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  1. Nomy Arpaly (2000). On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment. Ethics 110 (3):488-513.
    I argue that akrasia is not always significantly irrational. To be more precise, I argue that an agent is sometimes more rational for being akratic then she would have been for being enkratic or strong-willed.
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  2. Renée Bilodeau (2001). La satisfaction d'être dupe. Philosophiques 28 (2):381-393.
    Je me propose d'examiner la solution davidsonnienne au problème de la duperie de soi afin de clarifier en quel sens il s'agit d'un acte intentionnel. Après une étude de quelques difficultés liées au concept même de duperie de soi, mon analyse met en lumière que la notion de partition de l'esprit que Davidson emprunte à son traitement de la faiblesse de la volonté ne peut être appliquée de manière satisfaisante à ce nouveau problème. J'indique ensuite que non seulement Davidson mais (...)
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  3. Renée Bilodeau (1993). Donald Davidson, Paradoxes de l'irrationalité, tr. de Pascal Engel, Combas, Éditions de l'Éclat, coll. « Tiré à part », 1991. [REVIEW] Philosophiques 20 (2):503-506.
    Compte-rendu de trois articles de Donald Davidson "Paradoxes of Irrationality", "Deception and Division" et "Rational Animals".
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  4. Nicolas Bommarito (2010). Rationally Self-Ascribed Anti-Expertise. Philosophical Studies 151 (3):413-419.
    I argue that self-ascribed anti-expertise, taking our own beliefs to be false, is not always irrational.
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  5. Montse Bordes (2001). Motivated Irrationality: The Case of Self-Deception. Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 33 (97):3-32.
    This paper inquires into the conceptual nature of self-deception. I shall afford a theory which links SD to wishful thinking. First I present two rival models for the analysis of SD, and suggest reasons why the interpersonal model is flawed. It is necessary for supporters of this model to work out a strategy that avoids the ascription of inconsistency to the self-deceiver in order to fulfill the requirements of the charity principle. Some objections to the compartmentalization strategy are put forward, (...)
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  6. Lisa Bortolotti (2014). Irrationality. Polity Press.
    We talk about irrationality when behaviour defies explanation or prediction, when decisions are driven by emotions or instinct rather than by reflection, when reasoning fails to conform to basic principles of logic and probability, and when beliefs lack coherence or empirical support. Depending on the context, agents exhibiting irrational behaviour may be described as foolish, ignorant, unwise or even insane. -/- In this clear and engaging introduction to current debates on irrationality, Lisa Bortolotti presents the many facets of the concept (...)
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  7. Lisa Bortolotti (2012). Rationality and Sanity. In K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press
    Chapter discussing the relationship between rationality and sanity.
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  8. Lisa Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):109-123.
    In this paper my purpose is to examine whether the case of inconsistent believers can offer a reason to object to theories of belief ascription that rely on a rationality constraint. I shall first illustrate how the possibility of inconsistent believers might be a challenge for the rationality constraint and then assess Davidson's influential reply to that challenge.
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  9. Georg Brun (2009). Wer hat ein Problem mit irrationalen Präferenzen? Entscheidungstheorie und Überlegungsgleichgewicht. Studia Philosophica 68:11-41.
    Decision theory explicates norms of rationality for deriving preferences from preferences and beliefs. Empirical studies have found that actual preferences regularly violate these norms, launching a debate on whether this shows that subjects are prone to certain forms of irrationality or that decision theory needs to be revised. It has been claimed that such a revision is necessitated by the fact that normative uses of decision theory must be justified by a reflective equilibrium. The paper discusses three points. First, the (...)
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  10. Eugene Chislenko (2014). Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):n/a-n/a.
    G.E. Moore noticed the oddity of statements like: “It's raining, but I don't believe it.” This oddity is often seen as analogous to the oddity of believing akratically, or believing what one believes one should not believe, and has been appealed to in denying the possibility of akratic belief. I describe a Belief Akratic's Paradox, analogous to Moore's paradox and centered on sentences such as: “I believe it's raining, but I shouldn't believe it.” I then defend the possibility of akratic (...)
