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Summary Kant's thought about logic is at once central to his own philosophical system and also stands at a key transitional moment in the broader history of logic and philosophy of logic.  Kant conceives of logic as the science of our understanding, which means that it is tasked with discovering the basic kinds of activities that our understanding is capable of (formal logic), as well as the basic kinds of representational contents (concepts) that our understanding makes use of in these acts (transcendental logic).  Because forming a science is itself one of these acts, and because philosophy itself is intended to be a science, Kant thinks that logic provides philosophy with the core blueprint of its structure -- a thought exemplified by his famous organizational 'Tables', and picked up by later German Idealists (among others).  Yet because Kant thinks that our minds are capable of more than just understanding, both in terms of the kinds of its activity and in terms of the representational contents it can engage with, Kant thinks that the knowledge provided within logic is sharply limited.  Critically revisiting these alleged restrictions provided inspiration for many of those responsible for the most influential developments in the subsequent history of logic (such as Bolzano, Frege, and Russell).
Key works Despite its central importance for his philosophical system, Kant himself did not publish a separate work on logic during his lifetime.  Nevertheless, Kant does present his views on logic in almost all of his most important theoretical writings, including Kant 1998, and works collected in Kant 2002 and Kant 2002.  What is more, Kant lectured on logic throughout the entirety of his career, and the surviving student transcripts of some of these lectures provide us with a further window into Kant's thought about logic, some of which are collected in Kant 1992.  Finally, the vast collection of notes and fragments that Kant left after his death contain many brief discussions about logic, some of which can be found in Kant 2005.
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  1. J. Bergmann (1899). Zur Lehre Kants von den logischen Grundsätzen. Kant-Studien 2 (1-3):323-348.
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  2. Jean-Yves Beziau (2008). What is “Formal Logic”? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13:9-22.
    “Formal logic”, an expression created by Kant to characterize Aristotelian logic, has also been used as a name for modern logic, originated by Boole and Frege, which in many aspects differs radically from traditional logic. We shed light on this paradox by distinguishing in this paper five different meanings of the expression “formal logic”: (1) Formal reasoning according to the Aristotelian dichotomy of form and content, (2) Formal logic as a formal science by opposition to an empirical science, (3) Formal (...)
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  3. Alfredo Ferrarin (1997). Review of G. Tonelli, Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" Within the Tradition of Modern Logic. Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (3):472-474.
  4. Penelope Maddy (2012). The Philosophy of Logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (4):481-504.
    This talk surveys a range of positions on the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological questions about elementary logic, for example, as a starting point: what is the subject matter of logic—what makes its truths true? how do we come to know the truths of logic? A taxonomy is approached by beginning from well-known schools of thought in the philosophy of mathematics—Logicism, Intuitionism, Formalism, Realism—and sketching roughly corresponding views in the philosophy of logic. Kant, Mill, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, Quine, and Putnam (...)
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  5. Ulrich Majer (2006). The Relation of Logic and Intuition in Kant's Philosophy of Science, Particularly Geometry. In. In Emily Carson & Renate Huber (eds.), Intuition and the Axiomatic Method. Springer. 47--66.
  6. Wayne Martin, Inverse Psychologism in the Theory of Judgment.
    Outline: 1. Why Judgment? 2. Inverse Psychologism: General Issues 3. Inverse Psychologism in the Phenomeno-Logic of Judgment 4. Judgment and Language 5. [De-]stabilizing Kant’s Inverse Psychologism..
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  7. Emily Michael (1978). Peirce's Adaptation of Kant's Definition of Logic: The Early Manuscripts. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 14 (3):176 - 183.
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  8. Imtiaz Moosa (1995). Formalism of Kant's A Priori Versus Scheler's Material A Priori. International Studies in Philosophy 27 (2):33-47.
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  9. Hoke Robinson (2007). Comments on Mosser's "Kant and the Logic of Aristotle". Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (2):33-36.
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  10. Richard Velkley (1986). Kant on the Primacy and the Limits of Logic. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 11 (2):147-162.
