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  1. Robert Adamson (1883). Kant's View of Mathematical Premisses and Reasonings. Mind 8 (31):421 - 425.
  2. R. Lanier Anderson (2004). Containment Analyticity and Kant's Problem of Synthetic Judgment. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 25 (2):161-204.
  3. Jody Azzouni (2009). Why Do Informal Proofs Conform to Formal Norms? Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):9-26.
    Kant discovered a philosophical problem with mathematical proof. Despite being a priori , its methodology involves more than analytic truth. But what else is involved? This problem is widely taken to have been solved by Frege’s extension of logic beyond its restricted (and largely Aristotelian) form. Nevertheless, a successor problem remains: both traditional and contemporary (classical) mathematical proofs, although conforming to the norms of contemporary (classical) logic, never were, and still aren’t, executed by mathematicians in a way that transparently reveals (...)
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  4. Nathan Bauer (2010). Kant's Subjective Deduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
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  5. Frederick Beiser (2010). Mathematical Method in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
  6. Francesca Biagioli (2014). What Does It Mean That “Space Can Be Transcendental Without the Axioms Being So”? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-21.
    In 1870, Hermann von Helmholtz criticized the Kantian conception of geometrical axioms as a priori synthetic judgments grounded in spatial intuition. However, during his dispute with Albrecht Krause (Kant und Helmholtz über den Ursprung und die Bedeutung der Raumanschauung und der geometrischen Axiome. Lahr, Schauenburg, 1878), Helmholtz maintained that space can be transcendental without the axioms being so. In this paper, I will analyze Helmholtz’s claim in connection with his theory of measurement. Helmholtz uses a Kantian argument that can be (...)
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  7. Tyler Burge (2003). Logic and Analyticity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):199-249.
    The view that logic is true independently of a subject matter is criticized—enlarging on Quine's criticisms and adding further ones. It is then argued apriori that full reflective understanding of logic and deductive reasoning requires substantial commitment to mathematical entities. It is emphasized that the objectively apriori connections between deductive reasoning and commitment to mathematics need not be accepted by or even comprehensible to a given deductive reasoner. The relevant connections emerged only slowly in the history of logic. But they (...)
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  8. Mary Domski (2010). Kant on the Imagination and Geometrical Certainty. Perspectives on Science 18 (4):409-431.
    My goal in this paper is to develop our understanding of the role the imagination plays in Kant’s Critical account of geometry, and I do so by attending to how the imagination factors into the method of reasoning Kant assigns the geometer in the First Critique. Such an approach is not unto itself novel. Recent commentators, such as Friedman (1992) and Young (1992), have taken a careful look at the constructions of the productive imagination in pure intuition and highlighted the (...)
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  9. Theodor Ebert (2009). Michael Wolff über Syllogismen bei Aristoteles und Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):357 - 372.
  10. Edgard José Jorge Filho (2008). Concerning the Problem of Error in Kant. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:67-76.
    In the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic, of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents a conception of error. In the (Jäsche) Logic, he also deals with the problem of error, albeit in a different way. This paper aims at exposing this difference and arguing that, in the (Jäsche) Logic, error is explained moreconsistently and suitably than it is in the Transcendental Dialectic. It begins by considering judgment as the place of truth, falsehood and error, and inquiring into the cognitive (...)
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  11. M. Friedman (1992). Review of Questions of Form: Logic and the Analytic Proposition From Kant to Carnap by Joëlle Proust. [REVIEW] Noûs 26:532-542.
  12. Emily Grosholz (2000). Frege and the Surprising History of Logic: Introduction to Claude Imbert, "Gottlob Frege, One More Time&Quot;. Hypatia 15 (4):151-155.
    Convinced that logic has a history and that its history always manages to surprise the philosophers, Claude Imbert has devoted much of her work to the study of the Stoic school and of the late-nineteenth-century German logician Gottlob Frege. In the fifth chapter of her book Pour une histoire de la logique, she examines the trajectory of Frege's awareness of what his new logic entails, in particular the way it subverts the project of Kant.
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  13. Robert Hanna (1998). A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):497-528.
    According to Kant in the Prolegomena, the natural kind proposition (GYM) "Gold is a yellow metal" is analytically true, necessary, and a priori. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam have argued that on the contrary propositions such as (GYM) are neither analytic, nor necessary, nor a priori. The Kripke-Putnam view is based on the doctrine of "scientific essentialism" (SE). It is a direct consequence of SE that propositions such as (GE) "Gold is the element with atomic number number 79" are metaphysically (...)
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  14. Immanuel Kant (1963/1972). Kant's Introduction to Logic and His Essay on the Mistaken Subtilty of the Four Figures. Westport, Conn.,Greenwood Press.
    We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.
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  15. Anita Kasabova (2002). Is Logic a Theoretical or Practical Discipline? Kant and/or Bolzano. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 84 (3):319-333.
