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  1. Jonathan Baron & Jay Schulkin (1995). The Problem of Global Warming From a Decision-Theoretic Perspective. Social Epistemology 9 (4):353 – 368.
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  2. Colin Bird (2000). The Possibility of Self-Government. American Political Science Review 94 (3):563-577.
    M z ,f any have suggested that the findings of social choice theory demonstrate that there can be no "will of the people." This has subversive implications for our intuitive concept of self-government. I explore the relation between the notion of a "social will," that of self-government, and the impossibility theorems of social choice theory. I conclude that although the concept of the social will is essential to that of self-government, the findings of social choice theory do not cast doubt (...)
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  3. Jesús Zamora Bonilla (2007). Optimal Judgment Aggregation. Philosophy of Science 74 (5):813-824.
    The constitution of a collective judgment is analyzed from a contractarian point of view. The optimal collective judgment is defined as the one that maximizes the sum of the utility each member gets from the collective adoption of that judgment. It is argued that judgment aggregation is a different process from the aggregation of information and public deliberation. This entails that the adoption of a collective judgment should not make any rational member of the group change her individual opinion, and (...)
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  4. Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2006). Democratic Answers to Complex Questions – an Epistemic Perspective. Synthese 150 (1):131-153.
    This paper addresses a problem for theories of epistemic democracy. In a decision on a complex issue which can be decomposed into several parts, a collective can use different voting procedures: Either its members vote on each sub-question and the answers that gain majority support are used as premises for the conclusion on the main issue (premise based-procedure, pbp), or the vote is conducted on the main issue itself (conclusion-based procedure, cbp). The two procedures can lead to different results. We (...)
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  5. Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz, Democracy and Argument: Tracking Truth in Complex Social Decisions.
    Suppose a committee has to take a stand on a complex issue, where the decision presupposes answering a number of sub-questions. There is an agreement within the committee which sub-questions should be posed. All questions are of the ”yes or no?”-type and the main question is to be given the yes-answer if and only if each sub-question is answered with “yes”. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one procedure, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting (...)
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  6. Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2004). Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions. An Epistemic Perspective. Ratio Juris 17 (2):241-258.
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her (...)
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  7. Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Aggregating Causal Judgements.
    Decision making typically requires judgements about causal relations: we need to know both the causal e¤ects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. Judgements about the nature and strength of causal rela- tions often di¤er, even among experts. How to handle such diversity is the topic of this paper. First we consider the possibility of aggregating causal judgements via the aggregation of probabilistic ones. The broadly negative outcome of this investigation leads us to look at aggregating (...)
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  8. Rachael Briggs (2010). Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes. Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.
    It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometimes conflict. In certain famous cases of conflict—medical Newcomb problems—CDT and BT seem to get (...)
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  9. Peter Brössel & Anna-Maria A. Eder (forthcoming). How To Resolve Doxastic Disagreement. Synthese.
  10. Fabrizio Cariani (2011). Judgment Aggregation. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):22-32.
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  11. Fabrizio Cariani, Marc Pauly & Josh Snyder (2008). Decision Framing in Judgment Aggregation. Synthese 163 (1):1 - 24.
    Judgment aggregation problems are language dependent in that they may be framed in different yet equivalent ways. We formalize this dependence via the notion of translation invariance, adopted from the philosophy of science, and we argue for the normative desirability of translation invariance. We characterize the class of translation invariant aggregation functions in the canonical judgment aggregation model, which requires collective judgments to be complete. Since there are reasonable translation invariant aggregation functions, our result can be viewed as a possibility (...)
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  12. David Coady (2006). When Experts Disagree. Episteme 3 (1-2):68-79.
    Alvin Goldman has criticized the idea that, when evaluating the opinions of experts who disagree, a novice should “go by the numbers”. Although Goldman is right that this is often a bad idea, his argument involves an appeal to a principle, which I call the non-independence principle, which is not in general true. Goldman's formal argument for this principle depends on an illegitimate assumption, and the examples he uses to make it seem intuitively plausible are not convincing. The failure of (...)
