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Summary The nature of the human mind is a central concern in all of Kant's major works. His view of the mind is shaped by two fundamental distinctions: (1) activity vs. passivity and (2) form vs. matter. The paradigmatic activity of the mind, for Kant, is judgment, which involves the unification of representations through concepts. This activity is directed at intuitions/sensations, which are distinguished by our passivity in receiving them. While both judgment and intuition involve certain forms, the latter is the source of all the matter of our experience. Judgments, for Kant, are essentially connected to self-consciousness. Kant gives broadly similar accounts of practical and aesthetic experience, in each case emphasizing forms that we actively apply to the passive elements of our mental lives.
Key works The Critique of Pure Reason is taken by most scholars as the definitive statement of Kant's philosophy of mind, especially the 1787 B edition. Many of Kant's later works provide useful elaborations, however, especially the introductions to the 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment.
Introductions The secondary literature on Kant's philosophy of mind is vast. For an overview of issues concerning the nature of the mind and self-consciousness, see Brook 2008. For an overview of Kant's theory of judgment and how it fits into his larger project, see Hanna 2008. For an introductory discussion of how Kant's views of the mind relate to his early modern predecessors, see Kitcher 2006.
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  1. Theodor W. Adorno (2002). Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Polity..
    "This volume . . . provides wonderful insight into Adorno's understanding of Kant and also allows us to see more clearly the role Kant's thought played in ...
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  2. Jocelyn Benoist (1998). L'impensé de la Représentation: De Leibniz à Kant. Kant-Studien 89 (3):300-317.
  3. Michael Berman (2011). 'The Happy Accident': Merleau-Ponty and Kant on the Judgment of God. The European Legacy 16 (2):223-236.
    Kant's ideas about, questions, and challenges to the Western tradition of philosophy reverberate into the third century of the reception of his texts. The writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the twentieth-century French existential and hermeneutic phenomenologist, are interlaced with engagements with Kant's ideas. Often these incidents are marked by Merleau-Ponty's critique, yet there is a noticeable recurrence of his efforts to contend with Kant's philosophy. In Merleau-Ponty's course notes, Nature (2002), he wrestles with Kant's version of nature in the Critique of (...)
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  4. J. M. Bernstein (2000). Judging Life: From Beauty to Experience. From Kant to Chaim Soutine. Constellations 7 (2):157-177.
  5. Jeffrey Bernstein (1997). Imagination and Lunacy in Kant's First Critique and Anthropology. Idealistic Studies 27 (3):143-154.
  6. Alessandro Bertinetto (2009). «Wäre ihm dies klar geworden, so wäre seine Ktk. W.L. geworden«: Fichte's Auseinandersetzung mit Kant in den Vorlesungen ueber Transzendentale Logik. Fichte-Studien 33:145-164.
  7. Karl Beth (1925). Das Erlebnis in Religion Und Magie. Kant-Studien 30 (1-2):381-408.
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  8. Jean-Marie Beyssade (2008). Descartes' "I Am a Thing That Thinks" Versus Kant's "I Think". In Daniel Garber & Béatrice Longuenesse (eds.), Kant and the Early Moderns. Princeton University Press.
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  9. Sacha Golob (2013). Heidegger on Kant, Time and the 'Form' of Intentionality. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2):345 - 367.
    Between 1927 and 1936, Martin Heidegger devoted almost one thousand pages of close textual commentary to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This article aims to shed new light on the relationship between Kant and Heidegger by providing a fresh analysis of two central texts: Heidegger’s 1927/8 lecture course Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and his 1929 monograph Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. I argue that to make sense of Heidegger’s reading of Kant, one must resolve two (...)
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  10. John Hund (1998). Hegel's Break with Kant: The Leap From Individual Psychology to Sociology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (2):226-243.
    The author calls attention to and discusses certain basic but neglected and/or obscured features of Hegel's idealism. He treats these features as paradigmati cally sociological and uses them as a baseline with which to chart Hegel's critique of, and against which to measure, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Section 1 introduces Hegel's criticism of Kant's idealism; in contrast to his own objective idealism, transcendental idealism is individualistic. This criticism is elaborated in section 2, issuing in the quasi-Wittgensteinian indictment that Kant (...)
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  11. Charles Larmore (2003). Back to Kant? No Way. Inquiry 46 (2):260 – 271.
  12. Beatrice Longuenesse (2012). Two Uses of 'I' as Subject? In Simon Prosser & François Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error through Misidentification.
  13. Beatrice Longuenesse (2008). Cassam and Kant on "How Possible" Questions and Categorial Thinking. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):510-517.
  14. Kenton F. Machina (1972). Kant, Quine, and Human Experience. Philosophical Review 81 (4):484-497.
  15. Antonio-Maria Nunziante & Alberto Vanzo (2009). Representing Subjects, Mind-Dependent Objects: Kant, Leibniz, and the Amphiboly. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (1):133-151.
