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  1. R. Lanier Anderson (2008). Review: Martin, Wayne, Theories of Judgment. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 137 (1):91-108.
    Martin offers an intriguing account of nineteenth century challenges to the traditional theory of judgment as a synthesis of subject and predicate (the synthesis theory)--criticisms motivated largely by the problem posed by existential judgments, which need not have two terms at all. Such judgments led to a theory of "thetic" judgments, whose essential feature is to "posit" something, rather than to combine terms (as in synthetic judgment). I argue, however, that Kant's official definition of judgment already implicitly recognizes the importance (...)
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  2. R. Lanier Anderson (2004). Containment Analyticity and Kant's Problem of Synthetic Judgment. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 25 (2):161-204.
  3. R. Lanier Anderson (2004). It Adds Up After All: Kant's Philosophy of Arithmetic in Light of the Traditional Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (3):501–540.
    Officially, for Kant, judgments are analytic iff the predicate is "contained in" the subject. I defend the containment definition against the common charge of obscurity, and argue that arithmetic cannot be analytic, in the resulting sense. My account deploys two traditional logical notions: logical division and concept hierarchies. Division separates a genus concept into exclusive, exhaustive species. Repeated divisions generate a hierarchy, in which lower species are derived from their genus, by adding differentia(e). Hierarchies afford a straightforward sense of containment: (...)
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  4. Frederick Beiser (2010). Mathematical Method in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court
  5. Franz Brentano (2013). Philosophie scientifique et philosophie des préjugés. Philosophie (119):3-31.
    Le texte traduit ici est tiré d’un recueil réunissant plusieurs écrits du philosophe allemand Franz Brentano (1838-1917) et publié en 1925 par son disciple Alfred Kastil sous le titre Essai sur la connaissance. La pièce maîtresse du recueil est un manuscrit de Brentano intitulé « À bas les préjugés ! », portant le sous-titre : « Une exhortation pour inciter l’époque actuelle à renoncer, dans l’esprit de Bacon et de Descartes, à tous les a priori aveugles » (1903). Nous avons (...)
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  6. Ruth F. Chadwick (1994). Kant, Thought Insertion, and Mental Unity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):105-113.
  7. David Howard Chandler (1979). Furwahrhalten: The Subjective Validity of Judgments in Kant's Works on Logic. Dissertation, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
  8. Alberto Coffa (1982). Kant, Bolzano, and the Emergence of Logicism. Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):679-689.
  9. Kirk Dallas Wilson (1978). Studies in the Formal Logic of Kant's Modal Functions of Judgment. Kant-Studien 69 (1-4):252-272.
  10. Theodor Ebert (2010). Michael Wolff über Kant als Logiker. Eine Stellungnahme zu Wolffs Metakritik. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (2):373 - 382.
    In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357-372) I have discussed the arguments brought forward by Michael Wolff against the interpretation given in the commentary by Ebert and Nortmann on Aristotle's syllogistic theory (Aristoteles Analytica Priora Buch I, übersetzt und erläutert von Theodor Ebert und Ulrich Nortmann. Berlin 2007) and against the critique of Kant's adaption of the syllogistic logic. I have dealt with Wolff's arguments concerning (Ebert/Nortmann's interpretation of) Aristotle in the paper mentioned and with (...)
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  11. Luca Forgione (2016). Kant and Natural Kind Terms. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 31 (1):55-72.
    As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke’s essentialist approaches (cf. §3), touching upon different aspects (metaphysical and epistemological in particular) of Kan’s slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz’s approaches on natural kind terms in the light of contemporary reflections (cf. § 2), to eventually pinpoint Kant’s contribution (...)
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  12. Paul Forster (1997). Kant, Boole and Peirce's Early Metaphysics. Synthese 113 (1):43-70.
