About this topic
Summary The question for which Kant is best known -- how are synthetic a priori cognitions possible? -- is an epistemological one, as is his most famous doctrine, that we cannot cognize 'things in themselves' [Dinge an sich selbst].  Consequently, Kant and Kantian ideas have figured prominently in discussion in epistemology, in particular about a priori knowledge.  However, more recently scholars have widened their attention to consider aspects of Kant's epistemology that reflect the wide range of epistemic attitudes studied by contemporary epistemologists: belief, assent, opinion, knowledge by testimony, etc.  The contemporary separation between metaphysics and epistemology as distinct philosophical domains is somewhat alien to Kant; he typically discusses simultaneously what we would now call 'metaphysics' and 'epistemology,' making it difficult to discern how a particular claim is to be taken.  Consequently, Kant's epistemology has traditionally been discussed alongside his views in metaphysics (and philosophy of mind).  Many of the most influential works on Kant's epistemology also treat broader themes in his philosophy, although some more recent scholars have tried to isolate distinctively epistemic issues.
  Show all references
Related categories
Subcategories:
533 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 533
Material to categorize
  1. Michael Barker (2001). The Proof Structure of Kant's A-Deduction. Kant-Studien 92 (3):259-282.
    Kant wrote two versions of the Transcendental Deduction, the first, “A-”Deduction in 1781, and the second, “B-”Deduction in 1787. Since Henrich's “The Proof Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction”, most work on the Transcendental Deduction attempts to make sense of the B-Deduction's two-step argument structure. Though the A-Deduction has suffered comparative neglect, it has received some attention from interpreters who take its extended treatment of the “subjective” side of cognition to amount to a brand of proto-functionalism. Whatever the merits and demerits (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr (2010). Kant, Hegel, and Habermas. Review of Metaphysics 63 (4):871-903.
  3. Sacha Golob (2013). Heidegger on Kant, Time and the 'Form' of Intentionality. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):345 - 367.
    Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Arata Hamawaki (2009). Review of Fiona Hughes, Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology: Form and World. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (8).
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Kjartan Koch Mikalsen (2010). Testimony and Kant's Idea of Public Reason. Res Publica 16 (1):23-40.
    It is common to interpret Kant’s idea of public reason and the Enlightenment motto to ‘think for oneself’ as incompatible with the view that testimony and judgement of credibility is essential to rational public deliberation. Such interpretations have led to criticism of contemporary Kantian approaches to deliberative democracy for being intellectualistic, and for not considering our epistemic dependence on other people adequately. In this article, I argue that such criticism is insufficiently substantiated, and that Kant’s idea of public reason is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Antonio-Maria Nunziante & Alberto Vanzo (2009). Representing Subjects, Mind-Dependent Objects: Kant, Leibniz, and the Amphiboly. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (1):133-151.
    This paper compares Kant’s and Leibniz’s views on the relation between knowing subjects and known objects. Kant discusses Leibniz’s philosophy in the ‘Amphiboly’ section of the first Critique. According to Kant, Leibniz’s main error is mistaking objects in space and time for mind-independent things in themselves, that is, for monads. The paper argues that, pace Kant, Leibniz regards objects in space and time as mind-dependent. A deeper divergence between the two philosophers concerns knowing subjects. For Leibniz, they are substances. For (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Klaus Ruthenberg (2010). Das kant'sche echo in paneths philosophie der chemie. Kant-Studien 101 (4):465-479.
    The eminent radiochemist Friedrich Paneth (1887–1958) tried to come to terms with the following epistemological problem: On the one hand chemical elements are characterized empirically as indestructible material species, on the other hand they are characterized theoretically as having the same number of protons in the nuclei of their atoms. Paneth used the dualistic Kantian epistemology (using Eduard von Hartmann's interpretation) in order to describe the combination of these two aspects, applying the terms “Grundstoff”, fundamental matter, to the latter and (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Klaus Ruthenberg (2010). The Kantian Response in Paneth's Philosophy of Chemistry. Kant-Studien 101 (4):465-479.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Kant: Assent
  1. Wilhelm Beimer (1919). Der Phänomenologische Evidenzbegriff. Kant-Studien 23 (1-3):269-301.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Andrew Chignell (2010). Real Repugnance and Belief About Things-in-Themselves: A Problem and Kant's Three Solutions. In James Krueger & Benjamin Bruxvoort Lipscomb (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics. Walter DeGruyter.
