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  1. Robin Attfield (1990). Deep Ecology and Intrinsic Value. Cogito 4 (1):61-66.
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  2. Robert Audi (2006). Intrinsic Value and Reasons for Action. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. 30-56.
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  3. Robert Audi (2005). Intrinsic Value and Meaningful Life. Philosophical Papers 34 (3):331-355.
    Abstract I distinguish various ways in which human life may be thought to be meaningful and present an account of what might be called existential meaningfulness. The account is neutral with respect to both theism and naturalism, but each is addressed in several places and the paper's main points are harmonious with certain versions of both. A number of important criteria for existential meaningfulness are examined, and special emphasis is placed on criteria centering on creativity and excellence, on contributing to (...)
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  4. Robert Audi (2005). The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton Up.
    "Robert Audi's magisterial "The Good in the Right" offers the most comprehensive and developed account of rational ethical intuitionism to date."--Roger Crisp, St. Anne's College, University of Oxford "This is an excellent book.
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  5. Robert Audi (2003). Intrinsic Value, Inherent Value, and Experience: A Reply to Stephen Barker. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):323-327.
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  6. Robert Audi (1997). Intrinsic Value and Moral Obligation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):135-154.
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  7. John A. Bailey (1979). On Intrinsic Value. Philosophia 9 (1):1-8.
    Intrinsic value is differentiated from extrinsic, And assumed to be an empirical characteristic. Then six definitional hypotheses are introduced as to what "x has intrinsic value" means. Under examination, All collapse but d5. In d5, "x has intrinsic value" means "x is or would be liked or disliked for its own sake." d5's relations to ethical hedonism are next examined. Last, Moore's objection, That what one likes intrinsically, One may believe to be bad or not good if it were to (...)
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  8. Thomas Baldwin (1999). La valeur intrinsèque chez Brentano et Moore. Philosophiques 26 (231):243.
    In Principia Ethica Moore expresses his great admiration for Brentano's ethical writings, and a comparison between Moore and Brentano reveals that their ethical theories have much in common. But they disagree fundamentally on the metaphysics of intrinsic value. Moore adopts an abstract realist position, whereas Brentano interprets intrinsic value by reference to “correct love” : that which is good is that which merits correct love. Brentano's position has many advantages over that of Moore ; but it raises the question as (...)
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  9. Stephen Barker (2003). The Experiential Thesis: Audi on Intrinsic Value. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):57-61.
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  10. Monroe C. Beardsley (1965). Intrinsic Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1):1-17.
    Many philosophers apparently still accept the proposition that there is such a thing as intrinsic value, i.e., that some part of the value of some things (objects, events, or states of affairs) is intrinsic value. John Dewey's attack seems not to have dislodged this proposition, for today it is seldom questioned. I propose to press the attack again, in terms that owe a great deal to Dewey, as I understand him.
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  11. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1981). G.E. Moore and the Relation Between Intrinsic Value and Human Activity. Journal of Value Inquiry 15 (1):69-78.
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  12. M. Bernstein (2001). Intrinsic Value. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):329 - 343.
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  13. Reid D. Blackman (2008). Book Reviews:The Nature of Intrinsic Value. [REVIEW] Ethics 118 (2):375-377.
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  14. Ben Bradley (2006). Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):111 - 130.
    Recent literature on intrinsic value contains a number of disputes about the nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are those who think states of affairs, such as states of pleasure or desire satisfaction, are the bearers of intrinsic value (“Mooreans”); on the other hand, there are those who think concrete objects, like people, are intrinsically valuable (“Kantians”). The contention of this paper is that there is not a single concept of intrinsic value about which Mooreans and Kantians (...)
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  15. Ben Bradley (2002). Is Intrinsic Value Conditional? Philosophical Studies 107 (1):23 - 44.
    Accoding to G.E. Moore, something''s intrinsic valuedepends solely on its intrinsic nature. Recently Thomas Hurka andShelly Kagan have argued, contra Moore, that something''s intrinsic valuemay depend on its extrinsic properties. Call this view the ConditionalView of intrinsic value. In this paper I demonstrate how a Mooreancan account for purported counterexamples given by Hurka and Kagan. I thenargue that certain organic unities pose difficulties for the ConditionalView.
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  16. Johan Brännmark (2009). Goodness, Values, Reasons. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):329 - 343.
    Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like "good" or "valuable", the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern (...)
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  17. J. Baird Callicot (1992). Rolston on Intrinsic Value: A Deconstruction. Environmental Ethics 14 (2):129-143.
    Central to Holmes Rolston’s Environmental Ethics is the theoretical quest of most enviromnental philosophers for a defensible concept of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and nature as a whole. Rolston’s theory is similar to Paul Taylor’s in rooting intrinsic value in conation, but dissimilar in assigning value bonuses to consciousness and self-consciousness and value dividends to organic wholes andelemental nature. I argue that such a theory of intrinsic value flies in the face of the subject/object and fact/value dichotomies of (...)