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  13. Larissa Conradt, Christian List & Timothy J. Roper, Swarm Intelligence: When Uncertainty Meets Conflict.
    When animals share decisions with others, they pool personal information, offset individual errors and, thereby, increase decision accuracy. This is termed ‘swarm intelligence.’ But what if those decisions involve conflicts of interest between individual decision-makers? Should animals share decisions with individuals whose goals are different from, and partially in conflict with, their own? A group decision model developed by Larissa Conradt (MPI Berlin) and colleagues finds that, contrary to intuition, conflicting goals often increase both decision accuracy and the individual gains (...)
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  14. Ann E. Cudd (2002). Preference, Rationality, and Democratic Theory. In Robert L. Simon (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy. Blackwell.
  15. Franz Dietrich, Judgment Aggregation: (Im)Possibility Theorems.
    The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising …eld of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a speci…c type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore (...)
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  16. Franz Dietrich, Judgment Aggregation Under Constraints.
    In solving judgment aggregation problems, groups often face constraints. Many decision problems can be modelled in terms the acceptance or rejection of certain propositions in a language, and constraints as propositions that the decisions should be consistent with. For example, court judgments in breach-of-contract cases should be consistent with the constraint that action and obligation are necessary and su¢ - cient for liability; judgments on how to rank several options in an order of preference with the constraint of transitivity; and (...)
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  17. Franz Dietrich, Judgment Aggregation Without Full Rationality.
    Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route does not lead very far: we obtain oligarchies rather than dictatorships if instead of full rationality we merely require that collective judgments be deductively closed, arguably a minimal condition of (...)
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  18. Franz Dietrich, The Possibility of Judgment Aggregation on Agendas with Subjunctive Implications.
    The new …eld of judgment aggregation aims to …nd collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like “if a then b” are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide (...)
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  19. Franz Dietrich, Judgment Aggregation with Consistency Alone.
    All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete (in some recent results with completeness relaxed to deductive closure), arguably a demanding rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation functions mapping pro…les of (merely) consistent individual judgment sets to (merely) consistent collective ones. We prove that, whenever the agenda of propositions under consideration exhibits mild interconnections, any such aggregation function that is "neutral" between the acceptance and rejection of each (...)
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  20. Franz Dietrich, A Generalised Model of Judgment Aggregation.
    The new …eld of judgment aggregation aims to merge many individual sets of judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a single collective set of judgments on these propositions. Judgment aggregation has commonly been studied using classical propositional logic, with a limited expressive power and a problematic representation of conditional statements (“if P then Q”) as material conditionals. In this methodological paper, I present a simple uni…ed model of judgment aggregation in general logics. I show how many realistic decision problems can (...)
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  21. Franz Dietrich, A Liberal Paradox for Judgment Aggregation.
    In the emerging literature on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. A group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups with expert knowledge on, or particularly a¤ected by, certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions. We identify a problem that generalizes Sen’s ‘liberal paradox’. Under plausible conditions, the assignment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the unanimity principle, (...)
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  22. Franz Dietrich (2010). The Impossibility of Unbiased Judgment Aggregation. Theory and Decision 68 (3):281-299.
    Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without requiring systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or effectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. (...)
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  23. Franz Dietrich (2008). The Premises of Condorcet's Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified. Episteme 5 (1):56-73.
    Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they are competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: (i) whether a premise is justified depends on the notion of probability considered and (ii) none of the notions renders both premises simultaneously justified. Under the perhaps most interesting notions, the independence assumption should be weakened.
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  24. Franz Dietrich (2007). Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation. Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):269-300.
    Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of nonmanipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premisebased voting”, (...)
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  25. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.
    Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of (...)
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  26. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2013). Propositionwise Judgment Aggregation: The General Case. Social Choice and Welfare 40 (4):1067-1095.