    Kant says that it can be rational to accept propositions on the basis of non-epistemic or broadly practical considerations, even if those propositions include “transcendental ideas” of supersensible objects. He also worries, however, about how such ideas (of freedom, the soul, noumenal grounds, God, the kingdom of ends, and things-in-themselves generally) acquire genuine positive content in the absence of an appropriate connection to intuitional experience. How can we be sure that the ideas are not empty “thought-entities (Gedankendinge)”—that is, speculative fancies (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Andrew Chignell (2009). Are Supersensibles Really Possible? The Evidential Role of Symbols. In V. Rhoden, T. Terra & G. Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. DeGruyter.
    Kant on how certain experiences might give us considerations counting in favor of the real possibility of certain things. -/- .
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Andrew Chignell (2007). Belief in Kant. Philosophical Review 116 (3):323-360.
    Most work in Kant’s epistemology focuses on what happens “upstream” from experience, prior to the formation of conscious propositional attitudes. By contrast, this essay focuses on what happens "downstream": the formation of assent (Fuerwahrhalten) in its various modes. The mode of assent that Kant calls "Belief" (Glaube) is the main topic: not only moral Belief but also "pragmatic" and "doctrinal" Belief as well. I argue that Kant’s discussion shows that we should reject standard accounts of the extent to which theoretical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Andrew Chignell (2007). Kant's Concepts of Justification. Noûs 41 (1):33–63.
    An essay on Kant's theory of justification, where by “justification” is meant the evaluative concept that specifies conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence. Kant employs both epistemic and non-epistemic concepts of justification: an epistemic concept of justification sets out conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence and a candidate (if true and Gettier-immune) for knowledge. A non-epistemic concept of justification, by contrast, sets out (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. John Hawthorne & Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996). Are Beliefs About God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and Kant. Religious Studies 32 (2):233 - 258.
    The need to address our question arises from two sources, one in Kant and the other in a certain type of response to so-called Reformed epistemology. The first source consists in a tendency to distinguish theoretical beliefs from practical beliefs (commitments to the world's being a certain way versus commitments to certain pictures to live by), and to treat theistic belief as mere practical belief. We trace this tendency in Kant's corpus, and compare and contrast it with Aquinas's view and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Lawrence Pasternack (2014). Kant on Opinion: Assent, Hypothesis, and the Norms of General Applied Logic. Kant-Studien 105 (1):41-82.
    Kant identifies knowledge [Wissen], belief [Glaube], and opinion [Meinung] as our three primary modes of “holding-to-be-true” [Fürwahrhalten]. He also identifies opinion as making up the greatest part of our cognition. After a preliminary sketch of Kant’s system of propositional attitudes, this paper will explore what he says about the norms governing opinion and empirical hypotheses. The final section will turn to what, in the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere, Kant refers to as “General Applied Logic”. It concerns the “contingent (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Lawrence Pasternack (2014). Kant’s Touchstone of Communication and the Public Use of Reason. Society and Politics 8 (1):78-91.
    Nearly all of the work that has been done on Kant’s conception of public reason has focused on its socio-political significance. John Rawls, Onora O’Neill and others have explored its relevance to a well ordered democracy, to pluralism, to toleration, and so on. However, the relevance of public reason for Kant is not limited to the socio-political. Kant repeatedly appeals to the “touchstone of communication” in relation to the normative side of his epistemology. The purpose of this paper is to (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Leslie Stevenson (2004). Freedom of Judgement in Descartes, Hume, Spinoza and Kant. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (2):223 – 246.
    Is our judgement of the truth-value of propositions subject to the will? Do we have any voluntary control over the formation of our beliefs – and if so, how does it compare with the control we have over our actions? These questions lead into interestingly unclear philosophical and psychological territory which remains a focus of debate today. I will first examine the classic early modern discussions in Descartes, Spinoza and Hume. Then I will review some relevant themes in Kant, including (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Kant: Justification
  1. Nikolaos Avgelis (1991). Die Duhem-Quine-These unter dem Geltungsaspekt der erkenntnistheoretischen Fragestellung Kants. Kant-Studien 82 (3):285-302.
  2. Nathan Bauer (2010). Kant's Subjective Deduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Wilhelm Beimer (1919). Der Phänomenologische Evidenzbegriff. Kant-Studien 23 (1-3):269-301.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Christian Bonnet (2002). La théorie friesienne de la justification. Revue de Métaphysique Et de Morale 3 (3):325-339.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Andrew Chignell (2011). Real Repugnance and Our Ignorance of Things-in-Themselves: A Lockean Problem in Kant and Hegel. Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 7:135-159.