    Charles Peirce is often credited for being among the first, perhaps even the first, to develop a scientific metaphysics of indeterminism. After rejecting the received view that Peirce developed his views from Darwin and Maxwell, I argue that Peirce's view results from his synthesis of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy and George Boole's contributions to formal logic. Specifically, I claim that Kant's conception of the laws of logic as the basis for his architectonic, when combined with Boole's view of probability, yields (...)
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  13. M. Friedman (1992). Review of Questions of Form: Logic and the Analytic Proposition From Kant to Carnap by Joëlle Proust. [REVIEW] Noûs 26:532-542.
  14. Michael Friedman (2000). Logical Form and the Order of Nature: Comments on Beátrice Longuenesse's Kant and the Capacity to Judge. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 82 (2):202-215.
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  15. Robert Greenberg (1994). The Content of Kant's Logical Functions of Judgment. History of Philosophy Quarterly 11 (4):375 - 392.
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  16. Burkhard Hafemann (2002). Logisches Quadrat und Modalbegriffe bei Kant. Kant-Studien 93 (4):409-423.
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  17. Robert Hanna, Kant's Theory of Judgment. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  18. Tim Henning (2010). Kant und die Logik des "Ich denke". Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (3):331-356.
    This paper explores Kant’s views about the logical form of “I think”-judgments. It is shown that according to Kant, in an important class of cases the prefix “I think” does not contribute to the assertoric, truth-conditional content of judgments of the form “I think that P.” Thus, judgments of this type are often merely judgments that P. The prefix “I think” does mention the subject and his thought, but it does not make the complex judgment a judgment about the subject (...)
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  19. Andreas Kamlah (2009). Kants Antwort auf Hume und eine linguistische Analyse seiner Modalbegriffe. Kant-Studien 100 (1):28-52.
    The concept of necessity plays a central role in Kant's philosophy, but seems to lead to severe paradoxes. On the one hand he states: ‘Notwendigkeit und strenge Allgemeinheit sind sichere Kennzeichen einer Erkenntnis a priori’. On the other hand he talks also about ‘notwendig (d. i. nach einer Regel)’, which means ‘necessary according to the empirical natural laws’. However, he never states explicitly the distinction between these two different concepts of necessity. Either Kant's philosophy is inconsistent or we have to (...)
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  20. Immanuel Kant (2005). Notes and Fragments: Logic, Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Aesthetics. Cambridge University Press.
    This volume provides the first ever extensive translation of the notes and fragments that survived Kant's death in 1804. These include marginalia, lecture notes, and sketches and drafts for his published works. They are important as an indispensable resource for understanding Kant's intellectual development and published works, casting new light on Kant's conception of his own philosophical methods and his relations to his predecessors, as well as on central doctrines of his work such as the theory of space, time and (...)
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  21. Tapio Korte, Ari Maunu & Tuomo Aho (2009). Modal Logic From Kant to Possible Worlds Semantics. In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press
    This chapter begins with a discussion of Kant's theory of judgment-forms. It argues that it is not true in Kant's logic that assertoric or apodeictic judgments imply problematic ones, in the manner in which necessity and truth imply possibility in even the weakest systems of modern modal logic. The chapter then discusses theories of judgment-form after Kant, the theory of quantification, Frege's Begriffsschrift, C. I. Lewis and the beginnings of modern modal logic, the proof-theoretic approach (...)
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  22. Srećko Kovač (2014). Forms of Judgment as a Link Between Mind and the Concepts of Substance and Cause. In Marek Rosiak & Miroslaw Szatkowski (eds.), Substantiality and Causality. De Gruyter 51-66.
  23. Thomas Land (2013). Intuition and Judgment: How Not to Think About the Singularity of Intuition. In Stefano Bacin, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense. De Gruyter vol. 2, 221-231.
    According to a widely held view, a Kantian intuition functions like a singular term. I argue that this view is false. Its apparent plausibility, both textual and philosophical, rests on attributing to Kant a Fregean conception of judgment. I show that Kant does not hold a Fregean conception of judgment and argue that, as a consequence, intuition cannot be understood on analogy with singular terms.