    In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there (...)
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  27. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2010). The Problem of Constrained Judgment Aggregation. In. In Thomas Uebel, Stephan Hartmann, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Marcel Weber, Dennis Dieks & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. 125--139.
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  28. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2010). The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
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  29. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2007). Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation. Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
    In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although we thereby (...)
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  30. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Judgment Aggregation by Quota Rules: Majority Voting Generalized.
  31. Franz Dietrich & Philippe Mongin (2010). The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation. Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):562-582.
    We investigate judgment aggregation by assuming that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and the Independence condition (formula-wise aggregation) holds for them, though perhaps not for others. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus de…ned is non-degenerate depends on how premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions for dictatorship or oligarchy on the premisses, and investigate when these results extend to the whole agenda. Our theorems recover or strengthen (...)
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  32. Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann (2013). Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises. Economics and Philosophy 29 (1):87--120.
    The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the ‘wisdom of crowds’. But this theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises – voter independence – is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility for the theorem's misleading conclusion that ‘large crowds are infallible’. We prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, ‘large crowds are fallible but better than small groups’. This theorem rehabilitates the importance of deliberation (...)
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  33. Igor Douven (2009). Introduction: Computer Simulations in Social Epistemology. Episteme 6 (2):107-109.
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  34. Igor Douven & Alexander Riegler (2009). Extending the Hegselmann–Krause Model III: From Single Beliefs to Complex Belief States. Episteme 6 (2):145-163.
    In recent years, various computational models have been developed for studying the dynamics of belief formation in a population of epistemically interacting agents that try to determine the numerical value of a given parameter. Whereas in those models, agents’ belief states consist of single numerical beliefs, the present paper describes a model that equips agents with richer belief states containing many beliefs that, moreover, are logically interconnected. Correspondingly, the truth the agents are after is a theory (a set of sentences (...)
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  35. Don Fallis (2005). Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation. Episteme 2 (1):39-55.
    The doctrinal paradox shows that aggregating individual judgments by taking a majority vote does not always yield a consistent set of collective judgments. Philip Pettit, Luc Bovens, and Wlodek Rabinowicz have recently argued for the epistemic superiority of an aggregation procedure that always yields a consistent set of judgments. This paper identifies several additional epistemic advantages of their consistency maintaining procedure. However, this paper also shows that there are some circumstances where the majority vote procedure is epistemically superior. The epistemic (...)
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  36. A. Boyce Gibson (1951). Nature and Convention in the Democratic State. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):1 – 20.
  37. Robert E. Goodin (2006). The Benefits of Multiple Biased Observers. Episteme 3 (3):166-174.
    : We know that we can learn much from the reports of multiple competent, independent, unbiased observers. There are also things we can learn from the reports of competent but biased observers. Specifically, when reports go against the grain of an agent's known biases, we can be relatively confident in the veracity of those reports. Triangulating on the truth via that mechanism requires a multiplicity of observers with distinct biases, each of whose reports might be one-way decisive in that fashion. (...)
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  38. Robert E. Goodin (2006). The Epistemic Benefi Ts of Multiple Biased Observers. Episteme 3 (3):166-174.
    We know that we can learn much from the reports of multiple competent, independent, unbiased observers. There are also things we can learn from the reports of competent but biased observers. Specifically, when reports go against the grain of an agent’s known biases, we can be relatively confident in the veracity of those reports. Triangulating on the truth via that mechanism requires a multiplicity of observers with distinct biases, each of whose reports might be one-way decisive in that fashion. It (...)
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  39. Robert E. Goodin & Lina Eriksson (2009). Democratically Relevant Alternatives. Analysis 69 (1):9-17.
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  40. Goodin, E. Robert & Kai Spiekermann (2012). Epistemic Aspects of Representative Government. European Political Science Review 4 (3):303--325.
