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Summary Philosophers (and ordinary folk) draw a distinction between the features that a things has in and of itself and those that it has at least partly in virtue of the way the world is. An egg may have a certain mass and be the first egg that a young hen lays in her life. It has the first property just in virtue of how it is, while the second depends on its relation to other eggs (and the hen). The distinction has played a role in such issues as the nature of moral value, of real change, and of ontological dependence (in particular, supervenience). No single analysis has garnered widespread support; the search for one continues alongside related debates about the notions introduced in various analyses, such as that of a pure natural property and of the grounding relation between properties.
Key works Lewis 1983 is the seminal paper in this area; Langton & Lewis 1998 provides further refinements; and various responses, developments or alternatives are discussed in Vallentyne 1997Humberstone 1996Yablo 1999Denby 2006, Figdor 2008, and Marshall 2009.
Introductions Works in this area tend towards the sophisticated and technical once one goes beyond the initial motivating intuitions. While Lewis 1983 and Langton & Lewis 1998 are indispensable and short, they are highly condensed; Francescotti 1999 is a less condensed discussion of many basic analyses and so can serve as an introductory article to current debates. 
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  1. Ralf M. Bader (2013). Towards a Hyperintensional Theory of Intrinsicality. Journal of Philosophy 110 (10):525-563.
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  2. Ralf M. Bader (2010). Review of Vera Hoffmann-Kolss, The Metaphysics of Extrinsic Properties. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (10).
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  3. Saradindu Bhaduri & Hemant Kumar (2011). Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations to Innovate: Tracing the Motivation of 'Grassroot' Innovators in India. Mind and Society 10 (1):27-55.
    Extrinsic motivations like intellectual property protections and fiscal incentives continue to occupy the centre stage in debates on innovation policies. Joseph Schumpeter had, however, argued that the motive to accumulate private property can only explain part of innovative activities. In his view, “the joy of creating, of getting things done” associated with the behavioural traits that “seek out difficulties…and takes delight in ventures” stand out as the most independent factor of behaviour in explaining innovation and economic development, especially in early (...)
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  4. Krister Bykvist, Garrett Cullity, Åsa Carlson, Johan Brännmark, Klemens Kappel, Ulrik Kihlbom, Ian Law, Hans Mathlein, Derek Parfit & Ingmar Persson (2005). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake1. In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value. Springer. 115.
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  5. Ross Cameron (2009). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties. In Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics. Routledge.
    Consider two of my properties: my mass and my weight. There seems to be an interesting distinction between the reasons for my having these two properties. I have my mass solely in virtue of how I am, whereas I have my weight in virtue of both how I am and how my surroundings are. I have my weight as a result of the gravitational pull exerted by the Earth on a thing having my mass, whereas I have my mass independently (...)
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  6. Ross P. Cameron (2008). Recombination and Intrinsicality. Ratio 21 (1):1–12.
    In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis' principle of recombination presupposes warrant for a combinatorial analysis of intrinsicality, which in turn presupposes warrant for the principle of recombination. This, I claim, leads to a vicious circularity: warrant for neither doctrine can get off the ground.
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  7. Fatma Gül Cirhinlioğlu & Gözde Özdikmenli-Demir (2012). Religious Orientation and Its Relation to Locus of Control and Depression. Archive for the Psychology of Religion 34 (3):341-362.
    This study examines the relationships among intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations, locus of control and depression levels of 430 Turkish Muslim university students. The results show that some locus of control dimensions are related to participants’ religious orientations, but depression has no significant impact on intrinsic or extrinsic religiousness. Hierarchical Regression Analyses were conducted for predicting the intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations of different gender. Belief in chance and belief in fate contribute to male and female participants’ intrinsic religious orientations. (...)
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  8. William L. Croll & R. Mark Smith (1984). The Effects of Extrinsic Reward Timing on Intrinsic Motivation. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 22 (5):415-417.
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  9. A. Denby (2006). The Distinction Between Intrinsic and Kctrinsic Properties, DAVID. Mind 115 (457).
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  10. David A. Denby (2014). Essence and Intrinsicality. In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. de gruyter. 87-109.
    In the first half of this paper, I argue that essential properties are intrinsic and that this permits a modal analysis of essence that is immune the sort of objections raised by Fine (1994). In the second half, I argue that intrinsic properties collectively have a certain structure and that this accounts for some observations about essences: that things are essentially determinate; that things often have properties within a certain range essentially; and that the essential properties of things are their (...)
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  11. David A. Denby (2010). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties: A Reply to Hoffmann-Kolss. Mind 119 (475):773-782.
    In response to Hoffmann-Kolss, I modify my account of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties previously published in this journal. I also strengthen the reason I gave to think my account pins down the distinction uniquely.