    KANT ASSERTS THAT "ONTOLOGY IS NOTHING OTHER THAN A TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC," AND HE BOTH CONTINUES AND CRITICIZES A TRADITION IN WHICH LOGIC SERVES AS FOUNDATION FOR ONTOLOGY. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC IS A META-LOGIC THAT CRITICIZES THE FOUNDATIONAL COMPET.
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  11. John H. Zammito (2008). Kant and Naturalism Reconsidered. Inquiry 51 (5):532 – 558.
    Reconstructions of Kant are prominent in the contemporary debate over naturalism. Given that this naturalism rejects a priori principles, Kant's anti-naturalism can best be discerned in the “critical turn” as a response to David Hume. Hume did not awaken Kant to criticize but to defend rational metaphysics. But when Kant went transcendental did he not, in fact, go transcendent? The controversy in the 1990s over John McDowell's Mind and World explored just this suspicion: the questions of the normative force of (...)
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  12. Piotr Łaciak (2005). Kant I Husserl a Problem Materialnego a Priori. Nowa Krytyka 18.
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Kant: Inference
  1. Robert Adamson (1883). Kant's View of Mathematical Premisses and Reasonings. Mind 8 (31):421 - 425.
  2. R. Lanier Anderson (2004). Containment Analyticity and Kant's Problem of Synthetic Judgment. Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 25 (2):161-204.
  3. Jody Azzouni (2009). Why Do Informal Proofs Conform to Formal Norms? Foundations of Science 14 (1-2):9-26.
    Kant discovered a philosophical problem with mathematical proof. Despite being a priori , its methodology involves more than analytic truth. But what else is involved? This problem is widely taken to have been solved by Frege’s extension of logic beyond its restricted (and largely Aristotelian) form. Nevertheless, a successor problem remains: both traditional and contemporary (classical) mathematical proofs, although conforming to the norms of contemporary (classical) logic, never were, and still aren’t, executed by mathematicians in a way that transparently reveals (...)
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  4. Nathan Bauer (2010). Kant's Subjective Deduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
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  5. Frederick C. Beiser (2010). Mathematical Method in Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
  6. Tyler Burge (2003). Logic and Analyticity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):199-249.
    The view that logic is true independently of a subject matter is criticized—enlarging on Quine's criticisms and adding further ones. It is then argued apriori that full reflective understanding of logic and deductive reasoning requires substantial commitment to mathematical entities. It is emphasized that the objectively apriori connections between deductive reasoning and commitment to mathematics need not be accepted by or even comprehensible to a given deductive reasoner. The relevant connections emerged only slowly in the history of logic. But they (...)
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  7. Ruth F. Chadwick & Clive Cazeaux (eds.) (1992). Kant's Critique of Judgement. Routledge.
  8. Alfredo Dinis (1993). Kant: Objectividade e Causalidade na Segunda Analogia da Experiência. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 49 (4):627 - 633.
    O objectivo central de Kant no texto da "Segunda Analogia da Experiência", na Crítica da Razão Pura, é o de estabelecer a condição de possibilidade da experiência de uma sucessão objectiva de fenómenos. A sucessão contingente de fenómenos ao nível da intuição converte-se na percepção objectiva de uma sequência de fenómenos apenas pela actividade sintética da imaginação de acordo com o princípio de causalidade. No texto em análise, a aplicação daquele princípio não vai além das formas a priori do espaço (...)
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  9. Mary Domski (2010). Kant on the Imagination and Geometrical Certainty. Perspectives on Science 18 (4):409-431.
    My goal in this paper is to develop our understanding of the role the imagination plays in Kant’s Critical account of geometry, and I do so by attending to how the imagination factors into the method of reasoning Kant assigns the geometer in the First Critique. Such an approach is not unto itself novel. Recent commentators, such as Friedman (1992) and Young (1992), have taken a careful look at the constructions of the productive imagination in pure intuition and highlighted the (...)
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  10. Theodor Ebert (2009). Michael Wolff über Syllogismen bei Aristoteles und Vernunftschlüsse bei Kant. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (2):357 - 372.
