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Subcategories:History/traditions: Intuition
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  1. Michael J. Almeida (2004). Review of" Intuitions as Evidence". [REVIEW] Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):3.
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  2. Frederick Anderson (1926). Intuition. Journal of Philosophy 23 (14):365-377.
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  3. Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2014). The Nature of Epistemic Feelings. Philosophical Psychology 27 (2):1-19.
    Among the phenomena that make up the mind, cognitive psychologists and philosophers have postulated a puzzling one that they have called ?epistemic feelings.? This paper aims to (1) characterize these experiences according to their intentional content and phenomenal character, and (2) describe the nature of these mental states as nonconceptual in the cases of animals and infants, and as conceptual mental states in the case of adult human beings. Finally, (3) the paper will contrast three accounts of the causes and (...)
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  4. D. M. Azraf (1957). Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy. Pakistan Philosophical Journal 1 (2):17.
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  5. Archie J. Bahm (1961). Types of Intuition. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
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  6. Jonathan Baron (1995). A Psychological View of Moral Intuition. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 5 (1):36-40.
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  7. Avner Baz (2012). Must Philosopherss Rely On Intuitions? Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):316-337.
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  8. George Bealer (2000). A Priori Knowledge. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:1-12.
    This paper has three parts. First, a discussion of our use of intuitions as evidence (reasons) in logic, mathematics, philosophy (hereafter, “the a priori disciplines”). Second, an explanation of why intuitions are evidence. The explanation is provided by modal reliabilism—the doctrine that there is a certain kind of qualified modal tie between intuitions and the truth. Third, an explanation of why there should be such a tie between intuitions and the truth. This tie is a consequence of what, by definition, (...)
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  9. George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
    This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain qualified modal (...)
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  10. George Bealer, Robert Cummings, Michael DePaul, Richard Foley, Alvin Goldman, Alison Gopnik, George Graham, Gary Gutting, Tery Horgan, Tamara Horowitz, Hilary Kornblith, Joel Pust, E. Rosch, Eldar Shafir, Stephen Stitch, Ernest Sosa & Edward Wisniewkski (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Ancients and moderns alike have constructed arguments and assessed theories on the basis of common sense and intuitive judgments. Yet, despite the important role intuitions play in philosophy, there has been little reflection on fundamental questions concerning the sort of data intuitions provide, how they are supposed to lead us to the truth, and why we should treat them as important. In addition, recent psychological research seems to pose serious challenges to traditional intuition-driven philosophical inquiry. Rethinking Intuition brings together a (...)
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  11. Jocelyn Benoist (2001). Intuition catégorale et voir comme. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):593-612.
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  12. H. Bergson (1911). L'intuition philosophique. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 19 (6):809 - 827.
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  13. Rudolf Bernet (2001). Désirer Connaître Par Intuition. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):613-629.
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  14. Ned Block (2014). The Defective Armchair: A Reply to Tye. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):159-165.
    Michael Tye's response to my “Grain” (Block ) and “Windows” (Block ) raises general metaphilosophical issues about the value of intuitions and judgments about one's perceptions and the relations of those intuitions and judgments to empirical research, as well as specific philosophical issues about the relation between seeing, attention and de re thought. I will argue that Tye's appeal to what is (§. 2) “intuitively obvious, once we reflect upon these cases” (“intuition”) is problematic. I will also argue that first (...)
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  15. Paul Boghossian (2014). Philosophy Without Intuitions? A Reply to Cappelen. Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):368-381.
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  16. Laurence BonJour (2001). Michael DePaul and William Ramsey (Eds) Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):151-158.
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  17. Stephen J. Boulter (2007). The “Evolutionary Argument” and the Metaphilosophy of Commonsense. Biology and Philosophy 22 (3):369-382.
    Recently in these pages it has been argued that a relatively straightforward version of an old argument based on evolutionary biology and psychology can be employed to support the view that innate ideas are a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge. While sympathetic to the view that the “evolutionary argument” is pregnant with philosophical implications, I show in this paper how it needs to be developed and deployed in order to avoid serious philosophical difficulties and unnecessary complications. I sketch a revised (...)