    Kant holds that in order to have knowledge of an object, a subject must be able to “prove” that the object is really possible—i.e., prove that there is neither logical inconsistency nor “real repugnance” between its properties. This is (usually) easy to do with respect to empirical objects, but (usually) impossible to do with respect to particular things-in-themselves. In the first section of the paper I argue that an important predecessor of Kant’s account of our ignorance of real possibility can (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Andrew Chignell (2009). Are Supersensibles Really Possible? The Evidential Role of Symbols. In V. Rhoden, T. Terra & G. Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. DeGruyter.
    Kant on how certain experiences might give us considerations counting in favor of the real possibility of certain things. -/- .
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Andrew Chignell (2007). Belief in Kant. Philosophical Review 116 (3):323-360.
    Most work in Kant’s epistemology focuses on what happens “upstream” from experience, prior to the formation of conscious propositional attitudes. By contrast, this essay focuses on what happens "downstream": the formation of assent (Fuerwahrhalten) in its various modes. The mode of assent that Kant calls "Belief" (Glaube) is the main topic: not only moral Belief but also "pragmatic" and "doctrinal" Belief as well. I argue that Kant’s discussion shows that we should reject standard accounts of the extent to which theoretical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Andrew Chignell (2007). Kant's Concepts of Justification. Noûs 41 (1):33–63.
    An essay on Kant's theory of justification, where by “justification” is meant the evaluative concept that specifies conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence. Kant employs both epistemic and non-epistemic concepts of justification: an epistemic concept of justification sets out conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence and a candidate (if true and Gettier-immune) for knowledge. A non-epistemic concept of justification, by contrast, sets out (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. James R. Flynn (1979). Kant and the Price of a Justification. Kant-Studien 70 (1-4):279-311.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Axel Gelfert (2010). Kant and the Enlightenment's Contribution to Social Epistemology. Episteme 7 (1):79-99.
    The present paper argues for the relevance of Immanuel Kant and the German Enlightenment to contemporary social epistemology. Rather than distancing themselves from the alleged ‘individualism’ of Enlightenment philosophers, social epistemologists would be well-advised to look at the substantive discussion of social-epistemological questions in the works of Kant and other Enlightenment figures. After a brief rebuttal of the received view of the Enlightenment as an intrinsically individualist enterprise, this paper charts the historical trajectory of philosophical discussions of testimony as a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Axel Gelfert (2006). Kant on Testimony. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (4):627 – 652.
    Immanuel Kant is often regarded as an exponent of the ‘individualist’ tradition in epistemology, according to which testimony is not a fundamental source of knowledge. The present paper argues that this view is far from accurate. Kant devotes ample space to discussions of testimony and, in his lectures on logic, arrives at a distinct and stable philosophical position regarding testimony. Important elements of this position consist in (a) acknowledging the ineliminability of testimony; (b) realizing that testimony can establish empirical knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Moltke S. Gram (1979). Transcendental Arguments: A Meta-Critique. Kant-Studien 70 (1-4):508-513.
  13. Robert Hanna (2011). The Myth of the Given and the Grip of the Given. Diametros 27:25-46.
    In this paper I argue that the Sellarsian Myth of the Given does not apply to all forms of Non-Conceptualism; that Kant is in fact a non-conceptualist of the right-thinking kind and not a Conceptualist, as most Kant-interpreters think; and that an intelligible and defensible Kantian Non-Conceptualism can be developed which supports the thesis that true perceptual beliefs are non-inferentially justified and also normatively funded by direct, embodied, intentional interactions with the manifest world (a.k.a. the Grip of the Given).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Ralf Meerbote (2011). Hughes on Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology. Kant-Studien 102 (2):202-212.
    Hughes has recently argued that there is to be found in Kant's epistemology an aesthetic constraint that makes for an objectivity of empirical knowledge-claims. The reading that she defends leads to a rejection of an imposition-view of empirical concepts and the categories and to an affirmation of a realism in Kant's theory of empirical knowledge. I am in broad agreement with her thesis but disagree with her ultimate explanation of the ontology of Kant's objects of empirical knowledge. Hughes' exposition and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Lawrence Pasternack (2014). Kant’s Touchstone of Communication and the Public Use of Reason. Society and Politics 8 (1):78-91.