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  24. Sandra Lapointe (2012). Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant and the Kantian Logicians. Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):11-32.
    In the wake of Kant, logicians seemed to have adhered to the idea that what is distinctive of logic is its “formality”. In the paper, I discuss the distinction Kant draws between formality and generality of logic and argue that he ultimately conflates the two notions. I argue further that Kant's views on the formality of logic rest on a series of non trivial assumptions concerning the nature of cognition. I document the way in which these assumptions were received in (...)
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  25. Øystein Linnebo (2003). Frege's Conception of Logic: From Kant to Grundgesetze. Manuscrito 26 (2):235-252.
    I shall make two main claims. My first main claim is that Frege started out with a view of logic that is closer to Kant’s than is generally recognized, but that he gradually came to reject this Kantian view, or at least totally to transform it. My second main claim concerns Frege’s reasons for distancing himself from the Kantian conception of logic. It is natural to speculate that this change in Frege’s view of logic may have been spurred by a (...)
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  26. Béatrice Longuenesse (2005). Kant on the Human Standpoint. Cambridge University Press.
    Béatrice Longuenesse considers the three aspects of Kant's philosophy, his epistemology and metaphysics of nature, moral philosophy, and aesthetic theory, under one unifying standpoint: Kant's conception of our capacity to form judgments. She argues that the elements which make up our cognitive access to the world have an equally important role to play in our moral evaluations and our aesthetic judgments. Her book will appeal to all interested in Kant and his thought, ranging over Kant's account of our representations of (...)
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  27. Béatrice Longuenesse (2003). Kant's Theory of Judgment, and Judgments of Taste: On Henry Allison's "Kant's Theory of Taste". Inquiry 46 (2):143 – 163.
    Kant's use of the leading thread of his table of logical forms of judgment to analyze judgments of taste yields more results than Allison's account allows. It reveals in judgments of taste the combination of two judgments: a descriptive judgment about the object, and a normative judgment about the judging subjects. Core arguments of Kant's critique of taste receive new light from this analysis.
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  28. Béatrice Longuenesse (2001). Synthesis, Logical Forms, and the Objects of Our Ordinary Experience: Response to Michael Friedman. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (2):199-212.
    In the 82/2 (2000) issue of this journal, Michael Friedman has offered a stimulating discussion of my recent book, Kant and the Capacity to Judge. His conclusion is that on the whole I fail to do justice to what is most revolutionary about Kant's natural philosophy, and instead end up attributing to Kant a pre-Newtonian, Aristotelian philosophy of nature. This is because, according to Friedman, I put excessive weight on Kant's claim to have derived his categories from a set of (...)
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  29. Huaping Lu-Adler (2015). Chapter 5. Constructing a Demonstration of Logical Rules, or How to Use Kant’s Logic Corpus. In Robert R. Clewis (ed.), Reading Kant's Lectures. De Gruyter 137-158.
    In this chapter, I discuss some problems of Kant’s logic corpus while recognizing its richness and potential value. I propose and explain a methodic way to approach it. I then test the proposal by showing how we may use various mate- rials from the corpus to construct a Kantian demonstration of the formal rules of thinking (or judging) that lie at the base of Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction. The same proposal can be iterated with respect to other topics. The said demonstration (...)
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  30. Huaping Lu-Adler (2014). Kant on the Logical Form of Singular Judgements. Kantian Review 19 (3):367-392.
    At A71/B96–7 Kant explains that singular judgements are ‘special’ because they stand to the general ones as Einheit to Unendlichkeit. The reference to Einheit brings to mind the category of unity and hence raises a spectre of circularity in Kant’s explanation. I aim to remove this spectre by interpreting the Einheit-Unendlichkeit contrast in light of the logical distinctions among universal, particular and singular judgments shared by Kant and his logician predecessors. This interpretation has a further implication for resolving (...)
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  31. Huaping Lu-Adler (2013). The Objects and the Formal Truth of Kantian Analytic Judgments. History of Philosophy Quarterly 30 (2):177-93.
