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  1. Marcia Baron (2005). Is Justification (Somehow) Prior to Excuse? A Reply to Douglas Husak. Law and Philosophy 24 (6):595-609.
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  2. Matthew L. Baum (2013). The Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) Genetic Predisposition to Impulsive Violence: Is It Relevant to Criminal Trials? Neuroethics 6 (2):287-306.
    In Italy, a judge reduced the sentence of a defendant by 1 year in response to evidence for a genetic predisposition to violence. The best characterized of these genetic differences, those in the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), were cited as especially relevant. Several months previously in the USA, MAOA data contributed to a jury reducing charges from 1st degree murder (a capital offence) to voluntary manslaughter. Is there a rational basis for this type of use of MAOA evidence in criminal (...)
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  3. Andrew Botterell (2007). Why We Ought to Be (Reasonable) Subjectivists About Justification. Criminal Justice Ethics 26 (1):36-58.
    My aim in this paper is to argue that justification should not be conceived of in purely objective terms. In arguing for that conclusion I focus in particular on Paul Robinson’s presentation of that position, since it is the most sophisticated defense of the objective account of justification in the literature. My main point will be that the distinction drawn by robinson between objective and subjective accounts of justification is problematic, and that careful attention to the role played by reasonableness (...)
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  4. Stuart Henry & Dena Plemmons (2012). Neuroscience, Neuropolitics and Neuroethics: The Complex Case of Crime, Deception and fMRI. Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (3):573-591.
    Scientific developments take place in a socio-political context but scientists often ignore the ways their innovations will be both interpreted by the media and used by policy makers. In the rush to neuroscientific discovery important questions are overlooked, such as the ways: (1) the brain, environment and behavior are related; (2) biological changes are mediated by social organization; (3) institutional bias in the application of technical procedures ignores race, class and gender dimensions of society; (4) knowledge is used to the (...)
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  5. William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd (2014). Ethics and the Brains of Psychopaths: The Significance of Psychopathy for Our Ethical and Legal Theories. In Charles Wolfe (ed.), Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy. Springer. 149-170.
    The emerging neuroscience of psychopathy will have several important implications for our attempts to construct an ethical society. In this article we begin by describing the list of criteria by which psychopaths are diagnosed. We then review four competing neuropsychological theories of psychopathic cognition. The first of these models, Newman’s attentional model, locates the problem in a special type of attentional narrowing that psychopaths have shown in experiments. The second and third, Blair’s amygdala model and Kiehl’s paralimbic model represent the (...)
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  6. Matthew Lister (2010). Review of May & Hoskins, International Criminal Law and Philosophy. [REVIEW] Concurring Opinions Blog.
    This is a review of an anthology on international criminal law edited by Larry May and Zack Hoskins.
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  7. Steve Matthews (2004). Failed Agency and the Insanity Defence. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27:413-424.
    In this article I argue that insanity defences such as M’Nagten should be abolished in favour of a defence of failed agency. It is not insanity per se, or any other empirical condition, which constitutes the moral reason for exculpation. Rather, we should first recognize the conditions for being a responsible moral agent. These include some capacity to direct and control one’s behavior, a non-delusional component, and the capacity to recognize that one’s behavior is expressive of what they have reason (...)
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  8. Thomas Søbirk Petersen (2010). New Legal Moralism: Some Strengths and Challenges. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2):215-232.
    The aim of this paper is to critically discuss the plausibility of legal moralism with an emphasis on some central and recent versions. First, this paper puts forward and defends the thesis that recently developed varieties of legal moralism promoted by Robert P. George, John Kekes and Michael Moore are more plausible than Lord Devlin's traditional account. The main argument for this thesis is that in its more modern versions legal moralism is immune to some of the forceful challenges made (...)
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  9. C. G. Pulman (ed.) (2014). Hart on Responsibility. Palgrave Macmillan.
  10. C. G. Pulman (2014). 'Introduction'. In , Hart on Responsibility. Palgrave Macmillan.
  11. Re'em Segev (forthcoming). Moral Rightness and the Significance of Law: Why, How and When Mistake of Law Matters. University of Toronto Law Journal, Forthcoming.
    The question of whether a mistake of law should negate or mitigate criminal liability is commonly considered to be pertinent to the culpability of the agent, often examined in light of the (epistemic) reasonableness of the mistake. I argue that this view disregards an important aspect of this question, namely whether a mistake of law affects the rightness of the action, particularly in light of the moral significance of the mistake. I argue that several plausible premises, regarding moral rightness under (...)
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  12. Re'em Segev (2009). Sub-Optimal Justification and Justificatory Defenses. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):57-76.
