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  1. Nathan Bauer (2012). A Peculiar Intuition: Kant's Conceptualist Account of Perception. Inquiry 55 (3):215-237.
    Abstract Both parties in the active philosophical debate concerning the conceptual character of perception trace their roots back to Kant's account of sensible intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason. This striking fact can be attributed to Kant's tendency both to assert and to deny the involvement of our conceptual capacities in sensible intuition. He appears to waver between these two positions in different passages, and can thus seem thoroughly confused on this issue. But this is not, in fact, the (...)
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  2. James Cleve (1979). Substance, Matter, and Kant's First Analogy. Kant-Studien 70 (1-4):149-161.
  3. Kevin Connolly (forthcoming). Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)? Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    A recent debate in Kant scholarship concerns the role of concepts in Kant’s theory of perception. Roughly, proponents of a "conceptualist" interpretation argue that for Kant, the possession of concepts is a prior condition for perception, while "nonconceptualist" interpreters deny this. The debate has two parts. One part concerns whether possessing empirical concepts is a prior condition for having empirical intuitions. A second part concerns whether Kant allows empirical intuitions without a priori concepts. Outside of Kant interpretation, the contemporary debate (...)
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  4. D. R. Cousin (1941). Kant's Concept of Appearance: II. Philosophy 16 (63):272 - 284.
  5. D. R. Cousin (1941). Kant's Concept of Appearance: I. Philosophy 16 (62):169 - 184.
  6. Helmut Echternach (1982). Review: Verlag, Wittgenstein's Cognition-Games Versus Kant's Theory of Perception. [REVIEW] Philosophy and History 15 (2):105-106.
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  7. Andrea Faggion (2013). Kant and Non-Conceptual Content. [REVIEW] Manuscrito 36 (2):343-354.
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  8. Lorne Falkenstein (1998). Localizing Sensations: A Reply to Anthony Quinton's Trouble with Kant. Philosophy 73 (3):479-489.
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  9. J. Freudiger (1991). The Problem of Perceptual Judgment in Kant's Theoretical Philosophy. Kant-Studien 82 (4):414-435.
  10. S. P. Fullinwider (1993). Review: Hatfield, The Natural and the Normative. [REVIEW] Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (3):485-491.
  11. Hannah Ginsborg (2008). Was Kant a Nonconceptualist? Philosophical Studies 137 (1):65 - 77.
    I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience. I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the (...)
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  12. Hannah Ginsborg (2006). Aesthetic Judgment and Perceptual Normativity. Inquiry 49 (5):403 – 437.
    I draw a connection between the question, raised by Hume and Kant, of how aesthetic judgments can claim universal agreement, and the question, raised in recent discussions of nonconceptual content, of how concepts can be acquired on the basis of experience. Developing an idea suggested by Kant's linkage of aesthetic judgment with the capacity for empirical conceptualization, I propose that both questions can be resolved by appealing to the idea of "perceptual normativity". Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness (...)
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  13. Anil Gomes (2014). Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-Deduction. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (254):1-19.
    According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
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  14. Anil Gomes (2013). Kant and the Explanatory Role of Experience. Kant-Studien 104 (3):277-300.
    We are able to think of empirical objects as capable of existing unperceived. What explains our grasp of this conception of objects? In this paper I examine the claim that experience explains our understanding of objects as capable of existing unperceived with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that standard accounts of experience’s explanatory role are unsatisfactory, but that an alternative account can be extracted from the first Critique – one which relies on Kant’s transcendental idealism.
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  15. Robert Hanna (2005). Kant and Nonconceptual Content. European Journal Of Philosophy 13 (2):247-290.
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  16. Gary Hatfield (2011). Kant and Helmholtz on Primary and Secondary Qualities. In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.
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  17. Gary Hatfield (2006). Kant on the Perception of Space (and Time). In Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. 61--93.
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  18. Thomas Land (2011). Kantian Conceptualism. In Guenther Abel & James Conant (eds.), Rethinking Epistemology. de Gruyter. 1--197.
    In the recent debate between conceptualists and nonconceptualists about perceptual content, Kant’s notion of intuition has been invoked on both sides. Conceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their position, arguing that Kantian intuitions have the same kind of content as conceptual thought. On the other hand, nonconceptualists claim Kant as a forerunner of their own position, contending that Kantian intuitions have a distinctly nonconceptual kind of content. In this paper, I argue first, that both sides are wrong about Kant, (...)
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  19. Heinrich Lange (1966). Die rolle der anschauung im physikalischen denken. Kant-Studien 57 (1-4).
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  20. A. Lichtigfeld (1962). Jaspers' Philosophical Basis (Kant or Hegel). Kant-Studien 53 (1-4):29-38.
  21. Samantha Matherne (2014). The Kantian Roots of Merleau-Ponty's Account of Pathology. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):124-149.
    One of the more striking aspects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (1945) is his use of psychological case studies in pathology. For Merleau-Ponty, a philosophical interpretation of phenomena like aphasia and psychic blindness promises to shed light not just on the nature of pathology, but on the nature of human existence more generally. In this paper, I show that although Merleau-Ponty is surely a pioneer in this use of pathology, his work is deeply indebted to an earlier philosophical study (...)
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  22. Colin McLear (forthcoming). Kant on Perceptual Content. Mind.
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the “Content View.” I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial (...)