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  12. David A. Denby (2006). The Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties. Mind 115 (457):1-17.
    I propose an analysis of the metaphysically important distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, and, in the process, provide a neglected model for the analysis of recalcitrant distinctions generally. First, I recap some difficulties with Kim's well-known (1982) proposal and its recent descendants. Then I define two independence relations among properties and state a ‘quasi-logical’ analysis of the distinction in terms of them. Unusually, my proposal is holistic, but I argue that it is in a certain kind of equilibrium and (...)
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  13. John P. Doyle (1990). Extrinsic Cognoscibility. Modern Schoolman 68 (1):57-80.
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  14. J. Michael Dunn (1990). Relevant Predication 2: Intrinsic Properties and Internal Relations. Philosophical Studies 60 (3):177-206.
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  15. M. Eddon (2014). Intrinsic Explanations and Numerical Representations. In Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. 271-290.
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  16. M. Eddon (2011). Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):314-336.
    The standard counterexamples to David Lewis’s account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis’s can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties.
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  17. Howard E. Evans (1977). Commentary: Extrinsic Versus Intrinsic Factors in the Evolution of Insect Sociality. BioScience 27 (9):613-617.
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  18. Carrie Figdor (2014). What's the Use of an Intrinsic Property? In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter.
    Work on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is often motivated by its use in other areas, such as intrinsic value, real vs. Cambridge change, supervenience and other topics. With the exception of Figdor 2008, philosophers have sought to articulate a global distinction -- a distinction between kinds of properties, rather than ways in which individuals have properties. I argue that global I/E distinctions are unable to do the work that allegedly motivates them, focusing on the case of intrinsic value.
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  19. Carrie Figdor (2008). Intrinsically/Extrinsically. Journal of Philosophy 105 (11):691-718.
    I separate two intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions that are often conflated: one between properties (the intrinsic/extrinsic, or I/E, distinction) and one between the ways in which properties are had by individuals (the intrinsically/extrinsically, or I-ly/E-ly, distinction). I propose an analysis of the I-ly/E-ly distinction and its relation to the I/E distinction that explains, inter alia, the puzzle of cross-classification: how it can be, for example, that the property of being square can be classified as an intrinsic property and yet individuals can be (...)
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  20. Robert Francescotti (2014). Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended. In , Companion to Intrinsic Properties. 175-198.
    In "How to Define Intrinsic Properties" I offered a relational account of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. The basic idea is that F is an intrinsic property of an item x just in case x’s having F consists entirely in x’s having certain internal properties, where an internal property is one whose instantiation does not consist in one’s relation to any distinct items (items other than oneself and one’s proper parts). I still think that this relational analysis is largely correct, and here (...)
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  21. Robert Francescotti (2012). Understanding the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Distinction. Metascience 21 (1):91-94.
    Understanding the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9549-x Authors Robert Francescotti, Department of Philosophy, San Diego State University, 5500 Campanile Drive, San Diego, CA 92182-6044, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
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  22. Robert Francescotti (1999). How to Define Intrinsic Properties. Noûs 33 (4):590-609.
    An intrinsic property, according to one important account, is a property that is had by all of one's duplicates. Instead, one might choose to characterize intrinsic properties as those that can be had in the absence of all distinct individuals. After reviewing the problems with these earlier accounts, the author presents a less problematic analysis. The goal is to clarify the rough idea that an intrinsic property is a special sort of non-relational property; having the property does not consist in (...)
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  23. Robert Francescotti (1999). Mere Cambridge Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):295-308.
    The predicates 'is outgrown by Theaetetus,' 'is 300 miles west of a lemur,' and 'is such that 9 is odd' denote properties, but there is a sense in which these properties are not genuine features of the objects that have them. The fact that we find these mere-Cambridge properties odd has something to do with their relational character. But relationality in itself is not an adequate criterion for property-genuineness for there are many relational properties that do not qualify as mere-Cambridge. (...)
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  24. Robert M. Francescotti (ed.) (2014). Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter.
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  25. Roger Harris (2010). Do Material Things Have Intrinsic Properties? Metaphysica 11 (2):105-117.
    Possession of any actual physical property depends on the ambient conditions for its bearers, irrespective of one's particular theory of dispositions. If 'self-sufficiency' makes a property intrinsic, then, because of this dependence, things in the actual world cannot have an intrinsic physical resemblance to one another or to things in other possible worlds. Criteria for the self-sufficiency of intrinsic properties based on, or implying indifference to both 'loneliness' and 'accompaniment' entail that no self-sufficient property can require its bearers to be (...)
