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  1. Louis Agosta (1978). Kant's Treasure Hard-to-Attain. Kant-Studien 69 (1-4):422-443.
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  2. Henry E. Allison (2002). On the Very Idea of a Propensity to Evil. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (2-3):337-348.
  3. Henry E. Allison (1990). Kant's Theory of Freedom. Cambridge University Press.
    In his new book the eminent Kant scholar Henry Allison provides an innovative and comprehensive interpretation of Kant's concept of freedom. The author analyzes the concept and discusses the role it plays in Kant's moral philosophy and psychology. He also considers in full detail the critical literature on the subject from Kant's own time to the present day. In the first part Professor Allison argues that at the center of the Critique of Pure Reason there is the foundation for a (...)
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  4. Karl Ameriks (1992). Review: Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom. [REVIEW] Ethics 102 (3):655-.
  5. Sharon Anderson-Gold & Pablo Muchnik (eds.) (2014). Kant's Anatomy of Evil. Cambridge University Press.
    Kant infamously claimed that all human beings, without exception, are evil by nature. This collection of essays critically examines and elucidates what he must have meant by this indictment. It shows the role which evil plays in his overall philosophical project and analyses its relation to individual autonomy. Furthermore, it explores the relevance of Kant's views for understanding contemporary questions such as crimes against humanity and moral reconstruction. Leading scholars in the field engage a wide range of sources from which (...)
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  6. Audrey L. Anton (2006). Duty and Inclination. Southwest Philosophy Review 22 (1):199-207.
  7. Anne Margaret Baxley (2010). The Aesthetics of Morality: Schiller's Critique of Kantian Rationalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1084-1095.
  8. Anne Margaret Baxley (2000). Kant's Theory of Virtue: The Importance of Autocracy. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego
    Focusing on the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, historical and contemporary critics of Kant's rationalist ethical theory accuse him of holding an impoverished moral psychology and an inadequate account of character and virtue. Kant's sharp contrast between duty and inclination and his claim that only action from duty possesses moral worth appear to imply that pro-moral inclination is unnecessary for, if perhaps compatible with, a good will. On traditional accounts of virtue, however, having a good will and possessing (...)
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  9. Sven Bernecker (2006). Kant zur moralischen Selbsterkenntnis. Kant-Studien 97 (2):163-183.
    Der intentionalistischen Ethik oder Gesinnungsethik zufolge ist das, was an einer Handlung moralisch beurteilt wird, die Handlungsabsicht oder Intention. Der bedeutendste Vertreter des ethischen Intentionalismus, Immanuel Kant, spricht freilich nicht von "Absichten" sondern von "Maximen". Dem hier zugrundegelegten Verständnis zufolge sind Maximen weder Handlungsmotive noch Handlungsstrukturen, sondern Handlungsabsichten. Jedoch ist nicht jede beliebige Absicht eine Maxime. Eine Maxime zu haben, heißt für Kant, sich bewußt entschlossen zu haben, so-und-so zu handeln. Handeln nach Maximen ist regelgeleitetes Verhalten. Der Begriff der Maxime (...)
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  10. Mavis Biss (2015). Kantian Moral Striving. Kantian Review 20 (1):1-23.
    This paper focuses on a single question that highlights some of the most puzzling aspects of Kants disposition to duty, or strength of will? I argue that a dominant strand of Kant’s approach to moral striving does not fit familiar models of striving. I seek to address this problem in a way that avoids the flaws of synchronic and atomistic approaches to moral self-discipline by developing an account of Kantian moral striving as an ongoing contemplative activity complexly engaged with multiple (...)
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  11. Maria Borges (2008). Actions and Feelings: Série 2. Kant E-Prints 3:115-122.
    In this paper, I analyze Kant’s theory of action and if human beings can act morally without being moved by sensible feelings. I will show that the answer of the Critique of Pure Reason, Groundwork and the Critical of Practical Reason is without any doubt “yes”, but Kant is ambiguous in the Metaphysics of Morals and also in the Anthropology. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that there are some sensible conditions to the reception of the concept of duty: (...)
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  12. Maria Borges (2008). Physiology and the Controlling of Affects in Kant's Philosophy. Kantian Review 13 (2):46-66.
    Kant is categorical about the relation between virtue and the controlling of inclinations:Since virtue is based on inner freedom it contains a positive command to a human being, namely to bring all his capacities and inclinations under his reason's control and so to rule over himself. Virtue presupposes apathy, in the sense of absence of affects. Kant revives the stoic ideal of tranquilitas as a necessary condition for virtue: ‘The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind’ . In the (...)
