This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Subcategories:
217 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 217
Material to categorize
  1. Henry E. Allison (2007). Comments on Guyer. Inquiry 50 (5):480 – 488.
    Guyer argues for four major theses. First, in his early, pre-critical discussions of morality, Kant advocated a version of rational egoism, in which freedom, understood naturalistically as a freedom from domination by both one's own inclinations and from other people, rather than happiness, is the fundamental value. From this point of view, the function of the moral law is to prescribe rules best suited to the preservation and maximization of such freedom, just as on the traditional eudaemonistic account it is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Henry E. Allison (1990). Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press.
    In his new book the eminent Kant scholar Henry Allison provides an innovative and comprehensive interpretation of Kant's concept of freedom. The author analyzes the concept and discusses the role it plays in Kant's moral philosophy and psychology. He also considers in full detail the critical literature on the subject from Kant's own time to the present day. In the first part Professor Allison argues that at the center of the Critique of Pure Reason there is the foundation for a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Henry E. Allison (1986). Morality and Freedom: Kant's Reciprocity Thesis. Philosophical Review 95 (3):393-425.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Karl Ameriks (1992). Book Review:Kant's Theory of Freedom. Henry Allison. [REVIEW] Ethics 102 (3):655-.
  5. Karl Ameriks (1992). Kant and Hegel on Freedom: Two New Interpretations. Inquiry 35 (2):219 – 232.
    Can Kant's theory of freedom be defended in contemporary ?incompatibilist? terms, as Henry Allison believes, or is it vulnerable to Hegelian criticisms of the ?compatibilist? sort that Allen Wood presents? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is negative, and that there is a third option, namely that Kant's real theory of freedom is not as well off as Allison contends, nor as weak as Wood claims. Allison tries to save Kant's theory of freedom from both what (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Robert Arp (2007). Vindicating Kant's Morality. International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1):5-22.
    Among others, four significant criticisms have been leveled against Kant’s morality. These criticisms are that Kant’s morality lacks a motivational component, thatit ignores the spiritual dimensions of morality espoused by a virtue-based ethics, that it overemphasizes the principle of autonomy in neglecting the communal context of morality, and that it lacks a theological foundation in being detached from God. In this paper I attempt to show that, when understood in the broader context of his religious doctrines and the overall philosophical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Gary Banham (2010). Ethics Vindicated: Kant's Transcendental Legitimation of Moral Discourse. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):111-112.
    This is a short review of a work by Bencivenga on Kant's ethics that argues for a view of Kant that treats his moral rules as not prescriptive but only transcendental and takes issue with this reading.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Gary Banham (2006). Freedom and Transcendental Idealism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 14 (4):787 – 797.
    Full-text of this article is not available in this e-prints service. This article was originally published following peer-review in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, published by and copyright Routledge.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Marcia Baron (1993). Henry Allison on Kant's Theory of Freedom. Dialogue 32 (04):775-.
  10. A. M. Baxley (2007). Themes in Kant's Metaphysics and Ethics. Philosophical Review 116 (1):142-144.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Anne Margaret Baxley (2012). The Problem of Obligation, the Finite Rational Will, and Kantian Value Realism. Inquiry 55 (6):567-583.
    Abstract Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation is a remarkable achievement, representing an original reading of Kant's contribution to modern moral philosophy and the legacy he bequeathed to his later-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century successors in the German tradition. On Stern's interpretation, it was not the threat to autonomy posed by value realism, but the threat to autonomy posed by the obligatory nature of morality that led Kant to develop his critical moral theory grounded in the concept of the self-legislating moral agent. Accordingly, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Anthony F. Beavers (2000). Kant and the Problem of Ethical Metaphysics. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 7 (2-3):11-20.
