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  1. P. R. Adriaens & A. De Block (2013). Why We Essentialize Mental Disorders. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 38 (2):107-127.
    Essentialism is one of the most pervasive problems in mental health research. Many psychiatrists still hold the view that their nosologies will enable them, sooner or later, to carve nature at its joints and to identify and chart the essence of mental disorders. Moreover, according to recent research in social psychology, some laypeople tend to think along similar essentialist lines. The main aim of this article is to highlight a number of processes that possibly explain the persistent presence and popularity (...)
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  2. Daniel Algom (2009). To Understand a Cat: Methodology and Philosophy. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):808 – 812.
  3. Christian G. Allesch (2012). Hans Driesch and the Problems of “Normal Psychology”. Rereading His Crisis in Psychology (1925). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (2):455-461.
  4. Ian Apperly (2010). Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind". Psychology Press.
    Introduction -- Evidence from children -- Evidence form infants and non-human animals -- Evidence from neuroimaging and neuropsychology -- Evidence from adults -- The cognitive basis of mindreading -- Elaborating and applying the theory.
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  5. D. J. B. (1966). An Introduction to Parapsychology. Review of Metaphysics 19 (3):591-591.
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  6. R. J. B. (1964). General Psychopathology. Review of Metaphysics 17 (3):477-477.
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  7. Bernard Baars, Glossary and Guide to Theoretical Claims.
    absorbed state. (7.7) Empirically, a state like fantasy, selective attention, absent-minded day-dreaming and probably hypnosis, in which conscious experience is unusually resistant to distraction. Theoretically, a case in which access to the Global Workspace (GW) is controlled by a coherent context hierarchy , giving little opportunity for outside information to compete for conscious access (4.32). See als ideomotor theory, access, and options context.
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  8. Paolo Bartolomeo & Gianfranco Dalla Barba (2002). Varieties of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):331-332.
    In agreement with some of the ideas expressed by Perruchet & Vinter (P&V), we believe that some phenomena hitherto attributed to “unconscious” processing may in fact reflect a fundamental distinction between direct and reflexive forms of consciousness. This dichotomy, developed by the phenomenological tradition, is substantiated by examples coming from experimental psychology and lesion neuropsychology.
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  9. Ralf-Peter Behrendt (2005). Attentional Deficit Versus Impaired Reality Testing: What is the Role of Executive Dysfunction in Complex Visual Hallucinations? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):758-759.
    A “multifactorial” model should accommodate a psychological perspective, aiming to relate the phenomenology of complex visual hallucinations not only to neurobiological findings but also an understanding of the patient's psychological problems and situation in life. Greater attention needs to be paid to the role of the “lack of insight” patients may have into their hallucinations and its relationship to cognitive impairment.
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  10. Daryl Bem, Ganzfeld Phenomena.
    The ganzfeld procedure is a mild sensory isolation technique that was first introduced into experimental psychology during the 1930s and subsequently adapted by parapsychologists to test for the existence of psi--anomalous processes of information or energy transfer such as telepathy or other forms of extrasensory perception that are currently unexplained in terms of known physical or biological mechanisms. Parapsychologists developed the ganzfeld procedure, in part, because they had become dissatisfied the card-guessing methods for testing ESP pioneered by J. B. Rhine (...)
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  11. Eliza Bliss-Moreau & Lisa Feldman Barrett (2009). What's Reason Got to Do with It? Affect as the Foundation of Learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):201-202.
    We propose that learning has a top-down component, but not in the propositional terms described by Mitchell et al. Specifically, we propose that a host of learning processes, including associative learning, serve to imbue the representation of the conditioned stimulus (CS) with affective meaning.
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  12. Simon Boag (2011). Explanation in Personality Psychology: “Verbal Magic” and the Five-Factor Model. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):223-243.
    Scientific psychology involves both identifying and classifying phenomena of interest (description) and revealing the causes and mechanisms that contribute towards these phenomena arising (explanation). Within personality psychology, some propose that aspects of behavior and cognition can be explained with reference to personality traits. However, certain conceptual and logical issues cast doubt upon the adequacy of traits as coherent explanatory constructs. This paper discusses ?explanation? in psychology and the problems of circularity and reification. An analysis of relations and intrinsic properties is (...)