    Justificatory defenses apply to actions that are generally wrong and illegal—mainly since they harm people—when they are (exceptionally) justified—usually since they prevent (more serious) harm to others. A strict conception of justification limits justificatory defenses to actions that reflect all pertinent principles in the optimal manner. A more relaxed conception of justification applies (also) to actions that do not reflect all pertinent principles optimally due to (unjustified) mistake but are not too far from this optimum. In the paper, I consider (...)
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  13. Re'em Segev (2008). The Distributive Justice Theory of Self-Defense: A Response to Whitley Kaufman. Ethics and International Affairs 22 (1).
    In several papers, I have argued for a theory of distributive justice and considered its implications. This theory includes a principle of responsibility that was endorsed by others within an account of defensive force (self-defense and defense of others). Whitley Kaufman criticizes this account which he refers to as the "distributive justice theory of self-defense" (DJ theory). In this paper, I respond to this criticism. I argue that Kaufman presents the theory inaccurately, that his standard of evaluation of the theory (...)
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  14. Re'em Segev (2006). Justification, Rationality and Mistake: Mistake of Law is No Excuse? It Might Be a Justificaton! [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 25 (1):31-79.
    According to a famous maxim, ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse. This maxim is supposed to represent both the standard and the proper rule of law. In fact, this maxim should be qualified in both respects: ignorance and mistake of law sometimes are, and (perhaps even more often) should be, excused. But this dual qualification only reinforces the fundamental and ubiquitous assumption which underlies the discussions of the subject, namely, that the only ground of exculpation relevant to ignorance (...)
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  15. Kenneth Simons (2011). When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable? Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):97-114.
    Doug Husak suggests that sometimes an actor should be deemed reckless, and not merely negligent, with respect to the risks that she knowingly created but has forgotten at the moment of action. The validity of this conclusion, he points out, depends crucially on what it means to be aware of a risk. Husak’s neutral prompt and counterfactual actual belief criteria are problematic, however. More persuasive is his suggestion that we understand belief, in this moral and criminal law context, as a (...)
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  16. François Tanguay-Renaud (forthcoming). Puzzling About State Excuses as an Instance of Group Excuses. In R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. Marshall & V. Tadros (eds.), The Constitution of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press.
    Can the state, as opposed to its individual human members in their personal capacity, intelligibly seek to avoid blame for unjustified wrongdoing by invoking excuses (as opposed to justifications)? Insofar as it can, should such claims ever be given moral and legal recognition? While a number of theorists have denied it in passing, the question remains radically underexplored. -/- In this article (in its penultimate draft version), I seek to identify the main metaphysical and moral objections to state excuses, and (...)
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  17. François Tanguay-Renaud (2012). Individual Emergencies and the Rule of Criminal Law. In François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos (eds.), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law. Hart Publishing.
  18. François Tanguay-Renaud (2010). Understanding Criminal Law Through the Lens of Reason. Res Publica 16 (1):89-98.
    This is a review essay of Gardner, John. 2007, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 288 pp.
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  19. Lucinda Vandervort (2001). Mistake of Law and Obstruction of Justice: A 'Bad Excuse' ... Even for a Lawyer! University of New Brunswick Law Journal 50: 171-186.
    In Regina v. Murray, (2000, Ont S.Ct.J.) the learned trial judge, Justice Gravely, errs in his interpretation and application of the law of mens rea in the offense of willfully attempting to obstruct justice under section 139(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada. In view of his findings of fact and law, including the determination that the accused knowingly and intentionally committed the actus reus of the offense and the absence of any suggestion that he lacked awareness of any relevant (...)
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  20. Nicole A. Vincent (2011). Legal Responsibility Adjudication and the Normative Authority of the Mind Sciences. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):315-331.
    In the field of ?neurolaw?, reformists claim that recent scientific discoveries from the mind sciences have serious ramifications for how legal responsibility should be adjudicated, but conservatives deny that this is so. In contrast, I criticise both of these polar opposite positions by arguing that although scientific findings can have often-weighty normative significance, they lack the normative authority with which reformists often imbue them. After explaining why conservatives and reformists are both wrong, I then offer my own moderate suggestions about (...)
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  21. Gideon Yaffe (2009). Excusing Mistakes of Law. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (2):1-22.
    Whether we understand it descriptively or normatively, the slogan that ignorance of the law is no excuse is false. Our legal system sometimes excuses those who are ignorant of the law on those grounds and should. Still, the slogan contains a grain of truth; mistakes of law excuse less readily than mistakes of fact, and ought to. This paper explains the asymmetry by identifying a principle of excuse of the form “If defendant D has a false belief that p and (...)
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