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  1. Mark H. Bernstein (1998). On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters. Oxford University Press.
    In this fresh and powerfully argued book, Mark Bernstein identifies the qualities that make an entity deserving of moral consideration. It is frequently assumed that only (normal) human beings count. Bernstein argues instead for "experientialism"--the view that having conscious experiences is necessary and sufficient for moral standing. He demonstrates that this position requires us to include many non-human animals in our moral realm, but not to the extent that many deep ecologists champion.
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  2. Thomas H. Birch (1993). Moral Considerability and Universal Consideration. Environmental Ethics 15 (4):313-332.
    One of the central, abiding, and unresolved questions in environmental ethics has focused on the criterion for moral considerability or practical respect. In this essay, I call that question itself into question and argue that the search for this criterion should be abandoned because (1) it presupposes the ethical legitimacy of the Western project of planetary domination, (2) the philosophical methods that are andshould be used to address the question properly involve giving consideration in a root sense to everything, (3) (...)
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  3. Andrew Brennan & Y. S. Lo (2010). Understanding Environmental Philosophy. Acumen.
    Key ideas of environmental philosophy are explained and placed in their broader cultural, religious, historical, political ad philosophical context.
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  4. Roman Briggs (2009). The Greening of Heart and Mind: A Love Story. Environmental Ethics 31 (2):155-168.
    Some environmentalists have argued that an effective ecological conscience may be rooted in a perspective that is either anthropocentric or sentiocentric. But, neither seems to have had any substantial effect on the ways in which our species treats nature. In looking to successfully awaken the ecological conscience, the focus should be on extending moral consideration to the land (wherein doing so includes all of the soils, waters, plants, animals, and the collectivity of which these things comprise) by means of coming (...)
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  5. J. Baird Callicot (1992). Rolston on Intrinsic Value: A Deconstruction. Environmental Ethics 14 (2):129-143.
    Central to Holmes Rolston’s Environmental Ethics is the theoretical quest of most enviromnental philosophers for a defensible concept of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole. Rolston’s theory is similar to Paul Taylor’s in rooting intrinsic value in conation, but dissimilar in assigning value bonuses to consciousness and self-consciousness and value dividends to organic wholes andelemental nature. I argue that such a theory of intrinsic value flies in the face of the subject/object and fact/value dichotomies of (...)
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  6. J. Baird Callicott (1992). Rolston on Intrinsic Value. Environmental Ethics 14 (2):129-143.
    Central to Holmes Rolston’s Environmental Ethics is the theoretical quest of most enviromnental philosophers for a defensible concept of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole. Rolston’s theory is similar to Paul Taylor’s in rooting intrinsic value in conation, but dissimilar in assigning value bonuses to consciousness and self-consciousness and value dividends to organic wholes andelemental nature. I argue that such a theory of intrinsic value flies in the face of the subject/object and fact/value dichotomies of (...)
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  7. J. Baird Callicott (1992). Rolston on Intrinsic Value. Environmental Ethics 14 (2):129-143.
    Central to Holmes Rolston’s Environmental Ethics is the theoretical quest of most enviromnental philosophers for a defensible concept of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole. Rolston’s theory is similar to Paul Taylor’s in rooting intrinsic value in conation, but dissimilar in assigning value bonuses to consciousness and self-consciousness and value dividends to organic wholes andelemental nature. I argue that such a theory of intrinsic value flies in the face of the subject/object and fact/value dichotomies of (...)
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  8. Antoine C. Dussault (2013). In Search of Ecocentric Sentiments: Insights From the CAD Model in Moral Psychology. Environmental Ethics 35 (4):419-437.
    One aspect of J. Baird Callicott’s foundational project for ecocentrism consists in explaining how moral consideration for ecological wholes can be grounded in moral sentiments. Some critics of Callicott have objected that moral consideration for ecological wholes is impossible under a sentimentalist conception of ethics because, on both Hume and Smith’s views, sympathy is our main moral sentiment and it cannot be elicited by holistic entities. This conclusion is premature. The relevant question is not whether such moral consideration is compatible (...)
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  9. Richard J. Evanoff (2007). Communicative Ethics and Moral Considerability. Environmental Ethics 29 (3):247-266.
    Although nonhuman entities are indeed incapable of entering into contractual relations with humans or of participating in social dialogue on ethical norms, they can nonetheless become the objects of moral consideration on the part of humans. Moral consideration need not be extended universally to all nonnatural entities, but only to those entities with which humans interact. Rather than regard some or all of the natural world as having “intrinsic value,” considered judgments must be made regarding which parts of nature can (...)
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  10. Richard J. Evanoff (2007). Communicative Ethics and Moral Considerability. Environmental Ethics 29 (3):247-266.
    Although nonhuman entities are indeed incapable of entering into contractual relations with humans or of participating in social dialogue on ethical norms, they can nonetheless become the objects of moral consideration on the part of humans. Moral consideration need not be extended universally to all nonnatural entities, but only to those entities with which humans interact. Rather than regard some or all of the natural world as having “intrinsic value,” considered judgments must be made regarding which parts of nature can (...)
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  11. Ishtiyaque Haji (2001). On Moral Considerability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):730-733.
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  12. Benjamin Hale (2008). Technology, the Environment, and the Moral Considerability of Artifacts. In Evan Selinger, Jan Kyrre Berg Olson & Soren Riis (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Technology. Palgrave Macmillan.
