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  1. Uygar Abaci (2014). Kant's Only Possible Argument and Chignell's Real Harmony. Kantian Review 19 (1):1-25.
    Andrew Chignell recently proposed an original reconstruction of Kant's for the existence of God. Chignell claims that what motivates the of Kant's proof, , is the requirement that the predicates of a really possible thing must be , i.e. compatible in an extra-logical or metaphysical sense. I take issue with Chignell's reconstruction. First, the pre-Critical Kant does not present as a general condition of real possibility. Second, the real harmony requirement is not what motivates the of the proof. Instead, this (...)
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  2. Uygar Abaci (2013). The Coextensiveness Thesis and Kant's Modal Agnosticism in the 'Postulates'. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3).
    In the Critique of Pure Reason, following his elucidation of the ‘postulates’ of possibility, actuality, and necessity, Kant makes a series of puzzling remarks. He seems to deny the somewhat metaphysically intuitive contention that the extension of possibility is greater than that of actuality, which, in turn, is greater than that of necessity (A230/B283). Further, he states that the actual adds nothing to the possible (B284). This leads to the view, fairly common in the literature, that Kant holds that all (...)
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  3. Uygar Abaci (2008). Kant's Theses on Existence. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (3):559 – 593.
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  4. Robert Merrihew Adams (2000). God, Possibility, and Kant. Faith and Philosophy 17 (4):425-440.
    In one of his precritical works, Kant defends, as “the only possible” way of demonstrating the existence of God, an argument from the nature of possibility. Whereas Leibniz had argued that possibilities must be thought by God in order to obtain the ontological standing that they need, Kant argued that at least the most fundamental possibilities must be exemplified in God. Here Kant’s argument is critically examined in comparison with its Leibnizian predecessor, and it is suggested that an argument combining (...)
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  5. Robert Merrihew Adams (1997). Things in Themselves. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):801-825.
    The paper is an interpretation and defense of Kant's conception of things in themselves as noumena, along the following lines. Noumena are transempirical realities. As such they have several important roles in Kant's critical philosophy (Section 1). Our theoretical faculties cannot obtain enough content for a conception of noumena that would assure their real possibility as objects, but can establish their merely formal logical possibility (Sections 2-3). Our practical reason, however, grounds belief in the real possibility of some noumena, and (...)
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  6. Franz Andrä (1970). Grund und möglichkeit. Kant-Studien 61 (1-4):190-199.
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  7. Graham Bird (1959). The Necessity of Kant. Mind 68 (271):389-392.
  8. Ian S. Blecher (2013). Kant on Formal Modality. Kant-Studien 104 (1):44-62.
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  9. Andrew Chignell (forthcoming). Modal Motives for Noumenal Ignorance: Knowledge, Cognition, Coherence. Kant-Studien.
    Abstract: My goal in this paper is to show that Kant’s prohibition on certain kinds of knowledge of things-in-themselves is motivated less by his anti-soporific encounter with Hume than by his new view of the distinction between “real” and “logical” modality, a view that developed out of his reflection on the rationalist tradition in which he was trained. In brief: at some point in the 1770’s, Kant came to hold that a necessary condition on knowing a proposition is that one (...)
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  10. Andrew Chignell (2014). Kant and the 'Monstrous' Ground of Possibility. Kantian Review 19 (1):53-69.
    I reply to recent criticisms by Uygar Abaci and Peter Yong, among others, of my reading of Kant's pre-Critical of God's existence, and of its fate in the Critical period. Along the way I discuss some implications of this debate for our understanding of Kant's modal metaphysics and modal epistemology generally.
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  11. Andrew Chignell (2012). Kant, Real Possibility, and the Threat of Spinoza. Mind 121 (483):635-675.
    In the first part of the paper I reconstruct Kant’s proof of the existence of a ‘most real being’ while also highlighting the theory of modality that motivates Kant’s departure from Leibniz’s version of the proof. I go on to argue that it is precisely this departure that makes the being that falls out of the pre-critical proof look more like Spinoza’s extended natura naturans than an independent, personal creator-God. In the critical period, Kant seems to think that transcendental idealism (...)
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  12. Andrew Chignell (2011). Real Repugnance and Our Ignorance of Things-in-Themselves: A Lockean Problem in Kant and Hegel. Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 7:135-159.
    Kant holds that in order to have knowledge of an object, a subject must be able to “prove” that the object is really possible—i.e., prove that there is neither logical inconsistency nor “real repugnance” between its properties. This is (usually) easy to do with respect to empirical objects, but (usually) impossible to do with respect to particular things-in-themselves. In the first section of the paper I argue that an important predecessor of Kant’s account of our ignorance of real possibility can (...)
