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  1. L. Alexander (2001). Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law. Law and Philosophy 20 (6):617-635.
  2. Marcia Baron (2005). Is Justification (Somehow) Prior to Excuse? A Reply to Douglas Husak. Law and Philosophy 24 (6):595-609.
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  3. Matthew L. Baum (2013). The Monoamine Oxidase A (MAOA) Genetic Predisposition to Impulsive Violence: Is It Relevant to Criminal Trials? Neuroethics 6 (2):287-306.
    In Italy, a judge reduced the sentence of a defendant by 1 year in response to evidence for a genetic predisposition to violence. The best characterized of these genetic differences, those in the monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), were cited as especially relevant. Several months previously in the USA, MAOA data contributed to a jury reducing charges from 1st degree murder (a capital offence) to voluntary manslaughter. Is there a rational basis for this type of use of MAOA evidence in criminal (...)
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  4. Andrew Botterell (2007). Why We Ought to Be (Reasonable) Subjectivists About Justification. Criminal Justice Ethics 26 (1):36-58.
    My aim in this paper is to argue that justification should not be conceived of in purely objective terms. In arguing for that conclusion I focus in particular on Paul Robinson’s presentation of that position, since it is the most sophisticated defense of the objective account of justification in the literature. My main point will be that the distinction drawn by robinson between objective and subjective accounts of justification is problematic, and that careful attention to the role played by reasonableness (...)
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  5. Thom Brooks (2003). Choosing Correct Punishments. Archives de Philosophie du Droit 47:365-369.
  6. Thom Brooks, Moral Sentiments and the Justification of Punishment.
  7. Alexander A. Guerrero (2015). Deliberation, Responsibility, and Excusing Mistakes of Law. Jurisprudence 6 (1):81-94.
  8. William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd (2014). Ethics and the Brains of Psychopaths: The Significance of Psychopathy for Our Ethical and Legal Theories. In Charles Wolfe (ed.), Brain Theory: Essays in Critical Neurophilosophy. Springer 149-170.
    The emerging neuroscience of psychopathy will have several important implications for our attempts to construct an ethical society. In this article we begin by describing the list of criteria by which psychopaths are diagnosed. We then review four competing neuropsychological theories of psychopathic cognition. The first of these models, Newman’s attentional model, locates the problem in a special type of attentional narrowing that psychopaths have shown in experiments. The second and third, Blair’s amygdala model and Kiehl’s paralimbic model represent the (...)
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  9. Andrew Ingram (2015). The Good, the Bad, and the Klutzy: Criminal Negligence and Moral Concern. Criminal Justice Ethics 34 (1):87-115.
    One proposed way of preserving the link between criminal negligence and blameworthiness is to define criminal negligence in moral terms. On this view, a person can be held criminally responsible for a negligent act if her negligence reflects a deficit of moral concern. Some theorists are convinced that this definition restores the link between negligence and blameworthiness, while others insist that criminal negligence remains suspect. This article contributes to the discussion by applying the work of ethicist Nomy Arpaly to criminal (...)
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  10. Andrew Ingram (2012). Parsing the Reasonable Person: The Case of Self-Defense. American Journal of Criminal Law 39 (3):101-120.
    Mistakes are a fact of life, and the criminal law is sadly no exception to the rule. Wrongful convictions are rightfully abhorred, and false acquittals can likewise inspire outrage. In these cases, we implicitly draw a distinction between a court’s finding and a defendant’s actual guilt or innocence. These are intuitive concepts, but as this paper aims to show, contemporary use of the reasonable person standard in the law of self-defense muddles them. -/- Ordinarily, we can distinguish between a person's (...)
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  11. Ken Levy (2014). Why Retributivism Needs Consequentialism: The Rightful Place of Revenge in the Criminal Justice System. Rutgers Law Review 66:629-684.
