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Summary Kant's thought about logic is at once central to his own philosophical system and also stands at a key transitional moment in the broader history of logic and philosophy of logic.  Kant conceives of logic as the science of our understanding, which means that it is tasked with discovering the basic kinds of activities that our understanding is capable of (formal logic), as well as the basic kinds of representational contents (concepts) that our understanding makes use of in these acts (transcendental logic).  Because forming a science is itself one of these acts, and because philosophy itself is intended to be a science, Kant thinks that logic provides philosophy with the core blueprint of its structure -- a thought exemplified by his famous organizational 'Tables', and picked up by later German Idealists (among others).  Yet because Kant thinks that our minds are capable of more than just understanding, both in terms of the kinds of its activity and in terms of the representational contents it can engage with, Kant thinks that the knowledge provided within logic is sharply limited.  Critically revisiting these alleged restrictions provided inspiration for many of those responsible for the most influential developments in the subsequent history of logic (such as Bolzano, Frege, and Russell).
Key works Despite its central importance for his philosophical system, Kant himself did not publish a separate work on logic during his lifetime.  Nevertheless, Kant does present his views on logic in almost all of his most important theoretical writings, including Immanuel 1998, and works collected in Kant 2002 and Kant 2002.  What is more, Kant lectured on logic throughout the entirety of his career, and the surviving student transcripts of some of these lectures provide us with a further window into Kant's thought about logic, some of which are collected in Kant 1992.  Finally, the vast collection of notes and fragments that Kant left after his death contain many brief discussions about logic, some of which can be found in Kant 2005.
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  1. Francesco Barone (1956). Kant e la logica formale. Filosofia 7:697-750.
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  2. J. Bergmann (1899). Zur Lehre Kants von den logischen Grundsätzen. Kant-Studien 2 (1-3):323-348.
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  3. Jean-Yves Beziau (2008). What is “Formal Logic”? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13:9-22.
    “Formal logic”, an expression created by Kant to characterize Aristotelian logic, has also been used as a name for modern logic, originated by Boole and Frege, which in many aspects differs radically from traditional logic. We shed light on this paradox by distinguishing in this paper five different meanings of the expression “formal logic”: (1) Formal reasoning according to the Aristotelian dichotomy of form and content, (2) Formal logic as a formal science by opposition to an empirical science, (3) Formal (...)
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  4. Alfredo Ferrarin (1997). Review of G. Tonelli, Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" Within the Tradition of Modern Logic. Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (3):472-474.
  5. Bruno Haas (2004). Kant et la raison comme fonctionnalité logique. Archives de Philosophie 3:379-398.
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  6. Robert A. Holland (1993). Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 13 (5):239-241.
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  7. C. S. I. Jenkins & Masashi Kasaki (forthcoming). The Traditional Conception of the a Priori. Synthese:1-22.
    In this paper, we explore the traditional conception of a prioricity as epistemic independence of evidence from sense experience. We investigate the fortunes of the traditional conception in the light of recent challenges by Timothy Williamson. We contend that Williamson’s arguments can be resisted in various ways. En route, we argue that Williamson’s views are not as distant from tradition (in particular, from Kant) as they might seem at first glance.
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  8. Anders Kraal (2013). The Aim of Russell's Early Logicism: A Reinterpretation. Synthese:1-18.
    I argue that three main interpretations of the aim of Russell’s early logicism in The Principles of Mathematics (1903) are mistaken, and propose a new interpretation. According to this new interpretation, the aim of Russell’s logicism is to show, in opposition to Kant, that mathematical propositions have a certain sort of complete generality which entails that their truth is independent of space and time. I argue that on this interpretation two often-heard objections to Russell’s logicism, deriving from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (...)
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  9. Penelope Maddy (2012). The Philosophy of Logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (4):481-504.
    This talk surveys a range of positions on the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological questions about elementary logic, for example, as a starting point: what is the subject matter of logic—what makes its truths true? how do we come to know the truths of logic? A taxonomy is approached by beginning from well-known schools of thought in the philosophy of mathematics—Logicism, Intuitionism, Formalism, Realism—and sketching roughly corresponding views in the philosophy of logic. Kant, Mill, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, Quine, and Putnam (...)
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  10. Ulrich Majer (2006). The Relation of Logic and Intuition in Kant's Philosophy of Science, Particularly Geometry. In. In Emily Carson & Renate Huber (eds.), Intuition and the Axiomatic Method. Springer. 47--66.