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  18. J. Baird Callicott (2009). The Convergence Hypothesis Falsified: Implicit Intrinsic Value, Operational Rights, and de Facto Standing in the Endangered Species Act. In Ben A. Minteer (ed.), Nature in Common?: Environmental Ethics and the Contested Foundations of Environmental Policy. Temple University Press.
  19. J. Baird Callicott (1985). Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics. Environmental Ethics 7 (3):257-275.
    The central and most recalcitrant problem for environmental ethics is the problem of constructing an adequate theory of intrinsic value for nonhuman natural entities and for nature as a whole. In part one, I retrospectively survey the problem, review certain classical approaches to it, and recommend one as an adequate, albeit only partial, solution. In part two, I show that the classical theory of inherent value for nonhuman entities and nature as a whole outlined in part one is inconsistent with (...)
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  20. Erik Carlson (2001). Organic Unities, Non-Trade-Off, and the Additivity of Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 5 (4):335-360.
    Whether or not intrinsic value is additively measurable is often thought to depend on the truth or falsity of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities. I argue that the truth of this principle is, contrary to received opinion, compatible with additive measurement. However, there are other very plausible evaluative claims that are more difficult to combine with the additivity of intrinsic value. A plausible theory of the good should allow that there are certain kinds of states of affairs whose (...)
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  21. Erik Carlson (1996). The Intrinsic Value of Non-Basic States of Affairs. Philosophical Studies 85 (1):95-107.
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  22. Thomas L. Carson (2001). Gert on Rationality, Intrinsic Value, and the Overridingness of Morality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):441–446.
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  23. Robert E. Carter (1975). C. I. Lewis and the Immediacy of Intrinsic Value. Journal of Value Inquiry 9 (3):204-209.
    Immediate experiences may be found good or bad at the time of occurrence, and this value contributes to the goodness or badness of life in general. In addition, they may continue to affect later experiences to the very end of a lifetime. The final assessment of an experience, therefore, cannot be made until a lifetime has come to an end, at which point one would no longer be in a position to assess. It remains instructive, nevertheless, to apply the standard (...)
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  24. Robert Edgar Carter (1974). Intrinsic Value and the Intrinsic Valuer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (4):504-514.
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  25. Robert Edgar Carter (1968). The Importance of Intrinsic Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (4):567-577.
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  26. Ruth Chang (2012). &Quot;value Pluralism&Quot;. In James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behaviorial Sciences.
    ‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, for example, hedonistic utilitarianism, is mistaken. (...)
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  27. Ruth Chang (ed.) (1997). Introduction, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reasoning. Harvard University Press.
    This paper is the introduction to the volume. It gives an argumentative view of the philosophical landscape concerning incommensurability and incomparability. It argues that incomparability, not incommensurability, is the important phenomenon on which philosophers should be focusing and that the arguments for the existence of incomparability are so far not compelling.
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  28. Jim Cheney (1992). Intrinsic Value in Environmental Ethics. The Monist 75 (2):227-235.
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  29. Roderick M. Chisholm (1986). Brentano and Intrinsic Value. Cambridge University Press.
    Franz Brentano developed an original theory of intrinsic value which he attempted to base on his philosophical psychology. Roderick Chisholm presents here a critical exposition of this theory and its place in Brentano's general philosophical system. He gives a detailed account of Brentano's ontology, showing how Brentano tried to secure objectivity for ethics not through a theory of practical reason, but through his theory of the intentional objects of emotions and desires. Professor Chisholm goes on to develop certain suggestions about (...)
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  30. Roderick M. Chisholm (1975). The Intrinsic Value in Disjunctive States of Affairs. Noûs 9 (3):295-308.
  31. Roderick M. Chisholm & Ernest Sosa (1966). On the Logic of "Intrinsically Better&Quot;. American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (3):244 - 249.
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  32. Raphael Cohen-Almagor (1995). Autonomy, Life as an Intrinsic Value, and the Right to Die in Dignity. Science and Engineering Ethics 1 (3):261-272.
    This paper examines two models of thinking relating to the issue of the right to die in dignity: one takes into consideration the rights and interests of the individual; the other supposes that human life is inherently valuable. I contend that preference should be given to the first model, and further assert that the second model may be justified in moral terms only as long as it does not resort to paternalism. The view that holds that certain patients are not (...)
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  33. Earl Conee (1982). Instrumental Value Without Intrinsic Value? Philosophia 11 (3-4):345-359.
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  34. Roger Crisp (2005). Value, Reasons and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid Passing the Buck. Analysis 65 (285):80–85.
  35. Leon Culbertson (2008). Does Sport Have Intrinsic Value? Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 2 (3):302 – 320.