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  13. N. Brender (2001). Kant's Conception of Moral Character: The "Critical" Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgment. Philosophical Review 110 (3):440-443.
  14. Talbot Brewer (2002). The Character of Temptation: Towards a More Plausible Kantian Moral Psychology. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2):103–130.
    Kant maintained that dutiful action can have the fullest measure of moral worth even if chosen in the face of powerful inclinations to act immorally, and indeed that opposing inclinations only highlight the worth of the action. I argue that this conclusion rests on an implausibly mechanistic account of desires, and that many desires are constituted by tendencies to see certain features of one’s circumstances as reasons to perform one or another action. I try to show that inclinations to violate (...)
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  15. Talbot Brewer (2001). Rethinking Our Maxims: Perceptual Salience and Practical Judgment in Kantian Ethics. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):219-230.
    Some contemporary Kantians have argued that one could not be virtuous without having internalized certain patterns of awareness that permit one to identify and respond reliably to moral reasons for action. I agree, but I argue that this insight requires unrecognized, farreaching, and thoroughly welcome changes in the traditional Kantian understanding of maxims and virtues. In particular, it implies that one''s characteristic emotions and desires will partly determine one''s maxims, and hence the praiseworthiness of one''s actions. I try to show (...)
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  16. D. O. Brink (2000). Review: Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue. Philosophical Review 109 (3):428-434.
    Recent moral philosophy has seen a revival of interest in the concept of virtue, and with it a reassessment of the role of virtue in the work of Aristotle and Kant. This book brings that reassessment to a new level of sophistication. Nancy Sherman argues that Kant preserves a notion of virtue in his moral theory that bears recognizable traces of the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions, and that his complex anthropology of morals brings him into surprising alliance with Aristotle. She (...)
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  17. David O. Brink (1999). Review: Engstrom & Whiting, Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics. Philosophical Review 108 (4):576-582.
  18. Alexander Broadie & Elizabeth M. Pybus (1982). Kant and Weakness of Will. Kant-Studien 73 (1-4):406-412.
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  19. Randy Cagle (2005). Becoming a Virtuous Agent: Kant and the Cultivation of Feelings and Emotions. Kant-Studien 96 (4):452-467.
  20. Andrew Chignell (2013). Rational Hope, Moral Order, and the Revolution of the Will. In Eric Watkins (ed.), Divine Order, Human Order, and the Order of Nature.
    In this paper I sketch out one of the most important conditions on rational hope, and argue that Kant embraced a version of it. I go on to suggest that we can use this analysis to solve a longstanding 'conundrum' in Kant's ethics and religion regarding the nature of the individual moral revolution. -/- .
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  21. Kelly Coble (2003). Kant's Dynamic Theory of Character. Kantian Review 7 (1):38-71.
    Kant's moral theory has received trenchant criticism for its rigorism. Rigorism generally denotes an overemphasis on rules in moral theory, and a consequent neglect of the roles of emotional receptivity and perception in moral judgement. Critics of Kant's ethics have invoked the term rigorism with reference to any one of three overlapping features of Kant's moral theory. Usually rigorism designates the 'rigid and insensitive uniformities of conduct' that result from the mechanical application of rules. Occasionally it refers to the excessively (...)
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  22. Katerina Deligiorgi (2014). The Pleasures of Contra‐Purposiveness: Kant, the Sublime, and Being Human. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 72 (1):25-35.
    Serious doubts have been raised about the coherence of theories of the sublime and the usefulness of the concept. By contrast, the sublime is increasingly studied as a key function in Kant's moral psychology and in his ethics. This article combines methodological conservatism, approaching the topic from within Kant's discussion of aesthetic judgment, with reconstruction of a conception of human agency that is tenable on Kantian grounds. I argue that a coherent theory of the sublime is possible and useful, and (...)
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  23. Lara Denis (2000). Kant's Cold Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy. Kantian Review 4 (1):48-73.
    Some Kantian ethicists, myself included, have been trying to show how, contrary to popular belief, Kant makes an important place in his moral theory for emotions–especially love and sympathy. This paper confronts claims of Kant that seem to endorse an absence of sympathetic emotions. I analyze Kant’s accounts of different sorts of emotions (“affects,” “passions,” and “feelings”), and different sorts of emotional coolness (“apathy,” “self-mastery,” and “cold-bloodedness”). I focus on the particular way that Kant praises apathy, as “sublime,” in order (...)
