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  1. Lucy Allais (2015). Manifest Reality: Kant's Idealism and His Realism. Oxford University Press Uk.
    Lucy Allais presents an original interpretation of Kant's transcendental idealism. She argues that his distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear to us has both epistemological and metaphysical components. Kant is committed to a genuine idealism about things as they appear to us, but this is not a phenomenalist idealism. He is committed to the claim that there is an aspect of reality that grounds mind-dependent spatio-temporal objects, and which we cannot cognize, but he does not assert (...)
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  2. Nathan Bauer (2012). A Peculiar Intuition: Kant's Conceptualist Account of Perception. Inquiry 55 (3):215-237.
    Abstract Both parties in the active philosophical debate concerning the conceptual character of perception trace their roots back to Kant's account of sensible intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason. This striking fact can be attributed to Kant's tendency both to assert and to deny the involvement of our conceptual capacities in sensible intuition. He appears to waver between these two positions in different passages, and can thus seem thoroughly confused on this issue. But this is not, in fact, the (...)
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  3. James Cleve (1979). Substance, Matter, and Kant's First Analogy. Kant-Studien 70 (1-4):149-161.
  4. Kevin Connolly (2014). Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)? Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):316-337.
    A recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant's theory of perception. Roughly, proponents of a conceptualist interpretation argue that for Kant, the possession of concepts is a prior condition for perception, while nonconceptualist interpreters deny this. The debate has two parts. One part concerns whether possessing empirical concepts is a prior condition for having empirical intuitions. A second part concerns whether Kant allows empirical intuitions without a priori concepts. Outside of Kant interpretation, the contemporary debate (...)
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  5. D. R. Cousin (1941). Kant's Concept of Appearance: II. Philosophy 16 (63):272 - 284.
  6. D. R. Cousin (1941). Kant's Concept of Appearance: I. Philosophy 16 (62):169 - 184.
  7. Santiago Echeverri (2004). La filosofía trascendental de Kant y el argumento de la ilusión. Pensamiento 60 (227):247-277.
  8. Helmut Echternach (1982). Review: Verlag, Wittgenstein's Cognition-Games Versus Kant's Theory of Perception. [REVIEW] Philosophy and History 15 (2):105-106.
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  9. Andrea Faggion (2013). Kant and Non-Conceptual Content. [REVIEW] Manuscrito 36 (2):343-354.
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  10. Lorne Falkenstein (1998). Localizing Sensations: A Reply to Anthony Quinton's Trouble with Kant. Philosophy 73 (3):479-489.
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  11. Luca Forgione (2016). Kant and Natural Kind Terms. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 31 (1):55-72.
    As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke’s essentialist approaches, touching upon different aspects of Kan’s slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz’s approaches on natural kind terms in the light of contemporary reflections, to eventually pinpoint Kant’s contribution and see how some commentators have placed it within the theory of direct reference. Starting (...)
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  12. J. Freudiger (1991). The Problem of Perceptual Judgment in Kant's Theoretical Philosophy. Kant-Studien 82 (4):414-435.
  13. S. P. Fullinwider (1993). Review: Hatfield, The Natural and the Normative. [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (3):485-491.
  14. Hannah Ginsborg (2013). Kant's Perceiver. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):221-228.
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  15. Hannah Ginsborg (2008). Was Kant a Nonconceptualist? Philosophical Studies 137 (1):65 - 77.
    I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience. I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the (...)
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  16. Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Aesthetic Judgment and Perceptual Normativity. Inquiry 49 (5):403 – 437.
    I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual content, of how concepts can be acquired on the basis of experience. Developing an idea suggested by Kant's linkage of aesthetic judgment with the capacity for empirical conceptualization, I propose that both questions can be resolved by appealing to the idea of "perceptual normativity". Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness (...)
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  17. Sacha Golob (2014). Kant on Intentionality, Magnitude, and the Unity of Perception. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):505-528.