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  13. Andrew Chignell (2010). Real Repugnance and Belief About Things-in-Themselves: A Problem and Kant's Three Solutions. In James Krueger & Benjamin Bruxvoort Lipscomb (eds.), Kant's Moral Metaphysics. Walter DeGruyter.
    Kant says that it can be rational to accept propositions on the basis of non-epistemic or broadly practical considerations, even if those propositions include “transcendental ideas” of supersensible objects. He also worries, however, about how such ideas (of freedom, the soul, noumenal grounds, God, the kingdom of ends, and things-in-themselves generally) acquire genuine positive content in the absence of an appropriate connection to intuitional experience. How can we be sure that the ideas are not empty “thought-entities (Gedankendinge)”—that is, speculative fancies (...)
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  14. Andrew Chignell (2009). Are Supersensibles Really Possible? The Evidential Role of Symbols. In V. Rhoden, T. Terra & G. Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. DeGruyter.
    Kant on how certain experiences might give us considerations counting in favor of the real possibility of certain things. -/- .
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  15. Andrew Chignell (2009). Kant, Modality, and the Most Real Being. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 91 (2):157-192.
    Kant's speculative theistic proof rests on a distinction between “logical” and “real” modality that he developed very early in the pre-critical period. The only way to explain facts about real possibility, according to Kant, is to appeal to the properties of a unique, necessary, and “most real” being. Here I reconstruct the proof in its historical context, focusing on the role played by the theory of modality both in motivating the argument (in the pre-critical period) and, ultimately, in undoing it (...)
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  16. Gaetano Chiurazzi (2000). Schématisme Et Modalité: La Doctrine Kantienne du Schématisme Comme Thématisation de la Dimension Analogico-Expérimentale de la Connaissance. Kant-Studien 91 (2):146-164.
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  17. Pio Colonnello (1989). Über den Begriff der Notwendigkeit in Kants Analytik der Grundsätze. Kant-Studien 80 (1-4):48-62.
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  18. Kirk Dallas Wilson (1978). Studies in the Formal Logic of Kant's Modal Functions of Judgment. Kant-Studien 69 (1-4):252-272.
  19. Mark Fisher & Eric Watkins (2011). Kant on the Material Ground of Possibility. Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):369-395.
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  20. Mark Fisher & Eric Watkins (1998). Kant on the Material Ground of Possibility: From "The Only Possible Argument" to the "Critique of Pure Reason". Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):369 - 395.
  21. J. William Forgie (2008). Kant and Existence: Critique of Pure Reason A 600/B 628. Kant-Studien 99 (1):1-12.
    By whatever and by however many predicates we may think a thing – even if we completely determine it – we do not make the least addition to the thing when we further declare that this thing is. Otherwise, it would not be exactly the same thing that exists, but something more than we had thought in the concept; and we could not, therefore, say that the exact object of my concept exists.
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  22. William Forgie (2007). Gassendi and Kant on Existence. Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (4):511 - 523.
    : In rejecting Descartes's ontological proof for the existence of God, Gassendi maintained that existence is not a property and Kant said that it is not a "real predicate." It is commonly supposed that both are making the same claim. Some have even thought that they advance essentially the same argument for that same claim. I believe none of this is correct. Gassendi and Kant offer different arguments. And they are arguing for different conclusions. These differences stem from a more (...)
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  23. Martha I. Gibson (2011). A Revolution in Method, Kant's “Copernican Hypothesis”, and the Necessity of Natural Laws. Kant-Studien 102 (1):1-21.
    In an effort to account for our a priori knowledge of synthetic necessary truths, Kant proposes to extend the successful method used in mathematics and the natural sciences to metaphysics. In this paper, a uniform account of that method is proposed and the particular contribution of the ‘Copernican hypothesis’ to our knowledge of necessary truths is explained. It is argued that, though the necessity of the truths is in a way owing to the object's relation to our cognition, the truths (...)
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  24. Hans-Johann Glock (1997). Kant and Wittgenstein: Philosophy, Necessity and Representation. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):285 – 305.
    Several authors have detected profound analogies between Kant and Wittgenstein. Their claims have been contradicted by scholars, such being the agreed penalty for attributions to authorities. Many of the alleged similarities have either been left unsubstantiated at a detailed exegetical level, or have been confined to highly general points. At the same time, the 'scholarly' backlash has tended to ignore the importance of some of these general points, or has focused on very specific issues or purely terminological matters. To advance (...)
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  25. William Mark Goodwin (2010). Coffa's Kant and the Evolution of Accounts of Mathematical Necessity. Synthese 172 (3):361 - 379.
    According to Alberto Coffa in The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, Kant’s account of mathematical judgment is built on a ‘semantic swamp’. Kant’s primitive semantics led him to appeal to pure intuition in an attempt to explain mathematical necessity. The appeal to pure intuition was, on Coffa’s line, a blunder from which philosophy was forced to spend the next 150 years trying to recover. This dismal assessment of Kant’s contributions to the evolution of accounts of mathematical necessity is fundamentally (...)