  11. Wayne Martin, Inverse Psychologism in the Theory of Judgment.
    Outline: 1. Why Judgment? 2. Inverse Psychologism: General Issues 3. Inverse Psychologism in the Phenomeno-Logic of Judgment 4. Judgment and Language 5. [De-]stabilizing Kant’s Inverse Psychologism..
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  12. Emily Michael (1978). Peirce's Adaptation of Kant's Definition of Logic: The Early Manuscripts. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 14 (3):176 - 183.
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  13. Imtiaz Moosa (1995). Formalism of Kant's A Priori Versus Scheler's Material A Priori. International Studies in Philosophy 27 (2):33-47.
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  14. T. Pinder (2000). On the Akademie Edition of the New Logic Writings From the Previously Unpublished Works of Kant. Kant-Studien 91:172-177.
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  15. Tillmann Pinder (1979). Kants Begriff der Logik. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 61 (3):309-336.
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  16. Marcin Poręba (2013). Two Concepts of Apriority. Dialogue and Universalism 23 (2):43-53.
    The paper considers two—in author’s belief fundamental—approaches to apriority, which he proposes to call “absolute” and “relative.” The first was most fully expressed by Immanuel Kant, the second by Ludwig Wittgenstein. In author’s opinion, both derive from empiricist philosophy in its modern form. The concept of experience which is characteristic of modern empiricism forces acceptance of certain experienceindependent (a priori) assumptions, thanks to which only experience can provide information about objects. Depending on whether we regard these assumptions as independent of (...)
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  17. R. Pozzo (1999). I. KANT Logik-Vorlesungen: Unveroffentliche Nachschriften. History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (2):133-133.
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  18. Hoke Robinson (2007). Comments on Mosser's "Kant and the Logic of Aristotle". Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (2):33-36.
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  19. Paul Rusnock (1999). Philosophy of Mathematics: Bolzano's Responses to Kant and Lagrange/La Philosophie des Mathématiques: Les Réponses de Bolzano à Kant Et Lagrange. Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 52 (3):399-428.
  20. Pedro Santos (2012). A Note on Kant's Formal Logic. Manuscrito 35 (1):99-113.
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  21. Marco Sgarbi (2009). Kant, Rabe and the Aristotelian Logic. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 64 (2):269 - +.
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  22. Marco Sgarbi (2009). Kant, Rabe e la logica aristotelica. Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia:289-313.
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  23. Richard Velkley (1986). Kant on the Primacy and the Limits of Logic. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 11 (2):147-162.
    KANT ASSERTS THAT "ONTOLOGY IS NOTHING OTHER THAN A TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC," AND HE BOTH CONTINUES AND CRITICIZES A TRADITION IN WHICH LOGIC SERVES AS FOUNDATION FOR ONTOLOGY. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC IS A META-LOGIC THAT CRITICIZES THE FOUNDATIONAL COMPET.
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  24. John H. Zammito (2008). Kant and Naturalism Reconsidered. Inquiry 51 (5):532 – 558.
    Reconstructions of Kant are prominent in the contemporary debate over naturalism. Given that this naturalism rejects a priori principles, Kant's anti-naturalism can best be discerned in the “critical turn” as a response to David Hume. Hume did not awaken Kant to criticize but to defend rational metaphysics. But when Kant went transcendental did he not, in fact, go transcendent? The controversy in the 1990s over John McDowell's Mind and World explored just this suspicion: the questions of the normative force of (...)
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  25. Piotr Łaciak (2005). Kant I Husserl a Problem Materialnego a Priori. Nowa Krytyka 18.
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Kant: Inference
  1. Robert Adamson (1883). Kant's View of Mathematical Premisses and Reasonings. Mind 8 (31):421 - 425.
  2. R. Lanier Anderson (2004). Containment Analyticity and Kant's Problem of Synthetic Judgment. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 25 (2):161-204.
  3. Jody Azzouni (2009). Why Do Informal Proofs Conform to Formal Norms? Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):9-26.
    Kant discovered a philosophical problem with mathematical proof. Despite being a priori , its methodology involves more than analytic truth. But what else is involved? This problem is widely taken to have been solved by Frege’s extension of logic beyond its restricted (and largely Aristotelian) form. Nevertheless, a successor problem remains: both traditional and contemporary (classical) mathematical proofs, although conforming to the norms of contemporary (classical) logic, never were, and still aren’t, executed by mathematicians in a way that transparently reveals (...)