    The ethical philosophies of Kant and Levinas would seem, on the surface, to be incompatible. In this essay. I attempt to reconcile them by situating Levinas’s philosophy “beneath” Kant’s as its existential condition thereby addressing two shortcomings in each of their works, for Kant. the apparent difficulty of making ethics apply to real concrete cases, and, for Levinas, the apparent difficulty of establishing a normative ethics that can offer prescriptions for moral behavior. My general thesis is that the existential ethical (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. M. G. J. Beets (1988). Reality and Freedom: Reflections on Kant's Moral Philosophy. Eburon.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Richard A. Blanke (1985). The Motivation to Be Moral in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals. Philosophy Research Archives 11:335-345.
    Kant maintained that in order for an act to have moral worth it is necessary that it be done from the motive of duty. On the traditional view of Kant, the motive of duty is constituted solely by one’s belief or cognition that some act is one’s duty. Desire must be ruled out as forming partof the moral motive. On this view, if an agent’s act is to have moral worth, then it must be the ease that his belief that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. David Forman (2007). Review of Ermanno Bencivenga, Ethics Vindicated: Kant's Transcendental Legitimation of Moral Discourse. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (6).
  16. Alison Hills (2008). Kantian Value Realism. Ratio 21 (2):182–200.
    Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing. Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory. But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory is not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Alison Hills (2005). Rational Nature as the Source of Value. Kantian Review 10 (1):60-81.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Robert Hopkins (2001). Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement. European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):166–189.
    Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one's mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Patrick Kain (2010). Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason. In Benjamin Lipscomb & James Krueger (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics: God, Freedom, and Immortality. de Gruyter. 211--230.
    Kant’s claims about supersensible objects, and his account of the epistemic status of such claims, remain poorly understood, to the detriment of our understanding of Kant’s metaphysical and epistemological system. In the Critique of Practical Reason, and again in the Critique of Judgment, Kant claims that we have practical cognition (Erkenntnis) and knowledge (Wissen) of the moral law and of our supersensible freedom; that this cognition and knowledge cohere with, yet go beyond the limits of, our theoretical cognition; and that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Patrick Kain (2006). Constructivism, Intrinsic Normativity, and the Motivational Analysis Argument. In Heiner Klemme, Manfred Kuehn & Dieter Schönecker (eds.), Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. (Kant-Forschungen 16). Meiner Verlag.
    This essay addresses the relationship between Kant's theory of moral motivation and theories of normativity. Constructivist or "ideal agent" theories of normativity claim that what makes a principle normative is that rational agents endorse or possess a motive of a certain kind to comply with it, or that they endorse or possess such a motive to comply with it insofar as they are rational. Korsgaard has argued that Kant's "motivational analysis" of the concept of obligation in Grundlegung I provides an (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Patrick Kain (2006). Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant's Second Critique. Philosophy Compass 1 (5):449–465.
    This critical survey of recent work on Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason and his doctrine of the practical postulates (of freedom, God, and immortality) assesses the implications of these doctrines for the debate about realism and antirealism in Kant's moral philosophy. Section 1 briefly surveys some salient considerations from the first Critique and Groundwork. In section 2, I argue that recent work on the role, content, "factual" nature, and epistemic status of the fact of reason does not support (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Patrick Kain (2004). Self-Legislation in Kant's Moral Philosophy. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 86 (3):257-306.
    Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise. Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his opposition to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Noa Latham (1994). Causally Irrelevant Reasons and Action Solely From the Motive of Duty. Journal of Philosophy 91 (11):599-618.
    My concern in part I of this paper is with how to make sense of the position that one can have reasons both of duty and inclination for an action one performs but be motivated solely by duty, and more generally that one can have several reasons for an action one performs but be motivated only by some of them. I examine a number of ways of attempting to do this, most of them independent of the Kantian context, and argue (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Michael H. McCarthy (1985). The Objection of Circularity in Groundwork III. Kant-Studien 76 (1-4):28-42.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Michael H. McCarthy (1982). Kant's Rejection of the Argument of Groundwork III. Kant-Studien 73 (1-4):169-190.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Frederick Rauscher (2009). Freedom and Reason in Groundwork III. In Jens Timmermann (ed.), Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. John Skorupski (2009). Autonomy and Impartiality : Groundwork III. In Jens Timmermann (ed.), Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Lucas Thorpe (2006). The Point of Studying Ethics According to Kant. Journal of Value Inquiry 40 (4):461-474.
  29. Owen Ware (2010). Kant, Skepticism, and Moral Sensibility. Dissertation, University of Toronto
    In his early writings, Kant says that the solution to the puzzle of how morality can serve as a motivating force in human life is nothing less than the “philosophers’ stone.” In this dissertation I show that for years Kant searched for the philosophers’ stone in the concept of “respect” (Achtung), which he understood as the complex effect practical reason has on feeling. I sketch the history of that search in Chapters 1-2. In Chapter 3 I show that Kant’s analysis (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Kant: Moral Realism and Constructivism
  1. Carla Bagnoli (forthcoming). Constructivism About Practical Knowledge. In , Constructivism in Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
    It is largely agreed that if constructivism contributes anything to meta-ethics it is by proposing that we understand ethical objectivity “in terms of a suitably constructed point of view that all can accept” (Rawls 1980/1999: 307). Constructivists defend this “practical” conception of objectivity in contrast to the realist or “ontological” conception of objectivity, understood as an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order. Because of their objectivist but not realist commitments, Kantian constructivists place their theory “somewhere in the space between (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Thomas M. Besch (2008). Constructing Practical Reason: O'Neill on the Grounds of Kantian Constructivism. Journal of Value Inquiry 42 (1):55-76.
    The paper addresses O'Neill's view that her version of Kant's Categorical Imperative, namely, the requirement of followability (RF), marks the supreme principle of reason; it takes issue with her claim that RF commits us to Kantian constructivism in practical philosophy. The paper distinguishes between two readings of RF: on a weak reading, RF ranges over all (practical) reasoning but does not commit to constructivism, and on a strong version RF commits to constructivism but fails to meet its own test, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Charles P. Bigger (1981). Kant's Constructivism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):279-291.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. E. Sonny Elizondo (2013). Reason in its Practical Application. Philosophers' Imprint 13 (21):1-17.
    Is practical reason a cognitive faculty? Do practical judgments make claims about a subject matter that are appropriately assessed in terms of their agreement with that subject matter? According to Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, the answer is no. To think otherwise is to conflate the theoretical and the practical, the epistemic and the ethical. I am not convinced. In this paper, I motivate my skepticism through examination of the very figure who inspires Korsgaard's rejection of cognitivism: Kant. For as I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Paul Formosa (2013). Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist? European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):170-196.
    : The dominant interpretation of Kant as a moral constructivist has recently come under sustained philosophical attack by those defending a moral realist reading of Kant. In light of this, should we read Kant as endorsing moral constructivism or moral realism? In answering this question we encounter disagreement in regard to two key independence claims. First, the independence of the value of persons from the moral law (an independence that is rejected) and second, the independence of the content and authority (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Richard Galvin (2011). Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: Varieties of Kantian Constructivism in Ethics. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):16-36.
    Some commentators have attributed constructivism to Kant at the first-order level; others cast him as a meta-ethical constructivist. Among meta-ethical constructivist interpretations I distinguish between ‘atheistic’ and ‘agnostic’ versions regarding the existence of an independent moral order. Even though these two versions are incompatible, each is linked with central Kantian doctrines, revealing a tension within Kant's own view. Moreover, among interpretations that cast Kant as rejecting substantive realism but embracing procedural realism, some (i.e., those that are ‘constructivist’) face charges of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Heidi Chamberlin Giannini (2013). Korsgaard and the Wille/Willkür Distinction: Radical Constructivism and the Imputability of Immoral Actions. Kant Studies Online:72-101.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Alexander Kaufman (2012). Rawls and Kantian Constructivism. Kantian Review 17 (2):227-256.