    Does logic describe something or not? If not, is it a normative or practical discipline? Is there a radical division between the practical or normative level and the theoretical or descriptive level? A discipline is theoretical, we may say, if its main propositions contain descriptive expressions, such as “is” or “have”, but no normative expressions, such as “ought”, “ought not” or “may”. A discipline is normative if its main propositions are of the form “it ought to be”. Theoretical propositions express (...)
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  16. Patricia Kitcher (1994). Kant's Transcendental Psychology. OUP USA.
    For the last 100 years historians have denigrated the psychology of the Critique of Pure Reason. In opposition, Patricia Kitcher argues that we can only understand the deduction of the categories in terms of Kant's attempt to fathom the psychological prerequisites of thought, and that this investigation illuminates thinking itself. Kant tried to understand the "task environment" of knowledge and thought: Given the data we acquire and the scientific generalizations we make, what basic cognitive capacities are necessary to perform these (...)
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  17. Pauline Kleingeld (1998). Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason. Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):500-528.
    In his critical works of the 1780's, Kant claims, seemingly inconsistently, that (1) theoretical and practical reason are one and the same reason, applied differently, (2) that he still needs to show that they are, and (3) that theoretical and practical reason are united. I first argue that current interpretations of Kant's doctrine of the unity of reason are insufficient. But rather than concluding that Kant’s doctrine becomes coherent only in the Critique of Judgment, I show that the three statements (...)
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  18. Frank J. Leavitt (1991). Kant's Schematism and His Philosophy of Geometry. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (4):647-659.
    Kant's philosophy of geometry rests upon his doctrine of the "schematism" which I argue is formally identical to the ability to grass the middle term of an Aristotelian syllogism. The doctrine fails to avoid obscurities which were already present in Plato, Aristotle, and Hume.
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  19. Béatrice Longuenesse (2000). Kant's Categories and the Capacity to Judge: Responses to Henry Allison and Sally Sedgwick. Inquiry 43 (1):91 – 110.
    In response to Henry Allison's and Sally Sedwick's comments on my recent book, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, I explain Kant's description of the understanding as being essentially a "capacity to judge", and his view of the relationship between the categories and the logical functions of judgment. I defend my interpretation of Kant's argument in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the B edition. I conclude that, in my interpretation, Kant's notions of the "a priori" and the "given" (...)
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  20. Margaret MacDougall (2010). Poincaréan Intuition Revisited: What Can We Learn From Kant and Parsons? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):138-147.
  21. John MacFarlane (2008). Brandom's Demarcation of Logic. Philosophical Topics 36 (2):55-62.
    This is a lightly edited version of my comments on Brandom’s Lecture 2, as delivered in Prague at the “Prague Locke Lectures” in April, 2007. I try to say why Brandom’s proposed demarcation is significant, by placing it in a broader context of demarcation proposals from Kant to the twentieth century. I then raise some questions about the basic ingredients of Brandom’s demarcation—the notions of PP-sufficiency and VP-sufficiency—and question whether the vocabulary of conditionals, Brandom’s paradigm for logical vocabulary, can be (...)
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  22. W. Malzkorn (1995). Kant Critique of Traditional Syllogistic Theory. History and Philosophy of Logic 16 (1):75-88.
  23. Matthew McAndrew (2014). Kant's Theory of Inductive Reasoning: The Reflecting Power of Judgment in Kant's Logic. Kant Studies Online:43-64.
  24. Charles Nussbaum (1992). Critical and Pre-Critical Phases in Kant's Philosophy of Logic. Kant-Studien 83 (3):280-293.
    The transition in Kant's writings form a pre-critical to a critical standpoint has been thoroughly documented with regard to Kant's changing conception of metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of mathematics. But a similar alteration in standpoint in Kant's philosophy of logic has received little or no attention. This paper documents the existence of this shift in Kant's philosophy of logic and examines its nature. The resulting analysis provides evidence for the thesis that Kant began with a strictly intensional term (...)
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  25. Lawrence Pasternack (2014). Kant on Opinion: Assent, Hypothesis, and the Norms of General Applied Logic. Kant-Studien 105 (1):41-82.
    Kant identifies knowledge [Wissen], belief [Glaube], and opinion [Meinung] as our three primary modes of “holding-to-be-true” [Fürwahrhalten]. He also identifies opinion as making up the greatest part of our cognition. After a preliminary sketch of Kant’s system of propositional attitudes, this paper will explore what he says about the norms governing opinion and empirical hypotheses. The final section will turn to what, in the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere, Kant refers to as “General Applied Logic”. It concerns the “contingent (...)
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  26. Marcel Quarfood (2006). Kant on Biological Teleology: Towards a Two-Level Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (4):735-747.
    Kant stresses the regulative status of teleological attributions, but sometimes he seems to treat teleology as a constitutive condition for biology. To clarify this issue, the concept of natural purpose and its role for biology are examined. I suggest that the concept serves an identificatory function: it singles out objects as natural purposes, whereby the special science of biology is constituted. This relative constitutivity of teleology is explicated by means of a distinction of levels: on the object level of biological (...)
