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Subcategories:History/traditions: Intuition
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  1. Michael J. Almeida (2004). "Review of" Intuitions as Evidence". [REVIEW] Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):3.
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  2. Frederick Anderson (1926). Intuition. Journal of Philosophy 23 (14):365-377.
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  3. James Andow (2016). Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: A Metamethodology of Intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):105-125.
    Do philosophers use intuitions? Should philosophers use intuitions? Can philosophical methods be improved upon? In order to answer these questions we need to have some idea of how we should go about answering them. I defend a way of going about methodology of intuitions: a metamethodology. I claim the following: we should approach methodological questions about intuitions with a thin conception of intuitions in mind; we should carve intuitions finely; and, we should carve to a grain to which we are (...)
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  4. A. Nfuropsythologital Approath (1997). The Nature of Intuition O. In R. Davis-Floyd & P. Sven Arvidson (eds.), Intuition: The Inside Story. Routledge 19.
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  5. M. C. D' Arcy (1927). The Claims of Commonsense. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 27:317.
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  6. Gary Atkinson (1990). A Defense of Intuitions. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 64:107-117.
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  7. D. M. Azraf (1957). Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy. Pakistan Philosophical Journal 1 (2):17.
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  8. Archie J. Bahm (1961). Types of Intuition. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press.
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  9. Jonathan Baron (1995). A Psychological View of Moral Intuition. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 5 (1):36-40.
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  10. Avner Baz (2012). Must Philosopherss Rely On Intuitions? Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):316-337.
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  11. George Bealer (1996). A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):121-142.
    This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain qualified modal (...)
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  12. Jocelyn Benoist (2001). Intuition catégorale et voir comme. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):593-612.
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  13. H. Bergson (1911). L'intuition philosophique. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 19 (6):809 - 827.
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  14. Rudolf Bernet (2001). Désirer Connaître Par Intuition. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 99 (4):613-629.
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  15. Ned Block (2014). The Defective Armchair: A Reply to Tye. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):159-165.
    Michael Tye's response to my “Grain” (Block ) and “Windows” (Block ) raises general metaphilosophical issues about the value of intuitions and judgments about one's perceptions and the relations of those intuitions and judgments to empirical research, as well as specific philosophical issues about the relation between seeing, attention and de re thought. I will argue that Tye's appeal to what is (§. 2) “intuitively obvious, once we reflect upon these cases” (“intuition”) is problematic. I will also argue that first (...)
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  16. Paul Boghossian (2014). Philosophy Without Intuitions? A Reply to Cappelen. Analytic Philosophy 55 (4):368-381.
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  17. Laurence BonJour (2001). Michael DePaul and William Ramsey (Eds) Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):151-158.
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  18. Stephen J. Boulter (2007). The “Evolutionary Argument” and the Metaphilosophy of Commonsense. Biology and Philosophy 22 (3):369-382.
    Recently in these pages it has been argued that a relatively straightforward version of an old argument based on evolutionary biology and psychology can be employed to support the view that innate ideas are a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge. While sympathetic to the view that the “evolutionary argument” is pregnant with philosophical implications, I show in this paper how it needs to be developed and deployed in order to avoid serious philosophical difficulties and unnecessary complications. I sketch a revised (...)
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  19. J. Boussinesq (1880). Sur l'impossibilité d'arriver aux notions géométriques Par une simple condensation d'un grand nombre de résultats de l'expérience addition a une étude concernant le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 9:444 - 449.
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  20. J. Boussinesq (1879). Sur le role et la légitimité de l'intuition géométrique. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 8:357 - 370.
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  21. Thomas Boysen (2004). Death of a Compatibilistic Intuition. SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):92-104.
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  22. A. Barratt Brown (1914). Intuition. International Journal of Ethics 24 (3):282-293.
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  23. Anthony Alan Bryson, The View From the Armchair: A Defense of Traditional Philosophy.