    This paper considers the suggestion, central to McFee's (2004) moral laboratory argument, that sport is intrinsically valuable. McFee's position is outlined and critiqued and various interpretations of intrinsic value found in the philosophical literature are considered. In addition, Morgan's (2007) claim that sport is an appropriate final end is considered and partially accepted. The paper draws a number of terminological distinctions and concludes that sport does not have intrinsic value as traditionally conceived, but that this is of little consequence with (...)
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  36. Stephen Darwall (2006). Reply to Griffin, Raz, and Wolf. Utilitas 18 (4):434-444.
  37. Stephen Darwall (2003). Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value. Ethics 113 (3):468-489.
    Principia Ethica set the agenda for analytical metaethics. Moore’s unrelenting focus on fundamentals both brought metaethics into view as a potentially separate area of philosophical inquiry and provided a model of the analytical techniques necessary to pursue it.1 Moore acknowledged that he wasn’t the first to insist on a basic irreducible core of all ethical concepts. Although he seems not to have appreciated the roots of this thought in eighteenth-century intuitionists like Clarke, Balguy, and Price, not to mention sentimentalists like (...)
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  38. Darian C. DeBolt (2002). Review: Pasternack, Intrinslc Value and Overridingness in Kant's Groundwork. [REVIEW] Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):121-125.
  39. Joseph A. Diorio (1984). Do Altruistic Emotions Have Intrinsic Value? Journal of Value Inquiry 18 (1):57-61.
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  40. Marcel Dol (ed.) (1999). Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Animals: Beyond Animal Welfare. Van Gorcum.
    Introduction Moral concern for animals is commonly formulated in terms of concern for their welfare. Yet, besides the welfare issue, although highly ...
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  41. Dale Dorsey (2012). Intrinsic Value and the Supervenience Principle. Philosophical Studies 157 (2):267-285.
    An important constraint on the nature of intrinsic value---the “Supervenience Principle” (SP)---holds that some object, event, or state of affairs ϕ is intrinsically valuable only if the value of ϕ supervenes entirely on ϕ 's intrinsic properties. In this paper, I argue that SP should be rejected. SP is inordinately restrictive. In particular, I argue that no SP-respecting conception of intrinsic value can accept the importance of psychological resonance, or the positive endorsement of persons, in explaining value.
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  42. C. J. Ducasse (1968). Intrinsic Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 28 (3):410-412.
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  43. Austin Duncan-Jones (1959). Note on the Mensuration of Intrinsic Value. Philosophy 34 (128):50 - 52.
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  44. William A. Edmundson (2010). Political Authority, Moral Powers and the Intrinsic Value of Obedience. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 30 (1):179-191.
    Three concepts—authority, obedience and obligation—are central to understanding law and political institutions. The three are also involved in the legitimation of the state: an apology for the state has to make a normative case for the state’s authority, for its right to command obedience, and for the citizen’s obligation to obey the state’s commands. Recent discussions manifest a cumulative scepticism about the apologist’s task. Getting clear about the three concepts is, of..
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  45. Rem B. Edwards (1979). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value and Valuation. Journal of Value Inquiry 13 (2):133-143.
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  46. Robert Elliot (2005). Instrumental Value in Nature as a Basis for the Intrinsic Value of Nature as a Whole. Environmental Ethics 27 (1):43-56.
    Some environmental ethicists believe that nature as whole has intrinsic value. One reason they do is because they are struck by the extent to which nature and natural processes give rise to so much that has intrinsic value. The underlying thought is that the value-producing work that nature performs, its instrumentality, imbues nature with a value that is more than merely instrumental. This inference, from instrumental value to a noninstrumental value (such as intrinsic value or systemic value), has been criticized. (...)
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  47. Robert Elliot (1992). Intrinsic Value, Environmental Obligation and Naturalness. The Monist 75 (2):138-160.
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  48. Fred Feldman (2000). Basic Intrinsic Value. Philosophical Studies 99 (3):319-346.
    Hedonism: the view that (i) pleasure is the only thing that is intrinsically good, and (ii) pain is the only thing that is intrinsically bad; furthermore, the view that (iii) a complex thing such as a life, a possible world, or a total consequence of an action is intrinsically good iff it contains more pleasure than pain.
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  49. Fred Feldman (1998). Hyperventilating About Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 2 (4):339-354.
    Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Brentano, Moore, and Chisholm have suggested marks or criteria of intrinsic goodness. I distinguish among eight of these. I focus in this paper on four: (a) unimprovability, (b) unqualifiedness, (c) dependence upon intrinsic natures, and (d) incorruptibility. I try to show that each of these is problematic in some way. I also try to show that they are not equivalent – they point toward distinct conceptions of intrinsic goodness. In the end it appears that none of them (...)
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  50. Fred Feldman (1997). On the Intrinsic Value of Pleasures. Ethics 107 (3):448-466.
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