    This paper compares Kant’s and Leibniz’s views on the relation between knowing subjects and known objects. Kant discusses Leibniz’s philosophy in the ‘Amphiboly’ section of the first Critique. According to Kant, Leibniz’s main error is mistaking objects in space and time for mind-independent things in themselves, that is, for monads. The paper argues that, pace Kant, Leibniz regards objects in space and time as mind-dependent. A deeper divergence between the two philosophers concerns knowing subjects. For Leibniz, they are substances. For (...)
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  16. L. M. Palmer (2004). The Systematic Constitution of the Universe, the Constitution of the Mind and Kants Copernican Analogy. Kant-Studien 95 (2):171-181.
  17. H. J. Paton (1956). Kant's First Critique. Philosophical Quarterly 6 (24):260-265.
  18. Derk Pereboom (1988). Kant on Intentionality. Synthese 77 (3):321 - 352.
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  19. Paul M. Pietroski (1996). Experiencing the Facts: Critical Notice of Mind and World, by John McDowell. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26:613-36.
    Paul Pietroski, McGill University The general topic of_ Mind and World_, the written version of John McDowell's 1991 John Locke Lectures, is how `concepts mediate the relation between minds and the world'. And one of the main aims is `to suggest that Kant should still have a central place in our discussion of the way thought bears on reality' (1).1 In particular, McDowell urges us to adopt a thesis that he finds in Kant, or perhaps in Strawson's Kant: the content (...)
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  20. Suma Rajiva (2006). Is Hypothetical Reason a Precursor to Reflective Judgment? Kant-Studien 97 (1):114-126.
  21. Mark Sacks (2000). Objectivity and Insight. Oxford University Press.
    The first two parts of Objectivity and Insight explore the prospects for objectivity on the standard ontological conception, and find that they are not good. In Part I, under the heading of subject-driven scepticism, Sacks addresses the problem of securing epistemic reach that extends beyond subjective content. In so doing, he considers models of mind proposed by Locke, Hume, Kant, James, and Bergson. Part II, under the heading of world-driven scepticism, discusses the scope for universality of normative structure-a problem which (...)
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  22. Hubert Schwyzer (1973). Thought and Reality: The Metaphysics of Kant and Wittgenstein. Philosophical Quarterly 23 (92):193-206.
  23. Kieran Setiya (2004). Transcendental Idealism in the 'Aesthetic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):63–88.
    In the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant offers an argument for transcendental idealism. This argument is one focus of the longstanding controversy between "one-world" and "two-world" interpretations of the distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear. I present an interpretation of the argument of the "Aesthetic" that supports a novel "one-world" interpretation. On this interpretation, Kant is concerned with the mind-dependence of spatial and temporal properties; and with the idea that space and time (...)
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  24. Lionel Stefan Shapiro (2001). “The Transition From Sensibility to Reason in Regressu”: Indeterminism in Kant's Reflexionen. Kant-Studien 92 (1):3-12.
    In a remarkable series of Critical-period Reflexionen (5611-4, 5616-9), Kant sketches a defense of the possibility of freedom that differs radically from his usual compatibilism by incorporating an indeterministic account of the phenomena. Anticipating Łukasiewicz, Kant reconciles universal causal determination with an open future by positing a lower temporal bound for the infinite regress of prior determining causes issuing in a contingent action. On this account, Kant however concedes, the unity of experience "cannot fully obtain in the case of free (...)
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  25. J. G. Shurman (1899). Kant's Theory of the a Priori Forms of Sense: II. Philosophical Review 8 (2):113-127.
  26. Giuseppe Varnier (2000). Unity of the Mental and 'Logical' Identity: After Kant and Hegel. Topoi 19 (2):157-178.
  27. Falk Wunderlich (2004). Review of Otfried Hoeffe, Kants Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Die Grundlegung der Modernen Philosophie. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (9).
Kant: Apperception and Self-Consciousness
  1. Karl Ameriks (2000). Kant's Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. Oxford University Press.
    This seminal contribution to Kant studies, originally published in 1982, was the first to present a thorough survey and evaluation of Kant's theory of mind. Ameriks focuses on Kant's discussion of the Paralogisms in the Critique of Pure Reason, and examines how the themes raised there are treated in the rest of Kant's writings. Ameriks demonstrates that Kant developed a theory of mind that is much more rationalistic and defensible than most interpreters have allowed.
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  2. Richard E. Aquila (1997). Unity of Apperception and the Division of Labour in the Transcendental Analytic. Kantian Review 1:17-52.
  3. Richard E. Aquila (1988). Self-Consciousness, Self-Determination, and Imagination in Kant. Topoi 7 (1):65-79.
    I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one's self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one's consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requires a distinction between two notions of consciousness: one (...)