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  24. Janelle DeWitt (2014). Respect for the Moral Law: The Emotional Side of Reason. Philosophy 89 (1):31-62.
    Respect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction – i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, I develop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant's work, one (...)
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  25. Sam Duncan (2012). Moral Evil, Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (5):973-991.
    Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ?On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy?, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create (...)
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  26. J. Dybikowski (1999). Review: Engstrom & Whiting, Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty. [REVIEW] Dialogue 38 (01):215-.
  27. Anthony Earls (1991). The Case of the Unmitigated Blackguard or Saving Kant's Moral Feelings. Southwest Philosophy Review 7 (1):119-128.
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  28. Richard W. Eggerman (1980). Kant and Rational Imperatives of Happiness. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):43-50.
  29. E. Sonny Elizondo (forthcoming). Morality is its Own Reward. Kantian Review.
    Traditionally, Kantian ethics has been thought hostile to well-being. Recent commentators have rightly called this view into question, but they do not push their challenge far enough. For they leave in place a fundamental assumption on which the traditional view rests, viz., that happiness is all there is to well-being. This assumption is important, since, combined with Kant’s rationalism about morality and empiricism about happiness, it implies that morality and well-being are at best extrinsically related. Since morality can only make (...)
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  30. E. Sonny Elizondo (2014). More Than a Feeling. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):425-442.
    According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing (...)
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  31. Frits Reitze Feldmeijer (2009). Trying to Understand Kant's Ethical Views. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2):221-241.
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  32. David Forman (2013). Appetimus Sub Ratione Boni: Kant’s Practical Principles Between Crusius and Leibniz. In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. De Gruyter 323-334.
  33. Paul Formosa (2011). A Life Without Affects and Passions: Kant on the Duty of Apathy. Parrhesia 13:96-111.
  34. Paul Formosa (2011). Discipline and Autonomy: The Kantian Link Between Education and Morality. In Klas Roth & Chris Surprenant (eds.), Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary. Routledge
    In this paper I argue that Kant develops, in a number of texts, a detailed three stage theory of moral development which resembles the contemporary accounts of moral development defended by Lawrence Kohlberg and John Rawls. The first stage in this process is that of physical education and disciplining, followed by cultivating and civilising, with a third and final stage of moralising. The outcome of this process of moral development is a fully autonomous person. However, Kant’s account of moral development (...)
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  35. Paul Formosa (2009). Kant on the Limits of Human Evil. Journal of Philosophical Research 34:189-214.
    Kant has often been accused of being far too “optimistic” when it comes to the extremes of evil that humans can perpetrate upon one another. In particular, Kant’s supposed claim that humans cannot choose evil qua evil has struck many people as simply false. Another problem for Kant, or perhaps the same problem in another guise, is his supposed claim that all evil is done for the sake of self-love. While self-love might be a plausible way to explain some instances (...)
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  36. R. Z. Friedman (1984). The Importance and Function of Kant's Highest Good. Journal of the History of Philosophy 22 (3):325-342.
  37. Patrick Frierson (2014). Kant's Empirical Psychology. Cambridge University Press.
    Throughout his life, Kant was concerned with questions about empirical psychology. He aimed to develop an empirical account of human beings, and his lectures and writings on the topic are recognizable today as properly 'psychological' treatments of human thought and behavior. In this book Patrick R. Frierson uses close analysis of relevant texts, including unpublished lectures and notes, to study Kant's account. He shows in detail how Kant explains human action, choice, and thought in empirical terms, and how a better (...)
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  38. Ido Geiger (2011). Rational Feelings and Moral Agency. Kantian Review 16 (2):283-308.
    Kant's conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings are necessary conditions of moral agency: The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex . To act morally we must turn our affective moral perception towards the ends of moral action: the welfare of (...)
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  39. Piero Giordanetti (2012). Rivoluzione Copernicano-Newtoniana E Sentimento in Kant. Peter Lang.
    This volume, developing research on a theme that has been addressed very little, deals with the relation between the discovery of a priori feelings and emotions in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason and the «Preface» to the second edition of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in which he announces a revolution in the way of thinking. In Chapter One, I treat some aspects of the relation between the role of feel-ings and the Newtonian model in some of Kant’s pre-critical writings. (...)