    I defend the thesis that Kantian analytic judgments are about objects (as opposed to concepts) against two challenges raised by recent scholars. First, can it accommodate cases like “A two-sided polygon is two-sided”, where no object really falls under the subject-concept as Kant sees it? Second, is it compatible with Kant’s view that analytic judgments make no claims about objects in the world and that we can know them to be true without going beyond the given concepts? I address these (...)
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  32. Huaping Lu-Adler (2012). Kant’s Conception of Logical Extension and Its Implications. Dissertation, University of California, Davis
    It is a received view that Kant’s formal logic (or what he calls “pure general logic”) is thoroughly intensional. On this view, even the notion of logical extension must be understood solely in terms of the concepts that are subordinate to a given concept. I grant that the subordination relation among concepts is an important theme in Kant’s logical doctrine of concepts. But I argue that it is both possible and important to ascribe to Kant an objectual notion of logical (...)
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  33. John MacFarlane (2002). Frege, Kant, and the Logic in Logicism. Philosophical Review 111 (1):25-65.
    Let me start with a well-known story. Kant held that logic and conceptual analysis alone cannot account for our knowledge of arithmetic: “however we might turn and twist our concepts, we could never, by the mere analysis of them, and without the aid of intuition, discover what is the sum [7+5]” (KrV, B16). Frege took himself to have shown that Kant was wrong about this. According to Frege’s logicist thesis, every arithmetical concept can be defined in purely logical terms, and (...)
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  34. Penelope Maddy (1999). Logic and the Discursive Intellect. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):94-115.
    The effort to fit simple logical truths–like `if it's either red or green and it's not red, then it must be green'–into Kant's account of knowledge turns up a position more subtle and intriguing than might be expected at first glance.
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  35. W. Malzkorn (1995). Kants Kritik an der Traditionellen Syllogistik. History and Philosophy of Logic 16 (1):75-88.
  36. Wayne M. Martin (2006). Theories of Judgment: Psychology, Logic, Phenomenology. Cambridge University Press.
    Wayne Martin traces attempts to develop theories of judgment in British Empiricism, the logical tradition stemming from Kant, nineteenth-century psychologism, recent experimental neuropsychology, and the phenomenological tradition associated with Brentano, Husserl and Heidegger. His reconstruction of vibrant but largely forgotten nineteenth-century debates links Kantian approaches to judgment with twentieth-century phenomenological accounts. He also shows that the psychological, logical and phenomenological dimensions of judgment are not only equally important, but fundamentally interlinked.
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  37. Wayne M. Martin (2003). Nothing More or Less Than Logic: General Logic, Transcendental Philosophy, and Kant's Repudiation of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. Topoi 22 (1):29-39.
    In this paper I lay the foundations for an understanding of one of Fichte's most neglected and least understood texts: the late lecture course on Transcendental Logic. I situate this work in the context of Fichte's lifelong struggle with the problem of understanding the relation between logic and philosophy – a problem that I show to figure centrally both in Fichte's own revolutionary thinking and in his response to Kant's notorious denunciation of the Wissenschaftslehre. By attending to this context we (...)
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  38. Arthur Melnick (1993). Review: Kitcher, Kant's Transcendental Psychology. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 60 (3):513-.
  39. Kurt Mosser (2008). The Grammatical Background of Kant's General Logic. Kantian Review 13 (1):116-140.
    In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant conceives of general logic as a set of universal and necessary rules for the possibility of thought, or as a set of minimal necessary conditions for ascribing rationality to an agent . Such a conception, of course, contrasts with contemporary notions of formal, mathematical or symbolic logic. Yet, in so far as Kant seeks to identify those conditions that must hold for the possibility of thought in general, such conditions must hold a fortiori (...)
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  40. Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2011). The Historical and Philosophical Origins of Normativism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):253-254.
