Dennett's intentional stance, with a corresponding interpretive stance derived from contextualism. The insistence of radical behaviorists that private events such as thoughts and feelings belong in a science of human behavior is indicted in view of their failure to provide a credible interpretation of complex human behavior. Dennett's interpretation of intentional systems is an (...)
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  38. Christopher Gauker (1988). Objective Interpretationism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (June):136-51.
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  39. Christopher Gauker (1986). The Principle of Charity. Synthese 69 (October):1-25.
  40. Anthony C. Genova (1991). Craig on Davidson: A Thumbnail Refutation. Analysis (October) 195 (October):195-198.
  41. Philip Gerrans (2004). Cognitive Architecture and the Limits of Interpretationism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):42-48.
    © 2004 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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  42. Steven Gross (2012). Davidson, First-Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford University Press.
    Donald Davidson aims to illuminate the concept of meaning by asking: What knowledge would suffice to put one in a position to understand the speech of another, and what evidence sufficiently distant from the concepts to be illuminated could in principle ground such knowledge? Davidson answers: knowledge of an appropriate truth-theory for the speaker’s language, grounded in what sentences the speaker holds true, or prefers true, in what circumstances. In support of this answer, he both outlines such a truth-theory for (...)
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  43. Henry Jackman (1996). Radical Interpretation and the Permutation Principle. Erkenntnis 44 (3):317-326.
    Davidson has claimed that to conclude that reference is inscrutable, one must assume that "If some theory of truth... is satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence... then any theory that is generated from the first theory by a permutation will also be satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence." However, given that theories of truth are not directly read off the world, but rather serve as parts of larger theories of behavior, this assumption is far from self-evident. (...)
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  44. Andrew Jorgensen (2008). Lewis's Synthesis. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (1):77 – 84.
    This article criticises David Lewis's attempt to use his philosophical analysis of convention to reconcile the picture of languages as model-theoretic objects and the picture of languages as human social activity.
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  45. Peter D. Klein (1986). Radical Interpretation and Global Skepticism. In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  46. Peter D. Klein (1986). Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
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  47. Uriah Kriegel (ed.) (2013). Phenomenal Intentionality. OUP USA.
    Phenomenal intentionality is supposed to be a kind of directedness of the mind onto the world that is grounded in the conscious feel of mental life. This book of new essays explores a number of issues raised by the notion of phenomenal intentionality.
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  48. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 79--102.
    Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming intentionality is closely tied to consciousness, inasmuch as non- conscious intentionality in some sense depends upon conscious intentionality. Within this alternative framework, the question arises of how to account for unconscious intentionality, and different authors have offered different accounts. In this paper, I compare and contrast four possible accounts of unconscious intentionality, which I call potentialism, (...)
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  49. Rebecca Kukla (2000). How to Get an Interpretivist Committed. Protosociology 14:180-221.
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  50. Daniel Laurier (2001). Non-Conceptually Contentful Attitudes in Interpretation. Sorites 13 (October):6-22.
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