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  1. Lilian Alweiss (2005). Is There an ‘End’ to Philosophical Scepticism? Philosophy 80 (3):395-411.
    P F Strawson advocates a descriptive metaphysics. Contrary to Kant, he believes that metaphysics should be ‘content to describe the actual structure of thought about the world’, there is no need of postulating a world that lies beyond our grasp. We neither need to refute nor accept scepticism since we can ignore it with good reasons. Yet this paper argues that Strawson fails to provide us with good reasons. He fails to realise that one cannot do metaphysics by construing its (...)
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  2. Abraham Anderson (1998). On the Practical Foundation of Kant's Response to Epistemic Skepticism. Kant-Studien 89 (2):145-166.
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  3. Gary Banham, Kant's Refutations of Idealism.
  4. Gary Banham (2010). Scepticism, Causation and Cognition. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):507-520.
  5. Adrian Bardon (2004). Kant's Empiricism in His Refutation of Idealism. Kantian Review 8 (1):62-88.
    In the preface to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant laments thatit still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the existence of things outside us … must be accepted on faith, and if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof. The two editions of the Critique each contain a celebrated refutation of epistemological scepticisms like those of Descartes and Hume. (...)
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  6. Nathan Bauer (2010). Kant's Subjective Deduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
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  7. Anthony Brueckner (2008). Review: Forster, Michael N., Kant and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7).
  8. G. Anthony Bruno (2015). Epistemic Reciprocity in Schelling's Late Return to Kant. In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Rethinking Kant (volume 4). Cambridge Scholars Publishing
    In his 1841-2 Berlin lectures, Schelling critiques German idealism’s negative method of regressing from existence to its first principle, which is supposed to be intelligible without remainder. He sees existence as precisely its remainder since there could be nothing that exists. To solve this, Schelling enlists the positive method of progressing from the fact of existence to a proof of this principle’s reality. Since this proof faces the absurdity that there is anything rather than nothing, he concludes that this fact’s (...)
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  9. John J. Callanan (2013). Kant on Nativism, Scepticism and Necessity. Kantian Review 18 (1):1-27.
    Kant criticizes the so-called hypothesis at the end of the B-Deduction on the ground that it entails scepticism. I examine the historical context of Kant's criticism, and identify the targets as both Crusius and Leibniz. There are two claims argued for in this paper: first, that attending to the context of the opposition to certain forms of nativism affords a way of understanding Kant's commitment to the so-called, by contrasting the possession conditions for the categories with those for innate ideas; (...)
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  10. John J. Callanan (2006). Kant's Transcendental Strategy. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):360–381.
    The interpretation of transcendental arguments remains a contentious issue for contemporary epistemology. It is usually agreed that they originated in Kant's theoretical philosophy and were intended to have some kind of anti-sceptical efficacy. I argue that the sceptic with whom Kant was concerned has been consistently misidentified. The actual sceptic was Hume, questioning whether the faculty of reason can justify any of our judgements whatsoever. His challenge is a sceptical argument regarding rule-following which engenders a vicious regress. Once this sceptical (...)
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  11. H. G. Callaway (ed.) (2003). W.V. Quine, Immanuel Kant Lectures, translated and introduced by H.G. Callaway. Frommann-Holzboog.
    This book is a translation of W.V. Quine's Kant Lectures, given as a series at Stanford University in 1980. It provide a short and useful summary of Quine's philosophy. There are four lectures altogether: I. Prolegomena: Mind and its Place in Nature; II. Endolegomena: From Ostension to Quantification; III. Endolegomena loipa: The forked animal; and IV. Epilegomena: What's It all About? The Kant Lectures have been published to date only in Italian and German translation. The present book is filled out (...)
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  12. Luigi Caranti (2004). Kant E Lo Scetticismo. Marco.
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  13. Luigi Caranti (2004). The Problem of Idealism in Kants Pre-Critical Period. Kant-Studien 95 (3):283-303.
  14. Luigi Caranti (2003). Review: Heidemann, Kant Und Das Problem des Metaphysischen Idealismus. [REVIEW] American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (2):299-302.
  15. Quassim Cassam (1993). Inner Sense, Body Sense, and Kant's "Refutation of Idealism". European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):111-127.
  16. Brian Chance (2014). Kant and the Discipline of Reason. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):87-110.