    Nearly all of the work that has been done on Kant’s conception of public reason has focused on its socio-political significance. John Rawls, Onora O’Neill and others have explored its relevance to a well ordered democracy, to pluralism, to toleration, and so on. However, the relevance of public reason for Kant is not limited to the socio-political. Kant repeatedly appeals to the “touchstone of communication” in relation to the normative side of his epistemology. The purpose of this paper is to (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Derk Pereboom (1991). Is Kant's Transcendental Philosophy Inconsistent? History of Philosophy Quarterly 8 (4):357 - 372.
  17. Dennis Schulting (2012). Kant's Deduction and Apperception. Explaining the Categories. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Dennis Schulting offers a thoroughgoing, analytic account of the first half of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the B-edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason that is different from existing interpretations in at least one important aspect: its central claim is that each of the 12 categories is wholly derivable from the principle of apperception, which goes against the current view that the Deduction is not a proof in a strict philosophical sense and the standard reading that in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Dennis Schulting (2012). Kant's Deduction and Apperception. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book offers a thoroughgoing, analytic account of the first half of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the B-edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason that is different from existing interpretations in at least one important aspect: its central claim is that each of the 12 categories is wholly derivable from the principle of apperception, which goes against the current view that the Deduction is not a proof in a strict philosophical sense and the standard reading that in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Dennis Schulting (2012). Kant, Non-Conceptual Content, and the 'Second Step' of the B-Deduction. Kant Studies Online:51-92.
    This article is a modified version in translation of the original Dutch version that appeared in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 4 (2010) / * Inspired by Kant's account of intuition and concepts, John McDowell has forcefully argued that the relation between sensible content and concepts is such that sensible content does not severally contribute to cognition but always only in conjunction with concepts. This view is known as conceptualism. Recently, Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais, among others, have brought against this view (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Joseph Shieber (2010). Between Autonomy and Authority: Kant on the Epistemic Status of Testimony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):327-348.
  21. Alberto Vanzo (2012). Kant on Experiment. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor.
    This paper discusses Immanuel Kant’s views on the role of experiments in natural science, focusing on their relationship with hypotheses, laws of nature, and the heuristic principles of scientific enquiry. Kant’s views are contrasted with the philosophy of experiment that was first sketched by Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. Kant holds that experiments are always designed and carried out in the light of hypotheses. Hypotheses are derived from experience on the basis of a set (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Kant: Cognition and Knowledge
  1. Lucy Allais (2009). Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (3):pp. 383-413.
  2. Richard E. Aquila (1977). The Relationship Between Pure and Empirical Intuition in Kant. Kant-Studien 68 (1-4):275-289.
  3. Richard E. Aquila (1974). Kant's Theory of Concepts. Kant-Studien 65 (1-4):1-19.
  4. N. Avgelis (1991). The Relevance of Duhem and Quine Thesis in the Light of Kant Cognitive Theory. Kant-Studien 82 (3):285-302.
  5. Nikolaos Avgelis (1991). Die Duhem-Quine-These unter dem Geltungsaspekt der erkenntnistheoretischen Fragestellung Kants. Kant-Studien 82 (3):285-302.
  6. Gary Banham (2010). Scepticism, Causation and Cognition. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):507-520.
  7. Nathan Bauer (2010). Kant's Subjective Deduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Lewis White Beck (1976). Is There a Non Sequitur in Kant's Proof of the Causal Principle? Kant-Studien 67 (1-4):385-389.
  9. Ermanno Bencivenga (1987). Kant's Copernican Revolution. Oxford University Press.
    This is a highly original, wide-ranging, and unorthodox discourse on the idea of philosophy contained in Kant's major work, the Critique of Pure Reason. Bencivenga proposes a novel explanation of the Critique's celebrated "obscurity." This great obstacle to reading Kant, Bencivenga argues, has nothing to do with Kant's being a bad writer or with his having anything very complicated to say; rather, it is the natural result of the kind of operation Kant was performing: a universal conceptual revolution. Bencivenga contends (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Jonathan Francis Bennett (1966). Kant's Analytic. London, Cambridge U.P..
  11. Jocelyn Benoist (1998). L'impensé de la Représentation: De Leibniz à Kant. Kant-Studien 89 (3):300-317.
  12. Graham Bird (1996). McDowell's Kant: "Mind and World". [REVIEW] Philosophy 71 (276):219 - 243.
1 — 50 / 533