    This paper addresses a number of closely related questions concerning Kant's model of intentionality, and his conceptions of unity and of magnitude [Gröβe]. These questions are important because they shed light on three issues which are central to the Critical system, and which connect directly to the recent analytic literature on perception: the issues are conceptualism, the status of the imagination, and perceptual atomism. In Section 1, I provide a sketch of the exegetical and philosophical problems raised by Kant's views (...)
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  18. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Nonconceptualism, Hume’s Problem, and the Deduction. Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    Lucy Allais seeks to provide a reading of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories which is compatible with a nonconceptualist account of Kant’s theory of intuition. According to her interpretation, the aim of the Deduction is to show that a priori concept application is required for empirical concept application. I argue that once we distinguish the application of the categories from the instantiation of the categories, we see that Allais’s reconstruction of the Deduction cannot provide an answer to Hume’s problem (...)
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  19. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase. Mind.
    Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the (...)
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  20. Anil Gomes (2014). Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):1-19.
    According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
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  21. Anil Gomes (2013). Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience. Kant-Studien 104 (3):277-300.
    We are able to think of empirical objects as capable of existing unperceived. What explains our grasp of this conception of objects? In this paper I examine the claim that experience explains our understanding of objects as capable of existing unperceived with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that standard accounts of experience’s explanatory role are unsatisfactory, but that an alternative account can be extracted from the first Critique – one which relies on Kant’s transcendental idealism.
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  22. Robert Greenberg (1996). Perception and Kant's Categories. History of Philosophy Quarterly 13 (3):345 - 361.
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  23. Stefanie Grüne (2009). Blinde Anschauung: Die Rolle von Begriffen in Kants Theorie sinnlicher Synthesis. Klostermann.
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  24. Stefanie Grüne (2008). Begriffe als Regeln der Wahrnehmung. In Valerio Rohden, Ricardo R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. De Gruyter vol. 2, pp. 267-277.
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  25. Stefanie Grüne (2008). Begriffe als Regeln der Wahrnehmung. In Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. 4.-9. Sept. 2005 in São Paulo. vol. 2, 267-277.
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  26. Robert Hanna (2005). Kant and Nonconceptual Content. European Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):247-290.
  27. Gary Hatfield (2014). Kant on the Phenomenology of Touch and Vision. In Alix Cohen (ed.), Kant's Lectures on Anthropology: A Critical Guide. Cambridge University Pres 38–56.
    This chapter deals with Immanuel Kant's remarks on touch and vision in the context of his pragmatic anthropology, by considering his views of the scope, aims, and methods of that fledgling discipline. Kant supports his discussion with appeals to observation and experience that form a kind of everyday phenomenology of sensory experience. The chapter considers Kant's notion of the relation between the pragmatic and the theoretical, including his remarks that a pragmatic anthropology does not present theoretical or scholastic knowledge but (...)
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  28. Gary Hatfield (2006). Kant on the Perception of Space (and Time). In Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press 61--93.
    Although the “Transcendental Aesthetic” is the briefest part of the first Critique, it has garnered a lion's share of discussion. This fact reflects the important implications that Kant drew from his arguments there. He used the arguments concerning space and time to display examples of synthetic a priori cognition, to secure his division between intuitions and concepts, and to support transcendental idealism. Earlier, in the years around 1770, Kant's investigations into space and time had facilitated his turn toward “critical” philosophy. (...)
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  29. Gary Hatfield (1991). The Natural and the Normative: Theories of Spatial Perception From Kant to Helmholtz. Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Gary Hatfield examines theories of spatial perception from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century and provides a detailed analysis of the works of Kant and Helmholtz, who adopted opposing stances on whether central questions about spatial perception were fully amenable to natural-scientific treatment. At stake were the proper understanding of the relationships among sensation, perception, and experience, and the proper methodological framework for investigating the mental activities of judgment, understanding, and reason issues which remain at the core of philosophical psychology (...)
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  30. Gary Hatfield (1984). Spatial Perception and Geometry in Kant and Helmholtz. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:569 - 587.
    This paper examines Helmholtz's attempt to use empirical psychology to refute certain of Kant's epistemological positions. Particularly, Helmholtz believed that his work in the psychology of visual perception showed Kant's doctrine of the a priori character of spatial intuition to be in error. Some of Helmholtz's arguments are effective, but this effectiveness derives from his arguments to show the possibility of obtaining evidence that the structure of physical space is non-Euclidean, and these arguments do not depend on his theory of (...)