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  13. Cameron Buckner (2011). Two Approaches to the Distinction Between Cognition and 'Mere Association'. International Journal for Comparative Psychology 24 (1):1-35.
    The standard methodology of comparative psychology has long relied upon a distinction between cognition and ‘mere association’; cognitive explanations of nonhuman animals behaviors are only regarded as legitimate if associative explanations for these behaviors have been painstakingly ruled out. Over the last ten years, however, a crisis has broken out over the distinction, with researchers increasingly unsure how to apply it in practice. In particular, a recent generation of psychological models appear to satisfy existing criteria for both cognition and association. (...)
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  14. Erica Burman (1991). What Discourse is Not. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):325-342.
    Abstract This paper presents an evaluation of the role and function of discourse analysis in relation to claims that it promotes critical interventions within psychology. Discourse analysis challenges the function, truth claims and methodological adequacy of psychological practices, through attending to difference, resistance, relativism and reflexivity. However, these features pose theoretical and conceptual difficulties, particularly if a theoretically motivated position is attributed to the framework itself, rather than the ways it has been taken up and used. I explore how these (...)
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  15. Lawrence R. Carleton (1985). Levels in Description and Explanation. Philosophy Research Archives 11:89-109.
    Various authors insist that some body of natural phenomena are legitimately describable or explainable only on one level of description, and would disqualify any description not confined to that level. None offers an acceptable definition explicitly. I extract such a definition I find implicit in the work of two such authors, J.J. Gibson and Hubert Dreyfus, and modify the result to render it more defensible philosophically. I also criticize the definition Shaw and Turvey offer, demonstrate some applications of my definition, (...)
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  16. Axel Cleeremans (2010). The Grand Challenge for Psychology: Integrate and Fire! Frontiers in Psychology 1 (12):1-2.
    The grand challenge for psychology: integrate and fire!
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  17. Dario Cvencek, Anthony S. Brown, Nicola S. Gray & Robert J. Snowden, Faking of the Implicit Association Test Is Statistically Detectable and Partly Correctable.
    Male and female participants were instructed to produce an altered response pattern on an Implicit Association Test measure of gender identity by slowing performance in trials requiring the same response to stimuli designating own gender and self. Participants’ faking success was found to be predictable by a measure of slowing relative to unfaked performances. This combined task slowing (CTS) indicator was then applied in reanalyses of three experiments from other laboratories, two involving instructed faking and one involving possibly motivated faking. (...)
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  18. Malte Dahlgrün (2010). The Notion of a Recognitional Concept and Other Confusions. Philosophical Studies 150 (1):139 - 160.
    The notion of a recognitional concept (RC) is stated precisely and shown to be unrelated to the proper notion of a perceptually based concept, defining of concept empiricism. More fundamentally, it is argued that the notion of an RC does not reflect a potentially sensible candidate theory of concepts at all and therefore ought to be abandoned from concept-theoretical discourse. In the later parts of the paper, it is shown independently of these points that Fodor's attacks on RCs are in (...)
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  19. James L. Dannemiller & William Epstein (1999). Constraining the Use of Constraints. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):373-374.
  20. Jules Davidoff & Debi Roberson (1997). Empirical Evidence for Constraints on Colour Categorisation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):185-186.
    The question of whether colour categorisation is determined by nontrivial constraints (i.e., universal neurophysiological properties of visual neurons) is an empirical issue concerning the organisation of the internal colour space. Rosch has provided psychological evidence that categories are organised around focal colours and that the organisation is universal; this commentary reconsiders that evidence.
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  21. Richard Double (1988). What's Wrong with Self‐Serving Epistemic Strategies? Philosophical Psychology 1 (3):343-350.
    Abstract This paper contrasts two views on the ethics of belief, the absolutist position that adopting self?serving epistemic strategies is always morally wrong, and the holist position that non?epistemic factors may legitimately be consulted whenever we adopt epistemic strategies. In the first section, the absolutist view is shown to be untenable because of the holistic nature of moral questions in general. In the second section, the nagging appeal of the absolutist position is explored. An account of our ambivalence regarding the (...)