  13. Benjamin Hale (2006). The Moral Considerability of Invasive Transgenic Animals. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 19 (4):337-366.
    The term moral considerability refers to the question of whether a being or set of beings is worthy of moral consideration. Moral considerability is most readily afforded to those beings that demonstrate the clearest relationship to rational humans, though many have also argued for and against the moral considerability of species, ecosystems, and “lesser” animals. Among these arguments there are at least two positions: “environmentalist” positions that tend to emphasize the systemic relations between species, and “liberationist” positions that tend to (...)
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  14. Tim Hayward (1996). Universal Consideration as a Deontological Principle. Environmental Ethics 18 (1):55-63.
    A major problem that skeptical critics have identified with the project of environmental ethics as it is often conceived is that it involves the search for a criterion of moral considerability, and some claim that this search has not only been unsuccessful, but it is in principle mistaken. Birch has recently argued that this whole problem can be avoided through his proposal of universal consideration in a “root sense,” which applies to all beings, with no exceptions marked by any of (...)
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  15. W. Murray Hunt (1980). Are Mere Things Morally Considerable? Environmental Ethics 2 (1):59-65.
    Kenneth Goodpaster has criticized ethicists like Feinberg and Frankena for too narrowly circumscribing the range of moral considerability, urging instead that “nothing short of the condition of being alive” is a satisfactory criterion. Goodpaster overlooks at least one crucial objection: that his own “condition of being alive” may aIso be too narrow a criterion of moral considerability, since “being in existence” is at least as plausible and nonarbitrary a criterion as is Goodpaster’s. I show that each of the arguments that (...)
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  16. Alejandra Mancilla (2011). Allen Carlson and Sheila Lintott (Eds.): Nature, Aesthetics and Environmentalism: From Beauty to Duty. [REVIEW] Environmental Values 20 (3):449-452.
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  17. Alejandra Mancilla (2011). Avatar Vs Mononoke. Philosophy Now 85:44-46.
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  18. Matthew Pianalto (2013). Humility and Environmental Virtue Ethics. In Michael Austin (ed.), Virtues in Action: New Essays in Applied Virtue Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan.
  19. Christopher J. Preston (1998). Epistemology and Intrinsic Values: Norton and Callicott's Critiques of Rolston. Environmental Ethics 20 (4):409-428.
    Debates over the existence of intrinsic value have long been central to professional environmental ethics. Holmes Rolston, III’s version of intrinsic value is, perhaps, the most well known. Recently, powerful critiques leveled by Bryan G. Norton and J. Baird Callicott have suggested that there is an epistemological problem with Rolston’s account. In this paper, I argue first that the debates over intrinsic value are as pertinent now as they have ever been. I then explain the objections that Norton and Callicott (...)
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  20. Stanley N. Salthe & Barbara M. Salthe (1989). Ecosystem Moral Considerability: A Reply to Cahen. Environmental Ethics 11 (4):355-361.
    Appeals to science as a help in constructing policy on complex issues often assume that science has relatively clear-cut, univocal answers. That is not so today in the environmentally crucial fields of ecology and evolutionary biology. The social role of science has been as a source of information to be used in the prediction and domination of nature. Its perspectives are finely honed for such purposes. However, other more conscientious perspectives are now appearing within science, and we provide an example (...)
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  21. Robert Sparrow (1999). The Ethics of Terraforming. Environmental Ethics 21 (3):227-245.
    I apply an agent-based virtue ethics to issues in environmental philosophy regarding our treatment of complex inorganic systems. I consider the ethics of terraforming: hypothetical planetary engineering on a vast scale which is aimed at producing habitable environments on otherwise “hostile” planets. I argue that the undertaking of such a project demonstrates at least two serious defects of moral character: an aesthetic insensitivity and the sin of hubris. Trying to change whole planets to suit our ends is arrogant vandalism. I (...)
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  22. Toby Svoboda (2012). The Ethics of Geoengineering: Moral Considerability and the Convergence Hypothesis. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):243-256.
    Although it could avoid some harmful effects of climate change, sulphate aerosol geoengineering (SAG), or injecting sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere in order to reflect incoming solar radiation, threatens substantial harm to humans and non-humans. I argue that SAG is prima facie ethically problematic from anthropocentric, animal liberationist, and biocentric perspectives. This might be taken to suggest that ethical evaluations of SAG can rely on Bryan Norton's convergence hypothesis, which predicts that anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists will agree to implement the same (...)
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  23. Toby Svoboda (2011). Why There is No Evidence for the Intrinsic Value of Non-Humans. Ethics and the Environment 16 (2):25-36.
    The position of some environmental ethicists that some non-humans have intrinsic value as a mind-independent property is seriously flawed. This is because human beings lack any evidence for this position and hence are unjustified in holding it. For any possible world that is alleged to have this kind of intrinsic value, it is possible to conceive an observationally identical world that lacks intrinsic value. Hence, one is not justified in inferring the intrinsic value of some non-human from any set of (...)
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  24. Julia Tanner (2012). Anthropocentrism. In Craig W. Allin (ed.), Encyclopedia of Environmental Issues.
    Definition: considering human beings to be of central importance; the source of value.
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  25. M. Traxler (2000). On Moral Considerability: An Essay on Who Morally Matters. Philosophical Review 109 (4):595-598.
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  26. Jonathan Webber (2011). Climate Change and Public Moral Reasoning. In Thom Brooks (ed.), New Waves in Ethics. Palgrave.