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  1. Kristin Andrews (2002). Interpreting Autism: A Critique of Davidson on Thought and Language. Philosophical Psychology 15 (3):317-332.
    Donald Davidson's account of interpretation purports to be a priori , though I argue that the empirical facts about interpretation, theory of mind, and autism must be considered when examining the merits of Davidson's view. Developmental psychologists have made plausible claims about the existence of some people with autism who use language but who are unable to interpret the minds of others. This empirical claim undermines Davidson's theoretical claims that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers and that one (...)
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  2. T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.) (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press, USA.
    This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology.
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  3. Ansgar Beckermann (1988). Why Tropistic Systems Are Not Genuine Intentional Systems. Erkenntnis 29 (July):125-142.
  4. H. K. Bouma (2006). Radical Interpretation and High-Functioning Autistic Speakers: A Defense of Davidson on Thought and Language. Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):639-662.
    Donald Davidson argues in "Thought and Talk" that all speakers must be interpreters of other speakers: linguistic competence requires the possession of intentional concepts and the ability to attribute intentional states to other people. Kristin Andrews (in Philosophical Psychology, 15) has argued that empirical evidence about autism undermines this theoretical claim, for some individuals with autism lack the requisite "theory of mind" skills to be able to interpret, yet are competent speakers. In this paper, Davidson is defended on the grounds (...)
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  5. João Branquinho (ed.) (2001). The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Given the controversial nature of most issues in the foundations of cognitive science, it could hardly be expected from a description of the territory that ...
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  6. Robert Briscoe (2007). Communication and Rational Responsiveness to the World. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88:135-159.
    Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be credited with the concept of objectivity – and, so, with language and thought – it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here examine Davidson’s central argument for this thesis and argue that it is unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom’s defense of the thesis in Making It Explicit. I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept of objectivity it is not (...)
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  7. Anthony L. Brueckner (1991). The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again. Analysis (October) 199 (October):199-205.
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  8. Alex Byrne (1998). Interpretivism. European Review of Philosophy 3:199-223.
    In the writings of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson we find something like the following bold conjecture: it is an a priori truth that there is no gap between our best judgements of a subject's beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject's beliefs and desires. Under ideal conditions a subject's belief-box and desire-box become transparent.
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  9. H. G. Callaway (ed.) (1993). Context for Meaning and Analysis, A Critical Study in the Philosophy of Language. Rodopi.
    This book provides a concise overview, with excellent historical and systematic coverage, of the problems of the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition. Howard Callaway explains and explores the relation of language to the philosophy of mind and culture, to the theory of knowledge, and to ontology. He places the question of linguistic meaning at the center of his investigations. The teachings of authors who have become classics in the field, including Frege, Russell, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, and Putnam are (...)
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  10. H. G. Callaway (1988). Semantic Competence and Truth-Conditional Semantics. Erkenntnis 28 (1):3 - 27.
    Davidson approaches the notions of meaning and interpretation with the aim of characterizing semantic competence in the syntactically characterized natural language. The objective is to provide a truth-theory for a language, generating T-sentences expressed in the semantic metalanguage, so that each sentence of the object language receives an appropriate interpretation. Proceeding within the constraints of referential semantics, I will argue for the viability of reconstructing the notion of linguistic meaning within the Tarskian theory of reference. However, the view proposed here (...)
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  11. H. G. Callaway (1985). Meaning Without Analyticity (Reprinted in Callaway, 2008 Meaning Without Analyticity). Logique Et Analyse 109 (March):41-60.
    In a series of interesting and influential papers on semantics, Hilary Putnam has developed what he calls a “post-verificationist” theory of meaning. As part of this work, and not I think the most important part, Putnam defends a limited version of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In this paper I will survey and evaluate Putnam’s defense of analyticity and explore its relationship to broader concerns in semantics. Putnam’s defense of analyticity ultimately fails, and I want to show here exactly why it fails. (...)
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  12. H. G. Callaway & J. van Brakel (1996). No Need to Speak the Same Language? Review of Ramberg, Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language. Dialectica, Vol. 50, No.1, 1996, pp. 63-71..
    The book is an “introductory” reconstruction of Davidson on interpretation —a claim to be taken with a grain of salt. Writing introductory books has become an idol of the tribe. This is a concise book and reflects much study. It has many virtues along with some flaws. Ramberg assembles themes and puzzles from Davidson into a more or less coherent viewpoint. A special virtue is the innovative treatment of incommensurability and of the relation of Davidson’s work to hermeneutic themes. The (...)
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  13. John R. Cook (2009). Is Davidson a Gricean? Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review/Revue canadienne de philosophie 48 (3):557-575.
    In his recent collection of essays, Language, Truth and History (2005), Donald Davidson appears to endorse a philosophy of language which gives primary importance to the notion of the speaker’s communicative intentions, a perspective on language not too dissimilar from that of Paul Grice. If that is right, then this would mark a major shift from the formal semanticist approach articulated and defended by Davidson in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984). In this paper, I argue that although there (...)
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  14. S. Crawford (2013). Review of The Sources of Intentionality by Uriah Kriegel. [REVIEW] Analysis 73 (1):190-193.
  15. Anthony Dardis (1994). How the Radically Interpreted Make Mistakes. Dialogue 33 (03):415-.
    Meaning involves normativity: a word has a meaning only if some of its uses are correct and some are incorrect. A full understanding of meaning demands an account of the normativity of meaning. One such account has it that the normativity of meaning stems from conventions for the use of words. Donald Davidson argues that communication does not require linguistic conventions. Ian Hacking has objected to Davidson's theory of meaning on the ground that Davidson is unable to allow for the (...)
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  16. Donald Davidson (2001). What Thought Requires. In Joao Branquinho (ed.), The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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  17. Donald Davidson (1994). Radical Interpretation Interpreted. Philosophical Perspectives 8:121-128.
  18. Donald Davidson (1993). Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  19. Donald Davidson (1993). Reply to Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore's Is Radical Interpretation Possible?. In Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  20. Donald Davidson (1989). The Conditions of Thought. In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.
    This summary paper explains why we are not constrained to start from a solipsistic, or first person point of view in considering the nature of thought. My aim here is to suggest the nature of an acceptable extemalism. According to this view, knowledge of other minds need not be a problem m addition to the problem of empirical knowledge. The essential step toward determining the content of someone else's thought is made by discovering what normally causes those thoughts. Hence I (...)
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  21. Donald Davidson (1989). The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.
  22. Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
    Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, linguists, (...)
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  23. Donald Davidson (1980). Toward a Unified Theory of Meaning and Action. Grazer Philosophische Studien 11:1-12.
    The central propositional attitudes of belief, desire, and meaning are interdependent; it is therefore fruitless to analyse one or two of them in terms of the others. A method is outlined in this paper that yields a theory for interpreting speech, a measure of degree of belief, and a measure of desirability. The method combines in a novel way features of Bayesean decision theory, and a Quinean approach to radical interpretation.
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  24. Donald Davidson (1974). Belief and the Basis of Meaning. Synthese 27 (July-August):309-323.
    A theory of radical interpretation gives the meanings of all sentences of a language, and can be verified by evidence available to someone who does not understand the language. Such evidence cannot include detailed information concerning the beliefs and intentions of speakers, and therefore the theory must simultaneously interpret the utterances of speakers and specify (some of) his beliefs. Analogies and connections with decision theory suggest the kind of theory that will serve for radical interpretation, and how permissible evidence can (...)
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  25. Donald Davidson (1973). Radical Interpretation. Dialectica 27 (1):314-328.
  26. Daniel Dennett, Intentional Systems Theory.
    Intentional systems theory is in the first place an analysis of the meanings of such everyday ‘mentalistic’ terms as ‘believe,’ ‘desire,’ ‘expect,’ ‘decide,’ and ‘intend,’ the terms of ‘folk psychology’ (Dennett 1971) that we use to interpret, explain, and predict the behavior of other human beings, animals, some artifacts such as robots and computers, and indeed ourselves. In traditional parlance, we seem to be attributing minds to the things we thus interpret, and this raises a host of questions about the (...)
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  27. Daniel C. Dennett (1983). Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The 'Panglossian Paradigm' Defended. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6:343-90.
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  28. Daniel C. Dennett (1971). Intentional Systems. Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
  29. Pascal Engel (1988). Radical Interpretation and the Structure of Thought. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88:161-177.
  30. Jerry A. Fodor (1993). Is Radical Interpretation Possible? In Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
  31. Jerry A. Fodor (1993). Reflecting Davidson, Stoecker, Ralf. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
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  32. Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest LePore (1994). Is Radical Interpretation Possible? Philosophical Perspectives 8:101-119.
  33. Christopher Gauker (1988). Objective Interpretationism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (June):136-51.
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  34. Christopher Gauker (1986). The Principle of Charity. Synthese 69 (October):1-25.