  11. Edgard José Jorge Filho (2008). Concerning the Problem of Error in Kant. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:67-76.
    In the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic, of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents a conception of error. In the (Jäsche) Logic, he also deals with the problem of error, albeit in a different way. This paper aims at exposing this difference and arguing that, in the (Jäsche) Logic, error is explained moreconsistently and suitably than it is in the Transcendental Dialectic. It begins by considering judgment as the place of truth, falsehood and error, and inquiring into the cognitive (...)
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  12. Emily Grosholz (2000). Frege and the Surprising History of Logic: Introduction to Claude Imbert, "Gottlob Frege, One More Time&Quot;. Hypatia 15 (4):151-155.
    Convinced that logic has a history and that its history always manages to surprise the philosophers, Claude Imbert has devoted much of her work to the study of the Stoic school and of the late-nineteenth-century German logician Gottlob Frege. In the fifth chapter of her book Pour une histoire de la logique, she examines the trajectory of Frege's awareness of what his new logic entails, in particular the way it subverts the project of Kant.
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  13. Robert Hanna (1998). A Kantian Critique of Scientific Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):497-528.
    According to Kant in the Prolegomena, the natural kind proposition (GYM) "Gold is a yellow metal" is analytically true, necessary, and a priori. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam have argued that on the contrary propositions such as (GYM) are neither analytic, nor necessary, nor a priori. The Kripke-Putnam view is based on the doctrine of "scientific essentialism" (SE). It is a direct consequence of SE that propositions such as (GE) "Gold is the element with atomic number number 79" are metaphysically (...)
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  14. Immanuel Kant (1963/1972). Kant's Introduction to Logic and His Essay on the Mistaken Subtilty of the Four Figures. Westport, Conn.,Greenwood Press.
    We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.
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  15. Anita Kasabova (2002). Is Logic a Theoretical or Practical Discipline? Kant and/or Bolzano. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 84 (3):319-333.
    Does logic describe something or not? If not, is it a normative or practical discipline? Is there a radical division between the practical or normative level and the theoretical or descriptive level? A discipline is theoretical, we may say, if its main propositions contain descriptive expressions, such as “is” or “have”, but no normative expressions, such as “ought”, “ought not” or “may”. A discipline is normative if its main propositions are of the form “it ought to be”. Theoretical propositions express (...)
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  16. Patricia Kitcher (2011). Kant's Thinker. Oxford University Press.
    Overview -- Locke's internal sense and Kant's changing views -- Personal identity amd its problems -- Rationalalist metaphysics of mind -- Consciousness, self-consciousness, and cognition -- Strands of Argument in the Duisburg Nachlass -- A transcendental deduction for a priori concepts -- Synthesis : why and how? -- Arguing for apperception -- The power of apperception -- "I-think" as the destroyer of rational psychology -- Is Kant's theory consistent? -- The normativity objection -- Is Kant's thinker (as such) a free (...)
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  17. Pauline Kleingeld (1998). Kant on the Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason. Review of Metaphysics 52 (2):500-528.
    In his critical works of the 1780's, Kant claims, seemingly inconsistently, that (1) theoretical and practical reason are one and the same reason, applied differently, (2) that he still needs to show that they are, and (3) that theoretical and practical reason are united. I first argue that current interpretations of Kant's doctrine of the unity of reason are insufficient. But rather than concluding that Kant’s doctrine becomes coherent only in the Critique of Judgment, I show that the three statements (...)
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  18. Srećko Kovač (2008). Gödel, Kant, and the Path of a Science. Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):147-169.
    Gödel's philosophical views were to a significant extent influenced by the study not only of Leibniz or Husserl, but also of Kant. Both Gödel and Kant aimed at the secure foundation of philosophy, the certainty of knowledge and the solvability of all meaningful problems in philosophy. In this paper, parallelisms between the foundational crisis of metaphysics in Kant's view and the foundational crisis of mathematics in Gödel's view are elaborated, especially regarding the problem of finding the “ secure path of (...)
