The dilemma confronted by Buridan’s Ass leads into a problem about nil-preference situations, to which there is a solution in the literature that is inspired by Alan Turing: we have evolved with a computational module in our brains that comes into play in such situations by picking a random action among the alternatives that detennines the subject’s choice. We relate these Buridan’s Ass situations to a larger, theoretically interesting category in which there is no alternative that is decisively superior to (...) others with respect to expected utility, and we try to show how our emotional makeup figures in a rational response, particularly as informed by symbolic utilitythat we draw down from our culture’s shared understandings. The category is theoretically interesting because it contains moral dilemmas, as well as hard cases in which an imponant choice must be made without an option that has clearly superior expected utility. We argue that our Emotional Response Model is preferable to Turing’s Randomizer for this category, as well as more illuminating about nil-preference situations or close approximations thereto. (shrink)

This edition of that chapter is intended to make Buridan's ideas and arguments accessible to a wider range of readers.

"In this essay, I wish to question the view that the distinction between medieval and early modern philosophy is primarily one of method. I shall argue that what has come to be known as the modern method in fact owes much to the natural philosophy of John Buridan (ca. 1295-1361), a secular arts master who taught at the University of Paris some three centuries before Descartes. Surrounded by conflicts over institutional governance and curricular disputes, Buridan emerged as a forceful voice (...) for the independence and autonomy of teachers in the faculty of arts, arguing that philosophy as properly practiced belonged to them, the "artists artistae", not to those who taught in the so-called 'higher' faculties of theology, law, and medicine. Now such voices had been heard before at Paris, most notably from Averroist arts masters in the late 13th and early 14th-centuries.(*) Buridan is different, however, because unlike Boethius of Dacia and John of Jandun, he knew how to make the case for artistic autonomy without denigrating the theology and thereby inviting official condemnation. His trick was not to argue that there are 'two truths', one acquired and the other revealed, which might well come into conflict with each other, or that propositions whose truth has been revealed in scripture in no way qualify as scientia. It was rather to recognize the profoundly different methods of theology and philosophy, without losing sight of the fact that what counts as evidence in a proof in natural philosophy does not work in a theological argument, even if both have the same conclusion, such as that the human soul is immortal. Buridan seems to think that if only people would respect the differences between the rules of philosophical and theological inquiry, no conflicts would arise. He is not so naive as to claim this could ever happen, of course. But it does explain why he almost always diagnoses such conflicts in terms of some logical or linguistic confusion on the part of the people who propose them. Buridan is also different because in him the secularizing sentiment already present in the Latin Averroists begins to take shape as a way of doing philosophy, i.e., as a philosophical grammar.. (shrink)

Now we should have to answer the question: when were the questions on Perihermeneias written? Little is known about the chronology of Buridan's works. Even a relative date is difficult to establish. However, some remarks can be made. First, there is the fact that the questions on Perihermeneias are quoted several times in Tractatus I of the Summule (4), in a way that makes it highly probable that the Summule were written after the Questiones on Perihermeneias (5). Now, according to (...) professor Pinborg the first lectura of the Summule may be dated as early as the late 1320es (6), that is at the very beginning of Buridan's career as a teacher of philosophy at the university of Paris. This may be an indication for an early date of the Questiones on Perihermeneias, possibly as early as 1325. There are two other reasons for assuming that the commentary on Perihermeneias is one of Buridan's first works. The first clue is given by the places where Buridan refers to one of his own works: once he refers to his commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge (7), twice to his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (8), and six times to his commentary on the Physics (9). The way in which he refers to these tracts seems also to be significant: the reference to his commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge shows that this work is of an earlier date than the present work. As to the other two works, he only refers to the number of the book in which he is going to treat a particular subject, not to the number of the question. A (cross)reference to the Summule is not given, although, as Pinborg remarks, there is a general doctrinal concordance between the two works. The questions on Metaphysics do not contain a (cross)-reference to the questions on Perihermeneias, at least not on the places where one would expect them. I am not certain about possible references occurring in the commentary on Physics. However, we should be very careful to draw conclusions from the occurrence of references, since it is always possible that we are dealing with a second or third lectura of the text.. (shrink)