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  22. Brian Epstein (2012). Review of Creations of the Mind, Ed. Margolis and Laurence. [REVIEW] Mind 121 (481):200-204.
    This fascinating collection on artifacts brings together seven papers by philosophers with nine by psychologists, biologists, and an archaeologist. The psychological papers include two excellent discussions of empirical work on the mental representation of artifact concepts – an assessment by Malt and Sloman of a large variety of studies on the conflicting ways we classify artifacts and extend our applications of artifact categories to new cases, and a review by Mahon and Caramazza of data from semantically impaired patients and from (...)
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  23. Uljana Feest (2014). The Continuing Relevance of 19th-Century Philosophy of Psychology: Brentano and the Autonomy of Psychological Methods. In New Directions in the Philosophy of Science, The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective 5. Springer. Springer. 693-709.
    This paper provides an analysis of Franz Brentano’s thesis that psychology employs a distinctive method, which sets it apart from physiology. The aim of the paper is two-fold: First, I situate Brentano’s thesis (and the broader metaphysical system that underwrites it) within the context of specific debates about the nature and status of psychology, arguing that we regard him as engaging in a form of boundary work. Second, I explore the relevance of Brentano’s considerations to more recent debates about autonomy (...)
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  24. Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine (2010). Do You Know More When It Matters Less? Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):683–706.
    According to intellectualism, what a person knows is solely a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Anti-intellectualism is the view that what a person knows is more than simply a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Jason Stanley (2005) argues that, in addition to “traditional factors,” our ordinary practice of knowledge ascription is sensitive to the practical facts of a subject's situation. In this paper, we investigate this question empirically. Our results indicate that Stanley's (...)
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  25. Jan Kyrre Berg Olsen Friis (2012). Perception: Embodiment and Beyond. [REVIEW] Foundations of Science 17 (4):363-367.
    In this commentary on Don Ihde’s paper “Stretching the in-between: embodiment and beyond” I argue that perceptions and observations are based on tacit frames and these frames are expressed through pre-reflexive intuitions thus giving meaning to the perceived content of observations. However, if the objective or given information in perception is incomplete or missing our brain and nervous system will intuitively and unconsciously fill in the missing information in order to act—these particular pieces of added information may not be relevant (...)
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  26. George Graham (1980). Dismantling the Memory Machine: A Philosophical Investigation of Machine Theories of Memory. By Howard A. Bursen. Modern Schoolman 57 (3):269-270.
  27. Anthony Greenwald, The Implicit Association Test's D Measure Can Minimize a Cognitive Skill Confound: Comment on McFarland and Crouch (2002).
    McFarland and Crouch (2002) reported substantial positive correlations (a) between the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and response speed and (b) between IATs assessing racism or self-esteem and ostensibly unrelated control IATs. Using an IAT measure in millisecond-difference score format, they concluded that the IAT was confounded with general cognitive ability. A reanalysis of these data using the D measure (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003) eliminated the speed of responding confound, although it did not eliminate the correlation between the control (...)
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  28. Johannes Hönekopp (2009). Pre-Adjustment of Adult Attachment Style to Extrinsic Risk Levels Via Early Attachment Style is Neither Specific, nor Reliable, nor Effective, and is Thus Not an Adaptation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):31-31.
    The mechanism proposed by Del Giudice by which adult attachment style is adapted to the extrinsic risk in the local environment via attachment style during the early years does not fulfill important criteria of an adaptation. The proposed mechanism is neither specific, nor developmentally reliable, nor effective. Therefore, it should not be considered an adaptation.
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  29. Daniel D. Hutto (2002). The World is Not Enough: Shared Emotions and Other Minds. In Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals. Brookfield: Ashgate.
    This chapter argues that the conceptual problem of other minds cannot be properly addressed as long as we subscribe to an individualistic model of how we stand in relation to our own experiences and the behaviour of others. For it is commitment to this picture that sponsors the strong first/third person divide that lies at the heart of the two false accounts of experiential concept learning sketched above. This is the true source of the problem. To deal successfully with it (...)
