This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
36 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Maria Borges (2008). Physiology and the Controlling of Affects in Kant's Philosophy. Kantian Review 13 (2):46-66.
  2. Aaron Bunch (2014). Throwing Oneself Away: Kant on the Forfeiture of Respect. Kantian Review 19 (1):71-91.
    Surprisingly often Kant asserts that it is possible to behave in such a degrading way that one ‘throws oneself away’ and turns oneself ‘into a thing’, as a result of which others may treat one ‘as they please’. Rather than dismiss these claims out of hand, I argue that they force us to reconsider what is meant and required by ‘respect for humanity’. I argue that to ‘throw away’ humanity is not to lose or extinguish it, but rather to refuse (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Carl Cranor (1980). Kant's Respect-for-Persons Principle. International Studies in Philosophy 12 (2):19-39.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. David Cummiskey (2008). Dignity, Contractualism and Consequentialism. Utilitas 20 (4):383-408.
    Kantian respect for persons is based on the special status and dignity of humanity. There are, however, at least three distinct kinds of interpretation of the principle of respect for the dignity of persons: the contractualist conception, the substantive conception and the direct conception. Contractualist theories are the most common and familiar interpretation. The contractualist assumes that some form of consent or agreement is the crucial factor that is required by respect for persons. The substantive conceptions of dignity, on the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Stephen Darwall (2008). Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect. In Monika Betzler (ed.), Kant's Ethics of Virtues. Walter De Gruyter.
  6. Janelle DeWitt (2014). Respect for the Moral Law: The Emotional Side of Reason. Philosophy 89 (1):31-62.
    Respect, as Kant describes it, has a duality of nature that seems to embody a contradiction – i.e., it is both a moral motive and a feeling, where these are thought to be mutually exclusive. Most solutions involve eliminating one of the two natures, but unfortunately, this also destroys what is unique about respect. So instead, I question the non-cognitive theory of emotion giving rise to the contradiction. In its place, I develop the cognitive theory implicit in Kant's work, one (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Patrick Frierson, Kant's Empirical Psychology.
    This book offers a detailed explanation and analysis of Kant’s empirical psychology and applies that analysis to thinking through several particular issues in Kant’s philosophy more generally. Kant is one of the most important and widely discussed philosophers today and Oxford has a long tradition of publishing excellent monographs on Kant's philosophy (including, for example, recent books such as Robert Hanna’s Kant, Science, and Human Nature and Robert Louden’s Kant's Impure Ethics).
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ernesto V. Garcia (2012). A New Look at Kantian Respect for Persons. Kant Yearbook 4 (1).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Ido Geiger (2011). Rational Feelings and Moral Agency. Kantian Review 16 (2):283-308.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Jeanine Grenberg (1999). Anthropology From a Metaphysical Point of View. Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1):91-115.
    I argue that there can be, on Kant's account, a significant motivational role for feeling in moral action. I first discuss and reject Andrews Reath's claim that Kant is forced to disallow a motivational role for feeling because of his rejection of moral sense theory. I then consider and reject the more general challenge that allowing a role for the influence of feeling on the faculty of desire undermines Kant's commitment to a morality free from anthropological considerations. I conclude by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Paul Guyer (2012). Schopenhauer, Kant and Compassion. Kantian Review 17 (3):403-429.
    Schopenhauer presents his moral philosophy as diametrically opposed to that of Kant: for him, pure practical reason is an illusion and morality can arise only from the feeling of compassion, while for Kant it cannot be based on such a feeling and can be based only on pure practical reason. But the difference is not as great as Schopenhauer makes it seem, because for him compassion is supposed to arise from metaphysical insight into the unity of all being, thus from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Carol Hay (2012). Respect-Worthiness and Dignity. Dialogue 51 (4):587-612.
    In this paper I consider the possibility that failing to fulfill the Kantian obligation to protect one’s rational nature might actually vitiate future instances of this obligation. I respond to this dilemma by defending a novel interpretation of Kant’s views on the relation between the value we have and the respect we are owed. I argue, contra the received view among Kant scholars, that the feature in virtue of which someone has unconditional and incomparable value is not the same feature (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Carol Hay (2011). The Obligation to Resist Oppression. Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (1):21-45.