    Consider the reaction of Trayvon Martin’s family to the jury verdict. They were devastated that George Zimmerman, the defendant, was found not guilty of manslaughter or murder. Whatever the merits of this outcome, what does the Martin family’s emotional reaction mean? What does it say about criminal punishment – especially the reasons why we punish? Why did the Martin family want to see George Zimmerman go to jail? And why were – and are – they so upset that he didn’t? (...)
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  12. Matthew Lister (2010). Review of May & Hoskins, International Criminal Law and Philosophy. [REVIEW] Concurring Opinions Blog.
    This is a review of an anthology on international criminal law edited by Larry May and Zack Hoskins.
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  13. Matthew Matravers & Arina Cocoru (2014). Revisiting the Hart/Wootton Debate on Responsibility. In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility.
  14. Steve Matthews (2004). Failed Agency and the Insanity Defence. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 27:413-424.
    In this article I argue that insanity defences such as M’Nagten should be abolished in favour of a defence of failed agency. It is not insanity per se, or any other empirical condition, which constitutes the moral reason for exculpation. Rather, we should first recognize the conditions for being a responsible moral agent. These include some capacity to direct and control one’s behavior, a non-delusional component, and the capacity to recognize that one’s behavior is expressive of what they have reason (...)
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  15. Erasmus Mayr (2014). Hart, Punishment and Excusing Conditions. In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility.
  16. Thomas Søbirk Petersen (2010). New Legal Moralism: Some Strengths and Challenges. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2):215-232.
    The aim of this paper is to critically discuss the plausibility of legal moralism with an emphasis on some central and recent versions. First, this paper puts forward and defends the thesis that recently developed varieties of legal moralism promoted by Robert P. George, John Kekes and Michael Moore are more plausible than Lord Devlin's traditional account. The main argument for this thesis is that in its more modern versions legal moralism is immune to some of the forceful challenges made (...)
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  17. C. G. Pulman (ed.) (2014). Hart on Responsibility. Palgrave Macmillan.
  18. C. G. Pulman (2014). 'Introduction'. In Hart on Responsibility. Palgrave Macmillan
  19. Re'em Segev (2014). Moral Rightness and the Significance of Law: Why, How and When Mistake of Law Matters. University of Toronto Law Journal, Forthcoming 64:36-63.
    The question of whether a mistake of law should negate or mitigate criminal liability is commonly considered to be pertinent to the culpability of the agent, often examined in light of the (epistemic) reasonableness of the mistake. I argue that this view disregards an important aspect of this question, namely whether a mistake of law affects the rightness of the action, particularly in light of the moral significance of the mistake. I argue that several plausible premises, regarding moral rightness under (...)
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  20. Re'em Segev (2008). Online Exclusive: Response To Whitley Kaufman: The Distributive Justice Theory Of Self-Defense. Ethics & International Affairs 22.
    Segev argues for a theory of distributive justice and considers its implications. This theory includes a principle of responsibility that was endorsed by others within an account of defensive force. Kaufman criticizes this account, which he refers to as the "distributive justice theory of self- defense ". In this paper, Segev responds to this criticism.
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  21. Re'em Segev (2008). The Distributive Justice Theory of Self-Defense: A Response to Whitley Kaufman. Ethics and International Affairs 22 (1).
    In several papers, I have argued for a theory of distributive justice and considered its implications. This theory includes a principle of responsibility that was endorsed by others within an account of defensive force (self-defense and defense of others). Whitley Kaufman criticizes this account which he refers to as the "distributive justice theory of self-defense" (DJ theory). In this paper, I respond to this criticism. I argue that Kaufman presents the theory inaccurately, that his standard of evaluation of the theory (...)
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  22. Re'em Segev (2006). Justification, Rationality and Mistake: Mistake of Law is No Excuse? It Might Be a Justificaton! Law and Philosophy 25 (1):31-79.