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  30. Gregory Johnson (2012). The Relationship Between Psychological Capacities and Neurobiological Activities. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):453-480.
    This paper addresses the relationship between psychological capacities, as they are understood within cognitive psychology, and neurobiological activities. First, Lycan’s (1987) account of this relationship is examined and certain problems with his account are explained. According to Lycan, psychological capacities occupy a higher level than neurobiological activities in a hierarchy of levels of nature, and psychological entities can be decomposed into neurobiological entities. After discussing some problems with Lycan’s account, a similar, more recent account built around levels of mechanisms is (...)
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  31. Mark Johnson (1991). Knowing Through the Body. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):3-18.
    Abstract Recent empirical studies of categorization, concept development, semantic structure, and reasoning reveal the inadequacies of all theories that regard knowledge as static, propositional, and sentential. These studies show that conceptual structure and reason are grounded in patterns of bodily experience. Structures of our spatial/temporal orientations, perceptual interactions, and motor programs provide an imaginative basis for our knowledge of, and reasoning about, more abstract domains. Such a view transcends both foundationalism and extreme relativism or scepticism.
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  32. Sean D. Kelly, A Moment to Reflect Upon Perceptual Synchrony.
    & How does neuronal activity bring about the interpretation of visual space in terms of objects or complex perceptual events? If they group, simple visual features can bring about the integration of spikes from neurons responding to different features to within a few milliseconds. Considered as a potential solution to the ‘‘binding problem,’’ it is suggested that neuronal synchronization is the glue for binding together different features of the same object. This idea receives some support from correlated- and periodic-stimulus motion (...)
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  33. Rida Usman Khalafzai (2009). Eating Disorders. Chisholm Health Ethics Bulletin 15 (1):5.
    Khalafzai, Rida Usman The prevalence of eating disorders is increasing. This article provides an overview of these disorders and explores the biological and social conditions that influence their development.
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  34. Gary Kose & Gary Fireman (2000). Postmodern Readings of Piaget's Genetic Epistemology. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):52-60.
  35. Justin E. Lane & Nora Parren (2012). The Moral Psychology Handbook. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):765-768.
  36. Charles D. Laughlin & Vincenza A. Tiberia (2012). Archetypes: Toward a Jungian Anthropology of Consciousness. Anthropology of Consciousness 23 (2):127-157.
    It is very curious that C.G. Jung has had so little influence upon the anthropology of consciousness. In this paper, the reasons for this oversight are given. The archetypal psychology of Jung is summarized and shown to be more complex and useful than extreme constructivist accounts would acknowledge. Jung's thinking about consciousness fits very well with a modern neuroscience view of the psyche and acts as a corrective to relativist notions of consciousness and its relation to the self.
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  37. Derek Leben (2012). When Psychology Undermines Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-23.
    This paper attempts to specify the conditions under which a psychological explanation can undermine or debunk a set of beliefs. The focus will be on moral and religious beliefs, where a growing debate has emerged about the epistemic implications of cognitive science. Recent proposals by Joshua Greene and Paul Bloom will be taken as paradigmatic attempts to undermine beliefs with psychology. I will argue that a belief p may be undermined whenever: (i) p is evidentially based on an intuition which (...)
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  38. Charles Lenay, John Stewart, Marieke Rohde & Amal Ali Amar (2012). You Never Fail to Surprise Me: The Hallmark of the Other: Experimental Study and Simulations of Perceptual Crossing. Interaction Studies 12 (3):373-396.
    Classically, the question of recognizing another subject is posed unilaterally, in terms of the observed behaviour of the other entity. Here, we propose an alternative, based on the emergent patterns of activity resulting from the interaction of both partners. We employ a minimalist device which forces the subjects to externalize their perceptual activity as trajectories which can be observed and recorded; the results show that subjects do identify the situation of perceptual crossing with their partner. The interpretation of the results (...)
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  39. Neil Levy (2013). Psychopaths and Blame: The Argument From Content. Philosophical Psychology (3):1-17.
    The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation (...)
