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  1. Laywine Alison (2003). Kant on Sensibility and Understanding in the 1770s. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4).
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  2. Lucy Allais (2015). Manifest Reality: Kant's Idealism and His Realism. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Lucy Allais presents an original interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism. She argues that his distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear to us has both epistemological and metaphysical components. Kant is committed to a genuine idealism about things as they appear to us, but this is not a phenomenalist idealism. He is committed to the claim that there is an aspect of reality that grounds mind-dependent spatio-temporal objects, and which we cannot cognize, but he does not assert (...)
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  3. Lucy Allais (2010). Kant's Argument for Transcendental Idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (1):47-75.
    This paper gives an interpretation of Kant's argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental Aesthetic. I argue against a common way of reading this argument, which sees Kant as arguing that substantive a priori claims about mind-independent reality would be unintelligible because we cannot explain the source of their justification. I argue that Kant's concern with how synthetic a priori propositions are possible is not a concern with the source of their justification, but with how they can have objects. I (...)
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  4. Henry E. Allison (2000). Where Have All the Categories Gone? Reflections on Longuenesse's Reading of Kant's Transcendental Deduction. Inquiry 43 (1):67 – 80.
    This paper contains a critical analysis of the interpretation of Kant's second edition version of the Transcendental Deduction offered by Béatrice Longuenesse in her recent book: Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Though agreeing with much of Longuenesse's analysis of the logical function of judgment, I question the way in which she tends to assign them the objectifying role traditionally given to the categories. More particularly, by way of defending my own interpretation of the Deduction against some of her criticisms, (...)
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  5. Karl Ameriks (2003). Problems From Van Cleve's Kant: Experience and Objects. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):196–202.
  6. Richard E. Aquila (1977). The Relationship Between Pure and Empirical Intuition in Kant. Kant-Studien 68 (1-4):275-289.
  7. Ralf M. Bader (2013). Self-Knowledge in § 7 of the Transcendental Aesthetic. In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter 531-540.
    Kant's claim that time is a subjective form of intuition was first proposed in his Inaugural Dissertation. This view was immediately criticised by Schultz, Lambert and Mendelssohn. Their criticisms are based on the claim that representations change which implies that change is real. From the reality of change they then argue to the reality of time, which undermines its supposed status as a subjective form of intuition that only applies to appearances. Kant took these criticisms very seriously and attempted to (...)
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  8. Nathan Bauer (2012). A Peculiar Intuition: Kant's Conceptualist Account of Perception. Inquiry 55 (3):215-237.
    Abstract Both parties in the active philosophical debate concerning the conceptual character of perception trace their roots back to Kant's account of sensible intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason. This striking fact can be attributed to Kant's tendency both to assert and to deny the involvement of our conceptual capacities in sensible intuition. He appears to waver between these two positions in different passages, and can thus seem thoroughly confused on this issue. But this is not, in fact, the (...)
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  9. Nathan Bauer (2010). Kant's Subjective Deduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
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  10. Manfred Baum (1992). Kant on Pure Intuition. In Phillip D. Cummins & Guenter Zoeller (eds.), Minds, Ideas, and Objects: Essays in the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy. Ridgeview Publishing CompanyRidgeview Publishing Company
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  11. Jonathan Francis Bennett (1966). Kant's Analytic. London, Cambridge U.P..
  12. Jocelyn Benoist (2004). «Le Mythe du Donné» et les Avatars du Kantisme Analytique. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (4):511-529.
  13. Sven Bernecker (2012). Kant on Spatial Orientation. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):519-533.
    This paper develops a novel interpretation of Kant's argument from incongruent counterparts to the effect that the representations of space and time are intuitions rather than concepts. When properly understood, the argument anticipates the contemporary position whereby the meaning of indexicals cannot be captured by descriptive contents.
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  14. Graham Bird (2013). Reply to Edward Kanterian. Kantian Review 18 (2):289-300.
    The reply to Kanterian offers a rebuttal of his central criticisms. It reaffirms the difference between Kant's arguments in the Aesthetic and at B 148-9; it rejects the alleged error of logic in Fischer's (and my) arguments; and it rejects Kanterian's reading of passages in the Preface (A xx-xxii) and of the Amphiboly. Beyond these specific points Kanterian assumes that Kant's project in the first Critique cannot be understood as a and so begs the question at issue.
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  15. Graham Bird (1999). Review: Falkenstein, Kant's Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1):147 – 153.
    Kant's Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic. Lorne Falkenstein. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1995. pp. xxiii + 465. £45?50. ISBN 0?8020?2973?6.
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  16. Henny Blomme (forthcoming). Kant et la matière de l'espace. Georg Olms Verlag.
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  17. Henny Blomme (2013). Können wir den ursprünglichen Raum erkennen? In Dieter Hüning, Stefan Klingner & Carsten Olk (eds.), Das Leben der Vernunft. Beiträge zur Philosophie Kants. De Gruyter 30-39.