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  11. Vasco Correia (2011). Biases and Fallacies. Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 3 (1):107-126.
    This paper focuses on the effects of motivational biases on the way people reason and debate in everyday life. Unlike heuristics and cognitive biases, motivational biases are typically caused by the influence of a desire or an emotion on the cognitive processes involved in judgmental and inferential reasoning. In line with the ‘motivational’ account of irrationality, I argue that these biases are the cause of a number of fallacies that ordinary arguers commit unintentionally, particularly when the commitment to a given (...)
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  12. Tom Dougherty (2011). On Whether To Prefer Pain to Pass. Ethics 121 (3):521-537.
    Most of us are “time-biased” in preferring pains to be past rather than future and pleasures to be future rather than past. However, it turns out that if you are risk averse and time-biased, then you can be turned into a “pain pump”—in order to insure yourself against misfortune, you will take a series of pills which leaves you with more pain and better off in no respect. Since this vulnerability seems rationally impermissible, while time-bias and risk aversion seem rationally (...)
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  13. Simon J. Evnine (1989). Understanding Madness? Ratio 2 (1):1-18.
    The paper contrasts two ways of understanding the apparently strange assertions of mad persons, finds them both problematic, and proposes an alternative. The first approach, exemplified by R.D. Laing, is to suppose that the beliefs of the mad person are ordinary but expressed in terms that make them appear irrational. The other approach, advocated by Silvano Arieti, is to take the words at face value but to attribute to the mad person a kind of deviant logic. I suggest, on the (...)
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  14. Stacey Goguen (forthcoming). Stereotype Threat, Epistemic Injustice, and Rationality. In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy. OUP
    Though stereotype threat is most well-known for its ability to hinder performance, it actually has a wide range of effects. For instance, it can also cause stress, anxiety, and doubt. These additional effects are as important and as central to the phenomenon as its effects on performance are. As a result, stereotype threat has more far-reaching implications than many philosophers have realized. In particular, the phenomenon has a number of unexplored “epistemic effects.” These are effects on our epistemic lives—i.e., the (...)
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  15. Daniel Greco (2014). A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.
    In this paper I will present a puzzle about epistemic akrasia, and I will use that puzzle to motivate accepting some non-standard views about the nature of epistemological judgment. The puzzle is that while it seems obvious that epistemic akrasia must be irrational, the claim that epistemic akrasia is always irrational amounts to the claim that a certain sort of justified false belief—a justified false belief about what one ought to believe—is impossible. But justified false beliefs seem to be possible (...)
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  16. Amber L. Griffioen (2013). Irrationality and “Gut” Reasoning: Two Kinds of Truthiness. In Jason Holt (ed.), The Ultimate Daily Show and Philosophy: More Moments of Zen, More Indecision Theory. Wiley Blackwell 309-325.
    There are at least three basic phenomena that philosophers traditionally classify as paradigm cases of irrationality. In the first two cases, wishful thinking and self-deception, a person wants something to be true and therefore ignores certain relevant facts about the situation, making it appear to herself that it is, in fact, true. The third case, weakness of will, involves a person undertaking a certain action, despite taking herself to have an all-things-considered better reason not to do so. While I think (...)
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  17. Michael Huemer, Why People Are Irrational About Politics.
    I look for explanations for the phenomenon of widespread, strong, and persistent disagreements about political issues. The best explanation is provided by the hypothesis that most people are irrational about politics and not, for example, that political issues are particularly difficult or that we lack sufficient evidence for resolving them. I discuss how this irrationality works and why people are especially irrational about politics.
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  18. Christine James (1998). Irrationality in Philosophy and Psychology: The Moral Implications of Self-Defeating Behavior. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (2):224-234.
