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  1. David Abram (2010). Becoming Animal: An Essay on Wonder. Pantheon Books.
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  2. Donato Bergandi (2013). Epilogue: The Epistemic and Practical Circle in an Evolutionary, Ecologically Sustainable Society. In The Structural Links between Ecology, Evolution and Ethics The Virtuous Epistemic Circle. Springer 151-158.
    Abstract In a context of human demographic, technological and economic pressure on natural systems, we face some demanding challenges. We must decide 1) whether to “preserve” nature for its own sake or to “conserve” nature because nature is essentially a reservoir of goods that are functional to humanity’s wellbeing; 2) to choose ways of life that respect the biodiversity and evolutionary potential of the planet; and, to allow all this to come to fruition, 3) to clearly define the role of (...)
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  3. Donato Bergandi (2001). Biodiversité. In Gilbert Hottois & Jean-Noël Missa (eds.), Nouvelle encyclopédie de bioéthique. Médecine, environnement, biotechnologie. De Boeck Université 104-112.
  4. Paweł Bernat, A Way Out From the Wrongful Environmental Mindset: The Origins and Possible Solutions to the Tragedy of the Commons. Philosophy and Practice of Sustainable Development.
    The paper indicates and discusses three phenomena identified as the main origins of the mindset responsible for the tragedy of the global commons, namely (1) Cornucopianism, (2) rationality of self-interest and egoism, and (3) the presupposed instrumental value of nature. It is demonstrated that all those theses can be philosophically and ethically dismissed and thus, the wrongful environmental mindset built around them should be rejected. It is further argued that the up-to-date solutions to the tragedy are unsatisfactory. Moreover, the tragedy (...)
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  5. Mark H. Bernstein (1998). On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters. Oxford University Press.
    In this fresh and powerfully argued book, Mark Bernstein identifies the qualities that make an entity deserving of moral consideration. It is frequently assumed that only (normal) human beings count. Bernstein argues instead for "experientialism"--the view that having conscious experiences is necessary and sufficient for moral standing. He demonstrates that this position requires us to include many non-human animals in our moral realm, but not to the extent that many deep ecologists champion.
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  6. Thomas H. Birch (1993). Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration. Environmental Ethics 15 (4):313-332.
    One of the central, abiding, and unresolved questions in environmental ethics has focused on the criterion for moral considerability or practical respect. In this essay, I call that question itself into question and argue that the search for this criterion should be abandoned because (1) it presupposes the ethical legitimacy of the Western project of planetary domination, (2) the philosophical methods that are andshould be used to address the question properly involve giving consideration in a root sense to everything, (3) (...)
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  7. Andrew Brennan & Y. S. Lo (2010). Understanding Environmental Philosophy. Acumen.
    Key ideas of environmental philosophy are explained and placed in their broader cultural, religious, historical, political ad philosophical context.
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  8. Roman Briggs (2009). The Greening of Heart and Mind: A Love Story. Environmental Ethics 31 (2):155-168.
    Some environmentalists have argued that an effective ecological conscience may be rooted in a perspective that is either anthropocentric or sentiocentric. But, neither seems to have had any substantial effect on the ways in which our species treats nature. In looking to successfully awaken the ecological conscience, the focus should be on extending moral consideration to the land (wherein doing so includes all of the soils, waters, plants, animals, and the collectivity of which these things comprise) by means of coming (...)
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  9. J. Baird Callicot (1992). Rolston on Intrinsic Value: A Deconstruction. Environmental Ethics 14 (2):129-143.
    Central to Holmes Rolston’s Environmental Ethics is the theoretical quest of most enviromnental philosophers for a defensible concept of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole. Rolston’s theory is similar to Paul Taylor’s in rooting intrinsic value in conation, but dissimilar in assigning value bonuses to consciousness and self-consciousness and value dividends to organic wholes andelemental nature. I argue that such a theory of intrinsic value flies in the face of the subject/object and fact/value dichotomies of (...)
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  10. J. Baird Callicott (1992). Rolston on Intrinsic Value. Environmental Ethics 14 (2):129-143.
