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  1. Rolf Ahlers (2009). Review: Bondeli, Apperzeption und erfahrung: Kants transzendentale deduktion im spannungsfeld der frühen rezeption und kritik. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 475-476.
  2. Henry E. Allison (1993). Apperception and Analyticity in the B-Deduction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 44:233-252.
    This paper defends the thesis of the analyticity of the principle of apperception, as developed in the first part of the B-Deduction, against recent criticisms by Paul Guyer and Patricia Kitchen The first part presents these criticisms, the most important of which being that the analyticity thesis is incompatible with both the avowed goal of which being that the Deduction of establishing the validity of the categories and Üie account of apperception in the A-Deduction. The second part argues that Kant's (...)
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  3. Henry E. Allison (1987). Reflections on the B-Deduction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (S1):1-15.
  4. Karl Ameriks (1994). Review: Powell, Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] International Studies in Philosophy 26 (2):143-144.
  5. Karl Ameriks (1983). Kant and Guyer on Apperception. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 65 (2):174-186.
  6. Richard E. Aquila (1997). Unity of Apperception and the Division of Labour in the Transcendental Analytic. Kantian Review 1:17-52.
  7. Richard E. Aquila (1988). Self-Consciousness, Self-Determination, and Imagination in Kant. Topoi 7 (1):65-79.
    I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one's self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one's consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requires a distinction between two notions of consciousness: one (...)
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  8. Hermann Ulrich Asemissen (1959). Egologische Reflexion. Kant-Studien 50 (1-4):262-272.
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  9. Lewis Baldacchino (1980). Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness. Kant-Studien 71 (1-4):393-405.
    There is a widespread misinterpretation of kant according to which an analytic judgment is one that follows from a definition. Through a study of kant's theory of definition, And the role in knowledge that he ascribes to definition, It is shown that this is indeed a misinterpretation. Much criticism of kant's theory of analytic judgments is vitiated by substituting a modern definition of "analytic" for the one kant gave.
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  10. Gary Banham, Apperception and Spontaneity.
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  11. Manfred Baum (1989). Kant on Cosmological Apperception. International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):281-289.
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  12. José Luis Bermúdez (1994). The Unity of Apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason. European Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):213-240.
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  13. Sven Bernecker (2006). Kant on Moral Self-Awareness. Kant-Studien 97 (2):163-183.
  14. Sven Bernecker (2006). Kant zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis. Kant Studien 97 (2):163-183.
  15. Matthew Brendan Boyle (forthcoming). Kant and the Significance of Self-Consciousness. Philosophy.
    Human beings who have mastered a natural language are self-conscious creatures: they can think, and indeed speak, about themselves in the first person. This dissertation is about the significance of this capacity: what it is and what difference it makes to our minds. My thesis is that the capacity for self-consciousness is essential to rationality, the thing that sets the minds of rational creatures apart from those of mere brutes. This, I argue, is what Kant was getting at in a (...)
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  16. Daniel Breazeale (2008). Review: Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel. Lectures on German Idealism. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2):pp. 330-331.
  17. William F. Bristow (2001). Review: Keller, Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 110 (2):272-275.
  18. Andrew Brook, Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  19. Andrew Brook (2006). Kant: A Unified Representational Base for All Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 89-109.
  20. Andrew Brook (2001). Kant, Self-Awareness, and Self-Reference. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. 9--30.
  21. Andrew Brook (1994). Kant and the Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    Kant made a number of highly original discoveries about the mind - about its ability to synthesise a single, coherent representation of self and world, about the unity it must have to do so, and about the mind's awareness of itself and the semantic apparatus it uses to achieve this awareness. The past fifty years have seen intense activity in research on human cognition. Even so, Kant's discoveries have not been superseded, and some of them have not even been assimilated (...)
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  22. Richard Brown, Kant, Polysolipsism, and the Real Unity of Experience.
    The question I am interested in revolves around Kant’s notion of the unity of experience. My central claim will be that, apart from the unity of experiencings and the unity of individual substances, there is a third unity: the unity of Experience. I will argue that this third unity can be conceived of as a sort of ‘experiential space’ with the Aesthetic and Categories as dimensions. I call this ‘Euclidean Experience’ to emphasize the idea that individual experiencings have a ‘location’ (...)
