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  1. Karl Ameriks (2004). Kant i problem motywacji moralnej. Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 52 (4):167-182.
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  2. Sharon Anderson-Gold & Pablo Muchnik (eds.) (2014). Kant's Anatomy of Evil. Cambridge University Press.
    Kant infamously claimed that all human beings, without exception, are evil by nature. This collection of essays critically examines and elucidates what he must have meant by this indictment. It shows the role which evil plays in his overall philosophical project and analyses its relation to individual autonomy. Furthermore, it explores the relevance of Kant's views for understanding contemporary questions such as crimes against humanity and moral reconstruction. Leading scholars in the field engage a wide range of sources from which (...)
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  3. Audrey L. Anton (2006). Duty and Inclination. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):199-207.
  4. Richard E. Aquila (1984). Duty and Inclination: The Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 1 (1):307-330.
  5. Stefano Bacin (2009). Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. [REVIEW] Studi Kantiani 22.
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  6. Dennis J. Baker (2008). The Harm Principle Vs. Kantian Criteria for Ensuring Fair, Principled and Just Criminalisation. Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 33 (66):66-99.
    In this paper, I consider Ripstein and Dan-Cohen's critiques of the 'harm principle'. Ripstein and Dan-Cohen have asserted that the harm principle should be jettisoned, because it allegedly fails to provide a rationale for criminalising certain harmless wrongs that ought to be criminalised. They argue that Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative and his concept of 'external freedom' are better equipped for ensuring that criminalisation decisions meet the requirements of fairness. Per contra, I assert that Kant's deontological theory is (...)
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  7. Marcia Baron (1984). The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting From Duty. Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):197-220.
    Friends as well as foes of Kant have long been uneasy over his emphasis on duty, but lately the view that there is something morally repugnant about acting from duty seems to be gaining in popularity. More and more philosophers indicate their readiness to jettison duty and the moral 'ought' and to conceive of the perfectly moral person as someone who has all the right desires and acts accordingly without any notion that (s)he ought to act in this way. Elsewhere' (...)
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  8. Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). The Aesthetics of Morality: Schiller's Critique of Kantian Rationalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1084-1095.
  9. Anne Margaret Baxley (2007). Kantian Virtue. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):396–410.
  10. Anne Margaret Baxley (2000). Kant's Theory of Virtue: The Importance of Autocracy. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    Focusing on the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, historical and contemporary critics of Kant's rationalist ethical theory accuse him of holding an impoverished moral psychology and an inadequate account of character and virtue. Kant's sharp contrast between duty and inclination and his claim that only action from duty possesses moral worth appear to imply that pro-moral inclination is unnecessary for, if perhaps compatible with, a good will. On traditional accounts of virtue, however, having a good will and possessing (...)
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  11. Mavis Biss (2015). Kantian Moral Striving. Kantian Review 20 (1):1-23.
    This paper focuses on a single question that highlights some of the most puzzling aspects of Kants disposition to duty, or strength of will? I argue that a dominant strand of Kant’s approach to moral striving does not fit familiar models of striving. I seek to address this problem in a way that avoids the flaws of synchronic and atomistic approaches to moral self-discipline by developing an account of Kantian moral striving as an ongoing contemplative activity complexly engaged with multiple (...)
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  12. Maria Borges (2008). Actions and Feelings: Série 2. Kant E-Prints 3:115-122.
    In this paper, I analyze Kant’s theory of action and if human beings can act morally without being moved by sensible feelings. I will show that the answer of the Critique of Pure Reason, Groundwork and the Critical of Practical Reason is without any doubt “yes”, but Kant is ambiguous in the Metaphysics of Morals and also in the Anthropology. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that there are some sensible conditions to the reception of the concept of duty: (...)
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  13. Maria Borges (2008). Physiology and the Controlling of Affects in Kant's Philosophy. Kantian Review 13 (2):46-66.
    Kant is categorical about the relation between virtue and the controlling of inclinations:Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his reason's control and so to rule over himself. Virtue presupposes apathy, in the sense of absence of affects. Kant revives the stoic ideal of tranquilitas as a necessary condition for virtue: ‘The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind’ . In the (...)
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  14. Maria de Lourdes Borges (2002). Kant on Sympathy and Moral Motives. Ethic@ 1:183-199.
    The aim of this paper is to examine the role of sympathy in Kant’s moral theory, in order to determine whether there is any essential change from the Groundwork to works of the 1790’s .1 The point of departure is the distinction between motive and incentive of an action. I attempt to identify what constitutes a moral motive and a moral incentive in the philanthropist example of the Groundwork, and argue that the only moral incentive is the respect for moral (...)