This book presents novel formalizations of three of the most important medieval logical theories: supposition, consequence and obligations. In an additional fourth part, an in-depth analysis of the concept of formalization is presented - a crucial concept in the current logical panorama, which as such receives surprisingly little attention.Although formalizations of medieval logical theories have been proposed earlier in the literature, the formalizations presented here are all based on innovative vantage points: supposition theories as algorithmic hermeneutics, theories of consequence analyzed (...) with tools borrowed from model-theory and two-dimensional semantics, and obligations as logical games. For this reason, this is perhaps the first time that these medieval logical theories are made fully accessible to the modern philosopher and logician who wishes to obtain a better grasp of them, but who has always been held back by the lack of appropriate ‘translations' into modern terms.Moreover, the book offers a reflection on the very nature of logic, a reflection that is prompted by the comparisons between medieval and modern logic, their similarities and dissimilarities. It is thus a contribution not only to the history of logic, but also to the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language and semantics.The analysis of medieval logic is also relevant for the modern philosopher and logician in that, being the unifying methodology used across all disciplines at that time, logic really provided unity to science. It thus presents a unified model of scientific investigation, where logic plays the aggregating role. (shrink)

This thesis is on the history and philosophy of logic and semantics. Logic can be described as the ‘science of reasoning’, as it deals primarily with correct patterns of reasoning. However, logic as a discipline has undergone dramatic changes in the last two centuries: while for ancient and medieval philosophers it belonged essentially to the realm of language studies, it has currently become a sub-branch of mathematics. This thesis attempts to establish a dialogue between the modern and the medieval traditions (...) in logic, by means of ‘translations’ of the medieval logical theories into the modern framework of symbolic logic, i.e. formalizations. One of its conclusions is that, when properly understood within their own framework, the interest of medieval logical theories for modern investigations go beyond mere historical interest, but that a thorough conceptual analysis of such theories must be undertaken in order to avoid conceptual misprojections. While such translations of medieval into modern logic have been attempted before, the approach presented here is innovative in that attention is paid to the similarities as well as to the dissimilarities between the two traditions, and to what can be learned from the medieval masters for modern investigations in logic and semantics. (shrink)

On the basis of passages from John Buridan's Summula Suppositionibus and Sophismata, E. Karger has reconstructed what could be called the ?Buridanian theory of inferential relations between doubly quantified propositions?, presented in her 1993 article ?A theory of immediate inference contained in Buridan's logic?. In the reconstruction, she focused on the syntactical elements of Buridan's theory of modes of personal supposition to extract patterns of formally valid inferences between members of a certain class of basic categorical propositions. The present study (...) aims at offering semantic corroboration?a proof of soundness?to the inferential relations syntactically identified by E. Karger, by means of the analysis of Buridan's semantic definitions of the modes of personal supposition. The semantic analysis is done with the help of some modern logical concepts, in particular that of the model. In effect, the relations of inference syntactically established are shown to hold also from a semantic point of view, which means thus that this fragment of Buridan's logic can be said to be sound. (shrink)

The essay develops two major arguments. First, if John Buridan's 'first argument' for the reintroduction of natural supposition is only that the "eternal truth" of a scientific proposition is preserved because subject terms in scientific propositions supposit for all the term's past, present, and future significata indifferently; then Albert of Saxony thinks it is simply ineffective. Only the 'second argument', i.e. the argument for the existence of an 'atemporal copula', adequately performs this task; but is rejected by Albert. Second, later (...) fourteenth-century criticisms of Buridan's natural supposition, given in certain Notabilia from the anonymous author in, Paris, BnF, lat. 14.716, ff. 40va-41rb, are nothing but an interpolated hodge-podge of criticisms given earlier in the century against various views of Buridan's by Albert of Saxony. It is this fact that makes Albert the real source of late fourteenth-century criticisms of Buridan's view of natural supposition. (shrink)

Introduction STEN EBBESEN In the second half of the 20th century scholarly research uncovered a wealth of interesting medieval discussions about issues ...

The aim of this paper is to examine the medieval posterity of the Aristotelian and Pyrrhonian treatments of the infinite regress argument. We show that there are some possible Pyrrhonian elements in Autrecourt's epistemology when he argues that the truth of our principles is merely hypothetical. By contrast, Buridan's criticisms of Autrecourt rely heavily on Aristotelian material. Both exemplify a use of scepticism.