    Mit dem Terminus 'ursprünglicher Raum' wird der Raum bezeichnet, der Kant innerhalb der transzendentalen Ästhetik als reine subjektive Form der Anschauung des äußeren Sinnes bestimmt. Man könnte ihn auch den 'ästhetischen Raum' nennen. Auf jeden Fall muss er vom (proto-)geometrischen Raum unterschieden werden, da letzterer eine Einheit voraussetzt die auf einer Synthesis beruht, und dadurch – weil bei Kant alle Synthesis unter den Kategorien steht – weniger ursprünglich zum Anschauungsvermögen gehört. Es ist diese Unterscheidung zwischen dem ursprünglichen Raum, der „Form (...)
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  18. Brady Bowman (2011). A Conceptualist Reply to Hanna's Kantian Non-Conceptualism. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):417 - 446.
    Hanna proposes a version of non-conceptualism he closely associates with Kant. This paper takes issue with his proposal on two fronts. First, there are reasons to dispute whether any version of non-conceptualism can be rightly attributed to Kant. In addition to pointing out passages that conflict with Hanna's interpretation, I also suggest ways in which the Kant of the Opus Postumum could integrate key insights of non-conceptualism into a basically conceptualist framework. In Part Two of the paper, I turn to (...)
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  19. Andrew Brook (1998). Lorne Falkenstein, Kant's Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):247-268.
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  20. Nicholas Bunnin (2008). God's Knowledge and Ours: Kant and Mou Zongsan on Intellectual Intuition. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 35 (4):613-624.
    This article examines Mou Zongsan's claim that “if it is true that human beings cannot have intellectual intuition, then the whole of Chinese philosophy must collapse completely, and the thousands years of effort must be in vain. It is just an illusion.” I argue that Mou's commitment to establishing and justifying a “moral metaphysics” was his main motivation for rejecting Kant's denial of the possibility of humans having intellectual intuition. I consider the implications of Mou's response to Kant for the (...)
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  21. Jill Vance Buroker (1997). Review: Falkenstein, Kant's Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic. [REVIEW] Kantian Review 1 (1):162-171.
  22. Mario Caimi (2005). Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer. Kant-Studien 96 (2):135-146.
    Absicht dieser Arbeit ist, den seltsamen Satz Kants zu erklären: „Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer“. Der Satz ist wohlbekannt; er findet sich in der Einleitung zur Transzendentalen Logik, und macht dort einen Teil eines längeren Satzes aus, dessen zweiter Halbsatz besagt: „Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.“ Es ist aber nicht unser Vorhaben, den Sinn des Satzes, sondern nur seine merkwürdige Form zu erklären. Er gehört in einen Zusammenhang, in dem die gegenseitige Bedingtheit von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand hervorgehoben wird: Keine dieser (...)
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  23. Emily Carson (2013). Pure Intuition and Kant's Synthetic A Priori. In Stewart Duncan & Antonia LoLordo (eds.), Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses. Routledge 307.
  24. Emily Carson (1997). Kant on Intuition in Geometry. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):489 - 512.
  25. Emily Carson & Renate Huber (eds.) (2006). Intuition and the Axiomatic Method. Springer.
    By way of these investigations, we hope to understand better the rationale behind Kant's theory of intuition, as well as to grasp many facets of the relations ...
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  26. Chung-Ying Cheng (2006). Theoretical Links Between Kant and Confucianism: Preliminary Remarks. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33 (1):3–15.
  27. Andrew Chignell (2014). Modal Motivations for Noumenal Ignorance: Knowledge, Cognition, and Coherence. Kant-Studien 105 (4):573-597.
    My goal in this paper is to show that Kant’s prohibition on certain kinds of knowledge of things-in-themselves is motivated less by his anti-soporific encounter with Hume than by his new view of the distinction between “real” and “logical” modality, a view that developed out of his reflection on the rationalist tradition in which he was trained. In brief: at some point in the 1770’s, Kant came to hold that a necessary condition on knowing a proposition is that one be (...)
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  28. Phillip Cummins (1968). Kant on Outer and Inner Intuition. Noûs 2 (3):271-292.
  29. Roberto de Sá Pereira (2013). What is Nonconceptualism in Kant's Philosophy? Philosophical Studies 164 (1):233-254.
    The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the (...)
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  30. S. Dirschauer (2004). Kantian Theory of Auto-Affection. Kant-Studien 95 (1):53-85.
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  31. Denis Dumas (1994). Emmanuel Kant. Avant/Après. Dialogue 33 (01):164-.
  32. Michael Dummett (1982). Frege and Kant on Geometry. Inquiry 25 (2):233 – 254.
    In his Grundlagen, Frege held that geometrical truths.are synthetic a priori, and that they rest on intuition. From this it has been concluded that he thought, like Kant, that space and time are a priori intuitions and that physical objects are mere appearances. It is plausible that Frege always believed geometrical truths to be synthetic a priori; the virtual disappearance of the word ‘intuition’ from his writings from after 1885 until 1924 suggests, on the other hand, that he became dissatisfied (...)
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  33. Katherine Dunlop (2009). The Unity of Time's Measure: Kant's Reply to Locke. Philosophers' Imprint 9 (4):1-31.