    Central to Holmes Rolston’s Environmental Ethics is the theoretical quest of most enviromnental philosophers for a defensible concept of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole. Rolston’s theory is similar to Paul Taylor’s in rooting intrinsic value in conation, but dissimilar in assigning value bonuses to consciousness and self-consciousness and value dividends to organic wholes andelemental nature. I argue that such a theory of intrinsic value flies in the face of the subject/object and fact/value dichotomies of (...)
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  11. J. Baird Callicott (1992). Rolston on Intrinsic Value. Environmental Ethics 14 (2):129-143.
    Central to Holmes Rolston’s Environmental Ethics is the theoretical quest of most enviromnental philosophers for a defensible concept of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole. Rolston’s theory is similar to Paul Taylor’s in rooting intrinsic value in conation, but dissimilar in assigning value bonuses to consciousness and self-consciousness and value dividends to organic wholes andelemental nature. I argue that such a theory of intrinsic value flies in the face of the subject/object and fact/value dichotomies of (...)
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  12. Richard Christian (2016). Nature’s Legacy: On Rohwer and Marris and Genomic Conservation. Ethics, Policy and Environment 18 (3):265-267.
    Rohwer & Marris claim that “many conservation biologists” believe that there is a prima facie duty to preserve the genetic integrity of species. (A prima facie duty is a necessary pro tanto moral reason.) They describe three possible arguments for that belief and reject them all. They conclude that the biologists they cite are mistaken, and that there is no such duty: duties to preserve genetic integrity are merely instrumental: we ought act to preserve genetic integrity only because doing so (...)
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  13. Martin Drenthen (2009). Nietzsche and the Paradox of Environmental Ethics. New Nietzsche Studies 5 (1/2):12-25.
    In this paper, I offer a systematic inquiry into the significance of Nietzsche's philosophy to environmental ethics. Nietzsche's philosophy of nature is, I believe, relevant today because it makes explicit a fundamental ambiguity that is also characteristic of our current understanding of nature. I show how the current debate between traditional environmental ethics and postmodern environmental philosophy can be interpreted as a symptom of this ambiguity. I argue that, in light of Nietzsche's critique of morality, environmental ethics is a highly (...)
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  14. Antoine C. Dussault (2014). Fitting-Attitude Analyses and the Relation Between Final and Intrinsic Value. Les Ateliers de L’Éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):166-189.
    This paper examines the debate as to whether something can have final value in virtue of its relational (i.e., non-intrinsic) properties, or, more briefly put, whether final value must be intrinsic. The paper adopts the perspective of the fitting-attitude analysis (FA analysis) of value, and argues that from this perspective, there is no ground for the requirement that things may have final value only in virtue of their intrinsic properties, but that there might be some grounds for the alternate requirement (...)
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  15. Antoine C. Dussault (2013). In Search of Ecocentric Sentiments: Insights From the CAD Model in Moral Psychology. Environmental Ethics 35 (4):419-437.
    One aspect of J. Baird Callicotts foundational project for ecocentrism consists in explaining how <span class='Hi'>moralspan> consideration for <span class='Hi'>ecologicalspan> wholes can (...) be grounded in <span class='Hi'>moralspan> <span class='Hi'><span class='Hi'>sentimentsspan>span>. Some critics of Callicott have objected that <span class='Hi'>moralspan> consideration for <span class='Hi'>ecologicalspan> wholes is impossible under a sentimentalist conception of ethics because, on both Hume and Smiths views, sympathy is our main <span class='Hi'>moralspan> sentiment and it cannot be elicited by holistic entities. This conclusion is premature. The relevant question is not whether such <span class='Hi'>moralspan> consideration is compatible with the <span class='Hi'>moralspan> psychologies elaborated by Hume and Smith themselves, but, rather, whether it is possible given the <span class='Hi'>moralspan> <span class='Hi'><span class='Hi'>psychologyspan>span> human beings actually possess. To answer this question, we must turn to empirical <span class='Hi'>moralspan> <span class='Hi'><span class='Hi'>psychologyspan>span> and consider the possibility of a sentimentalist ecocentrism based on the community, autonomy, divinity model, a very promising model of human <span class='Hi'>moralspan> <span class='Hi'><span class='Hi'>psychologyspan>span> developed by psychologists Richard Shweder, Paul Rozin, and Jonathan Haidt. This model can be used to assess the possibility of grounding ecocentrism in human <span class='Hi'>moralspan> <span class='Hi'><span class='Hi'>sentimentsspan>span>. In light of this assessment, ecocentrism should be understood as a new form of naturalistic ethics informed by the <span class='Hi'>moralspan> emotions of disgust, shame, awe, and wonder. (shrink)
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  16. Antoine C. Dussault (2013). L’écocentrisme et ses appels normatifs à la nature : sont-ils nécessairement fallacieux ? In É Litalien (ed.), Peut-on tirer une éthique de l'étude de la nature ? Les Cahiers d'Ithaque 43-76.
