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Summary The problem of induction arises due to our apparent inability to justify our use of inductive inference in a non-circular manner.  The inductive skeptic takes the view that it is impossible to justify beliefs arrived at on the basis of inductive inference.  A wide variety of attempts have been made to resolve the problem of induction, usually by proposing justifications of induction.  Attempted justifications of induction include pragmatic, inductive and analytic justifications, as well as Popper's suggestion that the problem of induction may be bypassed since the rational acceptance of theory does not require use of inductive inference.
Key works For the pragmatic justification of induction, see Reichenbach 1938 and Rescher 1973.  A recent version of the inductive justification may be found in Papineau 1992.  The classic source for the analytic justification is Strawson 1952.  Nelson Goodman attempts to shift the ground by replacing the problem of induction with the so-called new riddle of induction Goodman 1954.  For Karl Popper's approach, see Popper 1989.  A naturalistic attempt to justify induction may be found in Kornblith 1993. An important recent approach is John Norton's material theory of induction Norton 2003.
Introductions Salmon 1967; Skyrms 1966, Skyrms 1975 and more recent editions; Vickers 2008.
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  1. L. A. (1971). The Implications of Induction. Review of Metaphysics 25 (2):350-351.
  2. Günter Abel (ed.) (2005). Kreativität. Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin.
  3. Peter Achinstein (2010). Induction and Severe Testing. In Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (eds.), Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science. Cambridge University Press. 170.
  4. Mario Alai (2009). The" No Miracles" Justification of Induction. Epistemologia 32 (2):303.
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  5. Peter Anstey (1995). Thomas Reid and the Justification of Induction. History of Philosophy Quarterly 12 (1):77 - 93.
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  6. Gary Atkinson (1973). Rationality and Induction. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):93-100.
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  7. Matthias Baaz & Georg Moser (2006). Herbrand's Theorem and Term Induction. Archive for Mathematical Logic 45 (4):447-503.
    We study the formal first order system TIND in the standard language of Gentzen's LK . TIND extends LK by the purely logical rule of term-induction, that is a restricted induction principle, deriving numerals instead of arbitrary terms. This rule may be conceived as the logical image of full induction.
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  8. Francis Bacon (1662). De Augmentis Scientiarum Lib. Ix. Sumptibus Joannis Ravesteinii.
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  9. Davis Baird (1988). The Rationality of Induction. Review of Metaphysics 42 (2):411-413.
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  10. Greg Bamford (1989). Watkins and the Pragmatic Problem of Induction. Analysis 49 (4):203 - 205..
    Watkins proposes a neo-Popperian solution to the pragmatic problem of induction. He asserts that evidence can be used non-Inductively to prefer the principle that corroboration is more successful over all human history than that, Say, Counter-Corroboration is more successful either over this same period or in the future. Watkins's argument for rejecting the first counter-Corroborationist alternative is beside the point, However, As whatever is the best strategy over all human history is irrelevant to the pragmatic problem of induction since we (...)
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  11. Jared Bates (2005). The Old Problem of Induction and the New Reflective Equilibrium. Dialectica 59 (3):347–356.
    In 1955, Goodman set out to 'dissolve' the problem of induction, that is, to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudoproblem not worthy of serious philosophical attention. I will argue that, under naturalistic views of the reflective equilibrium method, it cannot provide a basis for a dissolution of the problem of induction. This is because naturalized reflective equilibrium is -- in a way to be explained -- itself an inductive method, and thus renders Goodman's dissolution viciously (...)
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  12. Tom L. Beauchamp & Thomas A. Mappes (1975). Is Hume Really a Sceptic About Induction? American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (2):119 - 129.
  13. James Beebe (2008). Can Rationalist Abductivism Solve the Problem of Induction? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):151-168.
    Abstract: According to Laurence BonJour, the problem of induction can be solved by recognizing the a priori necessity that inductive conclusions constitute the best explanations of inductive premises. I defend an interpretation of the key probability claims BonJour makes about inductive premises and show that they are not susceptible to many of the objections that have been lodged against them. I then argue that these purportedly necessary probability claims nevertheless remain deeply problematic and that, as a result, BonJour's proposal fails (...)
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  14. John Bigelow & Robert Pargetter (1997). The Validation of Induction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):62 – 76.
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  15. Paolo C. Biondi & Louis F. Groarke (2014). Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Perspectives on Induction. De Gruyter.
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  16. M. Black (1969). Some Half-Baked Thoughts About Induction. In Ernest Nagel, Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Morton Gabriel White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method. New York, St. Martin's Press.