    The Federalist, justifying the Electoral College to elect the president, claimed that a small group of more informed individuals would make a better decision than the general mass. But the Condorcet Jury Theorem tells us that the more independent, better-than-random voters there are, the more likely it will be that the majority among them will be correct. The question thus arises as to how much better, on average, members of the smaller group would have to be to compensate for the (...)
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  41. Susan Haack (2008). Warrant, Causation, and the Atomism of Evidence Law. Episteme 5 (3):pp. 253-265.
    The epistemological analysis offered in this paper reveals that a combination of pieces of evidence, none of them sufficient by itself to warrant a causal conclusion to the legally required degree of proof, may do so jointly. The legal analysis offered here, interlocking with this, reveals that Daubert’s requirement that courts screen each item of scientific expert testimony for reliability can actually impede the process of arriving at the conclusion most warranted by the evidence proffered.
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  42. Russell Hardin (2002). Street-Level Epistemology and Democratic Participation. Journal of Political Philosophy 10 (2):212–229.
  43. Stephan Hartmann, Carlo Martini & Jan Sprenger (eds.) (2010). Formal Modeling in Social Epistemology. [REVIEW] Logic Journal of the IGPL (special issue).
    Special issue. With contributions by Rogier De Langhe and Matthias Greiff, Igor Douven and Alexander Riegler, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger, Carl Wagner, Paul Weirich, and Jesús Zamora Bonilla.
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  44. Stephan Hartmann, Gabriella Pigozzi & Jan Sprenger (2010). Reliable Methods of Judgment Aggregation. Journal for Logic and Computation 20:603--617.
    The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on the same propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to such a problem as the \textit{discursive dilemma}. In this paper we assume that the decision which the group is trying to reach is factually right or wrong. Hence, we address the question of how good (...)
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  45. Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger (2012). Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth. Synthese 187 (1):209-221.
    The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to that problem as the discursive dilemma. In this paper, we motivate that many groups do not only want to reach a factually right conclusion, but also want to correctly evaluate the reasons for that conclusion. In (...)
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  46. Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger (2012). Judgment Aggregation and the Problem of Tracking the Truth. Synthese 187 (1):209-221.
    The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. In this paper, we motivate that quite often, we do not only want to make a factually right decision, but also to correctly evaluate the reasons for that decision. In other words, we address the problem of tracking the truth. We set up (...)
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  47. James Hawthorne, Voting in Search of the Public Good: The Probabilistic Logic of Majority Judgments.
    I argue for an epistemic conception of voting, a conception on which the purpose of the ballot is at least in some cases to identify which of several policy proposals will best promote the public good. To support this view I first briefly investigate several notions of the kind of public good that public policy should promote. Then I examine the probability logic of voting as embodied in two very robust versions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem and some related results. (...)
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  48. Frank Hindriks (2009). Corporate Responsibility and Judgment Aggregation. Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):161-177.
    Paradoxical results concerning judgment aggregation have recently been invoked to defend the thesis that a corporate agent can be morally responsible for a decision without any of its individual members bearing such responsibility. I contend that the arguments offered for this irreducibility thesis are inconclusive. They do not pay enough attention to how we evaluate individual moral responsibility, in particular not to the role that a flawed assessment of the normative reasons that bear on the issue to be decided on (...)
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  49. Srecko Kovac (2012). Logical Opposition and Collective Decisions. In Jean-Yves Béziau & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition. Springer. 341--356.
    The square of opposition (as part of a lattice) is used as a natural way to represent different and opposite ways of who makes decisions, and in what way, in/for a group or a society. Majority logic is characterized by multiple logical squares (one for each possible majority), with the “discursive dilemma” as a consequence. Three-valued logics of majority decisions with discursive dilemma undecided, of veto, consensus, and sequential voting are analyzed from the semantic point of view. For instance, the (...)
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  50. Christian List, When to Defer to Supermajority Testimony — and When Not.
    Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. Here I identify the conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and those under which it does not. I also introduce the new concept of ‘consistency of degree k’, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only ‘blatant’ (...)
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