    According to a famous maxim, ignorance or mistake of law is no excuse. This maxim is supposed to represent both the standard and the proper rule of law. In fact, this maxim should be qualified in both respects: ignorance and mistake of law sometimes are, and (perhaps even more often) should be, excused. But this dual qualification only reinforces the fundamental and ubiquitous assumption which underlies the discussions of the subject, namely, that the only ground of exculpation relevant to ignorance (...)
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  23. Re’em Segev (2010). Sub-Optimal Justification and Justificatory Defenses. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):57-76.
    Justificatory defenses apply to actions that are generally wrong and illegal—mainly since they harm people—when they are justified—usually since they prevent harm to others. A strict conception of justification limits justificatory defenses to actions that reflect all pertinent principles in the optimal manner. A more relaxed conception of justification applies to actions that do not reflect all pertinent principles optimally due to mistake but are not too far from this optimum. In the paper, I consider whether justificatory defenses should reflect (...)
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  24. Kenneth Simons (2011). When is Negligent Inadvertence Culpable? Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):97-114.
    Doug Husak suggests that sometimes an actor should be deemed reckless, and not merely negligent, with respect to the risks that she knowingly created but has forgotten at the moment of action. The validity of this conclusion, he points out, depends crucially on what it means to be aware of a risk. Husak’s neutral prompt and counterfactual actual belief criteria are problematic, however. More persuasive is his suggestion that we understand belief, in this moral and criminal law context, as a (...)
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  25. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Ken Levy (2011). Insanity Defenses. In John Deigh & David Dolinko (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of the Criminal Law. Oxford University Press 299--334.
    We explicate and evaluate arguments both for and against the insanity defense itself, different versions of the insanity defense (M'Naghten, Model Penal Code, and Durham (or Product)), the Irresistible Impulse rule, and various reform proposals.
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  26. Uwe Steinhoff, Self-Defense and Imminence.
    This paper argues that there is a significant moral difference between force applied against (imminent) attackers on the one hand and force applied against “threatening” people who are not (imminent) attackers on the other. Given that there is such a difference, one should not blur the lines by using the term “self-defense” (understood as including other-defense) for both uses of force. Rather, only the former is appropriately called self-defense, while for the latter, following German legal terminology, the term “justifying defensive (...)
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  27. Uwe Steinhoff, Self-Defense and the Necessity Condition.
    Rights forfeiture or liability are not a path to the permissibility of self-defense (not even barring extraordinary circumstances), and the necessity condition is not intrinsic to justified self-defense. Rather, necessity in the context of justification must be distinguished from necessity in the context of rights forfeiture. While innocent aggressors only forfeit their right against necessary self-defense, culpable aggressors also forfeit, on grounds of a principle of reciprocity, certain rights against unnecessary self-defense. Yet, while culpable aggressors would therefore not be wronged (...)
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  28. Uwe Steinhoff, Shortcomings of and Alternatives to the Rights-Forfeiture Theory of Justified Self-Defense and Punishment.
    I argue that rights-forfeiture by itself is no path to permissibility at all (even barring special circumstances), neither in the case of self-defense nor in the case of punishment. The limiting conditions of self-defense, for instance – necessity, proportionality (or no gross disproportionality), and the subjective element – are different in the context of forfeiture than in the context of justification (and might even be absent in the former context). In particular, I argue that a culpable aggressor, unlike an innocent (...)
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  29. Uwe Steinhoff (2016). When May Soldiers Participate in War? International Theory 8 (2):262-296.
    I shall argue that in some wars both sides are (as a collective) justified, that is, they can both satisfy valid jus ad bellum requirements. Moreover, in some wars – but not in all – the individual soldiers on the unjustified side (that is, on the side without jus ad bellum) may nevertheless kill soldiers (and also civilians as a side-effect) on the justified side, even if the enemy soldiers always abide by jus in bello constraints. Traditional just war theory (...)