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  17. Robert Black (1990). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability. Philosophical Books 31 (1):57-59.
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  18. Chen Bo (2012). Justification of Induction: Russell and Jin Yuelin. A Comparative Study. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (4):353-378.
    Jin Yuelin (1895?1984), a Chinese logician and philosopher, is greatly influenced by Hume's and Russell's philosophies. How should we respond to Hume's problem of induction? This is an important clue to understand Jin's whole philosophical career. The first section of this paper gives a brief historical review of Russell and Jin. The second section outlines Hume's skeptical arguments against causality and induction. The third section expounds Russell's justification of induction by discussing his views on Hume's skepticism, causality, principle of induction, (...)
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  19. George Botterill (1987). The Rationality of Induction. Philosophical Books 28 (3):189-192.
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  20. Stephen J. Boulter (2002). Hume on Induction: A Genuine Problem or Theology's Trojan Horse? Philosophy 77 (1):67-86.
    In this paper I offer a straight solution to Hume's problem of induction by defusing the assumptions on which it is based. I argue that Hume's problem only arises if we accept (i) that there is no necessity but logical necessity, or (ii) that it is unreasonable to believe that there is any form of necessity in addition to logical necessity. I show that Hume's arguments in favour of (i) and (ii) are unsound. I then offer a suggestion as to (...)
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  21. R. Braithewaite (1974). The Predictionist Justification of Induction. In Richard Swinburne (ed.), The Justification of Induction. New York]Oxford University Press. 102--26.
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  22. Anthony Brueckner (2001). BonJour's a Priori Justification of Induction. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (1):1–10.
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  23. Scott Campbell & James Franklin (2004). Randomness and the Justification of Induction. Synthese 138 (1):79 - 99.
    In 1947 Donald Cary Williams claimed in The Ground of Induction to have solved the Humean problem of induction, by means of an adaptation of reasoning first advanced by Bernoulli in 1713. Later on David Stove defended and improved upon Williams’ argument in The Rational- ity of Induction (1986). We call this proposed solution of induction the ‘Williams-Stove sampling thesis’. There has been no lack of objections raised to the sampling thesis, and it has not been widely accepted. In our (...)
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  24. James Cargile (1998). The Problem of Induction. Philosophy 73 (2):247-275.
    No one doubts that philosophers have discussed at length ‘the problem of induction’, but it would also be generally recognized that there would be disagreement as to precisely what that problem is. Rather than tackle the formulation problem, I will borrow from a popular text: Our existence as well as science itself is based on the principle of induction that tells us to reason from past frequencies to future likelihoods, from the limited known of the past and present to the (...)
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  25. Charles Cassini (2013). Is Hume's Critique of Induction Self‐Defeating? Heythrop Journal 55 (1).
  26. Philip E. Catton, The Justification(s) of Induction(S).
    Induction is ‘the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy’. I diagnose why. I call my solution a “disappearance theory of induction”: inductive inferences are not themselves arguments, but they synthesise manifold reasons that are. Yet the form of all these underlying arguments is not inductive at all, but rather deductive. Both in science and in the wider practical sphere, responsible people seek the most measured way to understand their situation. The most measured understanding possible is thick with arguments (...)
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  27. D. P. Chattopadhyaya (1991). Induction, Probability, and Skepticism. State University of New York Press.
    Chattopadhyaya (philosophy, Jadavpur U., Calcutta) examines the epistemological and methodological implications of induction and probability.
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  28. Charles S. Chihara (1985). Horwich's Justification of Induction. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):107 - 110.
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  29. F. John Clendinnen (2010). Note on Howard Sankey's "Induction and Natural Kinds". Principia 2 (1):125-134.
    Note on Howard Sankey's "Induction and Natural Kinds".
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  30. F. John Clendinnen (1966). Induction and Objectivity. Philosophy of Science 33 (3):215-229.
    This paper is an attempt at a vindication of induction. The point of departure is that induction requires a justification and that the only kind of justification possible is a vindication. However traditional vindications of induction have rested on unjustified assumptions about the aim of induction. This vindication takes the end pursued in induction simply to be correct prediction. It is argued that induction is the only reasonable way of pursuing this end because induction is the only objective method of (...)
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  31. Andrew D. Cling (1988). The Rationality of Induction. By D. C. Stove. Modern Schoolman 65 (4):292-294.
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  32. Robert C. Coburn (1961). Braithwaite's Inductive Justification of Induction. Philosophy of Science 28 (1):65-71.