    Traditional philosophy has been under attack from several quarters in recent years. The traditional philosopher views philosophy as an armchair discipline relying, for the most part, on reason and reflection. Some philosophers doubt the legitimacy of this type of inquiry. Their arguments usually occur along two dimensions. Some argue that the primary data source for the armchair philosopher--intuition--does not provide evidence for philosophical theories. Others argue that conceptual analysis, which is the preferred method of inquiry for armchair philosophers, can't yield (...)
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  24. John Bunke (forthcoming). Professor Stuart Metaphilosophy October 7, 2011 Intuitions About Specific Situations and Intuitions About General Principles. [REVIEW] Metaphilosophy.
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  25. G. L. C. (1963). Intuition and Science. Review of Metaphysics 17 (1):143-143.
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  26. Charles Arthur Campbell (1948). Moral Intuition and the Principle of Self-Realization. London, G. Cumberlege.
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  27. Herman Cappelen (2013). Philosophy Without Intuitions. Oxford University Press Uk.
    The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.
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  28. Herman Cappelen & Douglas G. Winblad (1999). Intuitions. Facta Philosophica: Internazionale Zeitschrift für Gegenwartsphilosophie 1 (1):197-216.
    This paper examines two attempts to justify the way in which intuitions about specific cases are used as evidence for and against philosophical theories. According to the concept model, intuitions about cases are trustworthy applications of one’s typically tacit grasp of certain concepts. We argue that regardless of whether externalist or internalist accounts of conceptual content are correct, the concept model flounders. The second justification rests on the less familiar belief model, which has it that intuitions in philosophy derive from (...)
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  29. Mihnea D. I. Capraru (2016). Objective Truth in Matters of Taste. Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1755-1777.
    In matters of personal taste, faultless disagreement occurs between people who disagree over what is tasty, fun, etc., in those cases when each of these people seems equally far from the objective truth. Faultless disagreement is often taken as evidence that truth is relative. This article aims to help us avoid the truth-relativist conclusion. The article, however, does not argue directly against relativism; instead, the article defends non-relative truth constructively, aiming to explain faultless disagreement with the resources of semantic contextualism. (...)
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  30. David J. Chalmers (2014). Intuitions in Philosophy: A Minimal Defense. Philosophical Studies 171 (3):535-544.
    In Philosophy Without Intuitions, Herman Cappelen focuses on the metaphilosophical thesis he calls Centrality: contemporary analytic philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence for philosophical theories. Using linguistic and textual analysis, he argues that Centrality is false. He also suggests that because most philosophers accept Centrality, they have mistaken beliefs about their own methods.To put my own views on the table: I do not have a large theoretical stake in the status of intuitions, but unreflectively I find it fairly obvious that (...)
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  31. Carsun Chang (1960). Chinese Intuitionism: A Reply to Feigl on Intuition. Philosophy East and West 10 (1/2):35-49.
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  32. David Charlton (2009). Intuition. Teaching Ethics 10 (1):111-114.
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  33. Steve Clarke (2013). Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophical Expertise and the Developmental Challenge. Philosophical Papers 42 (2):175-207.
    Appeals to intuitions as evidence in philosophy are challenged by experimental philosophers and other critics. A common response to experimental philosophical criticisms is to hold that only professional philosophers? intuitions count as evidence in philosophy. This ?expert intuitions defence? is inadequate for two reasons. First, recent studies indicate significant variability in professional philosophers? intuitions. Second, the academic literature on professional intuitions gives us reasons to doubt that professional philosophers develop truth-apt intuitions. The onus falls on those who mount the expert (...)
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  34. Richard Cobb-Stevens (1988). Logical Analysis and Cognitive Intuition. Études Phénoménologiques 4 (7):3-32.
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  35. L. Jonathan Cohen (1982). Intuition, Induction, and the Middle Way. The Monist 65 (3):287-301.
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  36. Daniel Cohnitz (2012). Philosophy Without Intuitions, by Herman Cappelen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 242 Pp. [REVIEW] Disputatio (33):546-553.