    John Rawls's account of Kantian constructivism is perhaps his most striking contribution to ethics. In this paper, I examine the relation between Rawls's constructivism and its foundation in Kantian intuitions. In particular, I focus on the progressive influence on Rawls's approach of the Kantian intuition that the substance of morality is best understood as constructed by free and equal people under fair conditions. Rawls's focus on this Kantian intuition, I argue, motivates the focus on social contract that grounds both his (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Christine M. Korsgaard (2003). Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy. Journal of Philosophical Research 28 (Supplement):99-122.
    In this paper I trace the development of one of the central debates of late twentieth-century moral philosophy—the debate between realism and what Rawls called “constructivism.” Realism, I argue, is a reactive position that arises in response to almost every attempt to give a substantive explanation of morality. It results from the realist’s belief that such explanations inevitably reduce moral phenomena to natural phenomena. I trace this belief, and the essence of realism, to a view about the nature of concepts—that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Larry Krasnoff (1999). How Kantian is Constructivism? Kant-Studien 90 (4):385-409.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Catriona Mckinnon (1997). Review: O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. [REVIEW] Kantian Review 1:171-176.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Onora O'Neill (1989). Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    Two centuries after they were published, Kant's ethical writings are as much admired and imitated as they have ever been, yet serious and long-standing accusations of internal incoherence remain unresolved. Onora O'Neill traces the alleged incoherences to attempts to assimilate Kant's ethical writings to modern conceptions of rationality, action and rights. When the temptation to assimilate is resisted, a strikingly different and more cohesive account of reason and morality emerges. Kant offers a "constructivist" vindication of reason and a moral vision (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Frederick Rauscher (2002). Kant's Moral Anti-Realism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (4):477-499.
    I defend the claim that Kant is a moral antirealist, or (as he would state it) moral idealist. I first define moral realism and moral idealism, concluding that moral idealism requires that every moral property depend upon the minds of moral agents. Kant's metaethical theory is idealist regarding the nature of value, since it depends upon the voluntary choices of moral agents in pursuing particular ends, the nature of right, since the categorical imperative stems from moral agents' own reason, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Timothy Rosenkoetter (2011). Kant on Construction, Apriority, and the Moral Relevance of Universalization. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (6):1143 - 1174.
    This paper introduces a referential reading of Kant?s practical project, according to which maxims are made morally permissible by their correspondence to objects, though not the ontic objects of Kant?s theoretical project but deontic objects (what ought to be). It illustrates this model by showing how the content of the Formula of Universal Law might be determined by what our capacity of practical reason can stand in a referential relation to, rather than by facts about what kind of beings we (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Sergio Tenenbaum (2011). Review of Christine Korsgaard's "Self-Constitution&Quot;. [REVIEW] Ethics 121 (2):449-455.
  16. Victoria S. Wike (1983). Metaphysical Foundations of Morality in Kant. Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (3):225-233.
Kant: Freedom
  1. Henry E. Allison (1986). The Concept of Freedom in Kant's “Semi-Critical” Ethics. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 68 (1):96-115.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Kristina Mussgnug Barrett (2006). Review: Sherover & Johnson (Ed), Are We in Time? [REVIEW] Kantian Review 11:133-136.
  3. Federica Basaglia (2009). Libertà E Male Morale Nella "Critica Della Ragion Pratica" di Immanuel Kant. Aracne.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Kenneth Baynes (2007). Freedom as Autonomy. In Brian Leiter & Michael Rosen (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Ermanno Bencivenga (2007). Ethics Vindicated: Kant's Transcendental Legitimation of Moral Discourse. Oxford University Press.
    Can we regard ourselves as having free will? What is the place of values in a world of facts? What grounds the authority of moral injunctions, and why should we care about them? Unless we provide satisfactory answers to these questions, ethics has no credible status and is likely to be subsumed by psychology, history, or rational decision theory. According to Ermanno Bencivenga, this outcome is both common and regrettable. Bencivenga points to Immanuel Kant for the solution. Kant's philosophy is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 217