    In a crucial passage of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction, Kant claims that the concept of motion is central to our understanding of change and temporal order. I show that this seemingly idle claim is really integral to the Deduction, understood as a replacement for Locke’s “physiological” epistemology (cf. A86-7/B119). Béatrice Longuenesse has shown that Kant’s notion of distinctively inner receptivity derives from Locke. To explain the a priori application of concepts such as succession to this mode of sensibility, Kant construes (...)
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  34. Corey W. Dyck (forthcoming). Tetens as a Reader of Kant's Inaugural Dissertation. In Violetta L. Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Akten des 12. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses “Natur und Freiheit” in Wien vom 21.–25. September 2015.
    In this paper I consider Tetens' reaction to Kant's Inaugural Dissertation in his two most important philosophical works, the essay “Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie” of 1775 and the two-volume Philosophische Versuche of 1777. In particular, I focus on Tetens’ critical discussion of Kant's account of the acquisition of concepts of space and time.
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  35. Stephen Engstrom (2006). Understanding and Sensibility. Inquiry 49 (1):2 – 25.
    Kant holds that the human cognitive power is divided into two "stems", understanding and sensibility. This doctrine has seemed objectionably dualistic to many critics, who see these stems as distinct parts, each able on its own to produce representations, which must somehow interact, determining or constraining one another, in order to secure the fit, requisite for cognition, between concept and intuition. This reading cannot be squared, however, with what Kant actually says about theoretical cognition and the way understanding and sensibility (...)
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  36. Andrea Faggion (2013). Kant and Non-Conceptual Content. [REVIEW] Manuscrito 36 (2):343-354.
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  37. Joong Fang (1997). Kant and Mathematics Today: Between Epistemology and Exact Sciences. Edwin Mellen Press.
  38. Alfredo Ferrarin (2006). Goodbye is Too Good a Word: Sulle difficoltà del congedo di Ferraris. In Congedarsi da Kant? Interventi sul Goodbye Kant di Ferraris. ETS 13-35.
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  39. Alfredo Ferrarin (1995). Construction and Mathematical Schematism: Kant on the Exhibition of a Concept in Intuition. Kant-Studien 86 (2):131-174.
  40. Luca Forgione (2015). Kant on de Re. Some Aspects of the Kantian Non-Conceptualism Debate. Kant Studies Online:32-64.
    In recent years non-conceptual content theorists have taken Kant as a reference point on account of his notion of intuition (§§ 1-2). The present work aims at exploring several complementary issues intertwined with the notion of non-conceptual content: of these, the first concerns the role of the intuition as an indexical representation (§ 3), whereas the second applies to the presence of a few epistemic features articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (§ 4). (...)
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  41. Michael Friedman (2012). Geometria e Intuição espacial em Kant: Série 2. Kant E-Prints 7:02-32.
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  42. Michael Friedman (2012). Kant on Geometry and Spatial Intuition. Synthese 186 (1):231-255.
    I use recent work on Kant and diagrammatic reasoning to develop a reconsideration of central aspects of Kant’s philosophy of geometry and its relation to spatial intuition. In particular, I reconsider in this light the relations between geometrical concepts and their schemata, and the relationship between pure and empirical intuition. I argue that diagrammatic interpretations of Kant’s theory of geometrical intuition can, at best, capture only part of what Kant’s conception involves and that, for example, they cannot explain why Kant (...)
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  43. Michael Friedman (2000). Geometry, Construction, and Intuition in Kant and His Successors. In Gila Sher & Richard L. Tieszen (eds.), Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons. Cambridge University Press 186--218.
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  44. Michael Friedman (1990). Kant on Concepts and Intuitions in the Mathematical Sciences. Synthese 84 (2):213 - 257.
  45. Trip Glazer (2013). Sedgwick, Sally., Hegel's Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity. Review of Metaphysics 66 (3):600-602.
  46. Karen Gloy (1984). Die Kantische Differenz von Begriff und Anschauung und ihre Begründung. Kant-Studien 75 (1-4):1-37.
  47. Terry F. Godlove (2011). Hanna, Kantian Non-Conceptualism, and Benacerraf's Dilemma. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):447 - 464.
    Abstract Robert Hanna has recently advanced a theory of non-conceptual content, the central claim of which is that "it is perfectly possible for there to be directly referential intuitions without concepts". Hanna bases this claim in Kant's account of intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason, and so extends his Kantian non-conceptualism beyond the epistemology of empirical knowledge into the realm of mathematics. Thus, Hanna has proposed a Kantian non-conceptualist solution to a well-known dilemma set out by Paul Benacerraf in (...)
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  48. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase. Mind.
    Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the (...)
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  49. Aaron M. Griffith (2012). Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):193-222.
    Abstract: Philosophers interested in Kant's relevance to contemporary debates over the nature of mental content—notably Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais—have argued that Kant ought to be credited with being the original proponent of the existence of ‘nonconceptual content’. However, I think the ‘nonconceptualist’ interpretations that Hanna and Allais give do not show that Kant allowed for nonconceptual content as they construe it. I argue, on the basis of an analysis of certain sections of the A and B editions of the (...)
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  50. Stefanie Grüne (2009). Blinde Anschauung: Die Rolle von Begriffen in Kants Theorie sinnlicher Synthesis. Klostermann.
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