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  18. J. Boussinesq (1880). Sur l'impossibilité d'arriver aux notions géométriques Par une simple condensation d'un grand nombre de résultats de l'expérience addition a une étude concernant le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 9:444 - 449.
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  19. J. Boussinesq (1879). Sur le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 8:357 - 370.
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  20. Thomas Boysen (2004). Death of a Compatibilistic Intuition. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):92-104.
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  21. A. Barratt Brown (1914). Intuition. International Journal of Ethics 24 (3):282-293.
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  22. John Bunke (forthcoming). Professor Stuart Metaphilosophy October 7, 2011 Intuitions About Specific Situations and Intuitions About General Principles. [REVIEW] Metaphilosophy.
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  23. G. L. C. (1963). Intuition and Science. Review of Metaphysics 17 (1):143-143.
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  24. Charles Arthur Campbell (1948). Moral Intuition and the Principle of Self-Realization. London, G. Cumberlege.
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  25. Herman Cappelen (2012). Philosophy Without Intuitions. OUP Oxford.
    The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false, and reveals how it has encouraged pseudo-problems, presented misguided ideas of what philosophy is, and misled exponents of metaphilosophy and experimental philosophy.
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  26. Herman Cappelen & Douglas G. Winblad (1999). Intuitions. Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie 1 (1):197-216.
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  27. David J. Chalmers (2014). Intuitions in Philosophy: A Minimal Defense. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):535-544.
    In Philosophy Without Intuitions, Herman Cappelen focuses on the metaphilosophical thesis he calls Centrality: contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories. Using linguistic and textual analysis, he argues that Centrality is false. He also suggests that because most philosophers accept Centrality, they have mistaken beliefs about their own methods.To put my own views on the table: I do not have a large theoretical stake in the status of intuitions, but unreflectively I find it fairly obvious that (...)
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  28. Carsun Chang (1960). Chinese Intuitionism: A Reply to Feigl on Intuition. Philosophy East and West 10 (1/2):35-49.
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  29. David Charlton (2009). Intuition. Teaching Ethics 10 (1):111-114.
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  30. Steve Clarke (2013). Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophical Expertise and the Developmental Challenge. Philosophical Papers 42 (2):175-207.
    Appeals to intuitions as evidence in philosophy are challenged by experimental philosophers and other critics. A common response to experimental philosophical criticisms is to hold that only professional philosophers? intuitions count as evidence in philosophy. This ?expert intuitions defence? is inadequate for two reasons. First, recent studies indicate significant variability in professional philosophers? intuitions. Second, the academic literature on professional intuitions gives us reasons to doubt that professional philosophers develop truth-apt intuitions. The onus falls on those who mount the expert (...)
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  31. Richard Cobb-Stevens (1988). Logical Analysis and Cognitive Intuition. Études Phénoménologiques 4 (7):3-32.
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  32. L. Jonathan Cohen (1982). Intuition, Induction, and the Middle Way. The Monist 65 (3):287-301.
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  33. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). Philosophy Without Intuitions, by Herman Cappelen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 242 Pp. [REVIEW] Disputatio (33):546-553.
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  34. James Collins (1948). ORTEGAT, PAUL, S. J. "Intuition Et Religion: Le Problème Existentialiste". [REVIEW] Modern Schoolman 26:187.
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  35. Earl Conee (1998). Seeing the Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):847-857.
    Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can `just see' that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied.
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  36. L. Couturat (1913). Logistique et intuition. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 21 (2):260 - 268.
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  37. Jennifer Culbertson & Steven Gross (2011). Revisited Linguistic Intuitions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):639 - 656.
    Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues that, insofar as linguists possess better theories about language than non-linguists, their linguistic intuitions are more reliable. (Culbertson and Gross [2009]) presented empirical evidence contrary to this claim. Devitt ([2010]) replies that, in part because we overemphasize the distinction between acceptability and grammaticality, we misunderstand linguists' claims, fall into inconsistency, and fail to see how our empirical results can be squared with his position. We reply in this note. Inter alia we argue that Devitt's focus (...)