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  15. Talbot Brewer (2002). The Character of Temptation: Towards a More Plausible Kantian Moral Psychology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):103–130.
    Kant maintained that dutiful action can have the fullest measure of moral worth even if chosen in the face of powerful inclinations to act immorally, and indeed that opposing inclinations only highlight the worth of the action. I argue that this conclusion rests on an implausibly mechanistic account of desires, and that many desires are constituted by tendencies to see certain features of one’s circumstances as reasons to perform one or another action. I try to show that inclinations to violate (...)
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  16. Talbot Brewer (2001). Rethinking Our Maxims: Perceptual Salience and Practical Judgment in Kantian Ethics. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):219-230.
    Some contemporary Kantians have argued that one could not be virtuous without having internalized certain patterns of awareness that permit one to identify and respond reliably to moral reasons for action. I agree, but I argue that this insight requires unrecognized, farreaching, and thoroughly welcome changes in the traditional Kantian understanding of maxims and virtues. In particular, it implies that one''s characteristic emotions and desires will partly determine one''s maxims, and hence the praiseworthiness of one''s actions. I try to show (...)
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  17. Samuel V. Bruton (2003). Review: Stratton-Lake, Kant, Duty and Moral Worth. [REVIEW] Utilitas 15 (2):248.
  18. John Islay George Campbell (1980). Kantian Conceptions of Moral Worth. Dissertation, Princeton University
    In this thesis I focus attention on views about the nature of morally good persons and actions which are associated with the Kantian tradition in ethics. After a short introductory chapter, Chapter II outlines the Kantian view that morally good persons are motivated by a sense of duty, not by inclination. I try to explain why many people have found this view problematic and in need of defence. In Chapter III, I try to explain the view that morally good persons (...)
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  19. Paul Carus (1908). Mr. Spencer's Hedonism and Kant's Ethics of Duty. The Monist 18 (2):306-315.
  20. Kelly Coble (2007). How Compatibilists Can Account for the Moral Motive: Autonomy and Metaphysical Internalism. Kant-Studien 98 (3):329-350.
    I. Introduction In Groundwork III and in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant famously asserted that “Freiheit und unbedingtes praktisches Gesetz weisen […] wechselsweise auf einander zurück.” Kant's thesis of the analyticity of freedom and practical reason was rejected by his prominent early readers. In the eighth of his influential Letters on Kant's Philosophy of 1786–1787, Karl Leonhard Reinhold argued that the identification of the will with practical reason excluded the possibility of ascribing freedom to immoral and amoral actions. Reinhold (...)
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  21. Sr Mary Bernard Curran (2009). What is Pure, What is Good? Disinterestedness in Fénelon and Kant. Heythrop Journal 50 (2):195-205.
    Two philosophers, Robert Spaemann and Henri Gouhier, have identified a similarity between Fénelon and Kant in the prominence of motive in their thought: disinterestedness in Fénelon's pure love and in Kant's good will. Spaemann emphasizes their common detaching of the ethical in terms of motivation from the context of happiness. In this article I explore further similarities and differences under the topics of perfectionism, pure love, good will, happiness, and disinterestedness, as these are pertinent to their thought. On perfectionism there (...)
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  22. Lara Denis (2000). Kant's Cold Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy. Kantian Review 4 (1):48-73.
    Some Kantian ethicists, myself included, have been trying to show how, contrary to popular belief, Kant makes an important place in his moral theory for emotions–especially love and sympathy. This paper confronts claims of Kant that seem to endorse an absence of sympathetic emotions. I analyze Kant’s accounts of different sorts of emotions (“affects,” “passions,” and “feelings”), and different sorts of emotional coolness (“apathy,” “self-mastery,” and “cold-bloodedness”). I focus on the particular way that Kant praises apathy, as “sublime,” in order (...)
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  23. Janelle DeWitt (2014). Respect for the Moral Law: The Emotional Side of Reason. Philosophy 89 (1):31-62.
    Respect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction – i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, I develop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant's work, one (...)
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  24. Heiner F. Klemme Dieter Schönecker & Manfred Kuehn (eds.) (2006). Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism. [REVIEW] Felix Meiner Verlag.
  25. Paul Dietrichson (1962). What Does Kant Mean by 'Acting From Duty'? Kant-Studien 53 (1-4):277-288.
  26. Corey W. Dyck (2009). Review: Guyer, Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Social Criticism 35 (5):613-619.
  27. R. Z. Friedman (1984). The Importance and Function of Kant's Highest Good. Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (3):325-342.