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  19. Alison Laywine (2010). Kant and Lambert on Geometrical Postulates in the Reform of Metaphysics. In Michael Friedman, Mary Domski & Michael Dickson (eds.), Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science. Open Court.
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  20. Frank J. Leavitt (1991). Kant's Schematism and His Philosophy of Geometry. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (4):647-659.
    Kant's philosophy of geometry rests upon his doctrine of the "schematism" which I argue is formally identical to the ability to grass the middle term of an Aristotelian syllogism. The doctrine fails to avoid obscurities which were already present in Plato, Aristotle, and Hume.
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  21. Béatrice Longuenesse (2004). Les concepts a priori kantiens et leur destin. Revue de Métaphysique Et de Morale 4 (44):485-510.
    Kant soutient qu'une table complète et systématique des catégories peut être établie selon le « fil conducteur » des fonctions logiques du jugement. La première partie de cet article est une exposition de l'argument kantien. La deuxième partie est un examen de quelques-unes des objections formulées à l'encontre du « fil conducteur » de Kant. Je conclus que l'appropriation contemporaine de la doctrine kantienne des catégories est désormais divisée entre deux problèmes distincts : celui du contenu conceptuel (ou non) de (...)
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  22. Margaret MacDougall (2010). Poincaréan Intuition Revisited: What Can We Learn From Kant and Parsons? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (2):138-147.
  23. John MacFarlane (2008). Brandom's Demarcation of Logic. Philosophical Topics 36 (2):55-62.
    This is a lightly edited version of my comments on Brandom’s Lecture 2, as delivered in Prague at the “Prague Locke Lectures” in April, 2007. I try to say why Brandom’s proposed demarcation is significant, by placing it in a broader context of demarcation proposals from Kant to the twentieth century. I then raise some questions about the basic ingredients of Brandom’s demarcation—the notions of PP-sufficiency and VP-sufficiency—and question whether the vocabulary of conditionals, Brandom’s paradigm for logical vocabulary, can be (...)
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  24. Rudolf A. Makkreel (2003). The Cognition–Knowledge Distinction in Kant and Dilthey and the Implications for Psychology and Self-Understanding. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (1):149-164.
  25. Matthew McAndrew (2014). Kant's Theory of Inductive Reasoning: The Reflecting Power of Judgment in Kant's Logic. Kant Studies Online:43-64.
  26. Lawrence Pasternack (2014). Kant on Opinion: Assent, Hypothesis, and the Norms of General Applied Logic. Kant-Studien 105 (1):41-82.
    Kant identifies knowledge [Wissen], belief [Glaube], and opinion [Meinung] as our three primary modes of “holding-to-be-true” [Fürwahrhalten]. He also identifies opinion as making up the greatest part of our cognition. After a preliminary sketch of Kant’s system of propositional attitudes, this paper will explore what he says about the norms governing opinion and empirical hypotheses. The final section will turn to what, in the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere, Kant refers to as “General Applied Logic”. It concerns the “contingent (...)
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  27. Derk Pereboom (1995). Self-Understanding in Kant's Transcendental Deduction. Synthese 103 (1):1 - 42.
    I argue that §§15–20 of the B-Deduction contain two independent arguments for the applicability of a priori concepts, the first an argument from above, the second an argument from below. The core of the first argument is §16's explanation of our consciousness of subject-identity across self-attributions, while the focus of the second is §18's account of universality and necessity in our experience. I conclude that the B-Deduction comprises powerful strategies for establishing its intended conclusion, and that some assistance from empirical (...)
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  28. Marcel Quarfood (2006). Kant on Biological Teleology: Towards a Two-Level Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (4):735-747.
    Kant stresses the regulative status of teleological attributions, but sometimes he seems to treat teleology as a constitutive condition for biology. To clarify this issue, the concept of natural purpose and its role for biology are examined. I suggest that the concept serves an identificatory function: it singles out objects as natural purposes, whereby the special science of biology is constituted. This relative constitutivity of teleology is explicated by means of a distinction of levels: on the object level of biological (...)
