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  1. Nathan Bauer (2010). Kant's Subjective Deduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
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  2. Daniel Breazeale (2008). Review: Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel. Lectures on German Idealism. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2):pp. 330-331.
    As the author explains, the title of this work is intended to distinguish it from ordinary, Whiggish accounts of the development of German philosophy “from Kant to Hegel.” Instead, Heinrich treats the positions of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel as potentially viable alternatives, none of which must be viewed as aufgehoben by those that followed, and all of which deserve reconsideration by contemporary philosophers.Dieter Henrich is known for two things: first, for championing a minutely-detailed, revisionist approach to the history of post-Kantian (...)
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  3. William F. Bristow (2001). Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Review 110 (2):272-275.
  4. Andrew Brook (2006). Kant: A Unified Representational Base for All Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press 89-109.
  5. Andrew Brook (1997). Unity of Consciousness and Other Mental Unities. In Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Ablex Press
    Though there has been a huge resurgence of interest in consciousness in the past decade, little attention has been paid to what the philosopher Immanuel Kant and others call the unity of consciousness. The unity of consciousness takes different forms, as we will see, but the general idea is that each of us is aware of many things in the world at the same time, and often many of one's own mental states and of oneself as their single common subject, (...)
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  6. Richard Brown, Kant, Polysolipsism, and the Real Unity of Experience.
    The question I am interested in revolves around Kant’s notion of the unity of experience. My central claim will be that, apart from the unity of experiencings and the unity of individual substances, there is a third unity: the unity of Experience. I will argue that this third unity can be conceived of as a sort of ‘experiential space’ with the Aesthetic and Categories as dimensions. I call this ‘Euclidean Experience’ to emphasize the idea that individual experiencings have a ‘location’ (...)
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  7. Ralf Busse (2014). Review: Kitcher, Kant's Thinker, Transcendental Apperception: Consciousness or Self-Consciousness? [REVIEW] Kantian Review 19 (1):109-117.
    A core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to lack the theoretical resources to clearly (...)
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  8. Quassim Cassam (1989). Kant and Reductionism. Review of Metaphysics 43 (September):72-106.
  9. Stephen Engstrom (2013). Unity of Apperception. Studi Kantiani 26:37-54.
    This essay chiefly concerns the unity of self-consciousness expounded under the heading "the original synthetic unity of apperception" in Kant's transcendental deduction. It focuses mainly on Kant's identification of this unity with the understanding, the faculty of knowledge, with the aim of throwing light on the understanding and on knowledge as well as on synthetic unity.
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  10. Piero Giordanetti, Riccardo Pozzo & Marco Sgarbi (2012). Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious. Walter de Gruyter.
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  11. Patrick Grüneberg (2011). Apperzeption und idealrealistische Begründung. In Elena Ficara (ed.), Die Begründung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus. Königshausen & Neumann 221--230.
    Das Projekt einer Begründung der Philosophie, insbesondere der Metaphysik als Wissenschaft, verbindet sich programmatisch mit dem kritischen Werk Kants und dort mit dem Konzept der transzendentalen Apperzeption. Dieser „höchste Punkt“ bildete seinerseits auch einen der zentralen Anknüpfungspunkte nachfolgender idealistischer Entwürfe und sich daraus entwickelnder Systeme. Die nachkantische Entwicklung wird dabei häufig mit dem Rubrum einer spekulativen Überhöhung des transzendentalen Kritizismus Kants belegt. Dabei ging es Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer – um nur die prominenten Vertreter zu nennen – in erster Linie (...)
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  12. Aron Gurwitsch (1964). Der Begriff des Bewusstseins bei Kant und Husserl. Kant-Studien 55 (1-4):410-427.
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  13. Robert Hanna (2008). Kantian Non-Conceptualism. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
    There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or (...)
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  14. Robert Hanna (2000). The Inner and the Outer: Kant's 'Refutation' Reconstructed. Ratio 13 (2):146–174.
  15. D. C. Hoy (1991). A History of Consciousness : From Kant and Hegel to Derrida and Foucault. History of the Human Sciences 4 (2):261-281.
    Would a history of the human sciences seem strange if it featured a chapter on the history of consciousness? An argument for including such a chapter could point out that consciousness is often thought to be essential to what it is to be human. Yet the discipline that makes this.
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  16. Tim Jankowiak (2014). Sensations as Representations in Kant. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):492-513.
    This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ?subjective representations? and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those who claim that sensations cannot be representational at all, because sensations are not cognitively sophisticated enough to possess (...)
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  17. Immanuel Kant, On Comprehension and Transcendental Consciousness (German).
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  18. Friedrich Kaulbach (1963). Leibbewusstsein und welterfahrung beim frühen und späten Kant. Kant-Studien 54 (1-4):464-490.
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  19. Pierre Keller (1994). Personal Identity and Kant's Third Person Perspective. Idealistic Studies 24 (2):123-146.