  28. Patrick Frierson (2014). Kant's Empirical Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
    Throughout his life, Kant was concerned with questions about empirical psychology. He aimed to develop an empirical account of human beings, and his lectures and writings on the topic are recognizable today as properly 'psychological' treatments of human thought and behavior. In this book Patrick R. Frierson uses close analysis of relevant texts, including unpublished lectures and notes, to study Kant's account. He shows in detail how Kant explains human action, choice, and thought in empirical terms, and how a better (...)
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  29. J. L. A. Garcia (1990). Motive and Duty. Idealistic Studies 20 (3):230-237.
  30. Jeffrey A. Gauthier (1999). Hegel and the Problem of Particularity in Moral Judgment. Women's Philosophy Review 22:58-79.
    Barbara Herman's account of rules of moral salience goes far in explaining how Kantian moral theory can integrate historically emergent normative criticisms such as that offered by feminists. The ethical motives that initially lead historical agents to expand our moral categories, however, are often at odds with Kant's (and Herman's) theory of moral motivations. I argue that Hegel offers a more accurate account of ethical motivation under oppressive conditions.
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  31. Jeanine Grenberg (2013). Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account. Cambridge University Press.
    In this book, Jeanine Grenberg argues that everything important about Kant's moral philosophy emerges from careful reflection upon the common human moral experience of the conflict between happiness and morality. Through careful readings of both the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, Grenberg shows that Kant, typically thought to be an overly technical moral philosopher, in fact is a vigorous defender of the common person's first-personal encounter with moral demands. Grenberg uncovers a notion of phenomenological experience in Kant's account (...)
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  32. Jeanine Grenberg (1999). Anthropology From a Metaphysical Point of View. Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1):91-115.
    I argue that there can be, on Kant's account, a significant motivational role for feeling in moral action. I first discuss and reject Andrews Reath's claim that Kant is forced to disallow a motivational role for feeling because of his rejection of moral sense theory. I then consider and reject the more general challenge that allowing a role for the influence of feeling on the faculty of desire undermines Kant's commitment to a morality free from anthropological considerations. I conclude by (...)
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  33. John Hare (2011). Kant, The Passions, and The Structure of Moral Motivation. Faith and Philosophy 28 (1):54-70.
    This paper is an account of Kant’s view of the passions, and their place in the structure of moral motivation. The paper lays out the relations Kant sees be­tween feelings, inclinations, affects and passions, by looking at texts in Metaphysics of Morals, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Anthropology, and Lectures on Education. Then it discusses a famous passage in Groundwork about sympathetic inclination, and ends by proposing two ways in which Kant thinks feelings and inclinations enter into moral (...)
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  34. Dietmar Heidemann (ed.) (2012). Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. De Gruyter.
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  35. Larry Herrera (2000). Kant on the Moral Triebfeder. Kant-Studien 91 (4):395-410.
  36. Larry J. Herrera (1996). Kant on the Subjective Conditions of Moral Performance. Dissertation, Yale University
    In recent years, scholars have put forth a formidable defense of Kant's views on moral motivation. Their common goal has been to disclose the emotional dimension of his practical philosophy, an aspect of his thought arguably concealed by a couple of centuries of wrongheaded criticism. Yet a systematic study of the subjective factors that underlie moral performance as Kant understood it was missing. This dissertation tries to fill that gap. I reconstruct his theory of moral performance since 1755, and show (...)
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  37. Thomas E. Hill (2012). Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations. OUP Oxford.
    Thomas E. Hill, Jr., interprets and extends Kant's moral theory in a series of essays that highlight its relevance to contemporary ethics. He introduces the major themes of Kantian ethics and explores its practical application to questions about revolution, prison reform, and forcible interventions in other countries for humanitarian purposes.
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  38. Thomas E. Hill (2008). Kantian Virtue and Virtue Ethics. In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. Walter De Gruyter
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  39. Brad Hooker, Kant's Normative Ethics.
    One central moral idea is that your doing some act is morally permissible only if others’ doing that act would also be morally permissible. There are a number of different ways of developing this idea. One is the suggestion that, before deciding to do some act, you should ask yourself ‘What if everyone did that?’ Another central moral idea is that it is immoral to ‘use’ people.
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  40. Anja Jauernig (2013). Review: Bruxvoort Lipscomb, Benjamin J. And Krueger, James, Kant's Moral Metaphysics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 122 (4):651-657.