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  27. A. R. (2003). The Cognition-Knowledge Distinction in Kant and Dilthey and the Implications for Psychology and Self-Understanding. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (1):149-164.
    Both Kant and Dilthey distinguish between cognition and knowledge, but they do so differently in accordance with their respective theoretical interests. Kant's primary cognitive interest is in the natural sciences, and from this perspective the status of psychology is questioned because its phenomena are not mathematically measurable. Dilthey, by contrast, reconceives psychology as a human science.For Kant, knowledge is conceptual cognition that has attained certainty by being part of a rational system. Dilthey also links knowledge with certainty; however, he derives (...)
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  28. Rogelio Rovira (2010). ¿ Es una" falsa sutileza" la división lógica de las figuras del silogismo?: sobre la crítica de Kant a la doctrina aristotélica del silogismo categórico. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 29 (1):5-22.
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  29. Claudia M. Schmidt (2008). Kant's Transcendental and Empirical Psychology of Cognition. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (4):462-472.
  30. Nicholas Stang (forthcoming). Kant's Argument That Existence is Not a Determination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In this paper, I examine Kant’s famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non-existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further that Kant’s primary target is not ontological arguments as such (...)
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  31. Mary Tiles (2004). Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic. In Dov M. Gabbay, John Woods & Akihiro Kanamori (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic. Elsevier. 85-130.
  32. Mary Tiles (1980). Kant, Wittgenstein and the Limits of Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 1 (1-2):151-170.
    This paper has two purposes. (1) To justify the claim that there is an important distinction underlying the saying/showing distinction of the Tractatus; the distinction which Kant characterises as that between historical and rational knowledge. (2) To argue that it is because the Tractatus accepts Frege/Russell logic as a complete representation of all thought according to laws, that what is shown cannot be recognised as knowledge. This is done by interpolating Frege's logical innovations between the views of Kant and Wittgenstein (...)
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  33. Clinton Tolley (2006). Kant on the Nature of Logical Laws. Philosophical Topics 34 (1/2):371-407.
  34. Alberto Vanzo (2014). Kant on Existential Import. Kantian Review 19 (2):207-232.
    This article reconstructs Kant's view on the existential import of categorical sentences. Kant is widely taken to have held that affirmative sentences (the A and I sentences of the traditional square of opposition) have existential import, whereas negative sentences (E and O) lack existential import. The article challenges this standard interpretation. It is argued that Kant ascribes existential import only to some affirmative synthetic sentences. However, the reasons for this do not fall within the remit of Kant's formal logic. Unlike (...)
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  35. Alberto Vanzo (2012). Kant on Experiment. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor. Springer. 75-96.
    This paper discusses Immanuel Kant’s views on the role of experiments in natural science, focusing on their relationship with hypotheses, laws of nature, and the heuristic principles of scientific enquiry. Kant’s views are contrasted with the philosophy of experiment that was first sketched by Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. Kant holds that experiments are always designed and carried out in the light of hypotheses. Hypotheses are derived from experience on the basis of a set (...)
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  36. Kenneth R. Westphal (2004). Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is the first detailed study of Kant's method of 'transcendental reflection' and its use in the Critique of Pure Reason to identify our basic human cognitive capacities, and to justify Kant's transcendental proofs of the necessary a priori conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience. Kenneth Westphal, in a closely argued internal critique of Kant's analysis, shows that if we take Kant's project seriously in its own terms, the result is not transcendental idealism but (unqualified) realism regarding (...)
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  37. A. T. Winterbourne (1981). Construction and the Role of Schematism in Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 12 (1):33-46.
    This paper argues that kant's general epistemology incorporates a theory of algebra which entails a less constricted view of kant's philosophy of mathematics than is sometimes given. To extract a plausible theory of algebra from the "critique of pure reason", It is necessary to link kant's doctrine of mathematical construction to the idea of the "schematism". Mathematical construction can be understood to accommodate algebraic symbolism as well as the more familiar spatial configurations of geometry.
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  38. Michael Wolff (2010). Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (2):359 - 371.
    In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sei (2010) 41: 341-355) I have compared Aristotle's syllogistic with Kant's theory of "pure ratiocination". "Ratiocinia pura" („reine Vernunftschlüsse") is Kant's designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called 'perfect'. In Kant's view they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant's view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia (...)
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  39. Michael Wolff (2010). Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 1. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (1):199 - 213.
    In an earlier article (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:341-355, 2009), I have rejected an interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic which (since Patzig) is predominant in the literature on Aristotle, but wrong in my view. According to this interpretation, the distinguishing feature of perfect syllogisms is their being evident. Theodor Ebert has attempted to defend this interpretation by means of objections (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:357-365, 2009) which I will try to refute in part [1] of the following article. I (...)
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  40. Michael Wolff (2009). Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):341-355.
  41. J. M. Young (ed.) (1992). Lectures on Logic. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume includes three previously untranslated transcripts of Kant's logic lectures.
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