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  31. Tim Jankowiak (forthcoming). Intentionality and Sensory Consciousness in Kant. Journal of Philosophical Research 2016.
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  32. Tim Jankowiak (2014). Sensations as Representations in Kant. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):492-513.
    This paper defends an interpretation of the representational function of sensation in Kant's theory of empirical cognition. Against those who argue that sensations are ?subjective representations? and hence can only represent the sensory state of the subject, I argue that Kant appeals to different notions of subjectivity, and that the subjectivity of sensations is consistent with sensations representing external, spatial objects. Against those who claim that sensations cannot be representational at all, because sensations are not cognitively sophisticated enough to possess (...)
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  33. Tim Jankowiak (2013). Kant's Argument for the Principle of Intensive Magnitudes. Kantian Review 18 (3):387-412.
    In the first Critique, Kant attempts to prove what we can call the "Principle of Intensive Magnitudes," according to which every possible object of experience will possess a determinate "degree" of reality. Curiously, Kant argues for this principle by inferring from a psychological premise about internal sensations (they have intensive magnitudes) to a metaphysical thesis about external objects (they also have intensive magnitudes). Most commentators dismiss the argument as a failure. In this article I give a reconstruction of Kant's argument (...)
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  34. Patricia Kitcher (1993). Kant's Transcendental Psychology. OUP Usa.
    In this innovative study Patricia Kitcher argues that we can only understand the deduction of the categories in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in terms of his attempt to fathom the psychological prerequisites of thought. Thus a consideration of his conception of psychology is essential to an understanding of his philosophy. Kitcher specifically considers Kant's claims about the unity of the thinking self; the spatial forms of human perceptions; the relations among mental states necessary for them to have content; the (...)
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  35. Guido Kreis (2015). The Varieties of Perception Non-Conceptual Content in Kant, Cassirer, and McDowell. In Sebastian Luft & J. Tyler Friedman (eds.), The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer: A Novel Assessment. De Gruyter 313-338.
  36. Thomas Land (2011). Kantian Conceptualism. In Guenther Abel & James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology. De Gruyter 1--197.
    In the recent debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists about perceptual content, Kant’s notion of intuition has been invoked on both sides. Conceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their position, arguing that Kantian intuitions have the same kind of content as conceptual thought. On the other hand, nonconceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their own position, contending that Kantian intuitions have a distinctly nonconceptual kind of content. In this paper, I argue first, that both sides are wrong about Kant, (...)
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  37. A. Lichtigfeld (1962). Jaspers' Philosophical Basis (Kant or Hegel). Kant-Studien 53 (1-4):29-38.
  38. Béatrice Longuenesse (2004). Les concepts a priori kantiens et leur destin. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 4 (44):485-510.
    Kant soutient qu'une table complète et systématique des catégories peut être établie selon le « fil conducteur » des fonctions logiques du jugement. La première partie de cet article est une exposition de l'argument kantien. La deuxième partie est un examen de quelques-unes des objections formulées à l'encontre du « fil conducteur » de Kant. Je conclus que l'appropriation contemporaine de la doctrine kantienne des catégories est désormais divisée entre deux problèmes distincts : celui du contenu conceptuel (ou non) de (...)
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  39. Béatrice Longuenesse (1995). Kant et les jugements empiriques. Jugements de perception et jugements d'expérience. Kant-Studien 86 (3):278-307.
  40. Danielle Macbeth (2000). Empirical Knowledge: Kantian Themes and Sellarsian Variations. Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):113-142.
    Empirical knowledge is at once an exercise of freedom and rationally constrained by how things are. But if the reality on which empirical thought aims to bear is outside the sphere of the conceptual then, while it can exert a causal constraint on knowing, it cannot exert a rational constraint. Empirical reality both must and, so it seems, cannot have rational bearing on empirical thought. I consider the related ways Kant and Sellars try to avoid this antinomy, arguing that understanding (...)