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  23. Anthony L. Brueckner (1984). Transcendental Arguments II. Noûs 18 (2):197-225.
    In part I of the present work, I used the term 'Kantian transcendental argument' to refer to any argument which purports to establish that the existence of outer objects is a logically necessary condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience. In this second part, then, I examine Kantian transcendental arguments which proceed from the premise that one is the subject of widely construed self-conscious experience.
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  24. Etienne Brun-Rovet (2002). Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):495-510.
    I suggest a possible rehabilitation of Reid's philosophy of mind by a constructive use of Kant's criticisms of the common sense tradition. Kant offers two criticisms, explicitly claiming that common sense philosophy is ill directed methodologically, and implicitly rejecting Reid's view that there is direct epistemological access by introspection to the ontology of mind. Putting the two views together reveals a tension between epistemology and ontology, but the problem which Kant finds in Reid also infects his own system, as his (...)
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  25. Ralf Busse (2014). Review: Kitcher, Kant's Thinker, Transcendental Apperception: Consciousness or Self-Consciousness? [REVIEW] Kantian Review 19 (1):109-117.
    A core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to lack the theoretical resources to clearly (...)
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  26. Wolfgang Carl (1997). Apperception and Spontaneity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):147 – 163.
    The interest contemporary philosophy takes in Kant's notion of apperception is restricted to his criticism of the Cartesian Ego and to his refutation of scepticism, but there is a profound lack of concern for the notion itself and for the act of spontaneity in particular which is connected with the use of the word T. Starting from a comparison of Wittgenstein's account of this use with Kant's considerations it is argued that the latter aims at a theory of formal conditions (...)
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  27. David Carr (1977). Kant, Husserl, and the Nonempirical Ego. Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):682-690.
  28. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1990). The Role of Apperception in Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Noûs 24 (1):147-157.
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  29. Klaus Düsing (1983). Constitution and Structure of Self-Identity: Kant's Theory of Apperception and Hegel's Criticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8 (1):409-431.
  30. Corey W. Dyck (2011). A Wolff in Kant's Clothing: Christian Wolff's Influence on Kant's Accounts of Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Psychology. Philosophy Compass 6 (1):44-53.
    In attempts to come to grips with Kant’s thought, the influence of the philosophy of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) is often neglected. In this paper, I consider three topics in Kant’s philosophy of mind, broadly construed, where Wolff’s influence is particularly visible: consciousness, self-consciousness, and psychology. I argue that we can better understand Kant’s particular arguments and positions within this context, but also gain a more accurate sense of which aspects of Kant’s accounts derive from the antecedent traditions and which constitute (...)
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  31. Corey W. Dyck (2006). Empirical Consciousness Explained: Self-Affection, (Self-)Consciousness and Perception in the B Deduction. Kantian Review 11 (1):29-54.
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  32. Manfred Frank (2007). Non-Objectal Subjectivity. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):152-173.
    The immediate successors of Kant in classical German philosophy considered a subjectivity irreducible to objecthood as the core of personhood. The thesis of an irreducible subjectivity has, after the German idealists, been advocated by the phenomenological movement, as well as by analytical philosophers of self-consciousness such as Hector-Neri Castaneda and Sydney Shoemaker. Their arguments together show that self-consciousness cannot be reduced to a relation whereby a subject grasps itself as an object, but that there must be a core of subjectivity (...)
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  33. Manfred Frank (2004). Fragments of a History of the Theory of Self-Consciousness From Kant to Kierkegaard. Critical Horizons 5 (1):53-136.
    In the development of modern philosophy self-consciousness was not generally or unanimously given important consideration. This was because philosophers such as Descartes, Kant and Fichte thought it served as the highest principle from which we can 'deduce' all propositions that rightly claimed validity. However, the Romantics thought that the consideration of self-consciousness was of the highest importance even when any claim to foundationalism was abandoned. In this respect, Hölderlin and his circle, as well as Novalis and Schleiermacher, thought that self-consciousness, (...)
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  34. Karen Gloy (1991). Der Begriff des Selbstbewußtseins bei Kant. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 39 (1-6).
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  35. Garth Green (2010). The Aporia of Inner Sense: The Self-Knowledge of Reason and the Critique of Metaphysics in Kant. Brill.