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  4. Nathan Bauer (2010). Kant's Subjective Deduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
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  5. Frederick Beiser (2010). Mathematical Method in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
  6. Francesca Biagioli (2014). What Does It Mean That “Space Can Be Transcendental Without the Axioms Being So”? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-21.
    In 1870, Hermann von Helmholtz criticized the Kantian conception of geometrical axioms as a priori synthetic judgments grounded in spatial intuition. However, during his dispute with Albrecht Krause (Kant und Helmholtz über den Ursprung und die Bedeutung der Raumanschauung und der geometrischen Axiome. Lahr, Schauenburg, 1878), Helmholtz maintained that space can be transcendental without the axioms being so. In this paper, I will analyze Helmholtz’s claim in connection with his theory of measurement. Helmholtz uses a Kantian argument that can be (...)
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  7. Tyler Burge (2003). Logic and Analyticity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):199-249.
    The view that logic is true independently of a subject matter is criticized—enlarging on Quine's criticisms and adding further ones. It is then argued apriori that full reflective understanding of logic and deductive reasoning requires substantial commitment to mathematical entities. It is emphasized that the objectively apriori connections between deductive reasoning and commitment to mathematics need not be accepted by or even comprehensible to a given deductive reasoner. The relevant connections emerged only slowly in the history of logic. But they (...)
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  8. Mary Domski (2010). Kant on the Imagination and Geometrical Certainty. Perspectives on Science 18 (4):409-431.
    My goal in this paper is to develop our understanding of the role the imagination plays in Kant’s Critical account of geometry, and I do so by attending to how the imagination factors into the method of reasoning Kant assigns the geometer in the First Critique. Such an approach is not unto itself novel. Recent commentators, such as Friedman (1992) and Young (1992), have taken a careful look at the constructions of the productive imagination in pure intuition and highlighted the (...)
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  9. Theodor Ebert (2009). Michael Wolff über Syllogismen bei Aristoteles und Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):357 - 372.
  10. Edgard José Jorge Filho (2008). Concerning the Problem of Error in Kant. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:67-76.
    In the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic, of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents a conception of error. In the (Jäsche) Logic, he also deals with the problem of error, albeit in a different way. This paper aims at exposing this difference and arguing that, in the (Jäsche) Logic, error is explained moreconsistently and suitably than it is in the Transcendental Dialectic. It begins by considering judgment as the place of truth, falsehood and error, and inquiring into the cognitive (...)
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  11. M. Friedman (1992). Review of Questions of Form: Logic and the Analytic Proposition From Kant to Carnap by Joëlle Proust. [REVIEW] Noûs 26:532-542.
  12. Emily Grosholz (2000). Frege and the Surprising History of Logic: Introduction to Claude Imbert, "Gottlob Frege, One More Time&Quot;. Hypatia 15 (4):151-155.
    Convinced that logic has a history and that its history always manages to surprise the philosophers, Claude Imbert has devoted much of her work to the study of the Stoic school and of the late-nineteenth-century German logician Gottlob Frege. In the fifth chapter of her book Pour une histoire de la logique, she examines the trajectory of Frege's awareness of what his new logic entails, in particular the way it subverts the project of Kant.
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  13. Robert Hanna (1998). A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):497-528.
    According to Kant in the Prolegomena, the natural kind proposition (GYM) "Gold is a yellow metal" is analytically true, necessary, and a priori. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam have argued that on the contrary propositions such as (GYM) are neither analytic, nor necessary, nor a priori. The Kripke-Putnam view is based on the doctrine of "scientific essentialism" (SE). It is a direct consequence of SE that propositions such as (GE) "Gold is the element with atomic number number 79" are metaphysically (...)
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  14. Immanuel Kant (1963/1972). Kant's Introduction to Logic and His Essay on the Mistaken Subtilty of the Four Figures. Westport, Conn.,Greenwood Press.
    We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.
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  15. Anita Kasabova (2002). Is Logic a Theoretical or Practical Discipline? Kant and/or Bolzano. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 84 (3):319-333.
    Does logic describe something or not? If not, is it a normative or practical discipline? Is there a radical division between the practical or normative level and the theoretical or descriptive level? A discipline is theoretical, we may say, if its main propositions contain descriptive expressions, such as “is” or “have”, but no normative expressions, such as “ought”, “ought not” or “may”. A discipline is normative if its main propositions are of the form “it ought to be”. Theoretical propositions express (...)