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  40. Joshua M. Glasgow (2003). Expanding the Limits of Universalization: Kant's Duties and Kantian Moral Deliberation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):23 - 47.
    Despite all the attention given to Kant’s universalizability tests, one crucial aspect of Kant’s thought is often overlooked. Attention to this issue, I will argue, helps us resolve two serious problems for Kant’s ethics. Put briefly, the first problem is this: Kant, despite his stated intent to the contrary, doesn’t seem to use universalization in arguing for duties to oneself, and, anyway, it is not at all clear why duties to oneself should be grounded on a procedure that envisions a (...)
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  41. Jeanine Grenberg (2005). Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue. Cambridge University Press.
    In recent years, philosophers have either ignored the virtue of humility or found it to be in need of radical redefinition. But humility is a central human virtue, and it is the purpose of this book to defend that claim from a Kantian point of view. Jeanine Grenberg argues that we can indeed speak of Aristotelian-style, but still deeply Kantian, virtuous character traits. She proposes moving from focus on action to focus on person, not leaving the former behind, but instead (...)
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  42. A. Phillips Griffiths (1991). Kant's Psychological Hedonism. Philosophy 66 (256):207 - 216.
    As far as consideration of man as phenomenon, as appearance, as an empirical self, is concerned, Kant appears to be a thoroughgoing psychological hedonist.
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  43. Paul Guyer (2012). Schopenhauer, Kant and Compassion. Kantian Review 17 (3):403-429.
    Schopenhauer presents his moral philosophy as diametrically opposed to that of Kant: for him, pure practical reason is an illusion and morality can arise only from the feeling of compassion, while for Kant it cannot be based on such a feeling and can be based only on pure practical reason. But the difference is not as great as Schopenhauer makes it seem, because for him compassion is supposed to arise from metaphysical insight into the unity of all being, thus from (...)
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  44. Dietmar Heidemann (ed.) (2012). Kant and Contemporary Moral Philosophy. De Gruyter.
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  45. Willem Heubült (1980). Gewissen Bei Kant. Kant-Studien 71 (1-4):445-454.
  46. Thomas E. Hill & Adam Cureton (2014). Kant on Virtue and the Virtues. In Nancy Snow (ed.), Cultivating Virtue: Multiple Perspectives. 87-110.
    Immanuel Kant is known for his ideas about duty and morally worthy acts, but his conception of virtue is less familiar. Nevertheless Kant’s understanding of virtue is quite distinctive and has considerable merit compared to the most familiar conceptions. Kant also took moral education seriously, writing extensively on both the duty of adults to cultivate virtue and the empirical conditions to prepare children for this life-long responsibility. Our aim is, first, to explain Kant’s conception of virtue, second, to highlight some (...)
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  47. James Humphries (2014). Patrick R. Frierson, Kant's Questions: What is the Human Being? [REVIEW] Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies 37 (4):546-547.
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  48. Ian Hunter (2002). The Morals of Metaphysics: Kant's 'Groundwork' as Intellectual Paideia. Critical Inquiry 28 (4):908-929.
    To approach philosophy as a way of working on the self means to begin not with the experience it clarifies and the subject it discovers, but with the acts of self‐transformation it requires and the subjectivity it seeks to fashion. Commenting on the variety of spiritual exercises to be found in the ancient schools, Pierre Hadot remarks that: Some, like Plutarch’s ethismoi, designed to curb curiosity, anger or gossip, were only practices intended to ensure good moral habits. Others, particularly the (...)
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  49. Samuel Kahn (2013). Reconsidering RGV, AA 06: 26n and the Meaning of ‘Humanity’. In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter 307-316.
    At 6:26n Kant famously (or infamously) claims that humanity and personality are not necessarily coextensional. This claim has been characterized in the secondary literature as Kant's worst mistake and as an unnecessary repudiation of his earlier (and more plausible) ethical thought. I argue that this characterization of 6:26n rests on a misinterpretation of the term `humanity'. I try to show that Kant's claim at 6:26n not only is not problematic; it constitutes a powerful reminder of the kind of epistemic modesty (...)
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  50. Samuel Kahn (2013). The Guise of the Objectively Good. Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (1-2):87-99.
    According to one influential version of the derivation of Kant’s Formula of Humanity, the following claim is true: Agents necessarily represent their ends as objectively good. In this paper I argue that there is good reason to regard GOG as false. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I explain what is at stake in arguing that GOG is false. In the second, I explicate the terminology in this claim. I also contrast the claim with other possible (...)
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