  17. Antoine C. Dussault (2010). Le rôle de la science dans l'écocentrisme humien de Callicott. Revue Phares 10:103-123.
  18. R. Elliot (1992). Intrinsic Value, Naturalness and Environmental Obligation. Monist: An International Quarterly of General Philosophical Inquiry 75:138-160.
  19. Richard J. Evanoff (2007). Communicative Ethics and Moral Considerability. Environmental Ethics 29 (3):247-266.
    Although nonhuman entities are indeed incapable of entering into contractual relations with humans or of participating in social dialogue on ethical norms, they can nonetheless become the objects of moral consideration on the part of humans. Moral consideration need not be extended universally to all nonnatural entities, but only to those entities with which humans interact. Rather than regard some or all of the natural world as having “intrinsic value,” considered judgments must be made regarding which parts of nature can (...)
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  20. Richard J. Evanoff (2007). Communicative Ethics and Moral Considerability. Environmental Ethics 29 (3):247-266.
    Although nonhuman entities are indeed incapable of entering into contractual relations with humans or of participating in social dialogue on ethical norms, they can nonetheless become the objects of moral consideration on the part of humans. Moral consideration need not be extended universally to all nonnatural entities, but only to those entities with which humans interact. Rather than regard some or all of the natural world as having “intrinsic value,” considered judgments must be made regarding which parts of nature can (...)
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  21. Ishtiyaque Haji (2001). On Moral Considerability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):730-733.
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  22. Benjamin Hale (2008). Technology, the Environment, and the Moral Considerability of Artifacts. In Evan Selinger, Jan Kyrre Berg Olson & Soren Riis (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Technology. Palgrave Macmillan
  23. Benjamin Hale (2006). The Moral Considerability of Invasive Transgenic Animals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (4):337-366.
    The term moral considerability refers to the question of whether a being or set of beings is worthy of moral consideration. Moral considerability is most readily afforded to those beings that demonstrate the clearest relationship to rational humans, though many have also argued for and against the moral considerability of species, ecosystems, and “lesser” animals. Among these arguments there are at least two positions: “environmentalist” positions that tend to emphasize the systemic relations between species, and “liberationist” positions that tend to (...)
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  24. Tim Hayward (1996). Universal Consideration as a Deontological Principle. Environmental Ethics 18 (1):55-63.
    A major problem that skeptical critics have identified with the project of environmental ethics as it is often conceived is that it involves the search for a criterion of moral considerability, and some claim that this search has not only been unsuccessful, but it is in principle mistaken. Birch has recently argued that this whole problem can be avoided through his proposal of universal consideration in a “root sense,” which applies to all beings, with no exceptions marked by any of (...)
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  25. W. Murray Hunt (1980). Are Mere Things Morally Considerable? Environmental Ethics 2 (1):59-65.
    Kenneth Goodpaster has criticized ethicists like Feinberg and Frankena for too narrowly circumscribing the range of moral considerability, urging instead that “nothing short of the condition of being alive” is a satisfactory criterion. Goodpaster overlooks at least one crucial objection: that his own “condition of being alive” may aIso be too narrow a criterion of moral considerability, since “being in existence” is at least as plausible and nonarbitrary a criterion as is Goodpaster’s. I show that each of the arguments that (...)