    Kant's notion of ‘discipline’ has received considerable attention from scholars of his philosophy of education, but its role in his theoretical philosophy has been largely ignored. This omission is surprising since his discussion of discipline in the first Critique is not only more extensive and expansive in scope than his other discussions but also predates them. The goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive reading of the Discipline that emphasizes its systematic importance in the first Critique. I argue (...)
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  17. Andrew Chignell (2011). Causal Refutations of Idealism Revisited. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):184-186.
    Causal refutations of external-world scepticism start from our ability to make justified judgements about the order of our own experiences, and end with the claim that there must be perceptible external objects, some of whose states can be causally correlated with that order. In a recent paper, I made a series of objections to this broadly Kantian anti-sceptical strategy. Georges Dicker has provided substantive replies on behalf of a version of the causal refutation of idealism. Here I offer a few (...)
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  18. Andrew Chignell (2010). Causal Refutations of Idealism. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):487-507.
    In the ‘Refutation of Idealism’ chapter of the first Critique, Kant argues that the conditions required for having certain kinds of mental episodes are sufficient to guarantee that there are ‘objects in space’ outside us. A perennially influential way of reading this compressed argument is as a kind of causal inference: in order for us to make justified judgements about the order of our inner states, those states must be caused by the successive states of objects in space outside us. (...)
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  19. Andrew Chignell & Colin McLear (2010). Three Skeptics and the Critique: Review of Michael Forster's Kant and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Books 51 (4):228-244.
    A long critical notice of Michael Forster's recent book, "Kant and Skepticism." We argue that Forster's characterization of Kant's response to skepticism is both textually dubious and philosophically flawed. -/- .
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  20. James Conant & Andrea Kern (2014). Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell. De Gruyter.
  21. Georges Dicker (2010). Review: Forster, Kant and Skepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):609-615.
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  22. Corey W. Dyck (2009). Review: Guyer, Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Social Criticism 35 (5):613-619.
  23. Santiago Echeverri (2004). La filosofía trascendental de Kant y el argumento de la ilusión. Pensamiento 60 (227):247-277.
  24. Dina Edmundts (2010). The Refutation of Idealism and the Distinction Between Phenomena and Noumena. In Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press
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  25. Stephen Engstrom (1994). The Transcendental Deduction and Skepticism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (3):359-380.
    The common assumption that the Transcendental Deduction aims to refute scepticism often leads interpreters to conclude that it fails and even that Kant is confused about what it is supposed to achieve. By examining what Kant himself says concerning the Deductions' relation to scepticism, this article seeks to determine what sort of scepticism he has in view and how he responds to it. It concludes that the Deduction aims neither to refute Cartesian, outer- world scepticism nor to refute Humean, empiricist (...)
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  26. Lorne Falkenstein (1998). Hume's Answer to Kant. Noûs 32 (3):331-360.
  27. Vanderlei de Oliveira Farias (2006). Kants Realismus Und der Aussenweltskeptizismus. G. Olms.
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  28. Elena Ficara (ed.) (2012). Skeptizismus Und Philosophie: Kant, Fichte, Hegel. Editions Rodopi.
    Content: Elena Ficara: Einleitung Marco Ivaldo: Skeptizismus bei Fichte mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rolle des Zweifels in der »Bestimmung des Menschen« Angelica Nuzzo: A Question of Method: Transcendental Philosophy, Dialectic, and the Problem of Determination Rainer Schäfer: Kombinationen von Fundamentalismus, Kohärentismus und Skepsis bei Kant, Fichte und Hegel als Antworten auf Probleme gegenwärtiger Epistemologie Elena Ficara: Skeptizismus und die Begründung der Philosophie bei Kant und Hegel Lidia Gasperoni: Maimon und der Skeptizismus Jürgen Stahl: Skeptizismus und Kritik – zur Wandlung der (...)
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  29. Michael N. Forster, Hegelian Vs. Kantian Interpretations of Pyrrhonism: Revolution or Reaction?
    This paper concerns a surprisingly sharp disagreement about the nature of ancient Pyrrhonism which first emerges clearly in Kant and Hegel, but which continues in contemporary interpretations. The paper begins by explaining the character of this disagreement, then attempts to adjudicate it in the light of the ancient texts.
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  30. Michael N. Forster (2009). Kant and Skepticism. Princeton University Press.
    This book puts forward a much-needed reappraisal of Immanuel Kant's conception of and response to skepticism, as set forth principally in the Critique of Pure Reason.