    Elqayam & Evans' (E&E's) critique of normativism is related to an inherently philosophical question: Is thinking a normative affair? Should thinking be held accountable towards certain norms? I present the historical and philosophical origins of the view that thinking belongs to the realm of normativity and has a tight connection with logic, stressing the pivotal role of Kant in these developments.
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  41. Lawrence Pasternack (2016). Concordance to Excerpt From the Doctrine of Reason by Georg Friedrich Meier. In Lawrence Pasternack & Pablo Muchnik (eds.), Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason. 147-188.
  42. Lawrence Pasternack & Pablo Muchnik (2016). Preface to Excerpt From the Doctrine of Reason by Georg Friedrich Meier. In Lawrence Pasternack & Pablo Muchnik (eds.), Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason by Georg Friedrich Meier. Bloomsbury
  43. Derk Pereboom (2009). Kant's Transcendental Arguments. In Edward Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford
  44. Robert Pippin (2014). The Significance of Self‐Consciousness in Idealist Theories of Logic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):145-166.
    Among Kant's innovations in the understanding of logic (‘general logic’) were his claims that logic had no content of its own, but was the form of the thought of any possible content, and that the unit of meaning, the truth-bearer, judgement, was essentially apperceptive. Judging was implicitly the consciousness of judging. This was for Kant a logical truth. This article traces the influence of the latter claim on Fichte, and, for most of the discussion, on Hegel. The aim is to (...)
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  45. Robert B. Pippin (1997). Review: Longuenesse, Kant Et le Pouvoir de Juger: Sensibilite Et Discursivite Dans l'Analytique Transcendentale de la Critique de la Raison Pure. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophy 94 (6):318-324.
  46. Konstantin Pollok (2014). From the Clarity of Ideas to the Validity of Judgments: Kant's Farewell to Epistemic Perfectionism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):18-35.
    Against the standard interpretation of Kant's ‘Copernican revolution’ as the prioritization of epistemology over ontology, I argue in this paper that his critique of traditional metaphysics must be seen as a farewell to the perfectionism on which early modern rationalist ontology and epistemology are built. However, Kant does not simply replace ‘perfection’ with another fundamental concept of normativity. More radically, Kant realizes that it is not simply ideas but only the relation of ideas that can be subject to norms, and (...)
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  47. Michael D. Potter (2000). Reason's Nearest Kin: Philosophies of Arithmetic From Kant to Carnap. Oxford University Press.
    This is a critical examination of the astonishing progress made in the philosophical study of the properties of the natural numbers from the 1880s to the 1930s. Reassessing the brilliant innovations of Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, and others, which transformed philosophy as well as our understanding of mathematics, Michael Potter places arithmetic at the interface between experience, language, thought, and the world.
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  48. Joelle Proust (1989). Questions of Form: Logic and Analytic Proposition From Kant to Carnap. Univ of Minnesota Press.
    Hence, this book's provocative claim: today's so-called logical empiricism owes much more to Kant's notion of science than to Hume's.
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  49. Sebastian Rödl (2005). Transcendental Deduction of Predicative Structure in Kant and Brandom. Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):91-108.
    Fregean predicates applied to Fregean objects are merely defined by a "timeless" deductive order of sentences. They cannot provide sufficient structure in order to explain how names can refer to objects of intuition and how predicates can express properties of substances that change in time. Therefore, the accounts of Wilson and Quine, Prior and Brandom for temporal judgments fail -- and a new reconstruction of Kant's transcendental logic, especially of the analogies of experience, is needed.
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  50. Waldemar Rohloff (2012). From Ordinary Language to Definition in Kant and Bolzano. Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):131-149.
    In this paper I discuss Kant's and Bolzano's differing perspectives on ordinary natural language. I argue that Kant does not see ordinary language as providing semantically organized content and that, as a result, Kant does not believe that ordinary language is sufficiently well-developed to support philosophical analysis and definition. By contrast, for Bolzano, the content given in ordinary language are richly structured entities he calls 'propositions in themselves'. This contrast in views is used to explain Bolzano's criticism of Kant's belief (...)
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