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  37. James Collins (1948). ORTEGAT, PAUL, S. J. "Intuition Et Religion: Le Problème Existentialiste". [REVIEW] Modern Schoolman 26:187.
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  38. Earl Conee (1998). Seeing the Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):847-857.
    Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can `just see' that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied.
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  39. L. Couturat (1913). Logistique et intuition. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 21 (2):260 - 268.
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  40. Jennifer Culbertson & Steven Gross (2011). Revisited Linguistic Intuitions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3):639 - 656.
    Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues that, insofar as linguists possess better theories about language than non-linguists, their linguistic intuitions are more reliable. (Culbertson and Gross [2009]) presented empirical evidence contrary to this claim. Devitt ([2010]) replies that, in part because we overemphasize the distinction between acceptability and grammaticality, we misunderstand linguists' claims, fall into inconsistency, and fail to see how our empirical results can be squared with his position. We reply in this note. Inter alia we argue that Devitt's focus (...)
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  41. M. C. D'Arcy (1926). The Claims of Commonsense. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 27:317 - 336.
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  42. William L. Davidson (1882). Definition of Intuition. Mind 7 (26):304-310.
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  43. Michael R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.) (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Ancients and moderns alike have constructed arguments and assessed theories on the basis of common sense and intuitive judgments. Yet, despite the important role intuitions play in philosophy, there has been little reflection on fundamental questions concerning the sort of data intuitions provide, how they are supposed to lead us to the truth, and why we should treat them as important. In addition, recent psychological research seems to pose serious challenges to traditional intuition-driven philosophical inquiry. Rethinking Intuition brings together a (...)
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  44. Michael DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.) (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    Ancients and moderns alike have constructed arguments and assessed theories on the basis of common sense and intuitive judgments. Yet, despite the important role intuitions play in philosophy, there has been little reflection on fundamental questions concerning the sort of data intuitions provide, how they are supposed to lead us to the truth, and why we should treat them as important. In addition, recent psychological research seems to pose serious challenges to traditional intuition-driven philosophical inquiry. Rethinking Intuition brings together a (...)
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  45. Max Deutsch (2015). The Myth of the Intuitive. The MIT Press.
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  46. Max Deutsch (2010). Intuitions, Counter-Examples, and Experimental Philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):447-460.
    Practitioners of the new ‘experimental philosophy’ have collected data that appear to show that some philosophical intuitions are culturally variable. Many experimental philosophers take this to pose a problem for a more traditional, ‘armchair’ style of philosophizing. It is argued that this is a mistake that derives from a false assumption about the character of philosophical methods; neither philosophy nor its methods have anything to fear from cultural variability in philosophical intuitions.
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  47. Michael Dickson (2007). Intuition in Metaphysics. Philosophical Topics 35 (1/2):43-65.
    ‘Seeing is believing’ perhaps means that some visual experience provides good evidence for some claims that go beyond the content of the experience. Intuition—intellectual ‘seeming’—does not provide similarly good evidence, at least not for metaphysical claims, or so I shall argue. In §2, I sketch the conception of ‘metaphysics’ that is in use here, a conception that leads naturally to a problem about what counts as evidence in metaphysics. Some have suggested that intuition counts. In §3 I raise some doubts (...)
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  48. Sinan Dogramaci (2013). Intuitions for Inferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399.
    In this paper, I explore a question about deductive reasoning: why am I in a position to immediately infer some deductive consequences of what I know, but not others? I show why the question cannot be answered in the most natural ways of answering it, in particular in Descartes’s way of answering it. I then go on to introduce a new approach to answering the question, an approach inspired by Hume’s view of inductive reasoning.
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  49. Janice Dowell, J. L. (2008). Empirical Metaphysics: The Role of Intuitions About Possible Cases in Philosophy. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 140 (1):19 - 46.
    Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion of Jackson's claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on (...)
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  50. Grazer Philosophisch E. Studien (2007). Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status Alvin I. Goldman Rutgers University. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74:1.
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