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  26. Burkhard Hafemann (2002). Logisches Quadrat und Modalbegriffe bei Kant. Kant Studien 93 (4):409-423.
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  27. Robert Hanna (2001). Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Robert Hanna presents a fresh view of the Kantian and analytic traditions that have dominated continental European and Anglo-American philosophy over the last two centuries, and of the connections between them. But this is not just a study in the history of philosophy, for out of this emerges Hanna's original approach to two much-contested theories that remain at the heart of contemporary philosophy. Hanna puts forward a new 'cognitive-semantic' interpretation of transcendental idealism, and a vigorous defense of Kant's theory of (...)
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  28. Robert Hanna (1998). How Do We Know Necessary Truths? Kant's Answer. European Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):115–145.
  29. Joachim Horvath (2009). The Modal Argument for a Priori Justification. Ratio 22 (2):191-205.
    Kant famously argued that, from experience, we can only learn how something actually is, but not that it must be so. In this paper, I defend an improved version of Kant's argument for the existence of a priori knowledge, the Modal Argument , against recent objections by Casullo and Kitcher. For the sake of the argument, I concede Casullo's claim that we may know certain counterfactuals in an empirical way and thereby gain epistemic access to some nearby, nomologically possible worlds. (...)
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  30. Andreas Kamlah (2009). Kants Antwort auf Hume und eine linguistische Analyse seiner Modalbegriffe. Kant-Studien 100 (1):28-52.
    The concept of necessity plays a central role in Kant's philosophy, but seems to lead to severe paradoxes. On the one hand he states: ‘Notwendigkeit und strenge Allgemeinheit sind sichere Kennzeichen einer Erkenntnis a priori’. On the other hand he talks also about ‘notwendig (d. i. nach einer Regel)’, which means ‘necessary according to the empirical natural laws’. However, he never states explicitly the distinction between these two different concepts of necessity. Either Kant's philosophy is inconsistent or we have to (...)
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  31. Ivan Kolev (2008). Modal Thinking in the Philosophical Anthropology. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 20:129-136.
    If we take a bird’s-eye view of the history of philosophical ideas and try to assess the place the problems of modality hold in it, it is likely that we will gain the impression that they are not among the priorities of philosophical thinking of the essence of human being. A closer look at some classical theses, however, can provide us with different answers. In § 76 of Critique of Judgement, which is actually “just” a comment on the basic text, (...)
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  32. Tapio Korte, Ari Maunu & Tuomo Aho (2009). Modal Logic From Kant to Possible Worlds Semantics. In Leila Haaparanta (ed.), The Development of Modern Logic. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter begins with a discussion of Kant's theory of judgment-forms. It argues that it is not true in Kant's logic that assertoric or apodeictic judgments imply problematic ones, in the manner in which necessity and truth imply possibility in even the weakest systems of modern modal logic. The chapter then discusses theories of judgment-form after Kant, the theory of quantification, Frege's Begriffsschrift, C. I. Lewis and the beginnings of modern modal logic, the proof-theoretic approach to modal logic, possible world (...)
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  33. Frederick W. Kroon (1981). Kant and Kripke on the Identifiability of Modal and Epistemic Notions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):49-60.
    It is sometimes claimed that kripke's work in "naming and necessity" has demonstrated that kant was "right" in his acceptance of the synthetic "a priori", Even though perhaps "wrong" in his choice of examples. This article disputes such a claim by showing that, In accepting the identification of the empirically necessary and the "a priori", Kant's position is incompatible with an acceptance of the kripkean synthetic "a priori" (as well as the kripkean necessary "a posteriori").
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  34. Jessica Leech (2012). Kant's Modalities of Judgment. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (2):260-284.
    Abstract: This paper proposes a way to understand Kant's modalities of judgment—problematic, assertoric, and apodeictic—in terms of the location of a judgment in an inference. Other interpretations have tended to understand these modalities of judgment in terms of one or other conventional notion of modality. For example, Mattey (1986) argues that we should take them to be connected to notions of epistemic or doxastic modality. I shall argue that this is wrong, and that these kinds of interpretation of the modality (...)
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  35. Federico Luisetti (2009). Review: Chiurazzi, Modalità Ed Esistenza. Dalla Critica Della Ragion Pura Alla Critica Della Ragione Ermeneutica: Kant, Husserl, Heidegger [Modality and Existence: From the Critique of Pure Reason to the Critique of Hermeneutic Reason]. [REVIEW] Analecta Hermeneutica 1 (1).