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  16. Patricia Kitcher (1994). Kant's Transcendental Psychology. OUP USA.
    For the last 100 years historians have denigrated the psychology of the Critique of Pure Reason. In opposition, Patricia Kitcher argues that we can only understand the deduction of the categories in terms of Kant's attempt to fathom the psychological prerequisites of thought, and that this investigation illuminates thinking itself. Kant tried to understand the "task environment" of knowledge and thought: Given the data we acquire and the scientific generalizations we make, what basic cognitive capacities are necessary to perform these (...)
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  17. Pauline Kleingeld (1998). Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason. Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):500-528.
    In his critical works of the 1780's, Kant claims, seemingly inconsistently, that (1) theoretical and practical reason are one and the same reason, applied differently, (2) that he still needs to show that they are, and (3) that theoretical and practical reason are united. I first argue that current interpretations of Kant's doctrine of the unity of reason are insufficient. But rather than concluding that Kant’s doctrine becomes coherent only in the Critique of Judgment, I show that the three statements (...)
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  18. Frank J. Leavitt (1991). Kant's Schematism and His Philosophy of Geometry. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (4):647-659.
    Kant's philosophy of geometry rests upon his doctrine of the "schematism" which I argue is formally identical to the ability to grass the middle term of an Aristotelian syllogism. The doctrine fails to avoid obscurities which were already present in Plato, Aristotle, and Hume.
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  19. Margaret MacDougall (2010). Poincaréan Intuition Revisited: What Can We Learn From Kant and Parsons? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):138-147.
  20. John MacFarlane (2008). Brandom's Demarcation of Logic. Philosophical Topics 36 (2):55-62.
    This is a lightly edited version of my comments on Brandom’s Lecture 2, as delivered in Prague at the “Prague Locke Lectures” in April, 2007. I try to say why Brandom’s proposed demarcation is significant, by placing it in a broader context of demarcation proposals from Kant to the twentieth century. I then raise some questions about the basic ingredients of Brandom’s demarcation—the notions of PP-sufficiency and VP-sufficiency—and question whether the vocabulary of conditionals, Brandom’s paradigm for logical vocabulary, can be (...)
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  21. W. Malzkorn (1995). Kant Critique of Traditional Syllogistic Theory. History and Philosophy of Logic 16 (1):75-88.
  22. Matthew McAndrew (2014). Kant's Theory of Inductive Reasoning: The Reflecting Power of Judgment in Kant's Logic. Kant Studies Online:43-64.
  23. Charles Nussbaum (1992). Critical and Pre-Critical Phases in Kant's Philosophy of Logic. Kant-Studien 83 (3):280-293.
    The transition in Kant's writings form a pre-critical to a critical standpoint has been thoroughly documented with regard to Kant's changing conception of metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and philosophy of mathematics. But a similar alteration in standpoint in Kant's philosophy of logic has received little or no attention. This paper documents the existence of this shift in Kant's philosophy of logic and examines its nature. The resulting analysis provides evidence for the thesis that Kant began with a strictly intensional term (...)
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  24. Lawrence Pasternack (2014). Kant on Opinion: Assent, Hypothesis, and the Norms of General Applied Logic. Kant-Studien 105 (1):41-82.
    Kant identifies knowledge [Wissen], belief [Glaube], and opinion [Meinung] as our three primary modes of “holding-to-be-true” [Fürwahrhalten]. He also identifies opinion as making up the greatest part of our cognition. After a preliminary sketch of Kant’s system of propositional attitudes, this paper will explore what he says about the norms governing opinion and empirical hypotheses. The final section will turn to what, in the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere, Kant refers to as “General Applied Logic”. It concerns the “contingent (...)
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  25. Marcel Quarfood (2006). Kant on Biological Teleology: Towards a Two-Level Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (4):735-747.
    Kant stresses the regulative status of teleological attributions, but sometimes he seems to treat teleology as a constitutive condition for biology. To clarify this issue, the concept of natural purpose and its role for biology are examined. I suggest that the concept serves an identificatory function: it singles out objects as natural purposes, whereby the special science of biology is constituted. This relative constitutivity of teleology is explicated by means of a distinction of levels: on the object level of biological (...)
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