This paper deals with the simple paradoxes of validity and with the possibility of solving them in terms of Bradwardinian-Buridanian semantics. The paradoxes of validity as conceived here are cases of semantic pathology, which result due to the use of terms signifying the validity of inference. Semantic paradoxes are a semantico-epistemological phenomenon which is a symptom of the need to revise several apparently acceptable semantic assumptions. The analysis of possible solutions to the paradoxes focuses on Bradwardinian-Buridanian semantics and as a (...) result on the closed, token-based semantic theories that assume the existence of an implicit meaning of propositions. The key theses, as far as the solution to the paradoxes is concerned, are the principle of truth-implication which claims that every proposition expresses or implies its own truth and the closure principle which claims that every proposition asserts or expresses everything that follows from it logically. The present paper advances on recent research in claiming that (with certain reservations) the application of these principles can effectively solve inconsistency-paradoxes but not indeterminacy-paradoxes of validity.Haec dissertatio circa simplices “consequentias insolubiles” modumque eos solvendi iuxta doctrinam semanticam Bradwardiniano-Buridanianam versatur. Consequentiae insolubiles, quae hic considerantur, “pathologiam semanticam” exhibunt, quae ex usu terminorum validitatem consequentiae significantium resultat. Insolubilia ut phaenomenon semantico-epistemologicum necessitatem corrigendi nonnula principia semantica, quae secundum primam suiapparentiam bona esse videntur. Inquisitio in divorsos modos solvendi ista insolubilia praecipue doctrinas semanticas Thomae de Bradwardino Ioannisque Buridani respicit, scilicet doc trinas semanticas “clausas” (seu distinctionem inter “meta-linguam” et “linguam obiectualem” non ponentes), nominalisticas, propositionibus etiam significationem quandam “implicitam” ascribentes. Assertiones principales, ex quibus huiusmodi insolubilium solutio pendet, sunt duo: 1. ex omni propositione assertionem sequi sui ipsius veritatis; 2. omnem propositionem quodcumque ex ea logice sequatur asserere. Extendentes investigationem recentiorum conclusionem tractatione nostra defendimus, principiis praedictis adhibendis bene solvi posse consequentias insolubiles ratione inconsistentiae, non tamen consequentias insolubiles ratione indeterminationis. (shrink)

Joannis Buridani de semantice propositionum doctrinaDissertatio proposita Joannis Buridani de semantice propositionum sententiam, quae in suis operibus logicis continetur, pertractat. Quaestio de semantice propositionali duplici modo sumi potest: scil. vel pure semantice (quarendo definitionem veritatis) vel ontologice (inquirendo de statu ontologico “complexesignificabilium”). In utraque quaestione solvenda Buridanus doctrinam semanticam quae “terminismus” dicitur assumit. Notionem veritatis Buridanus non ex significatione sed ex suppositione explicat, quo pacto possibile redditur, veritatem inductive per valorem semanticum propositionis partium definiri. Quaestionem alteram circa semanticen complexionis “accusativi (...) cum infinitivo” seu “dicti” propositionis Buridanus ad semanticen terminorum reducit, propositionis structuram logicam explicando. Buridani principalis modus procedendi ergo in hoc consistit, quod ipse “obligationibus ontologicis” alicuius discursus evadere studet, abnegando “denotativam” doctrinam semanticam. Translatio: Lukáš NovákJohn Buridan’s Propositional SemanticsThe paper deals with Buridan’s approach to the problems of propositional semantics, contained in his logical works. This question can be conceived both as semantic (definition of truth) and ontological (ontological status of states of affairs). Buridan’s solution of both of these questions is based upon a terminist theory of meaning. Theory of truth is constructed as suppositional, not as significational, which enables the definition of truth in terms of the semantic values of components of a particular kind of proposition. The other important problem, the semantic analysis of accusative and infinitive constructions (i.e. of sentential nominalizations), is solved within the semantics of terms by exhibiting the logical structure of a proposition. Buridan’s crucial strategy is therefore the elimination of the apparent ontological commitments of a particular discourse in terms of dismissing the denotative theory of meaning. (shrink)