  41. Andrew B. Johnson (2005). Kant's Empirical Hedonism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (1):50–63.
    : According to the long orthodox interpretation of Kant's theory of motivation, Kant recognized only two fundamental types of motives: moral motives and egoistic, hedonistic motives. Seeking to defend Kant against the ensuing charges of psychological simplism, Andrews Reath formulated a forceful and seminal repudiation of this interpretation in his 1989 essay “Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant's Principle of Happiness.” The current paper aims to show that Reath's popular exegetical alternative is untenable. His arguments against the traditional view miss the mark, (...)
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  42. Robert N. Johnson, Merit.
    A few pages into the Groundwork Kant claims that only actions from duty have moral worth.ii Even though as an aside he also says that a dutiful action from sympathy or honor, though lacking in moral worth, "deserves praise and encouragement", it is tempting not to take him very seriously. One suspects that he regards this praise as only a poor and morally insignificant cousin of the esteem reserved for actions from duty. In the end, it seems hard to avoid (...)
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  43. Robert N. Johnson (1998). Weakness Incorporated. History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (3):349 - 367.
    Kant held that “an incentive can determine the will [Willkür] to action only so far as the individual has incorporated it into his maxim”, a view dubbed the “Incorporation Thesis” by Henry Allison (hereafter, “IT”). Although many see IT as basic to Kant’s views on agency, it also seems irreconcilable with the possibility of a kind of weakness, the kind exhibited by a person who acts on incentives that run contrary to principles she holds dear. The problem is this: According (...)
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  44. Robert N. Johnson (1996). Kant's Conception of Merit. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77:310.
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  45. Robert N. Johnson (1993). Kant's Theory of Moral Worth. Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
    The Kantian theory of moral worth, because it emphasizes the role of reason, has been universally castigated for being disaffecting, impersonal and alienating. My thesis is that, to the contrary, it is through its emphasis on reason that the Kantian view is able to give a full-blooded place to our sentiments, partial ties and projects in morality. ;My first task is to show how standard interpretations of Kant's theory misrepresent his true concerns. Typically, his views are treated as nothing more (...)
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  46. Ryan Kemp (2011). The Contingency of Evil: Rethinking the Problem of Universal Evil in Kant's 'Religion'. In Oliver Thorndike (ed.), Rethinking Kant: Volume 3. Cambridge Scholars
    In this paper I explore how three seemingly incompatible Kantian theses–a libertarian notion of freedom, the inscrutability of one’s fundamental moral maxim, and the ubiquity of evil–can each be maintained without contradiction. I do this by arguing against the popular notion that in his 'Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason,' Kant attributes 'radical evil' to all human beings.
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  47. Christine M. Korsgaard, Natural Motives and the Motive of Duty: Hume and Kant on Our Duties to Others.
    In this paper I argue that the ground of this disagreement is different than philosophers have traditionally supposed. On the surface, the disagreement appears to be a matter of substantive moral judgment: Hume admires the sort of person who rushes to the aid of another from motives of sympathy or humanity, while Kant thinks that a person who helps with the thought that it is his duty is the better character. While a moral disagreement of this kind certainly follows from (...)
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  48. Béatrice Longuenesse (2012). Kant's 'I' in 'I Ought To' and Freud's Superego. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):19-39.
    There are striking structural similarities between Freud's ego and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, which for Kant grounds our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’. There are also striking similarities between Freud's superego and Kant's account of the mental structure that grounds our use of ‘I’ in the moral ‘I ought to’. The paper explores these similarities on three main points: the conflict of motivations internal to the mind, the relation between discursive and pre-discursive representation of moral motivation, and the (...)
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  49. Bernd Ludwig (2007). Kant, Garve, and the Motives of Moral Action. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (2):183-193.
    against Garve' constitute his reaction to the latter's remarks on Cicero's De Officiis . Two related criticisms of Kant's against Garve are discussed in brief in this paper. A closer look is then taken at Garve's claim that `Kantian morality destroys all incentives that can move human beings to act at all'. I argue that Kant and Garve rely on two different models of human action for their analyses of moral motivation; these models differ in what each takes to be (...)
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  50. Jacqueline Mariña (1999). Schleiermacher on the Philosopher’s Stone: The Shaping of Schleiermacher’s Early Ethics by the Kantian Legacy. Journal of Religion 79 (2):193-215.
    This article explores the early Schleiermacher's attempts to deal with difficult philosophical problems arising from Kant's ethics, specifically Kant's notion of transcendental freedom. How do we connect a transcendentally free act with the nature of the subject? Insofar as the act is transcendentally free, it cannot be understood in terms of causes, and this means that it cannot be connected with the previous state of the individual before he or she engaged in the act. I work through Schleiermacher's grappling with (...)
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