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  33. Albert C. Cornsweet (1941). Induction and Recovery Sequence After Anesthetization IV. Pure Gasoline. Journal of Experimental Psychology 29 (1):58.
  34. Newton C. A. Costa & Steven French (1991). On Russell's Principle of Induction. Synthese 86 (2):285-295.
    An improvement on Horwich's so-called pseudo-proof of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.
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  35. Anthony M. Coyne (1984). Introduction to Inductive Reasoning. University Press of America.
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  36. Isabel P. Creed (1940). The Justification of the Habit of Induction. Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):85-97.
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  37. M. A. Cunningham (1939). The Justification of Induction. Analysis 7 (1):13 - 19.
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  38. Newton C. A. da Costa & Steven French (1991). On Russell's Principle of Induction. Synthese 86 (2):285 - 295.
    An improvement on Horwich's so-called "pseudo-proof" of Russell's principle of induction is offered, which, we believe, avoids certain objections to the former. Although strictly independent of our other work in this area, a connection can be made and in the final section we comment on this and certain questions regarding rationality, etc.
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  39. Niels H. de V. Heathcote (1965). N. J. Callan Inventor of the Induction Coil. Annals of Science 21 (3):145-167.
  40. Steffen Ducheyne (2008). Some Worries for Norton's Material Theory of Induction. Philosophia Naturalis 45 (1):37-46.
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  41. Brian Ellis (2010). An Essentialist Perspective on the Problem of Induction. Principia 2 (1):103-124.
    If one believes, as Hume did, that all events are loose and separate, then the problem of induction is probably insoluble. Anything could happen. But if one thinks, as scientific essentialists do, that the laws of nature are immanent in the world, and depend on the essential natures of things, then there are strong constraints on what could possibly happen. Given these constraints, the problem of induction may be soluble. For these constraints greatly strengthen the case for conceptual and theoretical (...)
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  42. Brian Ellis (1988). Solving the Problem of Induction Using a Values-Based Epistemology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (2):141-160.
  43. Patrícia Engrácia (2012). The Bounded Functional Interpretation of Bar Induction. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 163 (9):1183-1195.
  44. Theodore J. Everett (2010). Observation and Induction. Logos and Episteme 1 (2):303-324.
    This article offers a simple technical resolution to the problem of induction, which is to say that general facts are not always inferred from observations of particular facts, but are themselves sometimes defeasibly observed. The article suggests a holistic account of observation that allows for general statements in empirical theories to be interpreted as observation reports, in place of the common but arguably obsolete idea that observations are exclusively particular. Predictions and other particular statements about unobservable facts can then appear (...)
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  45. N. Everitt (2002). HOWSON, C.-Hume's Problem. Induction and the Justification of Belief. Philosophical Books 43 (4):306-306.
  46. Yiftach J. H. Fehige (2005). Kreativität Im Denken. Eine Kritik des Reliabilitätsarguments von John D. Norton Gegen Rationalistische Epistemologien Zur Methode des Gedankenexperiments. In Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität. Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin.
    In this paper I argue that Norton's case against Brown's rationalism about thought experiments suffers from serious shortcomings, which relate to the nature of induction.
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  47. Eliot D. Feldman (1975). L‐Σ N1 Transfinite Induction with an Application to the EHP Hierarchy. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 21 (1):463-471.
  48. L. Féraud (1949). Induction Amplifiante Et Inference Statistique. Dialectica 3 (1‐2):127-152.
    The basic assumptions in the physical theory of Brownian motion are analized and the arbitrary character of certain aspects of the current theories is emphasized. The most serious limitations of the theory arise from the fact that in the theory, the elementary processes of the individual collisions are nowhere discussed. However, it is shown that the encounters between stars under their Newtonian inverse square attractions considered in Stellar Dynamics provides, in virtue of the peculiar character of inverse square forces, a (...)
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  49. Gerard T. Ferrari (1986). The Resolution of Hume's Problem, and New Russellian Antinomies of Induction, Determinism, Relativism, and Skepticism. Philosophy Research Archives 12:471-517.
    A necessary refinement of the concept of circular reasoning is applied to the self-and-universally-referential inductive justification of induction. It is noted that the assumption necessary for the circular proof of a principle of induction is that one inference is valid, not that the entire principle or rule of induction governing that inference is true. The circularity in an ideal case is demonstrated to have a value of lin where n represents the number of inferences asserted valid by the conclusion of (...)
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  50. G. Fonsegrive (1896). Généralisation et induction. Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 41:353 - 379.
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