  20. Patricia Kitcher (2014). Replies. Kantian Review 19 (1):149-159.
  21. Patricia Kitcher & Ellen Fridland (2009). Empirical Consciousness. In Georg Mohr, Jürgen Stolzenburg & Marcus Willaschek (eds.), Kant-Lexikon. De Gruyter
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  22. Markus Kohl (2015). Kant on Freedom of Empirical Thought. Journal of the History of Philosophy 23 (2):301-26.
    It is standardly assumed that, in Kant, “free agency” is identical to moral agency and requires the will or practical reason. Likewise, it is often held that the concept of “spontaneity” that Kant uses in his theoretical philosophy is very different from, and much thinner than, his idea of practical spontaneity. In this paper I argue for the contrary view: Kant has a rich theory of doxastic free agency, and the spontaneity in empirical thought (which culminates in judgments of experience) (...)
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  23. Claudio la Rocca (2013). Moral consciousness and gesinnung. Ideas Y Valores 62:133-152.
    Kant ha subrayado el carácter problemático del auto-conocimiento en el campo de la antropología y la psicología: desde sus primeras obras insistió en la imposibilidad de conocer con certeza, sobre la base de las acciones, la disposición moral subjetiva, la única que da a la acción un valor moral. Esta dificultad no se atenúa cuando el juicio moral es dirigido sobre el sujeto mismo. A los problemas cognitivos se añade una tendencia al auto-engaño que está activa en toda la vida (...)
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  24. Claudio La Rocca (2008). Der dunkle Verstand. Unbewusste Vorstellungen und Selbstbewusstsein bei Kant. In Valerio Hrsg V. Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht Und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. 447-458.
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  25. Eric LaRock (2010). Cognition and Consciousness: Kantian Affinities with Contemporary Vision Research. Kant-Studien 101 (4):445-464.
    After providing a critique of Andreas Engel's neural mechanistic approach to object feature binding (OFB), I develop a Kantian approach to OFB that bears affinity with recent findings in cognitive psychology. I also address the diachronic object unity (DOU) problem and discuss the shortcomings of a purely neural mechanistic approach to this problem. Finally, I motivate a Kantian approach to DOU which suggests that DOU requires the persisting character of the cognizing subject. If plausible, the cognizing subject could make an (...)
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  26. Béatrice Longuenesse (2007). Selbstbewusstsein und Bewusstsein des eigenen Körpers. Variationen über ein kantisches Thema. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 55 (6):859-875.
    Kants Unterscheidung zwischen Bewusstsein seiner selbst „als Subjekt” und Bewusstsein seiner selbst „als Objekt” ist in jüngster Zeit lebendig diskutiert worden. Der Artikel bietet eine Diskussion des üblichen Vorwurfs, dem zufolge Kant ignoriert, dass ich, als Subjekt, meiner selbst als eines physischen Objektes beziehungsweise eines lebendigen Körpers bewusst bin. Gegen Quassim Cassams Argument zu dieser These argumentiert der Artikel, dass Kants Begriff des Ichs eher im Lichte seiner Rolle bei der Einigung unserer Vorstellungen zu verstehen ist als im Lichte zeitgenössischer (...)
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  27. Béatrice Longuenesse (2006). Self-Consciousness and Consciousness of One's Own Body: Variations on a Kantian Theme. Philosophical Topics 34 (1/2):283-309.
  28. William G. Lycan (1995). Consciousness as Internal Monitoring. Philosophical Perspectives 9:1-14.
    Locke put forward the theory of consciousness as "internal Sense" or "reflection"; Kant made it inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner state." On that theory, consciousness is a perception-like second-order representing of our own psychological states events. The term "consciousness," of course, has many distinct uses.
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  29. Jacqueline Marina (2000). Review: Collins, Possible Experience: Understanding Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1):130-131.
  30. John McDowell (2006). Sensory Consciousness in Kant and Sellars. Philosophical Topics 34 (1/2):311-326.
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  31. Colin McLear (2011). Kant on Animal Consciousness. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (15).
    Kant is often considered to have argued that perceptual awareness of objects in one's environment depends on the subject's possession of conceptual capacities. This conceptualist interpretation raises an immediate problem concerning the nature of perceptual awareness in non-rational, non-concept using animals. In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims concerning animal representation and consciousness do not foreclose the possibility of attributing to animals the capacity for objective perceptual consciousness, and that a non-conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s position concerning perceptual awareness can (...)
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  32. Arthur Melnick (1976). Review: Bennett, Kant's Dialectic. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 14 (2):236-239.
  33. Alf Nyman (1929). Über das „Unbewußte“. Kant-Studien 34 (1-4):151-166.
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  34. Riccardo Pozzo, Piero Giordanetti & Marco Sgarbi (eds.) (2012). Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious. Walter de Gruyter.