    In this paper I argue that, in addition to having an obligation to resist the oppression of others, people have an obligation to themselves to resist their own oppression. This obligation to oneself, I argue, is grounded in a Kantian duty of self-respect.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Larry Herrera (2000). Kant on the Moral Triebfeder. Kant-Studien 91 (4):395-410.
  15. Thomas E. Hill (2000). Respect, Pluralism, and Justice: Kantian Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    Respect, Pluralism, and Justice is a series of essays which sketches a broadly Kantian framework for moral deliberation, and then uses it to address important social and political issues. Hill shows how Kantian theory can be developed to deal with questions about cultural diversity, punishment, political violence, responsibility for the consequences of wrongdoing, and state coercion in a pluralistic society.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Robert Johnson (1998). Love in Vain. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (S1):45-50.
    Kant famously argued in the Groundwork that our fundamental moral obligation is simply to respect the humanity in persons. However, his fuller view, found in the Metaphysic of Morals, is that the humanity in persons not only demands our respect, but also our love. Neither of these demands, of course, requires that we feel anything for others, and Kant is much more specific here about what constitutes respect between persons. But in elaborating this position he also claims that these demands (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Marguerite La Caze (2005). Love, That Indispensable Supplement: Irigaray and Kant on Love and Respect. Hypatia 20 (3):92-114.
    Is love essential to ethical life, or merely a supplement? In Kant's view, respect and love, as duties, are in tension with each other because love involves drawing closer and respect involves drawing away. By contrast, Irigaray says that love and respect do not conflict because love as passion must also involve distancing and we have a responsibility to love. I argue that love, understood as passion and based on respect, is essential to ethics.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Rudolf A. Makkreel (2002). Reflective Judgment and the Problem of Assessing Virtue in Kant. Journal of Value Inquiry 36 (2-3):205-220.
  19. Richard McCarty (1994). Motivation and Moral Choice in Kant's Theory of Rational Agency. Kant-Studien 85 (1):15-31.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Catriona McKinnon (2000). &Quot;the Kingdom of Ends as a Social Philosophy&Quot;: Review: Kneller & Axinn (Ed), Autonomy and Community: Readings in Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy. [REVIEW] Kantian Review 4:138-148.
  21. Melissa McBay Merritt (2012). The Moral Source of the Kantian Sublime. In Timothy Costelloe (ed.), The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present (pp. 37-49). Cambridge University Press.
    A crucial feature of Kant's critical-period writing on the sublime is its grounding in moral psychology. Whereas in the pre-critical writings, the sublime is viewed as an inherently exhausting state of mind, in the critical-period writings it is presented as one that gains strength the more it is sustained. I account for this in terms of Kantian moral psychology, and explain that, for Kant, sound moral disposition is conceived as a sublime state of mind.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Thaddeus Metz (2013). How God Could Assign Us a Purpose Without Disrespect: Reply to Salles. Quadranti - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Contemporanea 1 (1):99-112.
    In one of the most widely read texts on what makes a life meaningful, composed more than 50 years ago, Kurt Baier presents an intriguing argument against the view that meaning in life would come by fulfilling a purpose God has assigned us. Baier contends that God could not avoid degrading us were He to assign us a purpose, which would mean that God, as a morally ideal being by definition, would not do so. Defenders of God-centred accounts of meaning (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Michael Neumann (2000). Did Kant Respect Persons? Res Publica 6 (3):285-299.
    The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical terms within his second formulation of the categorical imperative, “[A]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”. When we realize that “humanity” means rational nature and “person” means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Andrews Reath (1989). Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility. Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination. Kant-Studien 80 (1-4):284-302.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Michael Ridge (2005). Why Must We Threat Humanity with Respect? Evaluating the Regress Argument. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):57-73.
    -- Immanuel Kant (Kant 1990, p. 46/429) The idea that our most basic duty is to treat each other with respect is one of the Enlightenment’s greatest legacies and Kant is often thought to be one of its most powerful defenders. If Kant’s project were successful then the lofty notion that humanity is always worthy of respect would be vindicated by pure practical reason. Further, this way of defending the ideal is supposed to reflect our autonomy, insofar as it is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Dieter Schönecker (2012). Once Again: What is the 'First Proposition'in Kant's Groundwork? Some Refinements, a New Proposal, and a Reply to Henry Allison. Kantian Review 17 (2):281-296.