Semantica logicalis Ioannis Buridani eiusque explicatio necnon censuraHuius dissertationis scopus est analysis terminologiae logico-semanticae, quae Iohannes Buridanus (c. 1295–1360), logicus mediaevalis ad scholam Nominalium spectans, utitur. Inquisitio haec praecipue circa conceptus „causae veritatis“ et „consequentiae“ versatur, ad quos conceptus autem clarificandosduo apparent praerequisita: primo quidem explicatio significationis terminorum modalium (ut quid sit neessitas, quid possibilitas), secundo solutio (saltem attemptata) „insolubilium“ seu (ut moderni aiunt) paradoxorum semanticorum, ut paradoxi Epimenidis. Ex analysi Buridani discursus patet, eius intellegentiam logicae de facto parum successisse, (...) propter errores nonnulos in analysi conceptuali modalis semanticaeque terminologiae. Auctor igitur aliam explicationem notionis consequentiae proponit, quam ex conceptione semantica modalitatis, qua Buridanus implicite tantum innixus est, hausit. Auctor credit hanc explicationem possibilitatem aperit, systema logicum, quod conceptualiter et consequenter explicative „clausum“ sit, conficere. Translatio: L. NovákPerspectives of the Logical Semantics of Jean BuridanThe subject of the present article is the analysis of fundamental logical-semantical terminology of late-medieval nominalistic logician Jean Buridan (c. 1295–1360). The analysis focuses on the concepts of truth conditions and logical consequence, whose clarification presupposes explication of modal terminology as well as a solution of semantical antinomies such as “Liar” (or an attempt to solve them). The analysis of Buridan’s argumentation suggests that Buridan’s project of logic actually fails due to several failures of conceptual analysis of semantical and modal terminology. An alternative solution of the question concerning logical consequence is thus proposed in terms of Buridan’s implicit (and unused) semantical conception of modalities that makes it possible to establish conceptually and therefore explicatively closed logical framework. (shrink)

This paper addresses Klima’s charge of inconsistancy against John Buridan in a book recently published on the subject. Klima argues that Buridan’s theoryof abstraction commits him to the aspectuality of substantial concepts. However, his semantics of absolute terms and concepts prevents him from accepting anyaspectuality of substantial concepts. In light of this problem, the paper gives a detailed reconstruction of Buridan’s account of abstraction, beginning with sensoryperception and singular cognition and ending with the formation of substantial concepts that have a (...) universal signification. Then, from this reconstruction, someBuridanian responses are given to Klima’s critique, which explain at least why Buridan did not see the problem himself. Finally, the conclusion comes down in favor of Klima and, in light of the discussion, highlights some fundamental problems with the nominalist project. (shrink)

See collation, showing variants found in the early printed edition and some manuscripts. The corrected text following omits rejected variants and implements those that have been accepted.

introduced the concept of effective demand in the nascent science of economics; his discussions of astronomy were acute enough to raise Duhem’s interest. Neither are Buridan’s credentials as a nominalist in doubt, although investigation into his precise relation to William of Ockham continues: he rejected all abstract entities, whether universals, common natures, the complexe significabile, or types above and beyond tokens; for Buridan, every thing which exists is a concrete individual. His anti-realism included an epistemological component as well, for Buridan (...) maintained that the source of all knowledge is experience. (shrink)

forthcoming in: Shahid Rahman (ed.), Read’s Liar.

5th Annual Hawaii International Conference on Arts and Humanities, January 15, 2007, Honolulu, HI.

This paper provides a comparison of three fundamentally different approaches to the issue of ontological commitment. It argues that despite superficial similarities on either side, Buridan’s approach provides an intriguing third alternative to the two commonly recognized modern approaches. Keywords: ontological commitment, existence, meaning, reference..

Buridan's life, works, and influence -- Buridan's logic and the medieval logical tradition -- The primacy of mental language -- The various kinds of concepts and the idea of a mental language -- Natural language and the idea of a formal syntax in Buridan -- Existential import and the square of opposition -- Ontological commitment -- The properties of terms (proprietates terminorum) -- The semantics of propositions -- Logical validity in a token-based, semantically closed logic -- The possibility of scientific (...) knowledge -- Buridan's anti-skepticism -- Buridan's essentialist nominalism. (shrink)

To many contemporary philosophers, the phrase “essentialist nominalism” may appear to be an oxymoron. After all, essentialism is the doctrine that things come in natural kinds characterized by their essential properties, on account of some common nature or essence they share. But nominalism is precisely the denial of the existence, indeed, the very possibility of such shared essences. Nevertheless, despite the intuitions of such contemporary philosophers,2 John Buridan was not only a thoroughgoing nominalist, as is well-known, but also a staunch (...) defender of a strong essentialist doctrine against certain skeptics of his time. But then the question inevitably arises: could he consistently maintain such a doctrine? (shrink)

This paper argues for two principal conclusions about natural language semantics based on John Buridan's considerations concerning the notion of formal consequence, that is, formally valid inference. (1) Natural languages are essentially semantically closed, yet they do not have to be on that account inconsistent. (2) Natural language semantics has to be token based, as a matter of principle. The paper investigates the Buridanian considerations leading to these conclusions, and considers some obviously emerging objections to the Buridanian approach.

: In this paper I argue that the famous problems of dualism between mind (soul) and body, that is, the problems of interaction and unification, concerned philosophers already in a medieval Aristotelian tradition. The problems, although traceable earlier, become particularly visible after William Ockham in the early fourteenth century, and in formulating his own position on the animal and human souls I argue that Buridan realized these problems and laid down the only views on the soul he thought to be (...) possible in an Aristotelian framework. His discussion then sets the stage for the following centuries. In presenting the background to Buridan's discussion I treat Aquinas, Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham. (shrink)

Some fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family offer a promising starting-point for the formulation of full-fledged theories of truth with systematic relevance in their own right. In particular, Bradwardine's thesis that sentences typically say more than one thing gives rise to a quantificational approach to truth, and Buridan's theory of truth based on the notion of suppositio allows for remarkable metaphysical parsimony. Bradwardine's and Buridan's theories both have theoretical advantages, but fail to provide a satisfactory account of truth (...) because both are committed to the thesis, fatal for both, that every sentence signifies/implies its own truth. I close with remarks on Greg Restall's recent model-theoretic formalization of Bradwardine's theory of truth. (shrink)

I examine the theory of consequentia of the medieval logician, John Buridan. Buridan advocates a strict commitment to what we now call proposition-tokens as the bearers of truth-value. The analysis of Buridan's theory shows that, within a token-based semantics, amendments to the usual notions of inference and consequence are made necessary, since pragmatic elements disrupt the semantic behaviour of propositions. In my reconstruction of Buridan's theory, I use some of the apparatus of modern two-dimensional semantics, such as two-dimensional matrices and (...) the distinction between the context of formation and the context of evaluation of utterances. (shrink)

Buridan's theory of sentences with epistemic verbs (`to know', `to believe', etc.) has received much attention in recent scholarship. Its originality with respect to Ockham's approach, however, has been importantly overestimated. The present paper argues that both doctrines share crucial features and basically belong to the same family. This is done by comparing Buridan's notion of the `appellation of reason' with Ockham's application to epistemic sentences of the general principle that a predicate always `appellates its form'.

This paper is an attempt to rethink from two perspectives Buridan’s ideas concerning knowledge: On the one hand, I explore Buridan’s theory of knowledge in the hope that it will shed some light on the intuition that the structure of propositions determines the justification of our beliefs on various different levels. On the other hand, I would like to contribute to demonstrating the consistency of Buridan’s thought,which has been remarked by almost all scholars working on Buridan: in particular, I am (...) interested in exploring the benefits of using supposition theory when applied to the theory of knowledge. I will start by examining Buridan’s conception of scientia (as opposed to error, opinio and fides), from the perspective of two distinctions which are very important to Buridan’s theory of the proposition: complexio/enunciatio and enunciatio/assensus. Then I will recall Buridan’s analysis of propositions (and his use of supposition to define truth conditions) to show their consistency with this conception of knowledge. (shrink)

The first section of this article offers a reconstruction of Buridan's theory of propositions, along the following lines: on the syntactic plane, propositions obtain a special type of unity from the presence of a copula; on the semantic plane, the fact that a proposition does not have any specific significate (different from the significate of terms), does not erase the distinction between propositions and terms: the copula performs an act of saying, in virtue of which propositions can be true or (...) false. The second section sumarises Pardo's theory of propositions, showing how in this case a Buridanian starting point led to a result very different from that which Buridan reached. (shrink)

The solution John Buridan offers for the Paradox of the Liar has not been correctly placed within the framework of his philosophy of language. More precisely, there are two important points of the Buridanian philosophy of language that are crucial to the correct understanding of his solution to the Liar paradox that are either misrepresented or ignored in some important accounts of his theory. The first point is that the Aristotelian formula, ` propositio est vera quia qualitercumque significat in rebus (...) significatis ita est ', once amended, is a correct way to talk about the truth of a sentence. The second one is that he has a double indexing theory of truth: a sentence is true in a time about a time, and such times should be distinguished in the account of the truth-conditions of sentences. These two claims are connected in an important way: the Aristotelian formula indicates the time about which a sentence is true. Some interpreters of the Buridanian solution to the paradox, following the lead of Herzberger, have missed these points and have been led to postulate truth-values gaps, or surrogates of truth-value gaps, when there is nothing of this sort in his theory. I argue against this tradition of interpretation of Buridan and propose an interpretation of his solution to the Liar. (shrink)