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  41. Jacqueline Marina (2000). Review: Collins, Possible Experience: Understanding Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1):130-131.
  42. Colin Marshall (forthcoming). Kant on Impenetrability, Touch, and the Causal Content of Perception. European Journal of Philosophy.
    ABSTRACT: It is well known that Kant claims that causal judgments, including judgments about forces, must have an a priori basis. It is less well known that Kant claims that we can perceive the repulsive force of bodies (their impenetrability) through the sense of touch. Together, these claims present an interpretive puzzle, since they appear to commit Kant to both affirming and denying that we can have perceptions of force. My first aim is to show that both sides of the (...)
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  43. Samantha Matherne (2016). Kantian Themes in Merleau-Ponty’s Theory of Perception. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98 (2):193-230.
    It has become typical to read Kant and Merleau-Ponty as offering competing approaches to perceptual experience. Kant is interpreted as an ‘intellectualist’ who regards perception as conceptual ‘all the way out’, while Merleau-Ponty is seen as Kant’s challenger, who argues that perception involves non-conceptual, embodied ‘coping’. In this paper, however, I argue that a closer examination of their views of perception, especially with respect to the notion of ‘schematism’, reveals a great deal of historical and philosophical continuity between them. By (...)
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  44. Samantha Matherne (2015). Images and Kant’s Theory of Perception. Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    My aim in this paper is to offer a systematic analysis of a feature of Kant’s theory of perception that tends to be overlooked, viz., his account of how the imagination forms images in perception. Although Kant emphasizes the centrality of this feature of perception, indeed, calling it a ‘necessary ingredient’ of perception, commentators have instead focused primarily on his account of sensibility and intuitions on the one hand, and understanding and concepts on the other. However, I show that careful (...)
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  45. Edwin McCann (1985). Skepticism and Kant's B Deduction. History of Philosophy Quarterly 2 (1):71-89.
  46. Colin McLear (forthcoming). Animals and Objectivity. In Lucy Allais & John Callanan (eds.), Kant on Animals. Oxford University Press
    Starting from the assumption that Kant allows for the possible existence of conscious sensory states in non-rational animals, I examine the textual and philosophical grounds for his acceptance of the possibility that such states are also 'objective'. I elucidate different senses of what might be meant in crediting a cognitive state as objective. I then put forward and defend an interpretation according to which the cognitive states of animals, though extremely limited on Kant's view, are nevertheless minimally objective.
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  47. Colin McLear (forthcoming). Getting Acquainted with Kant. In Dennis Schulting (ed.), Kantian Nonconceptualism. Palgrave Macmillan
    My question here concerns whether Kant claims that experience has nonconceptual content, or whether, on his view, experience is essentially conceptual. However there is a sense in which this debate concerning the content of intuition is ill-conceived. Part of this has to do with the terms in which the debate is set, and part to do with confusion over the connection between Kant’s own views and contemporary concerns in epistemology and the philosophy of mind. However, I think much of the (...)
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  48. Colin McLear (forthcoming). Intuition and Presence. In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Kant and the Mind. Oxford University Press
    In this paper I explicate the notion of “presence” [Gegenwart] as it pertains to intuition. Specifically, I examine two central problems for the position that an empirical intuition is an immediate relation to an existing particular in one’s environment. The first stems from Kant’s description of the faculty of imagination, while the second stems from Kant’s discussion of hallucination. I shall suggest that Kant’s writings indicate at least one possible means of reconciling our two problems with a conception of “presence” (...)
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  49. Colin McLear (2016). Kant on Perceptual Content. Mind 125 (497):95-144.
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial (...)
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  50. Colin McLear (2015). Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason. Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (1):79-110.
    I argue that Kant’s distinction between the cognitive roles of sensibility and understanding raises a question concerning the conditions necessary for objective representation. I distinguish two opposing interpretive positions—viz. Intellectualism and Sensibilism. According to Intellectualism all objective representation depends, at least in part, on the unifying synthetic activity of the mind. In contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least some forms of objective representation, specifically intuitions, do not require synthesis. I argue that there are deep reasons for thinking that Intellectualism is (...)
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