    Discussing the concept of duty in Groundwork 1, Kant refers to a ‘second proposition’ and a ‘third proposition’, the latter being a ‘Folgerung aus beiden vorigen’. However, Kant does not identify what the ‘first proposition’ is. In this paper, I will argue that the first proposition is this: An action from duty is an action from respect for the moral law. I defend this claim against a critique put forward by Allison according to which ‘respect’ is a concept that is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Victor J. Seidler (1986). Kant, Respect and Injustice: The Limits of Liberal Moral Theory. Routledge & Kegan Paul.
    I INTRODUCTION: RESPECT, EQUALITY AND THE AUTONOMY OF MORALITY We often invoke a notion of respect to express our sense of human equality. ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Augustine Shutte (1981). Kant and Respect for Persons. Philosophical Papers 10 (1):1-8.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Jane Singleton (2007). Kant's Account of Respect: A Bridge Between Rationality and Anthropology. Kantian Review 12 (1):40-60.
  30. Andreas Teuber (1983). Kant's Respect for Persons. Political Theory 11 (3):369-392.
  31. Robert Theis (2005). Respect de la loi, respect de la personne: Kant. Revue Philosophique De Louvain 103 (3):331-346.
    This paper will attempt to reconstruct two Kantian approaches to the notion of 'respect': 1. respect in relation to the concept of law as well as respect for the law; 2. respect for the person. This reconstruction will be followed by an analysis of the significance of this twofold approach. The author will try to show that, in the end, it is through respect for the person that the necessity of, and hence respect for, the law is established. In other (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Krista K. Thomason (2013). Shame and Contempt in Kant's Moral Theory. Kantian Review 18 (2):221-240.
    Attitudes like shame and contempt seem to be at odds with basic tenets of Kantian moral theory. I argue on the contrary that both attitudes play a central role in Kantian morality. Shame and contempt are attitudes that protect our love of honour, or the esteem we have for ourselves as moral persons. The question arises: how are these attitudes compatible with Kant's claim that all persons deserve respect? I argue that the proper object of shame and contempt is not (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Mark Timmons & Robert Johnson (eds.) (forthcoming). Value, Reason, and Respect: Kantian Themes From the Philosophy of Thomas E. Hill, Jr. Oxford.
    The book features chapters by Bernard and Jan Boxill, Robin S. Dillon, Stephen Darwall, Mark Schroeder, Jonathan Dancy, Onora O’Neill, Gerald Gaus, Jeffrie G. Murphy, Matt Zwolinski and David Schmidtz, Cheshire Calhoun, Marcia Baron, Andrews Reath, and Julia Driver that take up themes and arguments in Tom Hill’s work in ethics, social, political and legal philosophy, as well as his work on Kant’s ethics. The volume concludes with an essay by Tom Hill in which he reflects on how he came (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Owen Ware (2014). Forgiveness and Respect for Persons. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (3).
    The concept of respect for persons is often rejected as a basis for understanding forgiveness. As many have argued, to hold your offender responsible for her actions is to respect her as a person; but this kind of respect is more likely to sustain, rather than dissolve, your resentment toward her (Garrard & McNaughton 2003; 2011; Allais 2008). I seek to defend an alternative view in this paper. To forgive, on my account, involves ceasing to identify your offender with her (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Owen Ware (2014). Kant on Moral Sensibility and Moral Motivation. Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (4):727-746.
    Despite Kant’s lasting influence on philosophical accounts of moral motivation, many details of his own position remain elusive. In the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant argues that our recognition of the moral law’s authority must elicit both painful and pleasurable feelings in us. On reflection, however, it is unclear how these effects could motivate us to act from duty. As a result, Kant’s theory of moral sensibility comes under a skeptical threat: the possibility of a morally motivating feeling (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. G. Weiler (1989). Review: Seidler, Kant, Respect and Injustice: The Limits of Liberal Moral Theory. [REVIEW] Philosophy of the Social Sciences 19 (3):377-379.