    The philosophical study of irrationality can yield interesting insights into the human mind. One provocative issue is self-defeating behaviours, i.e. behaviours that result in failure to achieve one’s apparent goals and ambitions. In this paper I consider a self-defeating behaviour called choking under pressure, explain why it should be considered irrational, and how it is best understood with reference to skills. Then I describe how choking can be explained without appeal to a purely Freudian subconscious or ‘sub-agents’ view of mind. (...)
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  19. Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti (2016). Instrumental Rationality in Psychopathy: Implications From Learning Tasks. Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):717-731.
    The issue whether psychopathic offenders are practically rational has attracted philosophical attention. The problem is relevant in theoretical discussions on moral psychology and in those concerning the appropriate social response to the crimes of these individuals. We argue that classical and current experiments concerning the instrumental learning in psychopaths cannot directly support the conclusion that they have impaired instrumental rationality, construed as the ability for transferring the motivation by means-ends reasoning. In fact, we defend the different claim that these experiments (...)
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  20. Errol Lord (2011). Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):392-399.
    It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide-scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow-scopers’) that it violates narrow-scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter-example to narrow-scope views. But a narrow-scoper should reject a crucial assumption which Brunero makes, namely, the claim that we always violate conditional narrow-scope requirements when we (...)
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  21. Kevin Lynch (2015). Irrationality, by Lisa Bortolotti (Polity Press, 2014). [REVIEW] International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (4):605-609.
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  22. Eric Mandelbaum & Jake Quilty-Dunn (2015). Believing Without Reason. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22:42-52.
  23. Nicholas Maxwell (2001). Can Humanity Learn to Create a Better World? The Crisis of Science Without Wisdom. In Tom Bentley & Daniel Stedman Jones (eds.), The Moral Universe.
    Can we learn to create a better world? Yes, if we first create traditions and institutions of learning rationally devoted to that end. At present universities all over the world are dominated by the idea that the basic aim of academic inquiry is to acquire knowledge. Such a conception of inquiry, judged from the standpoint of helping us learn wisdom and civilization, is grotesquely and damagingly irrational. We need to change our approach to academic enterprise if we are to create (...)
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  24. Alfred R. Mele (1998). Two Paradoxes of Self-Deception. In Jean-Pierre Dupuy (ed.), Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality. CSLI Publications
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  25. Alfred R. Mele (1998). Motivated Belief and Agency. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):353 – 369.
    Can the existence of motivationally biased beliefs plausibly be explained without appealing to actions that are aimed at producing or protecting these beliefs? Drawing upon some recent work on everyday hypothesis testing, I argue for an affirmative answer. Some theorists have been too quick to insist that motivated belief must involve, or typically does involve, our trying to bring it about that we acquire or retain the belief, or our trying to make it easier for ourselves to believe a preferred (...)
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  26. Alfred R. Mele (1986). Self-Deception and Akrasia: A Review of David Pears's Motivated Irrationality. [REVIEW] Behaviorism 14 (2):183-191.
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  27. Aaron Norby (2014). Against Fragmentation. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):30-38.
    I criticize the idea that theories of ‘fragmented’ or ‘compartmentalized’ belief (as found in, e.g., Lewis 1982, Egan 2008) can help to account for the puzzling phenomena they are often taken to account for. After introducing fragmentationalism and a paradigm case that purportedly motivates it, I criticize the view primarily on the grounds that the models and explanations it offers are at best trivial—as witnessed by examples of over-generation—and should be seen as merely re-describing in figurative terms the phenomena it (...)
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  28. Abelard Podgorski (2016). A Reply to the Synchronist. Mind 125 (499):859-871.
    On the face of it, in ordinary practices of rational assessment, we criticize agents both for the combinations of attitudes, like belief, desire, and intention, that they possess at particular times, and for the ways that they behave cognitively over time, by forming, reconsidering, and updating those attitudes. Accordingly, philosophers have proposed norms of rationality that are synchronic—concerned fundamentally with our individual time-slices, and diachronic—concerned with our temporally extended behaviour. However, a recent movement in epistemology has cast doubt on the (...)
