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  1. Leonardo Antonio Cisneiros Arrais (2008). Kant on Assertion and Content. In Valerio Hrsg V. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht Und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. 127-138.
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  2. Wilhelm Beimer (1919). Der phänomenologische Evidenzbegriff. Kant-Studien 23 (1-3):269-301.
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  3. Andrew Chignell (forthcoming). Knowledge, Discipline, System, Hope: The Fate of Metaphysics in the Doctrine of Method. In O'Shea James (ed.), Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press
  4. Andrew Chignell (2011). Real Repugnance and Our Ignorance of Things-in-Themselves: A Lockean Problem in Kant and Hegel. Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 7:135-159.
    Kant holds that in order to have knowledge of an object, a subject must be able to “prove” that the object is really possible—i.e., prove that there is neither logical inconsistency nor “real repugnance” between its properties. This is (usually) easy to do with respect to empirical objects, but (usually) impossible to do with respect to particular things-in-themselves. In the first section of the paper I argue that an important predecessor of Kant’s account of our ignorance of real possibility can (...)
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  5. Andrew Chignell (2010). Real Repugnance and Belief About Things-in-Themselves: A Problem and Kant's Three Solutions. In James Krueger & Benjamin Bruxvoort Lipscomb (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics. Walter DeGruyter
    Kant says that it can be rational to accept propositions on the basis of non-epistemic or broadly practical considerations, even if those propositions include “transcendental ideas” of supersensible objects. He also worries, however, about how such ideas (of freedom, the soul, noumenal grounds, God, the kingdom of ends, and things-in-themselves generally) acquire genuine positive content in the absence of an appropriate connection to intuitional experience. How can we be sure that the ideas are not empty “thought-entities (Gedankendinge)”—that is, speculative fancies (...)
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  6. Andrew Chignell (2007). Belief in Kant. Philosophical Review 116 (3):323-360.
    Most work in Kant’s epistemology focuses on what happens “upstream” from experience, prior to the formation of conscious propositional attitudes. By contrast, this essay focuses on what happens "downstream": the formation of assent (Fuerwahrhalten) in its various modes. The mode of assent that Kant calls "Belief" (Glaube) is the main topic: not only moral Belief but also "pragmatic" and "doctrinal" Belief as well. I argue that Kant’s discussion shows that we should reject standard accounts of the extent to which theoretical (...)
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  7. Andrew Chignell (2007). Kant's Concepts of Justification. Noûs 41 (1):33–63.
    An essay on Kant's theory of justification, where by “justification” is meant the evaluative concept that specifies conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence. Kant employs both epistemic and non-epistemic concepts of justification: an epistemic concept of justification sets out conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence and a candidate (if true and Gettier-immune) for knowledge. A non-epistemic concept of justification, by contrast, sets out (...)
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  8. Alix Cohen (2013). Kant on Doxastic Voluntarism and its Implications for Epistemic Responsibility. Kant Yearbook 5 (1):33-50.
    This paper sets out to show that Kant’s account of cognition can be used to defend epistemic responsibility against the double threat of either being committed to implausible versions of doxastic voluntarism, or failing to account for a sufficiently robust connection between the will and belief. To support this claim, I argue that whilst we have no direct control over our beliefs, we have two forms of indirect doxastic control that are sufficient to ground epistemic responsibility: first, the capacity to (...)
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  9. John Hawthorne & Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996). Are Beliefs About God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and Kant. Religious Studies 32 (2):233 - 258.
    The need to address our question arises from two sources, one in Kant and the other in a certain type of response to so-called Reformed epistemology. The first source consists in a tendency to distinguish theoretical beliefs from practical beliefs (commitments to the world's being a certain way versus commitments to certain pictures to live by), and to treat theistic belief as mere practical belief. We trace this tendency in Kant's corpus, and compare and contrast it with Aquinas's view and (...)
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  10. Doris Vera Hofmann (2000). Gewissheit des Fürwahrhaltens: Zur Bedeutung der Wahrheit Im Fluss des Lebens Nach Kant Und Wittgenstein. De Gruyter.
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  11. Markus Kohl (2015). Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 23 (2):301-26.
    It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (which culminates in judgments of experience) (...)
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  12. G. J. Mattey (1986). Kant's Theory of Propositional Attitudes. Kant-Studien 77 (1-4):423-440.
    Kant was among the first philosophers to recognize that modalities come in many varieties, and that there are systematic connections among them--an insight which has since been confirmed by the multitude of applications of the basic techniques of formalized modal logic. In particular, He recognized an affinity among what are now called doxastic and epistemic logics, As well as with a logic of judging which has not exact counterpart in contemporary thought. This paper will be concerned with the explication of (...)
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  13. Lawrence Pasternack (2014). Kant on Opinion: Assent, Hypothesis, and the Norms of General Applied Logic. Kant-Studien 105 (1):41-82.
    Kant identifies knowledge [Wissen], belief [Glaube], and opinion [Meinung] as our three primary modes of “holding-to-be-true” [Fürwahrhalten]. He also identifies opinion as making up the greatest part of our cognition. After a preliminary sketch of Kant’s system of propositional attitudes, this paper will explore what he says about the norms governing opinion and empirical hypotheses. The final section will turn to what, in the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere, Kant refers to as “General Applied Logic”. It concerns the “contingent (...)
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  14. Lawrence Pasternack (2014). Kant’s Touchstone of Communication and the Public Use of Reason. Society and Politics 8 (1):78-91.
    Nearly all of the work that has been done on Kant’s conception of public reason has focused on its socio-political significance. John Rawls, Onora O’Neill and others have explored its relevance to a well ordered democracy, to pluralism, to toleration, and so on. However, the relevance of public reason for Kant is not limited to the socio-political. Kant repeatedly appeals to the “touchstone of communication” in relation to the normative side of his epistemology. The purpose of this paper is to (...)
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  15. Leslie Stevenson (2004). Freedom of Judgement in Descartes, Hume, Spinoza and Kant. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (2):223 – 246.
    Is our judgement of the truth-value of propositions subject to the will? Do we have any voluntary control over the formation of our beliefs – and if so, how does it compare with the control we have over our actions? These questions lead into interestingly unclear philosophical and psychological territory which remains a focus of debate today. I will first examine the classic early modern discussions in Descartes, Spinoza and Hume. Then I will review some relevant themes in Kant, including (...)
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  16. Markos Valaris (2013). Spontaneity and Cognitive Agency. Kant Yearbook 5 (1).
    Cognitive agency - the idea that our judgments and beliefs are manifestations of agency on our part - is a deeply entrenched aspect of our self-conception as persons. And yet it has proven hard to give a satisfying account of what such agency might consist in. In this paper I argue that getting clear about Kant’s notion of spontaneity might help us make progress in that debate. In particular, I argue that the very same assumption - namely, that agency must (...)
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