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  26. Alejandra Mancilla (2011). Avatar Vs Mononoke. Philosophy Now 85:44-46.
    "Avatar" and "Princess Mononoke" as representative of radically different positions in environmental ethics.
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  27. Alejandra Mancilla (2011). Allen Carlson and Sheila Lintott (Eds.): Nature, Aesthetics and Environmentalism: From Beauty to Duty. [REVIEW] Environmental Values 20 (3):449-452.
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  28. Stephan Millett (2011). Aristotle’s Powers and Responsibility for Nature. Peter Lang.
    This book addresses what 'nature' is and humans' obligations toward the natural world. Beginning with ideas traced from Aristotle through some of the significant figures in European philosophy, the author shows that each living thing is a unique source of value. This value puts humans under an obligation and adopting an attitude of responsibility to living things is an essential part of what it means to be human.
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  29. Palmer (2008). Environmental Ethics and Agricultural Intensification. In Paul Thompson (ed.), The Ethics of Intensification: Agricultural Development and Cultural Chang. Springer 131-148.
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  30. Clare Palmer (2014). Value Conflicts in Feral Cat Management: Trap-Neuter-Return or Trap-Euthanize. In Michael Appleby, Dan Weary & Peter Sandoe (eds.), Dilemmas in Animal Welfare. CABI International 148-168.
    This chapter explores the key values at stake in feral cat management, focusing on the debate over whether to use trap-neuter-return or trap-euthanize as management tools for cat populations. The chapter provides empirical background on unowned cats, sketches widely used arguments in favour of reducing cat populations and considers how these arguments relate to important and widely held values including the value of lives, subjective experiences and species. The chapter promotes critical understanding of the diverse value positions that may be (...)
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  31. Clare Palmer (2011). Does Nature Matter? The Place of the Non-Human in the Ethics of Climate Change. In Denis Arnold (ed.), The Ethics of Global Climate Change. Cambridge University Press 272-291.
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  32. Clare Palmer (1992). Stewardship. In Ian Ball, Margaret Goodall, Clare Palmer & John Reader (eds.), The Earth Beneath. SPCK 67-87.
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  33. Erik Persson (2012). The Moral Status of Extraterrestrial Life. Astrobiology 12:976-984.
    If we eventually discover extraterrestrial life, do we have any moral obligations for how to treat the life-forms we find; does it matter whether they are intelligent, sentient, or just microbial—and does it matter that they are extraterrestrial? -/- In this paper, I examine these questions by looking at two of the basic questions in moral philosophy: What does it take to be a moral object? and What has value of what kind? I will start with the first of these (...)
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  34. Erik Persson (2008). What is Wrong with Extinction? Dissertation, Lund University
  35. Matthew Pianalto (2013). Humility and Environmental Virtue Ethics. In Michael Austin (ed.), Virtues in Action: New Essays in Applied Virtue Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan
  36. Christopher J. Preston (1998). Epistemology and Intrinsic Values: Norton and Callicott's Critiques of Rolston. Environmental Ethics 20 (4):409-428.
    Debates over the existence of intrinsic value have long been central to professional environmental ethics. Holmes Rolston, III’s version of intrinsic value is, perhaps, the most well known. Recently, powerful critiques leveled by Bryan G. Norton and J. Baird Callicott have suggested that there is an epistemological problem with Rolston’s account. In this paper, I argue first that the debates over intrinsic value are as pertinent now as they have ever been. I then explain the objections that Norton and Callicott (...)
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  37. Duncan Purves (2014). Anthropocentric Indirect Arguments and Anthropocentric Moral Attitudes. Ethics, Policy and Environment 17 (3):267-270.