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  26. Roger Harris (2010). How to Define Extrinsic Properties. Axiomathes 20 (4):461-478.
    There are, broadly, three sorts of account of intrinsicality: ‘self-sufficiency’, ‘essentiality’ and ‘pure qualitativeness’. I argue for the last of these, and urge that we take intrinsic properties of concrete objects to be all and only those shared by actual or possible duplicates, which only differ extrinsically. This approach gains support from Francescotti’s approach: defining ‘intrinsic’ in contradistinction to extrinsic properties which ‘consist in’ relations which rule out intrinsicality. I answer Weatherson’s criticisms of Francescotti, but, to answer criticisms of my (...)
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  27. John Hawthorne (2001). Intrinsic Properties and Natural Relations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):399-403.
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  28. V. Hoffmann-Kolss (2010). Denby on the Distinction Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties. Mind 119 (475):763-772.
    In this paper, I raise an objection to the criterion of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction proposed by David Denby in his article ‘The Distinction between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties’ (2006). I show that the extrinsic property of being either red and lonely or green cannot adequately be accounted for by Denby’s criterion and argue that this difficulty points to a general problem inherent to Denby’s account.
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  29. Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2014). Is the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Distinction Hyperintensional? In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. de Gruyter. 157-173.
    Several authors have recently claimed that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is hyperintensional, i.e., that there are cointensional properties P and Q, such that P is intrinsic, while Q is extrinsic. In this paper, I aim to defend the classical view that whenever P and Q are cointensional properties, then P and Q are either both intrinsic or both extrinsic. I first argue that the standard characterization of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction involves dependence claims: intrinsic properties are those properties (...)
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  30. Vera Hoffmann-Kolss (2010). The Metaphysics of Extrinsic Properties. Ontos-Verlag.
    This book aims to develop a philosophical theory of extrinsic properties – of properties whose instantiation by an object does not only depend on what the object itself is like, but also on features of its environment. Various accounts of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction are analysed in detail, and it is argued that the most promising approach to defining this distinction is to consider extrinsic properties as a particular type of relational property. Moreover, it is shown that two key notions in (...)
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  31. I. L. Humberstone (1996). Intrinsic/Extrinsic. Synthese 108 (2):205-267.
    Several intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions amongst properties, current in the literature, are discussed and contrasted. The proponents of such distinctions tend to present them as competing, but it is suggested here that at least three of the relevant distinctions (including here that between non-relational and relational properties) arise out of separate perfectly legitimate intuitive considerations: though of course different proposed explications of the informal distinctions involved in any one case may well conflict. Special attention is paid to the question of whether a (...)
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  32. Michael Jacovides (2000). Cambridge Changes of Color. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):142-164.
    Locke’s porphyry argument at 2.8.19 of the Essay has not been properly appreciated. On my reconstruction, Locke argues from the premise that porphyry undergoes a mere Cambridge change of color in different lighting conditions to the conclusion that porphyry’s colors do not belong to it as it is in itself. I argue that his argument is not quite sound, but it would be if Locke chose a different stone, alexandrite. Examining his argument teaches us something about the relation between explanatory (...)
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  33. R. E. Jennings (1986). Intrinsicality and the Conditional. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (2):221 - 238.
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  34. Rae Langton & David Lewis (2001). Marshall and Parsons on 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):353-355.
    Dan Marshall and Josh Parsons note, correctly. that the property of being either a cube or accompanied by a cube is incorrectly classified as intrinsic under the definition we have given unless it turns out to be disjunctive. Whether it is disjunctive, under the definition we gave, turns on certain judgements of the relative naturalness of properties. They doubt the judgements of relative naturalness that would classify their property as disjunctive. We disagree. They also suggest that the whole idea of (...)
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  35. Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
    Something could be round even if it were the only thing in the universe, unaccompanied by anything distinct from itself. Jaegwon Kim once suggested that we define an intrinsic property as one that can belong to something unaccompanied. Wrong: unaccompaniment itself is not intrinsic, yet it can belong to something unaccompanied. But there is a better Kim-style definition. Say that P is independent of accompaniment iff four different cases are possible: something accompanied may have P or lack P, something unaccompanied (...)
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  36. David Lewis (2001). Redefining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):381-398.
    Several alleged counterexamples to the definition of ‘intrinsic’ proposed in Rae Langton and David Lewis, ‘Defining “Intrinsic”’, are unconvincing. Yet there are reasons for dissatisfaction, and room for improvement. One desirable change is to raise the standard of non-disjunctiveness, thereby putting less burden on contentious judgements of comparative naturalness. A second is to deal with spurious independence by throwing out just the disjunctive troublemakers, instead of throwing out disjunctive properties wholesale, and afterward reinstating those impeccably intrinsic disjunctive properties that are (...)