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  29. A. R. (2003). The Cognition-Knowledge Distinction in Kant and Dilthey and the Implications for Psychology and Self-Understanding. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (1):149-164.
    Both Kant and Dilthey distinguish between cognition and knowledge, but they do so differently in accordance with their respective theoretical interests. Kant's primary cognitive interest is in the natural sciences, and from this perspective the status of psychology is questioned because its phenomena are not mathematically measurable. Dilthey, by contrast, reconceives psychology as a human science.For Kant, knowledge is conceptual cognition that has attained certainty by being part of a rational system. Dilthey also links knowledge with certainty; however, he derives (...)
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  30. Claudia M. Schmidt (2008). Kant's Transcendental and Empirical Psychology of Cognition. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (4):462-472.
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  31. Nicholas Stang (forthcoming). Kant's Argument That Existence is Not a Determination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In this paper, I examine Kant’s famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non-existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further that Kant’s primary target is not ontological arguments as such (...)
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  32. Mary Tiles (1980). Kant, Wittgenstein and the Limits of Logic. History and Philosophy of Logic 1 (1-2):151-170.
    This paper has two purposes. (1) To justify the claim that there is an important distinction underlying the saying/showing distinction of the Tractatus; the distinction which Kant characterises as that between historical and rational knowledge. (2) To argue that it is because the Tractatus accepts Frege/Russell logic as a complete representation of all thought according to laws, that what is shown cannot be recognised as knowledge. This is done by interpolating Frege's logical innovations between the views of Kant and Wittgenstein (...)
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  33. Clinton Tolley (2006). Kant on the Nature of Logical Laws. Philosophical Topics 34 (1/2):371-407.
  34. Alberto Vanzo (forthcoming). Kant on Existential Import. Kantian Review 19 (2).
    This paper reconstructs Kant’s view on the existential import of categorical sentences. Kant is widely taken to have held that affirmative sentences (the "A" and "I" sentences of the traditional square of opposition) have existential import, whereas negative sentences ("E" and "O") lack existential import. The paper challenges this standard interpretation. It is argued that Kant ascribes existential import only to affirmative synthetic sentences. However, the reasons for this do not fall within the remit of Kant’s formal logic. Unlike traditional (...)
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  35. Alberto Vanzo (2012). Kant on Experiment. In James Maclaurin (ed.), Rationis Defensor.
    This paper discusses Immanuel Kant’s views on the role of experiments in natural science, focusing on their relationship with hypotheses, laws of nature, and the heuristic principles of scientific enquiry. Kant’s views are contrasted with the philosophy of experiment that was first sketched by Francis Bacon and later developed by Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. Kant holds that experiments are always designed and carried out in the light of hypotheses. Hypotheses are derived from experience on the basis of a set (...)
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  36. Kenneth R. Westphal (2004). Kant's Transcendental Proof of Realism. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is the first detailed study of Kant's method of 'transcendental reflection' and its use in the Critique of Pure Reason to identify our basic human cognitive capacities, and to justify Kant's transcendental proofs of the necessary a priori conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience. Kenneth Westphal, in a closely argued internal critique of Kant's analysis, shows that if we take Kant's project seriously in its own terms, the result is not transcendental idealism but (unqualified) realism regarding (...)
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  37. Michael Wolff (2010). Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (2):359 - 371.
    In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sei (2010) 41: 341-355) I have compared Aristotle's syllogistic with Kant's theory of "pure ratiocination". "Ratiocinia pura" („reine Vernunftschlüsse") is Kant's designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called 'perfect'. In Kant's view they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant's view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia (...)
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  38. Michael Wolff (2010). Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 1. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (1):199 - 213.
    In an earlier article (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:341-355, 2009), I have rejected an interpretation of Aristotle's syllogistic which (since Patzig) is predominant in the literature on Aristotle, but wrong in my view. According to this interpretation, the distinguishing feature of perfect syllogisms is their being evident. Theodor Ebert has attempted to defend this interpretation by means of objections (s. J Gen Philos Sci 40:357-365, 2009) which I will try to refute in part [1] of the following article. I (...)
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