    Anthropocentric indirect arguments , which call for specific policies or actions because of human benefits that are correlated with but not caused by benefits to the environment, are gaining increasing traction with those who take a pragmatic approach to environmental protection. I contend that nonanthropocentrists might remain justifiably uneasy about AIAs because such arguments fail to challenge prevailing speciesist moral attitudes. I close by considering whether Elliott can address this concern of nonanthropocentrists by appealing to the ability of AIAs to (...)
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  38. Stanley N. Salthe & Barbara M. Salthe (1989). Ecosystem Moral Considerability: A Reply to Cahen. Environmental Ethics 11 (4):355-361.
    Appeals to science as a help in constructing policy on complex issues often assume that science has relatively clear-cut, univocal answers. That is not so today in the environmentally crucial fields of ecology and evolutionary biology. The social role of science has been as a source of information to be used in the prediction and domination of nature. Its perspectives are finely honed for such purposes. However, other more conscientious perspectives are now appearing within science, and we provide an example (...)
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  39. Robert Sparrow (1999). The Ethics of Terraforming. Environmental Ethics 21 (3):227-245.
    I apply an agent-based virtue ethics to issues in environmental philosophy regarding our treatment of complex inorganic systems. I consider the ethics of terraforming: hypothetical planetary engineering on a vast scale which is aimed at producing habitable environments on otherwise “hostile” planets. I argue that the undertaking of such a project demonstrates at least two serious defects of moral character: an aesthetic insensitivity and the sin of hubris. Trying to change whole planets to suit our ends is arrogant vandalism. I (...)
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  40. Toby Svoboda (2015). Duties Regarding Nature: A Kantian Environmental Ethic. Routledge.
    In this book, Toby Svoboda develops and defends a Kantian environmental virtue ethic, challenging the widely-held view that Kant's moral philosophy takes an instrumental view toward nature and animals and has little to offer environmental ethics. On the contrary, Svoboda posits that there is good moral reason to care about non-human organisms in their own right and to value their flourishing independently of human interests, since doing so is constitutive of certain virtues. Svoboda argues that Kant’s account of indirect duties (...)
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  41. Toby Svoboda (2012). The Ethics of Geoengineering: Moral Considerability and the Convergence Hypothesis. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):243-256.
    Although it could avoid some harmful effects of climate change, sulphate aerosol geoengineering (SAG), or injecting sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere in order to reflect incoming solar radiation, threatens substantial harm to humans and non-humans. I argue that SAG is prima facie ethically problematic from anthropocentric, animal liberationist, and biocentric perspectives. This might be taken to suggest that ethical evaluations of SAG can rely on Bryan Norton's convergence hypothesis, which predicts that anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists will agree to implement the same (...)
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  42. Toby Svoboda (2011). Why There is No Evidence for the Intrinsic Value of Non-Humans. Ethics and the Environment 16 (2):25-36.
    The position of some environmental ethicists that some non-humans have intrinsic value as a mind-independent property is seriously flawed. This is because human beings lack any evidence for this position and hence are unjustified in holding it. For any possible world that is alleged to have this kind of intrinsic value, it is possible to conceive an observationally identical world that lacks intrinsic value. Hence, one is not justified in inferring the intrinsic value of some non-human from any set of (...)
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  43. Julia Tanner (2012). Anthropocentrism. In Craig W. Allin (ed.), Encyclopedia of Environmental Issues.
    Definition: considering human beings to be of central importance; the source of value.
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  44. Attila Tanyi (2015). On the Intrinsic Value of Genetic Integrity: A Commentary. Ethics, Policy and Environment 18 (3):248-251.
    In their article “Is There a Prima Facie Duty to Preserve Genetic Integrity in Conservation Biology?” Yasha Rower and Emma Harris argue that there is no underived prima facie obligation to preserve genetic integrity. In particular, it is argued that there is no such obligation because genetic integrity has no <span class='Hi'>intrinsic</span> value. In this commentary I raise doubts about this part of the authors’ argument. I argue that there might well be at least prima facie value in genetic integrity, (...)
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  45. M. Traxler (2000). On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters. Philosophical Review 109 (4):595-598.
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  46. Jonathan Webber (2011). Climate Change and Public Moral Reasoning. In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave