There is what should be called the Curious George Model of Analysis, wherein the internal conflicts of some protagonist or program are the most revealing and significant features of the story. Take George. He is a good little monkey, but he's curious. These are virtues of sorts, but George's curiosity drives him first to investigate a yellow hat, then to try to fly like the seagulls, to investigate the telephone, and finally to try holding a large bunch of balloons. In (...) each case, these actions driven by curiosity make trouble for George and others as he, successively, is captured, falls into the ocean, calls the fire department and is then incarcerated, and is ultimately sent high above the city to the confusion .. (shrink)

John Dewey points out in A Common Faith (1934) that what stands in the way of religious belief for many is the apparent commitment of Western religious traditions to supernatural phenomena and questionable historical claims. We are to accept claims that in any other context we would find laughable. Are we to believe that water can be turned into wine without the benefit of the fermentation process? Are we to swallow the claim that there is such a phenomenon as the (...) spontaneous conception of a child without the intervention of the traditional technique? Were we to confront these claims in any but a religious context, we would dismiss them as the workings of an overactive imagination or simple cover for an overactive sex life. But for the devout believer, there is no doubt even with a paucity of evidence. At the same time, the rise of science has forcibly suggested the idea that the natural world is self-contained and, if explainable, that explanation will come from within. There seems to be no room for the traditional God and, much as one might wish otherwise, nothing for him to do. Perhaps... (shrink)

American philosophy has been dominated by the theme of "Nature."1 From Edwards to Emerson to Dewey to Dennett, American thought has variously invoked Nature. But to articulate a philosophy of Nature is not thereby to espouse a form of "naturalism." In fact, philosophies undertaken in the name of "naturalism" seem to have a different temperament than those that begin with the thought of Nature as such. As a theme, "Nature" invites an expansive mood for reflection, while "naturalism" sounds constrictive and (...) combative. "Nature" disposes the mind to musement, "pondering," theoria, Denken—to becoming Emerson's "transparent eyeball." "Naturalism" has something of a doctrinal, even dogmatic, flavor, since every "-ism" .. (shrink)

While Good’s book forces us to recognize the caricatures of Hegel and idealism that have dominated Anglo-American thought, Dewey’s relationship with idealism in general and Hegel in particular remains complex. Good proposes that the main reason for Dewey’s rejection of idealism was World War I. I find this implausible. Good downplays the central influence of James on Dewey, first with the Principles and then with his radical empiricism. By his move to Columbia in 1905 and in his article of that (...) year, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” Dewey had rejected all types of philosophy that equated reality with the object of knowledge, including idealism and Hegel. For Dewey, reality includes types of experiences that are not instances of knowing and that ideals, functionally understood, are possibilities, not actualities. (shrink)

After the end of the Second World War, Italy was thefirst Axis country (followed by Germany and Japan), toundergo a process of ``reeducation'' by the alliedtroops, focusing initially on the education system.Under the direction of American scholars and schoolinnovators, school syllabi and textbooks wererewritten in order to replace the ideologicalindoctrination exerted by the Fascist regime from 1923to 1943 with democratic ideas. This articlereconstructs different phases of the influence of JohnDewey's progressive education in Italy. This influencewas predominant in policy and experimental (...) schools, aswell as in educational theory in the periodimmediately following the War, but it was almosteliminated from policy documents in a restorativebacklash of the Cold War. From the sixties on however,Dewey's pedagogical thinking, which never lost groundwithin the liberal, laicist and Marxist circles,gradually and selectively regained influence inpolicies and reforms. (shrink)

In The Grace and the Severity of the Ideal, Victor Kestenbaum swims against the current of Dewey scholarship. He declares for and gives close articulation to the importance of transcendence in the philosophy of John Dewey. The guiding thread of the book is "the proposal that Dewey never outgrew his idealistic period. His philosophical achievement is not to be located in his naturalism but in the frontiers along which the natural and the transcendental touch" (137). Kestenbaum does not argue that (...) Dewey defends a supernatural sense of transcendence; instead, he documents the modes of transcendence that, for Dewey, reveal themselves within the flow of experience. This is a learned and carefully developed book, one that will provoke pragmatists to think carefully about how growth, self-revision, and... (shrink)

John Dewey (1859-1952) lived from the Civil War to the Cold War, a period of extraordinary social, economic, demographic, political and technological change. During his lifetime the United States changed from a rural to an urban society, from an agricultural to an industrial economy, from a regional to a world power. It emancipated its slaves, but subjected them to white supremacy. It absorbed millions of immigrants from Europe and Asia, but faced wrenching conflicts between capital and labor as they were (...) integrated into the urban industrial economy. It granted women the vote, but resisted their full integration into educational and economic institutions. As the face-to-face communal life of small villages and towns waned, it confronted the need to create new forms of community life capable of sustaining democracy on urban and national scales. Dewey believed that neither traditional moral norms nor traditional philosophical ethics were up to the task of coping with the problems raised by these dramatic transformations. Traditional morality was adapted to conditions that no longer existed. Hidebound and unreflective, it was incapable of changing so as to effectively address the problems raised by new circumstances. Traditional philosophical ethics sought to discover and justify fixed moral goals and principles by dogmatic methods. Its preoccupation with reducing the diverse sources of moral insight to a single fixed principle subordinated practical service to ordinary people to the futile search for certainty, stability, and simplicity. In practice, both traditional morality and philosophical ethics served the interests of elites at the expense of most people. To address the problems raised by social change, moral practice needed to be thoroughly reconstructed, so that it contained within itself the disposition to respond intelligently to new circumstances. Dewey saw his reconstruction of philosophical ethics as a means to effect this practical reconstruction. (shrink)

Jerry Kirkpatrick's Montessori, Dewey, and Capitalism: Educational Theory for a Free Market in Education presents a provocative synthesis of the educational philosophies of Maria Montessori and John Dewey with the economic philosophies of Ayn Rand and Ludwig Von Mises. At the center of Kirkpatrick's thesis is his belief that public education be subject to a free-market model. Kirkpatrick holds that students can thrive in an educational system free from all forms of coercion, something he believes can only be accomplished in (...) a free-market educational system that is not bound by government intervention. He borrows from Ayn Rand in arguing that only the individual matters and that all forms of imposed authority .. (shrink)

There are many books on the market about religion in American thought and history, but the idea for a collection of essays focused directly upon pragmatist reconstructions of religious belief and sentiment is overdue. Stuart Rosenbaum’s reader admirably fills this need, and is bound to bring fresh insights to students and advanced researchers alike.

The centennial of Dewey & Tuft’s Ethics (1908) provides a timely opportunity to reflect both on Dewey’s intellectual debt to utilitarian thought, and on his critique of it. In this paper I examine Dewey’s assessment of utilitarianism, but also his developing view of the good (ends; consequences), the right (rules; obligations) and the virtuous (approbations; standards) as “three independent factors in morals.” This doctrine (found most clearly in the 2nd edition of 1932) as I argue in the last sections, has (...) significant forward-going implications for debates in ethics, insofar as it functions to deflate debates among ethicists that turns on claims about the conceptual primacy of any one of these three ethical concepts over the other two. To find what “permanent value each group contributes to the clarification and direction of reflective morality” was the task Dewey set for himself. But to carry that project through demands showing also why the application of considerations of ends, rules, and virtues to problems of practice is not quite as many self-described utilitarians, deontologists, and virtue ethicists conceive it. (shrink)

This article reviews John Dewey and Our Educational Prospect, A Critical Engagement with Dewey's Democracy and Education, edited and spearheaded by David T. Hansen, with contributions by Gert Biesta, Reba N. Page, Larry A. Hickman, Naoko Saito, Gary D. Fenstermacher, Herbert M. Kliebard, Sharon Fieman-Nemser and Elizabeth Minnich. This review will not only praise and evaluate the merits of this book, but will also attempt to frame this new study of Dewey within the challenges that continue to engage education in (...) the realms of democracy, as the latter continues to strive for its own survival. While highlighting salient aspects of Hansen et al.'s rereading of Dewey's great work, this review seeks to frame both Dewey's text and this Deweyan study within the breadth of those other challenges by which education—and in turn philosophy of education—has come to take on issues such as: the nexus between theory and practice, the prevalent domination of the social scientific paradigm in education and the continuous threat of the standardisation and institutionalisation of human learning. It will be argued that, to meet this challenge, philosophy of education must sustain a continuous engagement with Dewey's work. A rereading of Dewey also involves a revaluation of his pragmatic theory of education and its lineage, moving from Emerson's metaphilosophy to Cavell's ethics. As Hansen et al. invariably engage with the latter, this review will question, through Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of pragmatisation, whether Deweyan pragmatism can still challenge the current state of affairs by which education is not only systematised away from learning, but also subsumed into a more institutionalised state—a condition that immediately jars with Dewey's own philosophical instincts and pedagogical labours. (shrink)

Certain discussions about “relativism” in the philosophy of Zhuangzi turn on the question of the morality of his dao 道. Some commentators, most notably Robert Eno, maintain that there is no ethical value whatsoever to Zhuangzi’s dao as presented in the Cook Ding episode and other “knack passages.” In this essay, it is argued that there is indeed a moral dimension to Cook Ding’s dao. One way to recognize it is to explore the similarity between that dao and John Dewey’s (...) notion of educational method. There are moral traits that Dewey can appeal to in recommending his method. It is argued here that these traits represent the moral features of Cook Ding’s dao as well. (shrink)

Introduction : Dewey's lifelong crusade for participatory democracy -- Michigan beginnings, 1884-1894 -- Dewey at the University of Chicago, 1894-1904 -- Dewey leaves the University of Chicago for Columbia University -- Elsie Clapp's contributions to community schools -- Penn and the third revolution in American higher education -- The Center for Community Partnerships -- The university civic responsibility idea becomes an international movement -- John Dewey, the Coalition for Community Schools, and developing a participatory democratic American society.

This article addresses somemethodological questions that are at stake inassessing the influence of the ideas of John Dewey onthe renewal of European education in the twentiethcentury, using examples from the history of Dutcheducation. It is argued that in this kind of researchthe focus should not be on the process of influence assuch, but rather on the activity of reception. This,in turn, requires a contextual reconstruction of theinteraction between Deweyan ideas and practices andexisting ones. The case studies presented in thisarticle exemplify (...) the more general methodologicalobservations. They not only provide an insight in therole of Deweyan ideas and practices in the developmentof Dutch education but also make clear for whatreasons, mostly unrelated to the significance ofDewey's work, these ideas and practices did not haveany lasting influence on the development of Dutcheducation, both on the level of early childhoodeducation and primary and secondary schools. (shrink)

Few pedagogical theories and practices have met with such strongreactive ambivalence in Germany as Dewey's. As it contained theideas of democracy and pragmatism it clashed with the monarchial andidealistic patterns of school-practice and pedagogic theory right fromthe beginning. On the other hand, reformists of all kinds wereoverwhelmed with enthusiasm. But even in the democratic phases of political development this ambivalence continued. The traditionof setting metaphysical and religious backgrounds stood in the way of a free examination of Dewey. Therefore, the reception (...) has, upuntil now, been signed by mistakes and misinterpretations, but also by a minority of fruitful debates. (shrink)

Different notions of truth imply and encourage different ideals of thinking, knowledge, meaning, and learning. Thus, these concepts have fundamental importance for educational theory and practice. In this paper, I intend to draw out and clarify the notions of truth, knowledge and meaning that are implied by P4C's pedagogical ideals. There is some disagreement amongst P4C theorists and practitioners about whether the community of inquiry implies either relativism or absolutism. I will argue that both relativism and absolutism are incompatible with (...) P4C, as neither one of them can facilitate all of P4C's ideals of reflective thinking, community, fallibilism, care, open-mindedness, empathy, and meaningfulness. I will argue that P4C incorporates Dewey's middle ground position between relativism and absolutism. (shrink)

John Dewey's early exposure to Hegel left a "permanent deposit" on his thinking. Dewey's Hegelian side does not emerge in the usual sense of someone predicting the march of Spirit through history. Rather it is as the complete philosopher seeking, above all else, to leave nothing out. Such a philosopher criticized reified abstractions, reinstated the centrality of relations, emphasized the importance of thinking ideas together with their history, and insisted on the interpenetration of individual and social. This Hegelian inheritance, when (...) passed through the filter of praxis, identifies, for some interpreters (I plead guilty) the strength of Dewey's philosophy.Coexisting with this dimension was another .. (shrink)

Review of essays by Bernstein, in translation. This book review could also be entitled “John Dewey: Old and New”, recalling a distant resemblance to one of the most well known books of Dewey, Individualism Old and New (1930). But in this case the subject pursued under this title would be the development in the reception of John Dewey’s work in the past century. This is a genuine hermeneutical reflection on the significance of one of the most important American intellectuals in (...) the present day. (shrink)

Environmentally oriented philosophers and educational theorists are now attempting to clarify how the ideas of John Dewey can be used as the basis for changing cultural practices that contribute to the ecological crisis. Although Dewey can be interpreted as a nonanthropocentric thinker and his method of experimental inquiry can be used in eco-management projects, Dewey should not be regarded as an environmental and eco-justice philosopher—and by extension, his followers should not be regarded in this light. (1) Dewey’s emphasis on an (...) experimental mode of inquiry did not take account of the knowledge systems of other cultures—particularly cultures that are more ecologically centered. (2) Dewey’s understanding of language prevented him from recognizing how the root metaphors (meta-cognitive schemata) he took for granted were also the basis, with several exceptions, of the Industrial Revolution. (3) Dewey’s failure to understand the complex nature of tradition, including the different ways in which intergenerational knowledge is shared and renewed, makes it difficult for his followers to address a central eco-justice issue—which is to regenerate within diverse cultural communities the non-commodified forms of knowledge, skills, and relationships that enable individuals and communities to have a smaller ecological footprint. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, I will sketch the main features of traditional models of evidence, indicating idealizations in such models that I regard as doing more harm than good. I will then proceed to elaborate on an alternative model of evidence that is functionalist, complex, dynamic, and contextual, which I will call DYNAMIC EVIDENTIAL FUNCTIONALISM. I will demonstrate its application to an illuminating example of scientific inquiry, and defend it from some likely objections. In the second part, (...) I will use that alternative to solve a variety of classic and contemporary problems in the literature on scientific evidence having to do with the empirical basis of science and the use of evidence in public policy. (shrink)

n 1909, the 50th anniversary of both the publication of Origin of the Species and his own birth, John Dewey published "The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy." This optimistic essay saw Darwin's advance not only as one of empirical or theoretical biology, but a logical and conceptual revolution that would shake every corner of philosophy. Dewey tells us less about the influence that Darwin exerted over philosophy over the past 50 years and instead prophesied the influence it would (or should) (...) take in the future. I will discuss this landmark paper and the key lessons Dewey draws from Darwinism for philosophy, and give a preliminary assessment of how well we've done so far. (Dewey would be largely disappointed.). (shrink)

This chapter will develop and apply ideas drawn from and inspired by Dewey’s work on science and democracy to the context of international relations (IR). I will begin with Dewey’s views on the nature of democracy, which lead us into his philosophy of science. I will show that scientific and policy inquiry are inextricably related processes, and that they both have special requirements in a democratic context. There are some challenges applying these ideas to the IR case, but these challenges (...) can be surmounted. To illustrate the fruitfulness of this Deweyan approach, I will end by showing that it provides an interesting new take on a major international crisis of our day: global climate change. (shrink)

In recent years, pragmatism in general and John Dewey in particular have been of increasing interest to philosophers of science. Dewey's work provides an interesting alternative package of views to those which derive from the logical empiricists and their critics, on problems of both traditional and more recent vintage. Dewey's work ought to be of special interest to recent philosophers of science committed to the program of analyzing ``science in practice.'' The core of Dewey's philosophy of science is his theory (...) of inquiry---what he called ``logic.'' There is a major lacuna in the literature on this point, however: no contemporary philosophers of science have engaged with Dewey's logical theory, and scholars of Dewey's logic have rarely made connections with philosophy of science. This paper aims to fill this gap, to correct some significant errors in the interpretation of key ideas in Dewey's logical theory, and to show how Dewey's logic provides resources for a philosophy of science. (shrink)

The essays in this collection address different aspects of Dewey's philosophy of logic, from his work at the beginning of the twentieth century to the culmination of his logical thought in the 1938 volume, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.

This is the first of two papers addressing Browning’s “Designation, Characterization, and Theory in Dewey’s Logic” (2002) where he distinguishes a series of pre-theoretical and theoretical stages for developing a theory of logic. The second of these two papers will recommend a modified version of this scheme of stages of inquiry into inquiry. The present paper recounts Browning’s original version of these stages and the ramifications of not clearly distinguishing them. I respond to Browning’s claim that in Burke 1994 I (...) made two such mistakes of not properly distinguishing theoretical and pre-theoretical stages of inquiry into inquiry. (shrink)

Although John Dewey is celebrated for his work in the philosophy of education and acknowledged as a leading proponent of American pragmatism, he might also have enjoyed more of a reputation for his philosophy of logic had Bertrand Russell not attacked him so fervently on the subject. In Dewey's New Logic , Tom Burke analyzes the debate between Russell and Dewey that followed the 1938 publication of Dewey's Logic: The Theory of Inquiry . Here, he argues that Russell failed to (...) understand Dewey's logic as Dewey intended, and despite Russell's resistance, Dewey's logic is surprisingly relevant to recent developments in philosophy and cognitive science. Burke demonstrates that Russell misunderstood crucial aspects of Dewey's theory and contends that logic today has progressed beyond Russell and is approaching Dewey's broader perspective. "[This] book should be of substantial interest not only to Dewey scholars and other historians of twentieth-century philosophy, but also to devotees of situation theory, formal semantics, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and Artificial Intelligence."--Georges Dicker, Transactions of the C.S. Peirce Society "No scholar, thus far, has offered such a sophisticated and detailed version of central themes and contentions in Dewey's Logic . This is a pathbreaking study."--John J. McDermott, editor of The Philosophy of John Dewey. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that John Dewey developed a philosophy of law that follows directly from his conception of democracy. Indeed, under Dewey’s theory an understanding of law can only follow from an accurate understanding of the social and political context within which it functions. This has important implications for the form law takes within democ- ratic society. The paper will explore these implications through a comparison of Dewey’s claims with those of Richard Posner and Ronald Dworkin; two other (...) theorists that inti- mately link law and democracy. After outlining their theories I will use the recent United States Supreme Court case, Citizens United, to discuss how practitioners of the three theo- ries would decide a case that implicates both the rule of law and democratic procedures. In order to do this judges following each theory, “Dews, Dworks and Poses,” are imagined. Ul- timately this paper will show that drastically different results to Citizens United would fol- low. The (tentative) conclusion of the paper is that Dewey’s conception of the relationship between democracy and law is a superior option to either that of Dworkin or Posner. (shrink)