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  31. Paul Franks (2014). Skepticism After Kant. In Andrea Kern & James Conant (eds.), Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell. De Gruyter 17-58.
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  32. Paul Franks (1999). Transcendental Arguments, Reason, and Skepticism: Contemporary Debates and the Origins of Post-Kantianism. In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford University Press 111--145.
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  33. Craig French (2009). Review: Forster, Kant and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Heythrop Journal 50 (2):334-335.
  34. Jonathan Friday (2005). Dugald Stewart on Reid, Kant and the Refutation of Idealism. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (2):263 – 286.
  35. Michael Friedman (2006). Kant, Skepticism, and Idealism. Inquiry 49 (1):26 – 43.
    Skeptical problems arising for Kant's version of transcendental idealism have been raised from Kant's own time to the present day. By focussing on how such problems originally arose in the wake of Kant's work, and on the first formulations of absolute idealism by Schelling, I argue that the skeptical problems in question ultimately depend on fundamental features of Kant's philosophy of natural science. As a result, Naturphilosophie and the organic conception of nature cannot easily be separated from the deep and (...)
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  36. Don Garrett (2008). Should Hume Have Been a Transcendental Idealist? In Daniel Garber & Béatrice Longuenesse (eds.), Kant and the Early Moderns. Princeton University Press 193--208.
  37. A. C. Genova (2008). Transcendentally Speaking. Kant-Studien 99 (1):13-29.
  38. Nathaniel Goldberg & Matthew Rellihan (2008). Incommensurability, Relativism, Scepticism: Reflections on Acquiring a Concept. Ratio 21 (2):147–167.
    Some opponents of the incommensurability thesis, such as Davidson and Rorty, have argued that the very idea of incommensurability is incoherent and that the existence of alternative and incommensurable conceptual schemes is a conceptual impossibility. If true, this refutes Kuhnian relativism and Kantian scepticism in one fell swoop. For Kuhnian relativism depends on the possibility of alternative, humanly accessible conceptual schemes that are incommensurable with one another, and the Kantian notion of a realm of unknowable things-in-themselves gives rise to the (...)
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  39. P. Guyer (2009). Kant and Skepticism. Philosophical Review 118 (3):384-389.
  40. P. Guyer (2003). Kant on Common Sense and Scepticism. Kantian Review 7 (1):1-37.
    Is the refutation of scepticism a central objective for Kant? Some commentators have denied that the refutation of either theoretical or moral scepticism was central to Kant's concerns. Thus, in his recent book Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Karl Ameriks rejects 'taking Kant to be basically a respondent to the skeptic'. According to Ameriks, who here has Kant's theoretical philosophy in mind,What Kant goes on to propose is that, instead of focusing on trying to establish with certainty – against (...)
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  41. Paul Guyer (2009). CHAPTER 1: Common Sense and the Varieties of Skepticism. In Knowledge, Reason, and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume. Princeton University Press 23-70.
  42. Paul Guyer (1987). The Failure of the B-Deduction. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (S1):67-84.
  43. Andy Hamilton (2010). Review: Guyer, Knowledge, Reason and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):737-739.
  44. Robert Hanna (2012). The Kantian's Revenge: On Forster's Kant and Skepticism. Kantian Review 17 (1):33-45.
  45. Robert Hanna (2011). Review: Forster, Michael, Kant and Skepticism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):635-637.
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  46. Robert Hanna (2000). The Inner and the Outer: Kant's 'Refutation' Reconstructed. Ratio 13 (2):146–174.
  47. Katie Harrington (2010). Review: Caranti, Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (1):168-171.
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  48. Charles Hartshorne (1968). Kant's Refutation Still Not Convincing. The Monist 52 (2):312-316.
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  49. Tsung-Hsing Ho (2013). Kant and McDowell on Skepticism and Disjunctivism. In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltburgerlicher Absicht: Akten Des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter 761-770.
    This paper is to propose a new form of Kant’s anti-skepticism argument in light of John McDowell’s works on disjunctivism. I first discuss recent debates between McDowell and Crispin Wright on disjunctivism. I argue that Wright wrongly downplays McDowell’s disjunctivism, whose metaphysical claim that our perceptual faculties directly engage in the world has an epistemological implication that should be able to dismiss the skeptic’s imagery as fictitious. However, McDowell does not clearly offer such an argument. I will show that we (...)
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  50. John Hooker (1979). A Refutation of Idealism. Kant-Studien 70 (1-4):197-205.
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