  36. G. J. Mattey (1986). Kant's Theory of Propositional Attitudes. Kant-Studien 77 (1-4):423-440.
    Kant was among the first philosophers to recognize that modalities come in many varieties, and that there are systematic connections among them--an insight which has since been confirmed by the multitude of applications of the basic techniques of formalized modal logic. In particular, He recognized an affinity among what are now called doxastic and epistemic logics, As well as with a logic of judging which has not exact counterpart in contemporary thought. This paper will be concerned with the explication of (...)
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  37. Edgar Morscher (1985). Was Existence Ever a Predicate? Grazer Philosophische Studien 25:269-284.
    The question ''Was 'existence' ever a predicate?" in a way already suggests its own answer, that this is really the wrong question to ask, because 'existence' has always been a predicate. Even those, such as Kant, who supposedly opposed this view, in fact held it. They merely denied that 'existence' is a "normal" first-order predicate. Not only Kant, but also Bolzano, Frege and Russell claimed that it is a second-order predicate. There is substantive disagreement between Kant and Bolzano on the (...)
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  38. Ohad Nachtomy (2012). Leibniz and Kant on Possibility and Existence. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (5):953-972.
    This paper examines the Leibnizian background to Kant's critique of the ontological argument. I present Kant's claim that existence is not a real predicate, already formulated in his pre-critical essay of 1673, as a generalization of Leibniz's reasoning regarding the existence of created things. The first section studies Leibniz's equivocations on the notion of existence and shows that he employs two distinct notions of existence ? one for God and another for created substances. The second section examines Kant's position in (...)
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  39. Everett J. Nelson (1935). Kant on the Cosmological Argument. Philosophical Review 44 (3):283-287.
  40. Osvaldo Ottaviani (2014). From “Possible Worlds” to “Possible Experience”. Real Possibility in Leibniz and Kant. Kant Yearbook 6 (1).
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  41. A. R. Raggio (1969). Was heisst „bedingungen der möglichkeit“? Kant-Studien 60 (2):153-165.
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  42. Peter Remnant (1959). Kant and the Cosmological Argument. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):152 – 155.
    The author states kant's cosmological argument and its connection to the ontological argument. He discusses different criticisms of kant's argument, None of which he finds convincing. (staff).
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  43. Tobias Rosefeldt (2008). Kants Begriff der Existenz. In Valerio Rohden, Ricardo Terra & Guido Almeida (eds.), Recht Und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. de Gruyter. vol. 2, 657-668.
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  44. Timothy Rosenkoetter (2010). Absolute Positing, the Frege Anticipation Thesis, and Kant's Definitions of Judgment. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):539-566.
    Abstract: Kant follows a substantial tradition by defining judgment so that it must involve a relation of concepts, which raises the question of why he thinks that single-term existential judgments should still qualify as judgments. There is a ready explanation if Kant is somehow anticipating a Fregean second-order account of existence, an interpretation that is already widely held for separate reasons. This paper examines Kant's early (1763) critique of Wolffian accounts of existence, finding that it provides the key idea in (...)
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  45. Nicholas Stang (forthcoming). Kant's Argument That Existence is Not a Determination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In this paper, I examine Kant’s famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non-existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further that Kant’s primary target is not ontological arguments as such (...)
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  46. Nicholas F. Stang (2011). Did Kant Conflate the Necessary and the A Priori? Noûs 45 (3):443-471.
    It is commonly accepted by Kant scholars that Kant held that all necessary truths are a priori, and all a priori knowledge is knowledge of necessary truths. Against the prevailing interpretation, I argue that Kant was agnostic as to whether necessity and a priority are co-extensive. I focus on three kinds of modality Kant implicitly distinguishes: formal possibility and necessity, empirical possibility and necessity, and noumenal possibility and necessity. Formal possibility is compatibility with the forms of experience; empirical possibility is (...)
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  47. Nicholas F. Stang (2010). Kant's Possibility Proof. History of Philosophy Quarterly 27 (3):275-299.
  48. Kurt Sternberg (1926). Über die Unterscheidung von analytischen und synthetischen Urteilen. Ein Beitrag zur Lösung des Problems der Urteilsmodalität. Kant-Studien 31 (1-3):171-200.
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  49. Alberto Vanzo (2008). A Correspondence Theory of Objects? On Kant's Notions of Truth, Object, and Actuality. History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (3):259-275.
    Ernst Cassirer claimed that Kant's notion of actual object presupposes the notion of truth. Therefore, Kant cannot define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object. In this paper, I discuss the relations between Kant's notions of truth, object, and actuality. I argue that's notion of actual object does not presuppose the notion of truth. I conclude that Kant can define truth as the correspondence of a judgement with an actual object.
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  50. Hj Wendel (1991). Aprioristic Insight and Metaphysical Necessity, Analyzing Kripkes Criticism of Kant. Kant-Studien 82 (1):63-80.
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