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  38. Ewa Dąbrowska (2013). Functional Constraints, Usage, and Mental Grammars: A Study of Speakers' Intuitions About Questions with Long-Distance Dependencies. Cognitive Linguistics 24 (4):633-665.
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  39. William L. Davidson (1882). Definition of Intuition. Mind 7 (26):304-310.
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  40. Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.) (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Ancients and moderns alike have constructed arguments and assessed theories on the basis of common sense and intuitive judgments. Yet, despite the important role intuitions play in philosophy, there has been little reflection on fundamental questions concerning the sort of data intuitions provide, how they are supposed to lead us to the truth, and why we should treat them as important. In addition, recent psychological research seems to pose serious challenges to traditional intuition-driven philosophical inquiry. Rethinking Intuition brings together a (...)
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  41. Max Deutsch (2010). Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):447-460.
    Practitioners of the new ‘experimental philosophy’ have collected data that appear to show that some philosophical intuitions are culturally variable. Many experimental philosophers take this to pose a problem for a more traditional, ‘armchair’ style of philosophizing. It is argued that this is a mistake that derives from a false assumption about the character of philosophical methods; neither philosophy nor its methods have anything to fear from cultural variability in philosophical intuitions.
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  42. Michael Dickson (2007). Intuition in Metaphysics. Philosophical Topics 35 (1/2):43-65.
    ‘Seeing is believing’ perhaps means that some visual experience provides good evidence for some claims that go beyond the content of the experience. Intuition—intellectual ‘seeming’—does not provide similarly good evidence, at least not for metaphysical claims, or so I shall argue. In §2, I sketch the conception of ‘metaphysics’ that is in use here, a conception that leads naturally to a problem about what counts as evidence in metaphysics. Some have suggested that intuition counts. In §3 I raise some doubts (...)
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  43. Sinan Dogramaci (2013). Intuitions for Inferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.
    In this paper, I explore a question about deductive reasoning: why am I in a position to immediately infer some deductive consequences of what I know, but not others? I show why the question cannot be answered in the most natural ways of answering it, in particular in Descartes’s way of answering it. I then go on to introduce a new approach to answering the question, an approach inspired by Hume’s view of inductive reasoning.
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  44. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2008). Empirical Metaphysics: The Role of Intuitions About Possible Cases in Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 140 (1):19 - 46.
    Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion of Jackson's claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on (...)
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  45. Grazer Philosophisch E. Studien (2007). Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status Alvin I. Goldman Rutgers University. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74:1.
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  46. Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux (2009). If Intuitions Must Be Evidential Then Philosophy is in Big Trouble. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):35-53.
    Many philosophers claim that intuitions are evidential. Yet it is hard to see how introspecting one's mental states could provide evidence for such synthetic truths as those concerning, for example, the abstract and the counterfactual. Such considerations have sometimes been taken to lead to mentalism---the view that philosophy must concern itself only with matters of concept application or other mind-dependent topics suited to a contemplative approach---but this provides us with a poor account of what it is that philosophers take themselves (...)
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  47. Gerard Esser (1957). Intuition in Thomistic Moral Philosophy. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 31:165-177.
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  48. Gerard Esser (1957). Problem : Intuition in Thomistic Moral Philosophy. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 31:165.
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  49. D. Farland (2008). 'African Intuitions' and Moral Theory. South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):356-363.
    On Metz's view, the best interpretation of ubuntu is that it enjoins agents always to promote harmony in the community. However, while I endorse the claim that intuitions play a foundational role in moral thinking, I am less sanguine about two aspects of Metz's particular employment of the intuitions he focuses on. First, I doubt the intuitions from which he begins are of the right sort to play the role he would like them to play. Second, I doubt that the (...)
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  50. Richard Foley (2012). Chapter 4. Intuitions About Knowledge. In When is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton University Press 12-18.
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