. According to John Buridan, the time for which a statement is true is underdetermined by the grammatical form of the sentence – the intention of the speaker is required. As a consequence, truth-bearers are not sentence types, nor sentence tokens plus facts of the context of utterance, but statements. Statements are also the bearers of logical relations, since the latter can only be established among entities having determined truth-conditions. This role of the intention of the speaker in the determination (...) of what is said by an utterance is not isolated in medieval semantics. (shrink)

One of the manuscripts of Buridan’s Summulae contains three figures, each in the form of an octagon. At each node of each octagon there are nine propositions. Buridan uses the figures to illustrate his doctrine of the syllogism, revising Aristotle's theory of the modal syllogism and adding theories of syllogisms with propositions containing oblique terms (such as ‘man’s donkey’) and with ‘propositions of non-normal construction’ (where the predicate precedes the copula). O-propositions of non-normal construction (i.e., ‘Some S (some) P is (...) not’) allow Buridan to extend and systematize the theory of the assertoric (i.e., non-modal) syllogism. Buridan points to a revealing analogy between the three octagons. To understand their importance we need to rehearse the medieval theories of signification, supposition, truth and consequence. (shrink)

This book sets out to examine the medieval understanding of Aristotle's famous discussion of "weakness of the will" (akrasia, incontinentia) in the seventh book of his Nicomachean Ethics. The medieval views are outlined primarily on the basis of the commentaries on Aristotle's "Ethics by Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Walter Burley, Gerald Odonis and John Buridan. An investigation of the earlier Augustinian discussion concerning reluctant actions (invitus facere) rounds out the study. The recent studies of weakness of the will have (...) neglected the medieval philosophers. The present volume fills this gap in historical research and shows that especially the conceptual refinement of the fourteenth-century discussion makes contributions that are comparable to those of twentieth-century philosophers. (shrink)

This article offers the first critical edition of the most important version of Francis of Marchia's famous question 1 of his commentary on Book IV of the Sentences, in which the Franciscan theologian puts forth his virtus derelicta theory of projectile motion. The introduction attempts to place Marchia's theory in its proper context. The theory might seem to us an obvious improvement on Aristotle, but rather than an immediate and complete break with tradition that all scholastics quickly adopted, Marchia's (...) virtus derelicta was more a stage in a gradual process that had begun many decades before and did not find universal acceptance among his first successors. Moreover, Marchia himself did not take the theory to what might seem the obvious conclusion that Jean Buridan would draw, because Marchia employed the virtus derelicta to explain more phenomena than just projectile motion. (shrink)

By way of conclusion we may add the following three items to A. Maier's and G. Federici-Vescovini's investigations: 1. The Questiones super libris Physicorum in the ms. Cesena, B. Malatestiana S.VIII.5 have been incorrectly attributed to John Buridan. Their real author is Albert of Saxony. 2. The ms. Cesena, B. Malatestiana S.VIII.5 ff. 4ra-4vb contains the Prologue and the tabula questionum of the Questions on De gen. et corr., whereas the ms. Vat. lat. 3097 ff. 103ra-146rb has the complete text. (...) This Prologue and the questions 1 and 3 can also be found in Vat. lat. 2185 ff. 50ra-50vb. This text certainly cannot be considered as another copy of Buridan's well known Questions on De gen. et corr. Neither is it certain that Nicole Oresme is their author, as A. Maier seems to believe. There are indications pointing in the direction of a redaction other than the one known, of Buridan's Questions. In any case this possibility cannot be ruled out by the material that has been presented here. 3. The ms. Cesena, B. Malatestiana S.VIII.5 has at one time had the same owner as the codices Vat. lat. 2159, 2160, 2185 and 3066, and the codices Cesena, B. Malatestiana S.VII.5 and S.VIII.2. This owner was in all probability Bernardus a Campanea of Verona, a physician. (shrink)

This book is a collection of papers on the metaphysics and natural philosophy of John Buridan (ca. 1295-1361), one of the most innovative and influential ...

After a brief sketch of the state of Buridan studies, this review article examines the recent study, by Benoît Patar, of a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics that is generally attributed to Albert of Saxony, but which Patar believes to have been authored by John Buridan (the text is preserved in the manuscript Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek 477, fols. 60va–163vb, and was edited by Patar himself in 1999). Patar is utterly convinced that the Bruges Quaestiones represent Buridan’s prima lectura, that is, his first (...) course of lectures on the Physics, which preceded the two other redactions that are traditionally attributed to him. However, there is no textual evidence in support of this assumption, but only speculative circumstantial evidence. The article therefore rejects Patar’s thesis as highly problematic. (shrink)