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  35. Jens Saugstad (2002). "I Think ...." Kant on Self-Consciousness. In Audun Øfsti, Peter Ulrich & Truls Wyller (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism Ii. The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Mentis 103-125.
  36. Dennis Schulting (2015). Chapter 3. Transcendental Apperception and Consciousness in Kant’s Lectures on Metaphysics. In Robert R. Clewis (ed.), Reading Kant's Lectures. De Gruyter 89-113.
    I shall focus on one topic in chiefly the metaphysics lectures that are contemporaneous with Kant’s Critical phase. I look at one particular, though crucial, element, namely transcendental apperception and the notion of ‘consciousness’ and explore to what extent, and in which context, they are featured in the lectures and what changes (or not) from the pre-Critical to the Critical phase of Kant’s lecturing activity. After introducing the theme of apperception and consciousness in Kant and addressing some terminological issues, I (...)
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  37. Dennis Schulting (2012). Non-Apperceptive Consciousness. In Riccardo Pozzo, Piero Giordanetti & Marco Sgarbi (eds.), Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious. De Gruyter
    * Note that in this article an inverted comma is used for NER', where it should be an accent, to differentiate it from standard NER. Same with P1', P2' etc. Apparently, the editors of de Gruyter can't understand an author's instruction and just invent their own conventions. -/- In this article, I am interested in answering two, relatively simple, but important questions: (a) Does Kant allow first-order consciousness without second-order consciousness, that is, does he allow for empirical consciousness that is (...)
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  38. Sydney Shoemaker (1983). Self-Consciousness and Synthesis. In Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy.
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  39. Curtis Sommerlatte (forthcoming). Empirical Cognition in the Transcendental Deduction: Kant’s Starting Point and His Humean Problem. Kantian Review.
    In this paper, I argue that in the sense of greatest epistemological concern for Kant, empirical cognition is “rational sensory discrimination”: the identification or differentiation of sensory objects from each other, occurring through a capacity to become aware of and express judgments on the basis of which she identifies or differentiates objects. With this account of empirical cognition, I show how the transcendental deduction of the first Critique is most plausibly read as having as its fundamental assumption the thesis that (...)
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  40. Nicholas Stang (2011). Review: Kitcher, Patricia, Kant's Thinker. [REVIEW] Notes Dame Philosophical Reviews:unknown.
  41. Thomas Sturm & Falk Wunderlich (2010). Kant and the Scientific Study of Consciousness. History of the Human Sciences 23 (3):48-71.
    We argue that Kant’s views about consciousness, the mind-body problem, and the status of psychology as a science all differ drastically from the way in which these topics are conjoined in present debates about the prominent idea of a science of consciousness. Kant did never use the concept of consciousness in the now dominant sense of phenomenal qualia; his discussions of the mind-body problem center not on the reducibility of mental properties but of substances; and his views about the possibility (...)
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  42. Ellen Bliss Talbot (1900). The Relation Between Human Consciousness and its Ideal as Conceived by Kant and Fichte. Kant-Studien 4 (1-3):286-310.
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  43. Alan Thomas (1997). Kant, McDowell and the Theory of Consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):283-305.
    This paper examines some of the central arguments of John McDowell's Mind and World, particularly his treatment of the Kantian themes of the spontaneity of thought and of the nature of self-consciousness. It is argued that in so far as McDowell departs from Kant, his position becomes less plausible in three respects. First, the space of reason is identified with the space of responsible and critical freedom in a way that runs together issues about synthesis below the level of concepts (...)
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  44. Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen (1977). Philosophical Idealism in Germany: The Way From Kant to Hegel and the Present. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (1):1-32.
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  45. Eric Watkins (2007). Review: Wunderlich, Kant Und Die Bewußtseinstheorien des 18. Jahrhunderts. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):452-454.
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  46. Kenneth R. Westphal (2007). Consciousness and its Transcendental Conditions: Kant’s Anti-Cartesian Revolt. In Lähteenmäki & Remes Heinämaa (ed.), Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Springer
    Kant was the first great anti-Cartesian in epistemology and philosophy of mind. He criticised five central tenets of Cartesianism and developed sophisticated alternatives to them. His transcendental analysis of the necessary a priori conditions for the very possibility of self-conscious human experience invokes externalism about justification and proves externalism about mental content. Semantic concern with the unity of the proposition—required for propositionally structured awareness and self-awareness—is central to Kant’s account of the unity of any cognitive judgment. The perceptual ‘binding problem’ (...)
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  47. Terence Wilkerson (1980). Kant on Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 30 (118):47-60.
  48. Holly L. Wilson (2008). The Green Kant: Kant's Treatment of Animals. In Paul Pojman Louis Pojman (ed.), in Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application.
    Kant's theory of animals is based on his belief that animals have presentations and consciousness and in this are like human beings. When we abuse animals then we are more likely to abuse human beings. But animals are organic beings that have internal purposiveness and hence are ends for which other things are means. In this limited sense animals have intrinsic value.
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