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  23. Colin McLear (forthcoming). Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason. Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    I argue that Kant’s distinction between the cognitive roles of sensibility and understanding raises a question concerning the conditions necessary for objective representation. I distinguish two opposing interpretive positions—viz. Intellectualism and Sensibilism. According to Intellectualism all objective representation depends, at least in part, on the unifying synthetic activity of the mind. In contrast, Sensibilism argues that at least some forms of objective representation, specifically intuitions, do not require synthesis. I argue that there are deep reasons for thinking that Intellectualism is (...)
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  24. Arthur Melnick (2013). Two Charges of Intellectualism Against Kant. Kantian Review 18 (2):197-219.
    The contemporary discussion of non-conceptual content inaugurated by Gareth Evans and John McDowell has generated a range of differing views as to Kant's position on the issues raised. I argue that for Kant perception is prior to thought and that it is as being prior that perception connects us to reality in outer intuition. I then argue that for Kant thought relates to perception by being the rule for perceptual procedures. This accounts for thought's extending in scope beyond what we (...)
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  25. Arthur Melnick (2001). A Modified Version of Kant's Theory of Cognition. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):459 – 483.
    According to Kant's theory of thought or cognition, thoughts are rules for empirical reactions in the compass of spatial and temporal constructions. Theses rules function to represent our situation in relation to all the ways it is proper to interact with reality. After outlining Kant's theory, I present a modified version in which rules are identified with executive mechanisms for behavioural output. Following Kant, I show how such rules can pertain to the past in terms of mechanisms for being beyond (...)
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  26. Justus Meyer (1931). Kants philosophie der lebenserscheinungen. Kant-Studien 36 (1-2):51-83.
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  27. Gustav E. Mueller (1959). Experiential and Existential Time and Their Relation to Eternity. Kant-Studien 50 (1-4):89-108.
  28. Christopher Norris (2011). ‘Second Nature’, Knowledge, and Normativity: Revisiting McDowell’s Kant. Diametros 27:64-107.
    In this article I raise a number of issues concerning John McDowell’s widely influential revisionist reading of Kant. These have to do with what I see as his failure – despite ambitious claims in that regard – to overcome the various problematic dualisms that dogged Kant’s thought throughout the three Critiques. Moreover, as I show, they have continued to mark the discourse of those who inherit Kant’s agenda in this or that updated, e.g., ‘linguistified’ form. More specifically, I argue that (...)
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  29. Michael Podro (1972). The Manifold in Perception: Theories of Art From Kant to Hildebrand. Oxford,Clarendon Press.
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  30. Jay F. Rosenberg (1997). Kantian Schemata and the Unity of Perception. In Language and Thought. Hawthorne: De Gruyter.
  31. Sandra B. Rosenthal & Patrick L. Bourgeois (1979). Lewis, Heidegger, and Kant: Schemata and the Structure of Perceptual Experience. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):239-248.
  32. Brigitte Sassen (2008). Varieties of Subjective Judgments: Judgments of Perception. Kant-Studien 99 (3):269-284.
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  33. Hubert Schwyzer (1997). Subjectivity in Descartes and Kant. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (188):342-357.
    Kant’s response to Cartesian scepticism is often characterized in the following way. Whereas Descartes drives a wedge between subjective experience and objective reality, Kant argues that there could be no such thing as experience at all if reality were not itself structured in just the way our thought about it is structured. This picture of Kant’s response to Descartes portrays him as succeeding, where Descartes fails, in arguing directly from the nature of experience to the nature of reality; as subscribing, (...)
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  34. Nicholas F. Stang (2011). Review: Kant's Thinker. [REVIEW] Notes Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  35. Leslie F. Stevenson (2000). Synthetic Unities of Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):281-306.
  36. P. F. Strawson (1982). Imagination and Perception. In Ralph Charles Sutherland Walker (ed.), Kant on Pure Reason. Oxford University Press.
  37. Alan Thomas, Perceptual Knowledge, Representation and Imagination.
    The focus of this paper will be on the problem of perceptual presence and on a solution to this problem pioneered by <span class='Hi'>Kant</span> [1781; 1783] and refined by Sellars [Sellars, 1978] and Strawson [Strawson, 1971]. The problem of perceptual presence is that of explaining how our perceptual experience of the world gives us a robust sense of the presence of objects in perception over and above those sensory aspects of the object given in perception. Objects possess other properties which (...)
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  38. Clinton Tolley (2013). The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions: A New Approach. Kantian Review 18 (1):107-36.
    There has been considerable recent debate about whether Kant's account of intuitions implies that their content is conceptual. This debate, however, has failed to make significant progress because of the absence of discussion, let alone consensus, as to the meaning of in this context. Here I try to move things forward by focusing on the kind of content associated with Frege's notion of , understood as a mode of presentation of some object or property. I argue, first, that Kant takes (...)
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  39. Alberto Vanzo (2012). Kant e la formazione dei concetti. Verifiche.
    How do we form concepts like those of three, bycicle and red? According to Kant, we form them by carrying out acts of comparison, reflection and abstraction on information provided by the senses. Kant's answer raised numerous objections from philosophers and psychologists alike. "Kant e la formazione dei concetti" argues that Kant is able to rebut those objections. The book shows that, for Kant, it is possible to perceive objects without employing concepts; it explains how, given those perceptions, we can (...)
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  40. W. H. Walsh (1967). Kant on the Perception of Time. The Monist 51 (3):376-396.