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  37. David Lewis (1983). Extrinsic Properties. Philosophical Studies 44 (2):197-200.
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  38. David Lewis & Rae Langton (2002). Comment définir « intrinsèque ». Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (4):511-527.
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  39. Dan Marshall (2014). The Varieties of Intrinsicality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2).
    Intrinsicality is a central notion in metaphysics that can do important work in many areas of philosophy. It is not widely appreciated, however, that there are in fact a number of different notions of intrinsicality, and that these different notions differ in what work they can do. This paper discusses what these notions are, describes how they are related to each other, and argues that each of them can be analysed in terms of a single notion of intrinsic aboutness that (...)
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  40. Dan Marshall (2013). Intrinsicality and Grounding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):1-19.
    A number of philosophers have recently claimed that intrinsicality can be analysed in terms of the metaphysical notion of grounding. Since grounding is a hyperintensional notion, accounts of intrinsicality in terms of grounding, unlike most other accounts, promise to be able to discriminate between necessarily coextensive properties that differ in whether they are intrinsic. They therefore promise to be compatible with popular metaphysical theories that posit necessary entities and necessary connections between wholly distinct entities, on which it is plausible that (...)
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  41. Dan Marshall (2013). Analyses of Intrinsicality Without Naturalness. Philosophy Compass 8 (2):186-197.
    Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. This article discusses three leading attempts to analyse this distinction that don’t appeal to the notion of nat-uralness: the duplication analysis endorsed by G. E. Moore and David Lewis, Peter Vallentyne’s analysis in terms of contractions of possible worlds, and the analysis of Gene Witmer, William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon in terms of grounding.
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  42. Dan Marshall (2012). Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness. Philosophy Compass 7 (8):531-542.
    Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in terms of the facts about naturalness. This article discusses the three most influential of these attempts, each of which involve David Lewis. These are Lewis's 1983 analysis, his 1986 analysis, and his joint 1998 analysis with Rae Langton.
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  43. Dan Marshall (2009). Can 'Intrinsic' Be Defined Using Only Broadly Logical Notions? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):646-672.
    An intrinsic property is roughly a property things have in virtue of how they are, as opposed to how they are related to things outside of them. This paper argues that it is not possible to give a definition of 'intrinsic' that involves only logical, modal and mereological notions, and does not depend on any special assumptions about either properties or possible worlds.
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  44. Dan Marshall, Yablo's Account of Intrinsicality.
    An intrinsic property is roughly a property something has in virtue of how it is, as opposed to how it is related to other things. More carefully, the property of being F is intrinsic iff, necessarily, for any x that is F , x is F in virtue of how it is, as opposed to how it is related to wholly distinct things, or how wholly distinct things are. An extrinsic property, on the other hand, is any property that is (...)
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  45. Dan Marshall & Josh Parsons (2001). Langton and Lewis on 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):347-351.
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  46. Erik Myin (1999). Beyond Intrinsicness and Dazzling Blacks. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):964-965.
    Palmer's target article is surely one of the most scientifically detailed and knowledgeable treatments of spectrum inversion ever. Unfortunately, it is built on a very shaky philosophical foundation, the notion of the "intrinsic". In the article's ontology, there are two kinds of properties of mental states, intrinsic properties and relational properties. The whole point of the article is that these aspects of experience are mutually exclusive: the intrinsic is nonrelational and the relational is nonintrinsic.
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  47. Douglas L. Nelson (1973). Word Coding: The Role of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Features. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 1 (4):241-243.
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  48. C. Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum (forthcoming). Conceptualising 'Authority'. International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-14.
    This paper attempts a conceptualisation of authority intended to be useful across all areas where the concept is relevant. It begins by setting off authority against power, on the one hand, and respect, on the other, and then spells out S1’s authority as consisting in S2’s voluntary action performed in the belief that S1 would approve of it. While this definition should hold for authority generally, a distinction is made between three different kinds of authority according to what grounds them: (...)
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  49. Josh Parsons, Intrinsic Value and Intrinsic Properties.
    It’s now commonplace — since Korsgaard (1996) — in ethical theory to distinguish between two distinctions: on the one hand, the distinction between value an object has in virtue of its intrinsic properties vs. the value it has in virtue of all its properties, intrinsic or extrinsic; and on the other hand, the distinction between the value has an object as an end, vs. the value it has as a means to something else. I’ll call the former distinction the distinction (...)
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  50. Theodore Sider (2001). Maximality and Intrinsic Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):357 - 364.
    A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of an F are not themselves Fs.' Maximality makes trouble for a recent analysis of intrinsicality by Rae Langton and David Lewis.
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