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  4. Hermann Ulrich Asemissen (1959). Egologische Reflexion. Kant-Studien 50 (1-4):262-272.
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  5. Ralf M. Bader (forthcoming). Self-Knowledge in §7 of the Transcendental Aesthetic. In Stefano Bacin (ed.), Proceedings of the XIth International Kant Kongress. de Gruyter.
    Kant's claim that time is a subjective form of intuition was first proposed in his Inaugural Dissertation. This view was immediately criticised by Schultz, Lambert and Mendelssohn. Their criticisms are based on the claim that representations change which implies that change is real. From the reality of change they then argue to the reality of time, which undermines its supposed status as a subjective form of intuition that only applies to appearances. Kant took these criticisms very seriously and attempted to (...)
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  6. Lewis Baldacchino (1980). Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness. Kant-Studien 71 (1-4):393-405.
    There is a widespread misinterpretation of kant according to which an analytic judgment is one that follows from a definition. Through a study of kant's theory of definition, And the role in knowledge that he ascribes to definition, It is shown that this is indeed a misinterpretation. Much criticism of kant's theory of analytic judgments is vitiated by substituting a modern definition of "analytic" for the one kant gave.
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  7. Gary Banham, Apperception and Spontaneity.
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  8. Manfred Baum (1989). Kant on Cosmological Apperception. International Philosophical Quarterly 29 (3):281-289.
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  9. José Luis Bermúdez (1994). The Unity of Apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason. European Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):213-240.
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  10. Sven Bernecker (2006). Kant on Moral Self-Awareness. Kant-Studien 97 (2):163-183.
  11. Daniel Breazeale (2008). Review: Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel. Lectures on German Idealism. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 46 (2):pp. 330-331.
  12. William F. Bristow (2001). Review: Keller, Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 110 (2):272-275.
  13. Andrew Brook, Kant's View of the Mind and Consciousness of Self. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  14. Andrew Brook (2006). Kant: A Unified Representational Base for All Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. 89-109.
  15. Andrew Brook (2001). Kant, Self-Awareness, and Self-Reference. In Andrew Brook & R. DeVidi (eds.), Self-Reference and Self-Awareness. John Benjamins. 9--30.
  16. Andrew Brook (1994). Kant and the Mind. Cambridge University Press.
    Kant made a number of highly original discoveries about the mind - about its ability to synthesise a single, coherent representation of self and world, about the unity it must have to do so, and about the mind's awareness of itself and the semantic apparatus it uses to achieve this awareness. The past fifty years have seen intense activity in research on human cognition. Even so, Kant's discoveries have not been superseded, and some of them have not even been assimilated (...)
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  17. Richard Brown, Kant, Polysolipsism, and the Real Unity of Experience.
    The question I am interested in revolves around Kant’s notion of the unity of experience. My central claim will be that, apart from the unity of experiencings and the unity of individual substances, there is a third unity: the unity of Experience. I will argue that this third unity can be conceived of as a sort of ‘experiential space’ with the Aesthetic and Categories as dimensions. I call this ‘Euclidean Experience’ to emphasize the idea that individual experiencings have a ‘location’ (...)
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  18. Etienne Brun-Rovet (2002). Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):495-510.
    I suggest a possible rehabilitation of Reid's philosophy of mind by a constructive use of Kant's criticisms of the common sense tradition. Kant offers two criticisms, explicitly claiming that common sense philosophy is ill directed methodologically, and implicitly rejecting Reid's view that there is direct epistemological access by introspection to the ontology of mind. Putting the two views together reveals a tension between epistemology and ontology, but the problem which Kant finds in Reid also infects his own system, as his (...)
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  19. Ralf Busse (2014). Review: Kitcher, Kant's Thinker, Transcendental Apperception: Consciousness or Self-Consciousness? [REVIEW] Kantian Review 19 (1):109-117.
    A core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to lack the theoretical resources to clearly (...)
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  20. Wolfgang Carl (1997). Apperception and Spontaneity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (2):147 – 163.
    The interest contemporary philosophy takes in Kant's notion of apperception is restricted to his criticism of the Cartesian Ego and to his refutation of scepticism, but there is a profound lack of concern for the notion itself and for the act of spontaneity in particular which is connected with the use of the word T. Starting from a comparison of Wittgenstein's account of this use with Kant's considerations it is argued that the latter aims at a theory of formal conditions (...)
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  21. David Carr (1977). Kant, Husserl, and the Nonempirical Ego. Journal of Philosophy 74 (11):682-690.
  22. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1990). The Role of Apperception in Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Noûs 24 (1):147-157.
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  23. Klaus Düsing (1983). Constitution and Structure of Self-Identity: Kant's Theory of Apperception and Hegel's Criticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8 (1):409-431.
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