  36. Patrick Grüneberg (2011). Apperzeption und idealrealistische Begründung. In Elena Ficara (ed.), Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Königshausen & Neumann. 221--230.
    Das Projekt einer Begründung der Philosophie, insbesondere der Metaphysik als Wissenschaft, verbindet sich programmatisch mit dem kritischen Werk Kants und dort mit dem Konzept der transzendentalen Apperzeption. Dieser „höchste Punkt“ bildete seinerseits auch einen der zentralen Anknüpfungspunkte nachfolgender idealistischer Entwürfe und sich daraus entwickelnder Systeme. Die nachkantische Entwicklung wird dabei häufig mit dem Rubrum einer spekulativen Überhöhung des transzendentalen Kritizismus Kants belegt. Dabei ging es Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer – um nur die prominenten Vertreter zu nennen – in erster Linie (...)
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  37. Patrick Grüneberg (2009). Wie kann die transzendentale Apperzeption ›gehaltvoll‹ werden bzw. die Rezeptivität spontan? Fichte-Studien 33:49-63.
    Das natürlich vorkommende Phänomen, das den Ausgangspunkt der vorliegenden Untersuchung ausmacht, ist das empirische Bewußtsein. Betrachtet man die Inhalte des menschlichen, empirischen Bewußtseins, dann fällt auf, daß diese grundsätzlich in zwei Klassen aufgeteilt werden können: Zum einen gibt es spontane Vorstellungen, die der Willkür des empirischen Subjekts unterliegen, etwa Phantasien, Pläne, (Handlungs)entscheidungen oder Spekulationen. Zum anderen hat das Subjekt räumlich und zeitlich strukturierte Vorstellungen, die ihm derart gegeben sind, daß es sich intentional auf Gegenstände und Prozesse innerer und äußerer Wahrnehmung (...)
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  38. Paul Guyer (2013). Review: Kitcher, Kant's Thinker; A Declaration of Interdependence. [REVIEW] European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):495-505.
  39. Paul Guyer (1987). The Failure of the B-Deduction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (S1):67-84.
  40. Paul Guyer (1980). Kant on Apperception and "A Priori" Synthesis. American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (3):205 - 212.
  41. Bryan Hall (2006). Review: Westphal, Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism. [REVIEW] Kantian Review 11 (1):127-130.
  42. Andy Hamilton (1993). Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Books 34 (1):19-21.
  43. Robert Hanna (2000). The Inner and the Outer: Kant's 'Refutation' Reconstructed. Ratio 13 (2):146–174.
  44. Robert Hanna (1992). Review: Powell, Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness. Review of Metaphysics 45 (3):631-633.
  45. R. Howell (1996). Review. Kant and the Mind. Andrew Brook. Mind 105 (419):491-495.
  46. Robert Howell (2001). Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):733-736.
  47. Robert Howell (1981). Apperception and the 1787 Transcendental Deduction. Synthese 47 (3):385 - 448.
    I examine central points in the 1787 deduction, Including the question of how kant can demonstrate his crucial claim that if I know via intuition "i", Then any element of "i"'s manifold is such that I am or can become conscious that that element is mine. I also consider the deduction's overall strategy, Kant's theory of synthesis and of our use of 'i', And some recent interpretations. See, Further, My 1981 "dialectica" transcendental-Object paper.
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  48. Paulo Jesus (2010). Le Je Pense Comme Facteur de Vérité: Adéquation, Cohérence Et Communauté Sémantique. Kant-Studien 101 (2):167-188.
  49. Paulo Jesus (2008). Poetique de L'Ipse: Etude Sur le Je Pense Kantien. Lang.
  50. Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Kant and Nietzsche on Self-Knowledge. In João Constâncio (ed.), Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity.
    Kant recognizes two distinct forms of self-knowledge: introspection, which gives us knowledge of our sensations, and apperception, which is knowledge of our own activities. Both modes of self-knowledge can go astray, and are particularly prone to being distorted be selfish motives; thus, neither is guaranteed to provide us with comprehensive self-knowledge. Nietzsche departs from Kant in arguing that these two modes of self-knowledge (1) are not distinct and (2) are far more limited than Kant acknowledges. In addition, Nietzsche departs from (...)
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