  35. Anthony C. Genova (1991). Craig on Davidson: A Thumbnail Refutation. Analysis (October) 195 (October):195-198.
  36. Philip Gerrans (2004). Cognitive Architecture and the Limits of Interpretationism. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):42-48.
    © 2004 by The Johns Hopkins University Press.
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  37. Steven Gross (forthcoming). Davidson, First Person Authority, and the Evidence for Semantics. In G. Preyer (ed.), Davidson's Philosophy: Truth, Meaning and the Mental. Oxford University Press.
    Donald Davidson aims to illuminate the concept of meaning by asking: What knowledge would suffice to put one in a position to understand the speech of another, and what evidence sufficiently distant from the concepts to be illuminated could in principle ground such knowledge? Davidson answers: knowledge of an appropriate truth-theory for the speaker’s language, grounded in what sentences the speaker holds true, or prefers true, in what circumstances. In support of this answer, he both outlines such a truth-theory for (...)
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  38. Henry Jackman (1996). Radical Interpretation and the Permutation Principle. Erkenntnis 44 (3):317-326.
    Davidson has claimed that to conclude that reference is inscrutable, one must assume that "If some theory of truth... is satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence... then any theory that is generated from the first theory by a permutation will also be satisfactory in the light of all relevant evidence." However, given that theories of truth are not directly read off the world, but rather serve as parts of larger theories of behavior, this assumption is far from self-evident. (...)
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  39. Andrew Jorgensen (2008). Lewis's Synthesis. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (1):77 – 84.
    This article criticises David Lewis's attempt to use his philosophical analysis of convention to reconcile the picture of languages as model-theoretic objects and the picture of languages as human social activity.
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  40. Peter D. Klein (1986). Radical Interpretation and Global Skepticism. In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  41. Peter D. Klein (1986). Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  42. Uriah Kriegel (2011). Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content. In T. Bayne & M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press.
    Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming intentionality is closely tied to consciousness, inasmuch as non- conscious intentionality in some sense depends upon conscious intentionality. Within this alternative framework, the question arises of how to account for unconscious intentionality, and different authors have offered different accounts. In this paper, I compare and contrast four possible accounts of unconscious intentionality, which I call potentialism, (...)
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  43. Rebecca Kukla (2000). How to Get an Interpretivist Committed. Protosociology 14:180-221.
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  44. Daniel Laurier (2001). Non-Conceptually Contentful Attitudes in Interpretation. Sorites 13 (October):6-22.
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  45. Ernest LePore (ed.) (1986). Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  46. David Lewis (1974). Radical Interpretation. Synthese 27 (July-August):331-344.
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  47. Jeff E. Malpas (1991). Holism and Indeterminacy. Dialectica 47:47-58.
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  48. Richard N. Manning (2003). Interpretation, Reasons, and Facts. Inquiry 46 (3):346-376.
    Donald Davidson argues that his interpretivist approach to meaning shows that accounting for the intentionality and objectivity of thought does not require an appeal, as John McDowell has urged it does, to a specifically rational relation between mind and world. Moreover, Davidson claims that the idea of such a relation is unintelligible. This paper takes issue with these claims. It shows, first, that interpretivism, contra Davidson's express view, does not depend essentially upon an appeal to a causal relation between events (...)
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  49. Richard N. Manning (1995). Interpreting Davidson's Omniscient Interpreter. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):335-374.
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  50. Timothy McCarthy (2002). Radical Interpretation and Indeterminacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    McCarthy develops a theory of radical interpretation--the project of characterizing from scratch the language and attitudes of an agent or population--and applies it to the problems of indeterminacy of interpretation first described by Quine. The major theme in McCarthy's study is that a relatively modest set of interpretive principles, properly applied, can serve to resolve the major indeterminacies of interpretation.
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  51. Gregory McCulloch (1998). Intentionality and Interpretation. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
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  52. Colin Mcginn (1986). Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  53. Colin Mcginn (1986). Radical Interpretation and Epistemology. In Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
    In this companion to ‘Charity, Interpretation, and Belief’, McGinn broadens his attack on Davidson's principle of charity, arguing that charity is no more required for the ascription of notional beliefs (i.e. shared concepts) than it is for the ascription of relational beliefs. His argument takes the form of a reductio: if Davidson were right that about the inherently charitable nature of interpretation, then, McGinn argues, traditional sceptical worries (e.g. concerning the external world, other minds) would not even arise. But that (...)
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  54. Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). Why Intentional Systems Theory Cannot Reconcile Physicalism with Realism About Belief and Desire. Protosociology 14:145-157.