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  29. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2001). A Centipede for Intransitive Preferrers. Studia Logica 67 (2):167-178.
    In the standard money pump, an agent with cyclical preferences can avoid exploitation if he shows foresight and solves his sequential decision problem using backward induction (BI). This way out is foreclosed in a modified money pump, which has been presented in Rabinowicz (2000). There, BI will lead the agent to behave in a self-defeating way. The present paper describes another sequential decision problem of this kind, the Centipede for an Intransitive Preferrer, which in some respects is even more striking (...)
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  30. Miriam Schoenfield (2015). A Dilemma for Calibrationism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):425-455.
    The aim of this paper is to describe a problem for calibrationism: a view about higher order evidence according to which one's credences should be calibrated to one's expected degree of reliability. Calibrationism is attractive, in part, because it explains our intuitive judgments, and provides a strong motivation for certain theories about higher order evidence and peer disagreement. However, I will argue that calibrationism faces a dilemma: There are two versions of the view one might adopt. The first version, I (...)
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  31. Jeffrey Seidman (2016). The Unity of Caring and the Rationality of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2785-2801.
    Caring is a complex attitude. At first look, it appears very complex: it seems to involve a wide range of emotional and other dispositions, all focused on the object cared about. What ties these dispositions together, so that they jointly comprise a single attitude? I offer a theory of caring, the Attentional Theory, that answers this question. According to the Attentional Theory, caring consists of just two, logically distinct dispositions: a disposition to attend to an object and hence to considerations (...)
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  32. Sam Shpall (2013). Wide and Narrow Scope. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.
    Offers a conciliatory solution to one of the central contemporary debates in the theory of rationality, the debate about the proper formulation of rational requirements. Introduces a novel conception of the “symmetry problem” for wide scope rational requirements, and sketches a theory of rational commitment as a response.
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  33. Susanna Siegel (2013). Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):749-757.
    Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath each contributed to a symposium on "The Epistemic Impact of the Etiology of Experience" in Philosophical Studies. These are my replies their contributions.
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  34. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy (2011). Insanity Defenses. In John Deigh & David Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press 299--334.
    We explicate and evaluate arguments both for and against the insanity defense itself, different versions of the insanity defense (M'Naghten, Model Penal Code, and Durham (or Product)), the Irresistible Impulse rule, and various reform proposals.
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  35. Barry Smith (1997). Dlaczego nie istnieje filozofia polska. Filozofia Nauki 5:5-15.
    The author raises the question why Polish philosophy (by which he means Polish analytical philosophy, or the philosophy of the Lvov-Warsaw School) differs so much from what is known as 'Continental philosophy'. He identifies and analyses the following factors which have influenced philosophical developments in Poland: socialism, the connection between philosophy and mathematics, the influence of Austrian philosophy, the peculiar role of K. Twardowski, and Catholicism. The article ends with an appeal for not tolerating irrationalism and relativism in philosophy.
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  36. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming). Fictional Persuasion and the Nature of Belief. In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford University Press
    Psychological studies on fictional persuasion demonstrate that being engaged with fiction systematically affects our beliefs about the real world, in ways that seem insensitive to the truth. This threatens to undermine the widely accepted view that beliefs are essentially regulated in ways that tend to ensure their truth, and may tempt various non-doxastic interpretations of the belief-seeming attitudes we form as a result of engaging with fiction. I evaluate this threat, and argue that it is benign. Even if the relevant (...)
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  37. Sergio Tenenbaum (2010). The Vice of Procrastination. In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark White (eds.), The Thief of Time. Oxford University Press
    The aim of this chapter is to understand more precisely what kind of irrationality involved in procrastination. The chapter argues that in order to understand the irrationality of procrastination one needs to understand the possibility and the nature of what I call “top-down independent” policies and long-term actions. A policy or long-term action) is top-down independent if it is possible to act irrationally relative to the adoption of the policy without ever engaging in a momentary action that is per se (...)
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