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  30. François Tanguay-Renaud (forthcoming). Puzzling About State Excuses as an Instance of Group Excuses. In R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. Marshall & V. Tadros (eds.), The Constitution of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press
    Can the state, as opposed to its individual human members in their personal capacity, intelligibly seek to avoid blame for unjustified wrongdoing by invoking excuses (as opposed to justifications)? Insofar as it can, should such claims ever be given moral and legal recognition? While a number of theorists have denied it in passing, the question remains radically underexplored. -/- In this article (in its penultimate draft version), I seek to identify the main metaphysical and moral objections to state excuses, and (...)
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  31. François Tanguay-Renaud (2012). Individual Emergencies and the Rule of Criminal Law. In François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos (eds.), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law. Hart Publishing
  32. François Tanguay-Renaud (2010). Understanding Criminal Law Through the Lens of Reason. Res Publica 16 (1):89-98.
    This is a review essay of Gardner, John. 2007, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 288 pp.
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  33. Malcolm Thorburn (2008). Justifications, Powers, and Authority. Yale Law Journal 117:1070.
    Criminal law theory made a significant advance roughly thirty years ago when George Fletcher popularized the important conceptual distinction between justifications and excuses. In the intervening years, however, very little progress has been made in exploring the structure and function of justification defenses. The reason for this failure, I suggest, is a widely shared misconception about their place within the criminal law’s institutional structure. Contrary to what is generally believed, it is not up to trial courts to decide ex post (...)
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  34. Lucinda Vandervort (2001). Mistake of Law and Obstruction of Justice: A 'Bad Excuse' ... Even for a Lawyer! University of New Brunswick Law Journal 50: 171-186.
    In Regina v. Murray, (2000, Ont S.Ct.J.) the learned trial judge, Justice Gravely, errs in his interpretation and application of the law of mens rea in the offense of willfully attempting to obstruct justice under section 139(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada. In view of his findings of fact and law, including the determination that the accused knowingly and intentionally committed the actus reus of the offense and the absence of any suggestion that he lacked awareness of any relevant (...)
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  35. Nicole A. Vincent (2011). Legal Responsibility Adjudication and the Normative Authority of the Mind Sciences. Philosophical Explorations 14 (3):315-331.
    In the field of ?neurolaw?, reformists claim that recent scientific discoveries from the mind sciences have serious ramifications for how legal responsibility should be adjudicated, but conservatives deny that this is so. In contrast, I criticise both of these polar opposite positions by arguing that although scientific findings can have often-weighty normative significance, they lack the normative authority with which reformists often imbue them. After explaining why conservatives and reformists are both wrong, I then offer my own moderate suggestions about (...)
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  36. Gideon Yaffe (2009). Excusing Mistakes of Law. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (2):1-22.
    Whether we understand it descriptively or normatively, the slogan that ignorance of the law is no excuse is false. Our legal system sometimes excuses those who are ignorant of the law on those grounds and should. Still, the slogan contains a grain of truth; mistakes of law excuse less readily than mistakes of fact, and ought to. This paper explains the asymmetry by identifying a principle of excuse of the form “If defendant D has a false belief that p and (...)
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  37. Radosław Zyzik (2012). Genetyka Behawioralna Na Sali Sądowej [Behavioral Genetics in the Courtroom]. Forum Prawnicze 3 (11):27-42.
    W artykule została postawiona teza, że bezpośrednie wykorzystanie osiągnięć genetyki behawioralnej w naukach prawnych jest przedwczesne i wątpliwe pod względem metodologicznym. Struktura artykułu przedstawia się następująco. W pierwszej kolejność zaprezentowane zostały sprawy, w których genetyka behawioralna została wykorzystana (Bayout, Stefani, Landrigan). W kolejnym kroku możliwe sposoby pojawienia się tego typu dowodów w procesach karnych (np. wina, złagodzenie kary) są analizowane i krytycznie omawiane. Ostatnie dwie części artykułu poświęcone zostały analizie badań genetycznych mającej na celu ustalenie związku pomiędzy genami a zachowaniem. (...)
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