  55. Bruno Mölder (2010). Mind Ascribed. An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. John Benjamins.
    This book provides a thoroughly worked out and systematic presentation of an interpretivist position in the philosophy of mind, of the view that having mental properties is a matter of interpretation. Bruno Mölder elaborates and defends a particular version of interpretivism, the ascription theory, which explicates the possession of mental states with contents in terms of their canonical ascribability, and shows how it can withstand various philosophical challenges. Apart from a defence of the ascription theory from the objections commonly directed (...)
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  56. Richard A. Moran (1994). Interpretation Theory and the First-Person. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):154-73.
  57. Elisabeth Pacherie (1995). Attitudes Propositionnelles, Intentionnalité Et Évolution. Revue de Métaphysique Et de Morale 100 (3):339 - 371.
    La question du statut ontologique des attitudes propositionnelles et, corrélativement, celle de l'efficacité causale des contenus mentaux sont parmi les principaux problèmes actuellement débattus en philosophie de la psychologie. La théorie des systèmes intentionnels de Dennett, tout en accordant une valeur prédictive aux attributions d'attitudes propositionnelles, refuse aux croyances et désirs droit d'entrée dans une ontologie scientifique. Le but de cet article est de proposer une analyse critique de cette théorie et des arguments darwiniens qui la sous-tendent. The question of (...)
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  58. Jaroslav Peregrin (2011). The Use-Theory of Meaning and the Rules of Our Language Games. In K. Turner (ed.), Making semantics pragmatic. Emerald.
    While most theoreticians of meaning in the first half of the twentieth century subscribed to a representational theory (viewing meanings as entities stood for by the expressions), the second half of the century was marked by the rise of various versions of use-theories of meaning. The roots of this ‘pragmatist turn’ are detectable in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, the Oxford speech act theorists (Austin, Grice) and the American neopragmatists (Quine, Sellars). Though it is now rather popular (and sometimes (...)
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  59. Philip Pettit (1994). Towards Interpretation. Philosophia 23 (1-4):157-170.
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  60. Eva Picardi (1989). The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.
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  61. Eva Picardi (1989). Davidson on Assertion, Convention and Belief. In The Mind of Donald Davidson. Netherlands: Rodopi.
    The attitude of believing or "holding true" fulfils a twofold role in Davidson's theory of meaning: it provides the basic evidence for a theory of radical interpretation and it also constitutes the key notion in terms of which the linguistic act of assertion is to be characterized. It is however doubtful whether the notion of "holding true" can fulfil either of these two roles without presupposing an implicit grasp of the public significance of the practice of making assertions. The lack (...)
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  62. G. Preyer (ed.) (forthcoming). Davidson's Philosophy: Truth, Meaning and the Mental. Oxford University Press.
  63. Gerhard Preyer (1998). Interpretation and Rationality: Steps From Radical Interpretation to the Externalism of Triangulation. Protosociology 11:245-260.
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  64. Hilary Putnam (1987). Artificial Intelligence. St Martin's Press.
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  65. Hilary Putnam (1987). Computational Psychology and Interpretation Theory. In Artificial Intelligence. St Martin's Press.
  66. W. V. Quine (1977). Review of Evans and McDowell. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 74:225-242.
  67. Bjorn Ramberg (2004). Naturalizing Idealizations: Pragmatism and the Interpretivist Strategy. Contemporary Pragmatism 1 (2):1-63.
    Following Quine, Davidson, and Dennett, I take mental states and linguistic meaning to be individuated with reference to interpretation. The regulative principle of ideal interpretation is to maximize rationality, and this accounts for the distinctiveness and autonomy of the vocabulary of agency. This rationality-maxim can accommodate empirical cognitive-psychological investigation into the nature and limitations of human mental processing. Interpretivism is explicitly anti-reductionist, but in the context of Rorty's neo-pragmatism provides a naturalized view of agents. The interpretivist strategy affords a less (...)
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  68. Piers Rawling (2003). Radical Interpretation. In Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  69. Piers Rawling (2003). Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  70. Paul Saka (2007). Spurning Charity. Axiomathes.
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  71. Timothy Schroeder (2011). Review of Bruno Mölder, Mind Ascribed: An Elaboration and Defence of Interpretivism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (2).
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  72. Robert Sinclair (2002). What is Radical Interpretation? Davidson, Fodor, and the Naturalization of Philosophy. Inquiry 45 (2):161-184.
    Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently criticized Davidson's methodology of radical interpretation because of its apparent failure to reflect how actual interpretation is achieved. Responding to such complaints, Davidson claims that he is not interested in the empirical issues surrounding actual interpretation but instead focuses on the question of what conditions make interpretation possible. It is argued that this exchange between Fodor and Lepore on one side, and Davidson on the other, cannot be viewed simply as a naturalist reaction (...)
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  73. Barry C. Smith (2006). Davidson, Interpretation and First-Person Constraints on Meaning. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):385-406.
    International Journal of Philosophical Studies 0967-2559 (print)/1466-4542 (online) Original Article.
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  74. Erik Stenius (1976). Comments on Donald Davidson's Paper Radical Interpretation. Dialectica 30:35-60.
    Formulating my comments I have had difficulties of three kinds. First, I am not at all sure that I have understood Davidson correctly at every point. Secondly, not being aware of how far I may take for granted that Davidson and I share what may be called the same background ...
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  75. Stephen P. Stich (1981). Dennett on Intentional Systems. Philosophical Topics 12 (1):39-62.
  76. William W. Taschek (2002). Making Sense of Others: Donald Davidson on Interpretation. Harvard Review of Philosophy 10 (1):27-40.
  77. Maura Tumulty (2006). Davidson's Fear of the Subjective. Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (3):509-532.
    According to Donald Davidson, any philosophy of mind that appeals to propositional content is doomed to become an account of the mind as a private theater. But Davidson’s own work on thought-attribution can be used to make propositional content safe. This paper uses Davidson’s negative reaction to Gareth Evans’s works on perceptually based demonstrative thought to tease out a way of talking about propositional content that doesn’t slide into subjectivism. It also explains why Davidson saw Evans as a mentalist enemy (...)
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  78. Jason Turner (forthcoming). (Metasemantically) Securing Free Will. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Metasemantic security arguments aim to show, on metasemantic grounds, that even if we were to discover that determinism is true, that wouldn't give us reason to think that people never act freely. Flew's [1955] Paradigm Case Argument is one such argument; Heller's [1996] Putnamian argument is another. In this paper I introduce a third which uses a metasemantic picture on which meanings are settled as though by an ideal interpreter. Metasemantic security arguments are widely thought discredited by van Inwagen's [1983] (...)
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  79. Claudine Verheggen (2007). Triangulating with Davidson. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):96-103.
    According to Davidson, 'triangulation' is necessary both to fix the meanings of one's thoughts and utterances and to have the concept of objectivity, both of which are necessary for thinking and talking at all. Against these claims, it has been objected that neither meaning-determination nor possession of the concept of objectivity requires triangulation; nor does the ability to think and talk require possession of the concept of objectivity. But this overlooks the important connection between the tasks that triangulation is meant (...)
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  80. Alan Weir, Indeterminacy of Translation.
    in Ernest Lepore and Barry C. Smith (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Chapter Eleven, pp. 233-249.
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  81. J. Robert G. Williams (2008). Permutations and Foster Problems: Two Puzzles or One? Ratio 21 (1):91–105.
    How are permutation arguments for the inscrutability of reference to be formulated in the context of a Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics? Davidson (1979) takes these arguments to establish that there are no grounds for favouring a reference scheme that assigns London to “Londres”, rather than one that assigns Sydney to that name. We shall see, however, that it is far from clear whether permutation arguments work when set out in the context of the kind of truth-theoretic semantics which Davidson favours. The (...)
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  82. J. Robert G. Williams (2007). Eligibility and Inscrutability. Philosophical Review 116 (3):361-399.
    Inscrutability arguments threaten to reduce interpretationist metasemantic theories to absurdity. Can we find some way to block the arguments? A highly influential proposal in this regard is David Lewis’ ‘eligibility’ response: some theories are better than others, not because they fit the data better, but because they are framed in terms of more natural properties. The purposes of this paper are (1) to outline the nature of the eligibility proposal, making the case that it is not ad hoc, but instead (...)
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  83. Robert Williams (2008). The Price of Inscrutability. Noûs 42 (4):600 - 641.
  84. Robert Williams (2008). Gavagai Again. Synthese 164 (2):235 - 259.
    Quine (1960, "Word and object". Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, ch. 2) claims that there are a variety of equally good schemes for translating or interpreting ordinary talk. 'Rabbit' might be taken to divide its reference over rabbits, over temporal slices of rabbits, or undetached parts of rabbits, without significantly affecting which sentences get classified as true and which as false. This is the basis of his famous 'argument from below' to the conclusion that there can be no fact of the (...)
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