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  40. Michael Loughlin (2011). Psychologism, Overpsychologism, and Action. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (4):305-309.
    To someone coming fairly fresh to this debate, Sykes’ paper is somewhat shocking. The psychogenic inference seems such an obvious fallacy, yet he shows, with detailed reference to both diagnostic practice and the literature on mental disorders, the extraordinary pervasiveness of its influence, extending even to the systematic ambiguities built into key diagnostic terms. Sykes characterizes the inference in the following terms: “If there is no known physical cause for a symptom or disorder, the cause must be psychological” (2010, 290). (...)
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  41. William Lyons (1991). Intentionality and Modern Philosophical Psychology—II. The Return to Representation. Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):83-102.
    Abstract In rounded terms and modern dress a theory of intentionality is a theory about how humans take in information via the senses and in the very process of taking it in understand it and, most often, make subsequent use of it in guiding human behaviour. The problem of intentionality in this century has been the problem of providing an adequate explanation of how a purely physical causal system, the brain, can both receive information and at the same time understand (...)
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  42. Edouard Machery (2012). Dissociations in Neuropsychology and Cognitive Neuroscience. Philosophy of Science 79 (4):490-518.
  43. Bruce Mangan (1993). Some Philosophical and Empirical Implications of the Fringe. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (2):142-154.
  44. Teresa McCormack, Stephen Andrew Butterfill, Christoph Hoerl & Patrick Burns (2009). Cue Competition Effects and Young Children's Causal and Counterfactual Inferences. Developmental Psychology 45 (6):1563-1575.
    The authors examined cue competition effects in young children using the blicket detector paradigm, in which objects are placed either singly or in pairs on a novel machine and children must judge which objects have the causal power to make the machine work. Cue competition effects were found in a 5- to 6-year-old group but not in a 4-year-old group. Equivalent levels of forward and backward blocking were found in the former group. Children's counterfactual judgments were subsequently examined by asking (...)
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  45. Steven McFarlane (2013). Like-Minded: Externalism and Moral Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):772-775.
  46. Katharine McGovern (1993). Feelings in the Fringe. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (2):119-125.
  47. Alain Morin, Critical Comment on “Improving Your Decision Making by Observing Your Inner Speech”.
    While this article by Waldman and Newberg is correct in its main message, it is unfortunately fraught with inaccuracies and problems. To illustrate: (1) the statement that “Inner speech is also associated with lower levels of psychological distress” is invalid as a wide array of distressing psychological disorders are associated with distorted (e.g., ruminative) inner speech activity.
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  48. Donnchadh O'Conaill (2013). On Being Motivated. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):579-595.
    Merleau-Ponty’s notion of being motivated or solicited to act has recently been the focus of extensive investigation, yet work on this topic has tended to take the general notion of being motivated for granted. In this paper, I shall outline an account of what it is to be motivated. In particular, I shall focus on the relation between the affective character of states of being motivated and their intentional content, i.e. how things appear to the agent. Drawing on Husserl’s discussion (...)
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  49. Morten Overgaard, Problems in the "Functional" Investigations of Consciousness.
    This article presents the view that the “problem of consciousness” – per definition – can not be seen as a strictly scientific or strictly philosophical problem. The first idea, especially, leads to important difficulties: First of all, the idea has in most cases implied some rather superficial reductionistic or functionalistic a priori assumptions, and, secondly, it can be shown that some of the most commonly used empirical methods in these regards are inadequate. Especially so in the case of contrastive analysis, (...)
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  50. Gareth S. Owen, Fabian Freyenhagen, Matthew Hotopf & Wayne Martin (forthcoming). Temporal Inabilities and Decision-Making Capacity in Depression. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-20.
    We report on an interview-based study of decision-making capacity in two classes of patients suffering from depression. Developing a method of second-person hermeneutic phenomenology, we articulate the distinctive combination of temporal agility and temporal inability characteristic of the experience of severely depressed patients. We argue that a cluster of decision-specific temporal abilities is a critical element of decision-making capacity, and we show that loss of these abilities is a risk factor distinguishing severely depressed patients from mildly/moderately depressed patients. We explore (...)
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